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

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ERRATA.

Page 103, fifth line from bottom, for "reassuring" read "reasoning."
Page 104, ninth line from top, for "predicts" read "protests."
Page 105, fourth line from top, for "burly" read "truly;" sixth line from top, for "menage" read "message."
Page 107, fifth line from top, for "puny" read "fussy."
Page 297, seventh line from bottom, for "supersedes" read "supersede."
Page 304, sixth line from bottom, for "compound" read "confound."
Page 306, sixteenth line from bottom, for "rational" read "national."
Page 315, bottom line, for "is" read "in."

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

OCTOBER, 1895.

IS LIFE WORTH LIVING?*

WHEN Mr. Mallock's book with this title appeared some fifteen years ago, the jocose answer that "it depends on the *liver*" had great currency in the newspapers. The answer that I propose to give to-day cannot be jocose. In the words of one of Shakespeare's prologues, "I come no more to make you laugh; things now that bear a weighty and a serious brow, sad, high, and working, full of state and woe," must be my theme. In the deepest heart of all of us there is a corner in which the ultimate mystery of things works sadly, and I know not what such an Association as yours intends nor what you ask of those whom you invite to address you, unless it be to lead you from the surface-glamour of existence and for an hour at least to make you heedless to the buzzing and jigging and vibration of small interests and excitements that form the tissue of our ordinary consciousness. Without further explanation or apology, then, I ask you to join me in turning an attention, commonly too unwilling, to the profounder bass-note of life. Let us search the lonely depths for an hour together and see what answers in the last folds and recesses of things our question may find.

* An Address to the Young Men's Christian Association of Harvard University, May, 1895.—Afterwards read at the Philadelphia Ethical Society and at the Plymouth School of Applied Ethics.

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I.

With many men the question of life's worth is answered by a temperamental optimism that makes them incapable of believing that anything seriously evil can exist. Our dear old Walt Whitman's works are the standing text-book of this kind of optimism: the mere joy of living is so immense in Walt Whitman's veins that it abolishes the possibility of any other kind of feeling.

"To breathe the air, how delicious!
To speak, to walk, to seize something by the hand! . . .
To be this incredible God I am! . . .
O amazement of things, even the least particle!
O spirituality of things! . . .
I too carol the Sun, or at noon, or as now setting,
I, too, throb to the brain and beauty of the earth, and of all the growths of the earth. . . .
I sing the equalities, modern or old;
I sing the endless finales of things;
I say Nature continues—Glory continues;
I praise with electric voice;
For I do not see one imperfection in the Universe,
And I do not see one cause or result lamentable at last."

So Rousseau, writing of the nine years he spent at Annecy, with nothing but his happiness to tell:

"How tell what was neither said nor done nor even thought, but tasted only and felt, with no object of my felicity but the emotion of felicity itself. I rose with the sun and I was happy; I went to walk and I was happy; I saw 'Maman' and I was happy; I left her and I was happy. I rambled through the woods and over the vine-slopes, I wandered in the valleys, I read, I lounged, I worked in the garden, I gathered the fruits, I helped at the indoor work, and happiness followed me everywhere: it was in no one assignable thing; it was all within myself; it could not leave me for a single instant."

If moods like this could be made permanent and constitutions like these universal, there would never be any occasion for such discourses as the present one. No philosopher would seek to prove articulately that life is worth living, for the fact that it absolutely is so would vouch for itself, and the problem disappear in the vanishing of the question rather than in the coming of anything like a reply. But we are not magicians

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to make the optimistic temperament universal; and alongside of the deliverances of temperamental optimism concerning life, those of temperamental pessimism always exist and oppose to them a standing refutation. In what is called circular insanity phases of melancholy succeed phases of mania, with no outward cause that we can discover, and often enough to one and the same well person life will offer incarnate radiance to-day and incarnate dreariness to-morrow, according to the fluctuations of what the older medical books used to call the concoction of the humors. In the words of the newspaper joke, "it depends on the liver." Rousseau's ill-balanced constitution undergoes a change, and behold him in his latter evil days a prey to melancholy and black delusions of suspicion and fear. And some men seem launched upon the world even from their birth with souls as incapable of happiness as Walt Whitman's soul was of gloom, and they have left us their messages in even more lasting verse than his—the exquisite Leopardi, for example, or our own contemporary, James Thomson, in that pathetic book, "The City of Dreadful Night," which I think is less well-known than it should be for its literary beauty, simply because men are afraid to quote its words—they are so gloomy and at the same time so sincere. In one place Thomson describes a congregation gathered to listen to a preacher in a great unillumined cathedral at night. The sermon is too long to quote, but it ends thus:

> "O Brothers of sad lives! they are so brief;
> A few short years must bring us all relief:
> Can we not bear these years of laboring breath?
> But if you would not this poor life fulfil,
> Lo, you are free to end it when you will,
> Without the fear of waking after death.—
>
> The organ-like vibrations of his voice
> Thrilled through the vaulted aisles and died away;
> The yearning of the tones which bade rejoice
> Was sad and tender as a requiem lay:
> Our shadowy congregation rested still
> As brooding on that 'End it when you will.'

* * * * * * * * * *

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Our shadowy congregation rested still,
As musing on that message we had heard
And brooding on that 'End it when you will;'
Perchance awaiting yet some other word;
When keen as lightning through a muffled sky
Sprang forth a shrill and lamentable cry:—

The man speaks sooth, alas! the man speaks sooth
We have no personal life beyond the grave;
There is no God; Fate knows nor wrath nor ruth:
Can I find here the comfort which I crave?

In all eternity I had one chance,
One few years' term of gracious human life:
The splendors of the intellect's advance,
The sweetness of the home with babes and wife;

The social pleasures with their genial wit;
The fascination of the worlds of art;
The glories of the worlds of nature, lit
By large imagination's glowing heart;

The rapture of mere being, full of health;
The careless childhood and the ardent youth,
The strenuous manhood winning various wealth,
The reverend age serene with life's long truth:

All the sublime prerogatives of Man;
The storied memories of the times of old,
The patient tracking of the world's great plan
Through sequences and changes myriadfold.

This chance was never offered me before;
For me the infinite past is blank and dumb:
This chance recurreth never, nevermore;
Blank, blank for me the infinite To-come.

And this sole chance was frustate from my birth,
A mockery, a delusion; and my breath
Of noble human life upon this earth
So racks me that I sigh for senseless death.

My wine of life is poison mixed with gall,
My noonday passes in a nightmare dream,
I worse than lose the years which are my all:
What can console me for the loss supreme?

Speak not of comfort where no comfort is,
Speak not at all: can words make foul things fair?
Our life's a cheat, our death a black abyss:
Hush and be mute envisaging despair.—

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This vehement voice came from the northern aisle
  Rapid and shrill to its abrupt harsh close;
And none gave answer for a certain while,
  For words must shrink from these most wordless woes;
At last the pulpit speaker simply said,
With humid eyes and thoughtful, drooping head,—

My Brother, my poor Brothers, it is thus;
This life itself holds nothing good for us,
  But it ends soon and nevermore can be;
And we knew nothing of it ere our birth,
And shall know nothing when consigned to earth:
  I ponder these thoughts and they comfort me."

"It ends soon and nevermore shall be. . . . Lo! you are free to end it when you will"—these verses flow truthfully from poor James Thomson's pen, and are in truth a consolation for all to whom, as to him, the earth is far more like a steady den of fear than a continual fountain of delight. That life is *not* worth living the whole army of suicides declare—an army whose roll-call, like the famous evening drum-beat of the British army, follows the sun round the world and never terminates. We, too, as we sit here in our comfort, must "ponder these things" also, for we are of one substance with these suicides, and their life is the life we share. The plainest intellectual integrity, nay, more, the simplest manliness and honor, forbid us to forget their case.

"If suddenly," says Mr. Ruskin, "in the midst of the enjoyments of the palate and lightnesses of heart of a London dinner-party the walls of the chamber were parted, and through their gap the nearest human beings who were famishing and in misery were borne into the midst of the company feasting and fancy free—if, pale from death, horrible in destitution, broken by despair, body by body, they were laid upon the soft carpet, one beside the chair of every guest, would only the crumbs of the dainties be cast to them—would only a passing glance, a passing thought, be vouchsafed to them? Yet the actual facts, the real relation of each Dives and Lazarus, are not altered by the intervention of the house-wall between the table and the sick-bed—by the few feet of ground (how few!) which are, indeed, all that separate the merriment from the misery."

II.

To come immediately to the heart of my theme, then, what I propose is to imagine ourselves reasoning with a fellow-mortal who is on such terms with life that the only comfort

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left him is to brood on the assurance "you may end it when you will." What reasons can we plead that may render such a brother (or sister) willing to take up the burden again? Ordinary Christians, reasoning with would-be suicides, have little to offer them beyond the usual negative "thou shalt not." God alone is master of life and death, they say, and it is a blasphemous act to anticipate his absolving hand. But can we find nothing richer or more positive than this, no reflections to urge whereby the suicide may actually see, and in all sad seriousness feel, that in spite of adverse appearances even for him life is worth living still? There are suicides and suicides—in the United States about three thousand of them every year—and I must frankly confess that with perhaps the majority of these my suggestions are impotent to deal. Where suicide is the result of insanity or sudden frenzied impulse, reflection is impotent to arrest its headway, and cases like these belong to the ultimate mystery of evil concerning which I can only offer considerations tending towards religious patience at the end of this hour. My task, let me say now, is practically narrow, and my words are to deal only with that metaphysical *tedium vitæ* which is peculiar to reflecting men. Most of you are devoted for good or evil to the reflective life. Many of you are students of philosophy, and have already felt in your own persons the scepticism and unreality that too much grubbing in the abstract roots of things will breed. This is, indeed, one of the regular fruits of the over-studious career. Too much questioning and too little active responsibility lead, almost as often as too much sensualism, to the edge of the slope at the bottom of which lie pessimism and the nightmare or suicidal view of life. But to the diseases which reflection breeds, still further reflection can oppose effective remedies; and it is of the melancholy and *Weltschmerz* bred of reflection that I now proceed to speak.

Let me say immediately that my final appeal is to nothing more recondite than religious faith. So far as my argument is to be destructive, it will consist in nothing more than the sweeping away of certain views that often keep the springs of religious faith compressed; and so far as it is to be constructive

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it will consist in holding up to the light of day certain considerations calculated to let loose these springs in a normal, natural way. Pessimism is essentially a religious disease. In the form of it to which you are most liable it consists in nothing but a religious demand to which there comes no normal religious reply.

Now there are two stages of recovery from this disease, two different levels upon which one may emerge from the midnight view to the daylight view of things, and I must treat of them in turn. The second stage is the more complete and joyous, and it corresponds to the freer exercise of religious trust and fancy. There are, as is well known, persons who are naturally very free in this regard, others who are not at all so. There are persons, for instance, whom we find indulging to their heart's content in prospects of immortality, and there are others who experience the greatest difficulty in making such a notion seem real to themselves at all. These latter persons are tied to their senses, restricted to their natural experience; and many of them moreover feel a sort of intellectual loyalty to what they call hard facts which is positively shocked by the easy excursions into the unseen that they witness other people make at the bare call of sentiment. Minds of either class may, however, be intensely religious. They may equally desire atonement, harmony, reconciliation; and crave acquiescence and communion with the total Soul of Things. But the craving, when the mind is pent in to the hard facts, especially as "Science" now reveals them, can breed pessimism quite as easily as it breeds optimism when it inspires religious trust and fancy to wing their way to another and a better world.

This is why I call pessimism an essentially religious disease. The nightmare view of life has plenty of *organic* sources, but its great *reflective* source in these days, and at all times, has been the contradiction between the phenomena of Nature and the craving of the heart to believe that behind Nature there is a spirit whose expression Nature is. What philosophers call natural theology has been one way of appeasing this craving. The poetry of Nature in which our English literature

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is so rich has been another way. Now suppose a mind of the latter of our two classes, whose imagination is pent in consequently, and who takes its facts "hard;" suppose it, moreover, to feel strongly the craving for communion, and yet to realize how desperately difficult it is to construe the scientific order of Nature either theologically or poetically, and what result *can* there be but inner discord and contradiction? Now this inner discord (merely as discord) can be relieved in either of two ways. The longing to read the facts religiously may cease, and leave the bare facts by themselves. Or supplementary facts may be discovered or believed in, which permit the religious reading to go on. And these two ways of relief are the two stages of recovery, the two levels of escape from pessimism, to which I made allusion a moment ago, and which what follows will, I trust, make more clear.

III.

Starting then with Nature, we naturally tend, if we have the religious craving, to say with Marcus Aurelius, O Universe, what thou wishest I wish. Our sacred books and traditions tell us of one God who made heaven and earth, and looking on them saw that they were good. Yet, on more intimate acquaintance, the visible surfaces of heaven and earth refuse to be brought by us into any intelligible unity at all. Every phenomena that we would praise there exists cheek by jowl with some contrary phenomenon that cancels all its religious effect upon the mind. Beauty and hideousness, love and cruelty, life and death keep house together in indissoluble partnership; and there gradually steals over us, instead of the old warm notion of a man-loving Deity, that of an awful Power that neither hates nor loves, but rolls all things together meaninglessly to a common doom. This is an uncanny, a sinister, a nightmare view of life, and its peculiar *unheimlichkeit* or poisonousness lies expressly in our holding two things together which cannot possibly agree,—in our clinging on the one hand to the demand that there shall be a living spirit of the whole, and, on the other, to the belief that the course of nature must be such a spirit's adequate manifestation and ex-

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pression. It is in the contradiction between the supposed *being* of a spirit that encompasses and owns us and with which we ought to have some communion, and the character of such a spirit, as revealed by the visible world's course, that this particular death-in-life paradox and this melancholy-breeding puzzle reside. Carlyle expresses the result in that chapter of his immortal Sartor Resartus entitled the Everlasting No. "I ended," says poor Teufelsdröckh, "by living in a continual indefinite pining fear; tremulous, pusillanimous, apprehensive of I knew not what. It seemed as if all things in the Heavens above and the Earth beneath would hurt me; as if the Heavens and the Earth were but boundless Jaws of a devouring Monster, wherein I, palpitating, lay waiting to be devoured."

This is the first stage of speculative melancholy. No brute can have this sort of melancholy, no man that is irreligious can become its prey. It is the sick shudder of the frustrated religious demand, and not the mere necessary outcome of animal experience. Teufelsdröckh himself could have made shift to face the general chaos and bedevilment of this world's experiences very well were he not the victim of an originally unlimited trust and affection towards them. If he might meet them piecemeal, with no suspicion of any Whole expressing itself in them, shunning the bitter parts and husbanding the sweet ones, as the occasion served, and as (to use a vulgar phrase) he struck it fat or lean, he could have zigzagged fairly towards an easy end, and felt no obligation to make the air vocal with his lamentations. The mood of levity, of "I don't care," is for this world's ills a sovereign and practical anæsthetic. But no! something deep down in Teufelsdröckh and in the rest of us tells us that there *is* a spirit in things to which we owe allegiance and for whose sake we must keep up the serious mood, and so the inner fever and discord also are kept up—for Nature taken on her visible surface reveals no such spirit, and beyond the facts of Nature we are at the present stage of our inquiry not supposing ourselves to look.

Now, I do not hesitate frankly and sincerely to confess to you that this real and genuine discord seems to me to proclaim the inevitable bankruptcy of natural religion naïvely and

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simply taken. There were times when Leibnitzes with their heads buried in monstrous wigs could compose Theodicies, and when stall-fed officials of an established church could prove by the valves in the heart and the round ligament of the hip-joint the existence of a "Moral and Intelligent Contriver of the World." But those times are past, and we of the nineteenth century, with our evolutionary theories and our mechanical philosophies, already know nature too impartially and too well to worship unreservedly any god of whose character she can be an adequate expression. Truly all we know of good and beauty proceeds from nature, but none the less so all we know of evil. Visible nature is all plasticity and indifference, a multiverse, as one might call it, and not a universe. To such a harlot we owe no moral allegiance; with her as a whole we can establish no sentimental communion; and we are free in our dealings with her several parts to obey or destroy, and to follow no law but that of prudence in coming to terms with such of her particular features as will help us to our private ends. If there be a divine spirit of the universe, nature, such as we know her, cannot possibly be its *ultimate word* to man. Either there is no spirit revealed in nature, or else it is inadequately revealed there; and (as all the higher religions have assumed) what we call visible nature or this world must be but a veil and surface-show whose full meaning resides in a supplementary unseen or *other* world.

I cannot help, therefore, accounting it on the whole a gain (though it may seem for certain poetic constitutions a very sad loss) that the naturalistic superstition, the worship of the God of nature simply taken as such, should have begun to loosen its hold upon the educated mind. In fact, if I am to express my personal opinion unreservedly, I should say (in spite of its sounding blasphemous at first to certain ears) that the initial step towards getting into healthy ultimate relations with the universe is the act of rebellion against the idea that such a God exists. Such rebellion essentially is that which in the chapter quoted a while ago Carlyle goes on to describe:

"Wherefore, like a coward, dost thou forever pip and whimper, and go cowering and trembling? Despicable biped! . . . Hast thou not a heart? Canst thou

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not suffer whatso it be, and as a Child of Freedom, though outcast, trample Tophet itself under thy feet, while it consumes thee? Let it come then; I will meet it and defy it! And as I so thought there rushed like a stream of fire over my whole soul; and I shook base Fear away from me forever. . . . Thus had the Everlasting No pealed authoritatively through all the recesses of my being, of my ME; and then it was that my whole ME stood up, in native God-created majesty, and recorded its protest. Such a protest, the most important transaction in Life, may that same indignation and defiance, in a psychological point of view, be fitly called. The Everlasting No had said: 'Behold, thou art fatherless, outcast, and the Universe is mine' . . . to which my whole Me now made answer: 'I am not thine, but Free, and forever hate thee!'" "From that hour," Teufelsdröckh-Carlyle adds, "I began to be a Man."

And our friend, poor James Thomson, similarly writes:

"Who is most wretched in this dolorous place?
I think myself; yet I would rather be
My miserable self than He, than He
Who formed such creatures to His own disgrace.

The vilest thing must be less vile than Thou
From whom it had its being, God and Lord!
Creator of all woe and sin! abhorred,
Malignant and implacable! I vow

That not for all Thy power furled and unfurled,
For all the temples to Thy glory built,
Would I assume the ignominious guilt
Of having made such men in such a world."

We are familiar enough in this community with the spectacle of persons exulting in their emancipation from belief in the God of their ancestral Calvinism, him who made the garden and the serpent and pre-appointed the eternal fires of hell. Some of them have found humaner Gods to worship, others are simply converts from all theology; but both alike they assure us that to have got rid of the sophistication of thinking they could feel any reverence or duty towards that impossible idol gave a tremendous happiness to their souls. Now, the idol of a worshipful spirit of Nature also leads to sophistication; and in souls that are religious and would also be scientific, the sophistication breeds a philosophical melancholy from which the first natural step of escape is the denial of the idol; and with the downfall of the idol, whatever lack of positive joyousness may remain, there comes also the downfall of the

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whimpering and cowering mood. With evil simply taken as such, men can make short work, for their relations with it then are only practical. It looms up no longer so spectrally, it loses all its haunting and perplexing significance as soon as the mind attacks the instances of it singly and ceases to worry about their derivation from the "one and only" Power.

Here, then, on this stage of mere emancipation from monistic superstition, the would-be suicide may already get encouraging answers to his question about the worth of life. There are in most men instinctive springs of vitality that respond healthily when the burden of metaphysical and infinite responsibility rolls off. The certainty that you now *may* step out of life whenever you please, and that to do so is not blasphemous or monstrous, is itself an immense relief. The thought of suicide is now no longer a guilty challenge and obsession. "This little life is all we must endure; the grave's most holy peace is ever sure," says Thomson; adding, "I ponder these thoughts, and they comfort me." Meanwhile we can always stand it for twenty-four hours longer, if only to see what to-morrow's newspaper will contain or what the next postman will bring. But far deeper forces than this mere vital curiosity are arousable, even in the pessimistically-tending mind; for where the loving and admiring impulses are dead, the hating and fighting impulses will still respond to fit appeals. This evil which we feel so deeply is something which we can also help to overthrow, for its sources, now that no "Substance" or "Spirit" is behind them, are finite, and we can deal with each of them in turn. It is, indeed, a remarkable fact that sufferings and hardships do not, as a rule, abate the love of life; they seem, on the contrary, usually to give it a keener zest. The sovereign source of melancholy is repletion. Need and struggle are what excite and inspire us; our hour of triumph is what brings the void. Not the Jews of the captivity, but those of the days of Solomon's glory are those from whom the pessimistic utterances in our Bibles come. Germany, when she lay trampled beneath the hoofs of Bonaparte's troopers, produced perhaps the most optimistic and idealistic literature that the world has seen; and not till the French "milliards" were

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distributed after 1871 did pessimism overrun the country in the shape in which we see it there to-day. The history of our own race is one long commentary on the cheerfulness that comes with fighting ills. Or take the Waldenses, of whom I lately have been reading, as examples of what strong men will endure. In 1485, a papal bull of Innocent VIII. enjoined their extermination. It absolved those who should take up the cross against them from all ecclesiastical pains and penalties, released them from any oath, legitimized their title to all property which they might have illegally acquired, and promised remission of sins to all who should kill the heretics.

"There is no town in Piedmont," says a Vaudois writer, "where some of our brethren have not been put to death. Jordan Terbano was burnt alive at Susa; Hippolite Rossiero at Turin; Michael Goneto, an octogenarian, at Sarcena; Villermin Ambrosio hanged on the Col di Meano; Hugo Chiambs, of Fenestrelle, had his entrails torn from his living body at Turin; Peter Geymarali of Bobbio in like manner had his entrails taken out in Luzerne, and a fierce cat thrust in their place to torture him further; Maria Romano was buried alive at Rocca Patia; Magdalena Fauno underwent the same fate at San Giovanni; Susanna Michelini was bound hand and foot and left to perish of cold and hunger on the snow at Sarcena; Bartolomeo Fache, gashed with sabres, had the wounds filled up with quicklime, and perished thus in agony at Fenile; Daniel Michelini had his tongue torn out at Bobbo for having praised God; James Baridari perished covered with sulphurous matches which had been forced into his flesh under the nails, between the fingers, in the nostrils, in the lips, and all over the body and then lighted; Daniel Rovelli had his mouth filled with gunpowder which, being lighted, blew his head to pieces; . . . Sara Rostignol was slit open from the legs to the bosom, and left so to perish on the road between Eyral and Luzerna; Anna Charbonnier was impaled, and carried thus on a pike from San Giovanni to La Torre."

Und dergleichen mehr! In 1630, the plague swept away one-half the Vaudois population, including fifteen of their seventeen pastors. The places of these were supplied from Geneva and Dauphiny, and the whole Vaudois people learned French in order to follow their services. More than once their number fell by unremitting persecution from the normal standard of twenty-five thousand to about four thousand. In 1686, the Duke of Savoy ordered the three thousand that remained to give up their faith or leave the country. Refusing, they fought the French and Piedmontese armies till only eighty of their fighting men remained alive or uncaptured,

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when they gave up and were sent in a body to Switzerland. But in 1689, encouraged by William of Orange and led by one of their pastor-captains, between eight hundred and nine hundred of them returned to capture their old homes again. They fought their way to Bobi, reduced to four hundred men in the first half year, and met every force sent against them until at last the Duke of Savoy, giving up his alliance with that abomination of desolation, Louis XIV., restored them to comparative freedom. Since which time they have increased and multiplied in their barren Alpine valleys to this day.

What are our woes and sufferance compared with these? Does not the recital of such a fight so obstinately waged against such odds fill us with resolution against *our* petty powers of darkness, machine politicians, spoilsmen, and the rest? Life is worth living, no matter what it bring, if only such combats may be carried to successful terminations and one's heel set on the tyrant's throat. To the suicide, then, in his supposed world of multifarious and immoral Nature, you can appeal, and appeal in the name of the very evils that make his heart sick there, to wait and see *his* part of the battle out. And the consent to live on, which you ask of him under these circumstances, is not the sophistical "resignation" which devotees of cowering religions preach. It is not resignation in the sense of licking a despotic deity's hand. It is, on the contrary, a resignation based on manliness and pride. So long as your would-be suicide leaves an evil of *his own* unremedied, so long he has strictly *no concern* with evil in the abstract and at large. The submission which you demand of yourself to the general fact of evil in the world, your apparent acquiescence in it, is here nothing but the conviction that evil at large is *none of your business* until your business with your private particular evils is liquidated and settled up. A challenge of this sort, with proper designation of detail, is one that need only be made to be accepted by men whose normal instincts are not decayed, and your reflective would-be suicide may easily be moved by it to face life with a certain interest again. The sentiment of honor is a very penetrating thing. When you and I, for instance, realize how many innocent beasts

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have had to suffer in cattle-cars and slaughter-pens and lay down their lives that we might grow up, all fattened and clad, to sit together here in comfort and carry on this discourse, it does, indeed, put our relation to the Universe in a more solemn light. "Does not," as a young Amherst philosopher (Xenos Clark, now dead) once wrote, "the acceptance of a happy life upon such terms involve a point of honor?" Are we not bound to do some self-denying service with *our* lives in return for all those lives upon which ours are built? To hear this question is to answer it in only one possible way, if one have a normally constituted heart!

Thus, then, we see that mere instinctive curiosity, pugnacity, and honor may make life on a purely naturalistic basis seem worth living from day to day to men who have cast away all metaphysics in order to get rid of hypochondria, but who are resolved to owe nothing as yet to religion and its more positive gifts. A poor half-way stage, some of you may be inclined to say; but at least you must grant it to be an honest stage; and no man should dare to speak meanly of these instincts which are our nature's best equipment, and to which religion herself must in the last resort address her own peculiar appeals.

IV.

And now, in turning to what religion may have to say to the question, I come to what is the soul of my discourse. Religion has meant many things in human history, but when from now onward I use the word I mean to use it in the supernaturalist sense, as signifying that the so-called order of nature that constitutes this world's experience is only one portion of the total Universe, and that there stretches beyond this visible world an unseen world of which we now know nothing positive, but in its relation to which the true significance of our present mundane life consists. A man's religious faith (whatever more special items of doctrine it may involve) means for me essentially his faith in the existence of an unseen order of some kind in which the riddles of the natural order may be found explained. In the more developed religions this world has always been regarded as the mere scaffolding or vestibule

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of a truer, more eternal world, and affirmed to be a sphere of education, trial, or redemption. One must in some fashion die to this world before one can enter into life eternal. The notion that this physical world of wind and water, where the sun rises and the moon sets, is absolutely and ultimately the divinely aimed at and established thing, is one that we find only in very early religions, such as that of the most primitive Jews. It is this natural religion (primitive still in spite of the fact that poets and men of science whose good-will exceeds their perspicacity keep publishing it in new editions tuned to our contemporary ears) that, as I said a while ago, has suffered definitive bankruptcy in the opinion of a circle of persons, amongst whom I must count myself, and who are growing more numerous every day. For such persons the physical order of Nature, taken simply as Science knows it, cannot be held to reveal any one harmonious spiritual intent. It is mere *weather*, as Chauncey Wright called it, doing and undoing without end.

Now I wish to make you feel, if I can in the short remainder of this hour, that we have a *right* to believe that the physical order is only a partial order; we have a right to supplement it by an unseen spiritual order which we assume on trust, if only thereby life may seem to us better worth living again. But as such a trust will seem to some of you sadly mystical and execrably unscientific, I must first say a word or two to weaken the veto which you may consider that Science opposes to our act.

There is included in human nature an ingrained naturalism and materialism of mind which can only admit facts that are actually tangible. Of this sort of mind the entity called "Science" is the idol. Fondness for the word "scientist" is one of the notes by which you may know its votaries; and its short way of killing any opinion that it disbelieves in is to call it "unscientific." It must be granted that there is no slight excuse for this. Science has made such glorious leaps in the last three hundred years, and extended our knowledge of Nature so enormously both in general and in detail; men of science, moreover, have as a class displayed such admirable

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virtues, that it is no wonder if the worshippers of Science lose their head. In this very University, accordingly, I have heard more than one teacher say that all the fundamental conceptions of truth have already been found by Science, and that the future has only the details of the picture to fill in. But the slightest reflection on the real conditions will suffice to show how barbaric such notions are. They show such a lack of scientific imagination, that it is hard to see how one who is actively advancing any part of Science can make a mistake so crude. Think how many absolutely new scientific conceptions have arisen in our own generation, how many new problems have been formulated that were never thought of before, and then cast an eye upon the brevity of Science's career. It began with Galileo just three hundred years ago. Four thinkers since Galileo, each informing his successor of what discoveries his own lifetime had seen achieved, might have passed the torch of Science into our hands as we sit here in this room. Indeed, for the matter of that, an audience much smaller than the present one, an audience of some sixty or seventy people, if each person in it could speak for his own generation, would carry us away to the black unknown of the human species, to days without a document or monument to tell their tale. Is it credible that such a mushroom knowledge, such a growth overnight as this, *can* represent more than the minutest glimpse of what the Universe will really prove to be when adequately understood? No! our Science is a drop, our ignorance a sea. Whatever else be certain, this at least is certain: that the world of our present natural knowledge *is* enveloped in a larger world of *some* sort of whose residual properties we at present can frame no positive idea.

Agnostic positivism, of course, admits this principle theoretically in the most cordial terms, but insists that we must not turn it to any practical use. We have no right, this doctrine tells us, to dream dreams, or *suppose* anything about the unseen part of the universe, merely because to do so may be for what we are pleased to call our highest interests. We must always wait for sensible evidence for our beliefs; and where such evidence is inaccessible we must frame no hypotheses

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whatever. Of course this is a safe enough position *in abstracto.* If a thinker had no stake in the unknown, no vital needs, to live or languish according to what the unseen world contained, a philosophic neutrality and refusal to believe either one way or the other would be his wisest cue. But, unfortunately, neutrality is not only inwardly difficult, it is also outwardly unrealizable, where our relations to an alternative are practical and vital. This is because, as the psychologists tell us, belief and doubt are living attitudes, and involve conduct on our part. Our only way, for example, of doubting, or refusing to believe, that a certain thing *is*, is continuing to act as if it were *not.* If, for instance, we refuse to believe that the room is getting *cold*, we must leave the windows open and light no fire just as if it still were *warm.* If I refuse to believe that you are unworthy of my confidence, I must keep telling you everything just as if you were *worthy* of the same. And similarly if, as the agnostics tell me, I must not believe that the world *is* divine, I can only express that refusal by declining to act distinctively as if it were so, which can only mean acting on certain critical occasions as if it were *not* so, or unmorally and irreligiously. Not to be *for*, you see, is often to be practically *against;* so that a strict and consistent neutrality is really unattainable.

And after all, isn't this duty of neutrality where only our inner interests would lead us to believe, the most ridiculous of commands? Isn't it sheer dogmatic folly to say that with the forces that the hidden world *may* contain the mystical side of our nature *can* have no real connection? In other cases divinations based on inner interests have proved prophetic enough. Without an imperious inner demand on our part for ideal, logical, and mathematical harmonies, Science herself would never have attained to proving that such harmonies lie hidden between all the chinks and interstices of the crude natural world. Hardly a law has been established in Science, hardly a fact ascertained, that was not first sought after, often with sweat and blood, to gratify an inner need. Whence such needs come from we do not know—we find them in us, and biological psychology so far only classes

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them with Darwin's "accidental variations" But the inner need of believing that this world of Nature is a sign of something more spiritual and eternal than itself is just as strong and authoritative in those who feel it, as the inner need of uniform laws of causation ever can be in a professionally scientific head. The toil of many generations has proved the latter need prophetic. Why *may* not the former one be prophetic, too? If needs of ours outrun the visible universe, why may not that be a sign that an invisible universe is there? What, in short, is to debar us from trusting our religious demands? Science as such assuredly has no authority, for she can only say what is, not what is not; and the agnostic "thou shalt not believe without coercive sensible evidence" is simply an expression (free to any one to make) of private personal appetite for evidence of a particular kind.

Now, when I speak of trusting our religious demands, just what do I mean by "trusting"? Is the word to carry with it license to define in detail an invisible world and to anathematize and excommunicate those whose trust is different? Certainly not! Our faculties of belief were not primarily given us to make orthodoxies and heresies withal; they were given us to live by. And to trust our religious demands means first of all to live in the light of them, and to act as if the invisible world which they suggest were real. It is a fact of human nature that men can live and die by the help of a sort of faith that goes without a single dogma or definition. The bare assurance that this natural order is not ultimate but a mere sign or vision, the external staging of a many-storied universe, in which spiritual forces have the last word and are eternal; this bare assurance is to such men enough to make life seem worth living in spite of every contrary presumption suggested by its circumstances on the natural plane. Destroy this inner assurance, vague as it is, however, and all the light and radiance of existence is extinguished for these persons at a stroke. Often enough the wild-eyed look at life,—the suicidal mood will then set in.

And now the application comes directly home to you and me. Probably to almost every one of us here the most

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adverse life would seem well worth living if we only could be *certain* that our bravery and patience with it were terminating and eventuating and bearing fruit somewhere in an unseen spiritual world. But granting we are not certain, does it then follow that a bare trust in such a world is a fool's paradise and lubberland, or rather that it is a living attitude in which we are free to indulge? Well, we are free to trust at our own risks anything that is not impossible and that can bring analogies to bear in its behalf. That the world of physics is probably not absolute, all the converging multitude of arguments that make in favor of idealism tend to prove. And that our whole physical life may lie soaking in a spiritual atmosphere, a dimension of Being that we at present have no organ for apprehending, is vividly suggested to us by the analogy of the life of our domestic animals. Our dogs, for example, are *in* our human life but not *of* it. They witness hourly the outward body of events whose inner meaning cannot, by any possible operation, be revealed to their intelligence, events in which they themselves often play the cardinal part. My terrier bites a teasing boy, for example, and the father demands damages. The dog may be present at every step of the negotiations, and see the money paid without an inkling of what it all means, without a suspicion that it has anything to do with *him*. And he never *can* know in his natural dog's life. Or take another case which used greatly to impress me in my medical-student days. Consider a poor dog whom they are vivisecting in a laboratory. He lies strapped on a board and shrieking at his executioners, and to his own dark consciousness is literally in a sort of hell. He cannot see a single redeeming ray in the whole business; and yet all these diabolical-seeming events are usually controlled by human intentions with which, if his poor benighted mind could only be made to catch a glimpse of them, all that is heroic in him would religiously acquiesce. Healing truth, relief to future sufferings of beast and man are to be bought by them. It is genuinely a process of redemption. Lying on his back on the board there he is performing a function incalculably higher than any prosperous canine life admits of; and yet, of the whole per-

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formance, this function is the one portion that must remain absolutely beyond his ken.

Now turn from this to the life of man. In the dog's life we see the world invisible to him because we live in both worlds. In human life, although we only *see* our world, and his within it, yet encompassing these worlds a still wider world may be there unseen by us; and to believe in that world *may* be the most essential function that our lives in this world have to perform. But "*may* be! *may* be!" one hears the positivist contemptuously exclaim; "what use can a scientific life have for maybes?" But the "scientific" life itself has much to do with maybes, and human life at large has everything to do with them. So far as man stands for anything, and is productive or originative at all, his entire vital function may be said to be to deal with maybes. Not a victory is gained, not a deed of faithfulness or courage is done, except upon a maybe; not a service, not a sally of generosity, not a scientific exploration or experiment or text-book, that *may* not be a mistake. It is only by risking our persons from one hour to another that we live at all. And often enough our faith beforehand in an uncertified result *is the only thing that makes the result come true*. Suppose, for instance, that you are climbing a mountain and have worked yourself into a position from which the only escape is by a terrible leap. Have faith that you *can* successfully make it, and your feet are nerved to its accomplishment. But mistrust yourself, and think of all the sweet things you have heard the scientists say of *maybes*, and you will hesitate so long that, at last, all unstrung and trembling, and launching yourself in a moment of despair, you roll in the abyss. In such a case (and it belongs to an enormous class), the part of wisdom as well as of courage is to *believe what is in the line of your needs*, for only by the belief is the need fulfilled. Refuse to believe, and you shall indeed be right, for you shall irretrievably perish. But believe, and again you shall be right, for you shall save yourself. You *make* one or the other of two possible universes true by your trust or mistrust, both universes having been only *maybes*, in this particular, before you contributed your act.

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Now, it appears to me that the question whether life is worth living is subject to conditions logically much like these. It does, indeed, depend on you the liver. If you surrender to the nightmare view and crown the evil edifice by your own suicide, you have indeed made a picture totally black. Pessimism, completed by your act, is true beyond a doubt, so far as your world goes. Your mistrust of life has removed whatever worth your own enduring existence might have given to it; and now, throughout the whole sphere of possible influence of that existence, the mistrust has proved itself to have had divining power. But suppose, on the other hand, that instead of giving way to the nightmare view you cling to it that this world is not the *ultimatum*. Suppose you find yourself a very well-spring, as Wordsworth says, of

> "Zeal, and the virtue to exist by faith
> As soldiers live by courage; as, by strength
> Of heart, the sailor fights with roaring seas."

Suppose, however thickly evils crowd upon you, that your unconquerable subjectivity proves to be their match, and that you find a more wonderful joy than any passive pleasure can bring in trusting ever in the larger whole. Have you not now *made* life worth living on *these* terms? What sort of a thing would life really be, with *your* qualities ready for a tussle with it, if it only brought fair weather and gave these higher faculties of yours no scope? Please remember that optimism and pessimism are definitions of the world, and that our own reactions on the world, small as they are in bulk, are parts of it, and necessarily help to determine the definition. They may be the decisive elements in determining the definition. A large mass can have its unstable equilibrium overturned by the addition of a feather's weight. A long phrase may have its sense reversed by the addition of the three letters *n*, *o*, *t*. This life *is* worth living, we can say, since it is what we make it, from the moral point of view, and we are bound to make it from that point of view, so far as we have anything to do with it, a success.

Now, in this description of faiths that verify themselves

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I have assumed that our faith in an invisible order is what inspires those efforts and that patience of ours that make this visible order good for moral men. Our faith in the seen world's goodness (goodness now meaning fitness for successful moral and religious life) has verified itself by leaning on our faith in the unseen world. But will our faith in the unseen world similarly verify itself? Who knows?

Once more it is a case of *maybe*. And once more *maybes* are the essence of the situation. I confess that I do not see why the very existence of an invisible world *may* not in part depend on the personal response which any one of us may make to the religious appeal. God himself, in short, *may* draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity. For my own part, I do not know what the sweat and blood and tragedy of this life mean, if they mean anything short of this. If this life be not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the Universe by success, it is no better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will. But it *feels* like a real fight; as if there were something really wild in the Universe which we, with all our idealities and faithfulnesses, are needed to redeem. And first of all to redeem our own hearts from atheisms and fears. For such a half-wild, half-saved universe our nature is adapted. The deepest thing in our nature is this *Binnenleben* (as a German doctor lately has called it), this dumb region of the heart in which we dwell alone with our willingnesses and unwillingnesses, our faiths and fears. As through the cracks and crannies of subterranean caverns the earth's bosom exudes its waters, which then form the fountain-heads of springs, so in these crepuscular depths of personality the sources of all our outer deeds and decisions take their rise. Here is our deepest organ of communication with the nature of things; and compared with these concrete movements of our soul all abstract statements and scientific arguments, the veto, for example, which the strict positivist pronounces upon our faith, sound to us like mere chatterings of the teeth. For here possibilities, not finished facts, are the realities that we encounter; and to quote my friend William Salter, of the Philadelphia

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Ethical Society, "as the essence of courage is to stake one's life on a possibility, so the essence of faith is to believe that the possibility exists."

These, then, are my last words to you: Be not afraid of life. Believe that life *is* worth living, and your belief will help create the fact. The "scientific proof" that you are right may not be clear before the day of judgment (or some stage of Being which that expression may serve to symbolize) is reached. But the faithful fighters of this hour, or the beings that then and there will represent them, may then turn to the faint-hearted, who here decline to go on, with words like those with which Henry IV. greeted the tardy Crillon after a great victory had been gained: "Hang yourself, Crillon! we fought at Arques, and you were not there."

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REFORM IN EDUCATION.*

IT is with difficulty that a writer on this subject refrains from beginning with an apology. He cannot add to the list of defects that every one finds in English education, and he cannot have the heart to increase the list of remedies. In the present case the interesting condition in which the reform of secondary education finds itself gives him some excuse, but he relies mainly on a hope that the policy which he is to argue has special interest for the readers of the JOURNAL OF ETHICS,—both for those who are more expressly concerned with practical questions, and for those who are concerned about philosophy.

Technical education, continuation schools, the educational ladder,—these are subjects which the zeal of reformers is undertaking with much promise of success. But this progress is not so much by reforming previous education as by adding to it. One would like to think that the demand for schooling

* This paper has been written with special reference to the condition of education in England.

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beyond the school age, or, at least, the willing expenditure of money upon it, has come from a sense of its value within that time; but the contrary is the commoner reason. It is true that parents are seldom heard to complain of the education which is given in either secondary or elementary schools; they are too pessimistic for that. Their apathy cannot be due to want of interest in their children, or to hopeless views about them, or even about those who teach them; but, seeming to remember their own school-days, they expect little. Of course, one is speaking of the mass, and there is no denying that parents are only less willing to bring the general education of their children to an end than the children themselves. This might be explained as a plea of necessity but for the fact that in the majority of cases a full stop is put to the education thus left abrupt, and every one knows that it soon crumbles out of all use. It would seem that a parent values the school education of his boys only as it will help them to get on in the world. Now an apathy so universal must be due to an "experimental belief" that the quality of a general or liberal education is of little moment, and that there is small room for improvement. As for the elementary schools, they hardly profess to offer a general education though, from time and circumstance, their pupils need it most; at any rate the schools have utterly failed to impress the parents with even a mistaken idea about it. In the oratorical essays which fill the empty newspapers at midsummer, the mayors, members of Parliament, and the successful persons who distribute school-prizes, are found to do little but urge the national economic point of view upon parents, and lecture the pupils on the means of getting on. The school is advertised by a list of its "successes," prize-winners are directed to bigger stakes, and the unsuccessful are told that if they continue to struggle they too will meet a good market. These exhibitions, however depressing, do service in revealing the adult opinion of those who have passed through our liberal or general education, and they bring home the fact, which might otherwise be ignored, that we are making a market of our schools and showmen of our teachers,—that, in the words of a recent president of the

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British Association, "in education we are a nation of shopkeepers." I say "ignored" because the system has greatly increased the efficiency both of schools and teachers, and this is set against the evil so far as to entirely obscure it for the general onlooker and for the majority of teachers. The only people who seem to take a serious view of the evil are those writers who talk about an end or purpose in education; but a teacher regards them as unpractical, because, in removing the evil, they would be sure to take efficiency with it. And he has, of course, the best right to hold that opinion. There are few teachers, indeed, who think any theory of education to be other than impracticable. It is made over to women and any others who may be refreshed by ideals. It may be beautiful, but it is not business.

The purpose of this paper is to argue what seems to me to be the only way in which that reform of education is practicable which all writers on education regard as supreme, but to which most teachers are consciously, and most parents unconsciously, indifferent. I propose first to examine the forces which have kept the idea of a general education out of practice, and then to consider the institution of the only means by which, I believe, it can be realized.

I.

The purpose of a general education is to develop and characterize the various activities of young people,—in other words, to produce an intellectual, an æsthetic, and a moral character, together with various kinds of skill. Every one agrees to this and allows that the formation of moral character is the main thing; but it will hardly be denied that the general education which is actually given requires a different definition. It means general knowledge and consists in teaching a little of everything. How this can be supposed to meet the other definition it is hard to see. What is required is the formation through knowledge and discipline of a variety of interests, which gradually make themselves spontaneous till schooling is no longer required, and further education may be left to the interests themselves. If, during the whole or any part of the

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school course, this purpose is better secured by few studies than by many, then few are better than many for the time or altogether. But from the age of eight or nine the mind of a boy is driven about among so much disconnected material that he is hardly interested enough to be even curious about it, and liking is out of the question. Thus, in the middle of his course—at the age of twelve—he is usually found to be learning the grammars of three languages besides his own, seeing mystery still in Euclid and other subjects that are expressly meant for practice in method and clear ideas, and moving slowly through small text-books on history, geography, and "science." No doubt a boy at that age is about as ready to learn one thing as another, hardly distinguishing between a page of irregular verbs and other causes of confinement. But what mental interests such a stage in general education is encouraging and developing it would be hard to find. It cannot be said that the seeds are being so inserted that the boy will, in a few years, wake up and enjoy the fruit, for it is very well known that the interests thus painfully planted seldom shoot at all. And the most important subject suffers most. It has been a constant theme of the best practical authorities on education, both elementary and secondary, that English literature is the most effective instrument of general education. Yet no one denies that always from the shortness of the time allowed it, and generally from the nature of the instruction, there is no subject in which the results are so meagre and so very inadequate to the purpose.

I have spoken mainly of secondary schools where the pupils leave at fifteen or sixteen, but the same general features are to be found in all schools that are not state-aided. Though so many of them are in private hands and there is almost no compulsory organization, the course of instruction is much the same in most of them. The reason for this will shortly appear. It might seem that this general description is unfair to the highest class of schools,—those from which boys go to a university. But I purposely include them because of—not in spite of—the superior qualifications of their teachers. It is sufficiently true of the lower forms and the preparatory

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schools, and in the upper forms the notion of a general education has given way to the race for scholarships which put a premium on early specializing that few have the courage or the power to resist.

The schools in which a general education is of most importance must be those where the pupils complete their education at thirteen and begin to earn their living. No doubt the difficulties are great, but the failure is out of proportion to them. The temptation to take up a crowd of subjects is small and the syllabus of work prescribed by the Education Department includes numerous alternatives, and in many respects is as good as withdrawn. The Science and Art Department has put a stop to the exploitation of pupils in its sciences and promises a radical reform. But there is no denying that the school curriculum and the methods of teaching and discipline do little to form character whether in will, taste, or intellect. They hardly profess to do it, except as regards drawing and music. The Education Department does, indeed, urge the view of a general education, and has long "encouraged" moral education by an eighteen-penny grant, which it reduces to a shilling or nothing at all if the children do not make an adequate appearance of morality before the government inspector. One would naturally suppose that the quantity and the quality of the literature read would receive most consideration, but the neglect is actually greater than in secondary schools, and with less reason; even the pupil-teachers are expected to read almost no literature. Not only do our elementary schools fail to create any taste in literature, and to communicate the moral interest which largely waits on that, but they have even failed to give their pupils a wide vocabulary and more correct habits of speech. Not that I am careful to put this matter of speech in the first place; I make special mention of the failure because it is a failure that is not due to neglect. Recently the difficulty of teaching grammar or a feeling of its uselessness has put it out of favor, and we find, for example, in a large midland town that bits of natural history have been substituted in all the board-schools. The possibility of such an alteration is encouraging, even though it is absurd, as in

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this case, to find boys of ten or eleven spending a year on the minute study of the cray-fish under a lad who knew nothing about it till he had to teach it. The encouraging thing is the conscious adoption and application of any standard of educational values.*

But, it will be very properly objected, though our schools fail to give a general education, if that means the formation of an intellectual, an æsthetic, and a moral character, and if these are to be measured by interests that have become more or less spontaneous, there is at least one side of general education in which our record may be better. The side in question is what is always presented against those who complain of the "useless" studies in the curriculum. The purpose of these and other studies is, it is said, to give the pupils an "all-round ability," so that they will bring industry and intelligence to whatever they may afterwards apply themselves. I do not propose to inquire whether the studies that are actually undertaken are the best for this purpose, nor whether the purpose can be effected without at the same time communicating at least intellectual interests. We may assume that the main thing is not the subjects of study, but the methods of teaching them.

The best proof that improvements in method have taken place is that the school knowledge of a boy is usually a year or more in advance of what his father had at the same age. But a prominent head master recently argued that learning is being made so easy for boys that they are not getting the mental discipline which their fathers got. By mental discipline he obviously means a training in mental patience or endurance. And he is probably right in saying that teachers, and even text-books, sometimes do for boys what it would be

* It may be as well to say that I do not at all approve of the omission of grammar from the curriculum of elementary schools, but think that at least two-thirds of the time spent on it might be saved; for (1) all the grammar ever taught in an elementary school could be better taught orally in the space of a single year when the pupils are approaching their teens, and (2) the correction and widening of speech are best taught directly—before grammar—through exercises and literature.

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better if they did for themselves, though certain things are not to be forgotten: that endurance should not have to be learnt in a way that would also lead to disgust; that all exercises should produce greater facility, and should have reference to the facility already acquired; and, above all, that the pupils should be taught how to proceed methodically, instead of wandering painfully among their ideas without making progress. But the serious charge against our schools, so far as they aim at "all-round ability," is not this; it is their failure to do what they specially profess, for they do not train their pupils to a habit of intelligence. They give a sufficient variety of knowledge, and they are strong in much, though not all, that concerns memory; but the most important thing is wanting in the neglect of methods which directly train to insight and mental grasp. From want of knowledge, of interest, or of time, a teacher has to take short cuts to knowledge, which leave it unrelated in the passive minds of his pupils. One might refer to the recitations from small text-books of history and geography, studies in which intellectual discipline is apparently assumed to be impossible; or to the use of text-books on literary history whereby the pupils can "characterize the prose style of Milton and Addison" at public examinations, and "write an appreciation of Dryden and Pope," without having read them. But the fact is there is hardly a school subject which may not be taught either by tips or by rational methods, and at present a teacher has often the same reason to choose the method by tips as a coach in anatomy. Even in arithmetic how many teachers take the mystery out of the rules for multiplying by a fraction, for inverting a fractional divisor, for converting recurring decimals, or even for performing simple subtraction? At any rate, it may be thought, these things are done in elementary schools because their teachers have been "trained" and know how to do it. But knowledge is little, and the "training" is not strong enough to induce more than a few.

Such is the weakness of our general education. We have seen how far short we are, if we define its purpose to be the formation of an intellectual, an æsthetic, and a moral character,

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whose value is to be seen in the interests which have so far become spontaneous. And we see how far short we are even if we confine it to the formation of an intellectual character, and of only that one factor which appears as general intelligence or an "all-round ability." It may seem to some that I have retailed an old story too harshly, and therefore I repeat that, for the reason stated, I have omitted features of our education that are all for good; that the efficiency of our schools has unquestionably increased, and that a boy will usually be found to have much more knowledge than his father had at the same age. But, I believe, that any one—certainly any teacher—who argues from a fairly wide experience—and has some notion of a purpose in education—will admit that the state of our general education is as I have represented it.

II.

The evil is variously apportioned between competitive examinations and the teacher's indolence or his ignorance of method. All that is to be said on these heads has been said long ago. Let us rather consider why the evil persists if its causes are so well known.

Twenty years ago the following judgment was made by a most competent and careful observer, Dr. Wiese, formerly privy councillor in the Prussian University of Public Instruction,—who forty years ago had written strongly in our praise.

"There can be no doubt that the examinations of schools and scholars by the universities and the College of Preceptors has produced a good effect on many an institution; that they have increased the eagerness to learn, and have set in motion the stagnating waters, more especially by publishing the results of the examinations, because an institution which carries through none or only a few scholars loses confidence with the public. But the public in this case may be greatly deceived, and we in Germany consider this very stimulus unsuited for the teachers as well as for the pupils. . . . The school has higher aims than those of a 'racing stable,' as some one in England expressed himself in speaking of its schools."

He also quotes English opinion to the effect that "the mania for examinations has been pushed to its furthest limits," that "a system whereby the teachers of the country are con-

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verted into coaches is, by its very nature, hostile to the true conception of education," and that "if we go on long as we are now doing we shall utterly deteriorate the education of our youth and impair the national character." And, impressed with the frequency with which these things were said even at that time, he concludes with the belief that the system would not live long. That was twenty years ago, and yet we are now the most examined nation outside of China, beating France on her own ground because she is leaving it. And so convinced are we of the value of our policy that the latest movement of the three bodies which by their local examinations control the course of instruction in secondary schools, has been looked upon as a natural and proper "evolution of existing forces." One of them having announced that it had at last yielded to the request of teachers for a lower examination than it had hitherto held, the other two have at once advertised their adoption of the same policy.

If these examinations are so dangerous, why are they so popular? They give parents a means of comparing the efficiency of schools, and they fix a curriculum and a standard which serve to give a certain unity and system to the schools, so that a boy may pass from one to another without the same loss of time as formerly. Much, however, as these advantages are proclaimed, it is not by them that the examinations keep their hold and their popularity. One has only to read school advertisements and prospectuses to see the use that is made of them, and to understand the temptation which besets enterprising proprietors and head masters to exploit their pupils for the good of the school. They are a battle-ground on which the competition between schools is being constantly fought, and no casual observer can feel how keen that is, or can appreciate the courage and unselfishness of those teachers who do not concentrate their efforts on securing a list of "successes," through a periodical output of examinable knowledge. But even this aspect of the case is not the fundamental one. It is true that not many schools could afford to keep out of the competition, but it is equally true that not many have the desire. If the struggle for existence or supremacy were

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relaxed, it is the weak and not the strong schools which would decline the competition. And it is not the struggling school-master only who regards the examinations as a "boon;" if they were abolished to-day, it is the efficient teacher who would most regret them. I don't say all efficient teachers, but certainly the majority.

Here we come to the fundamental fact in the case. I believe that no measures for the improvement of our general education will have any value which are not immediately concerned with it.

About a year ago M. Max O'Rell propounded this problem to the readers of the *Pall Mall Gazette:* Why do the English people regard the occupation of a school-master with contempt? Some said one thing, some another, but the significant thing is the undeniable fact. Its significance is partly as an illustration of the curious possibilities of the English mind which despises or pities a school-master, while it says he has the future of the country in his hands and undertakes the greatest of responsibilities. But far more significant is this, that the general contempt does no more than express the distaste for their work that is general among teachers themselves. The charge is not thought one of disgrace as it would be for those who have the care of adult souls; and, excluding women, I have never observed that it has any novelty for either the teacher or the public. Consequently, I need not accumulate the proofs. The distaste can, in the present state of things, be easily understood; and I am far, indeed, from blaming any one in whom it either is an active feeling or has fallen to indifference. But I think that no one has begun to understand the state of English education, the nature of its defects, and the possibilities of reform, who has not appreciated the feeling and seen in it the argument for our present system of education. The irksome monotony of hearing the same recitations and correcting the same errors, the constant consciousness of keeping the pupils at their work whether they like it or not, the tendency to irritation at any want of attention or reflection, the consequent posing and the feeling of strain, the gradual failure of light-heartedness and a sense of humor through fric-

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tion or the fear of it, the notion of trading in trivialities, the want of any idea that would make school work seem important and worth doing,—in short, all that causes deterioration into the solemn dulness of pedantry,—these are the things that threaten a teacher, and his distaste is the measure of their victory over him. If, so far from being prepared to meet them, he actually enters upon his work with the popular notion of their force, and with a regret that he is unable for the present to undertake a more reputable occupation, he cannot but find the business uncongenial and depressing. Hence the necessity of spurring and inducing him.

If the work is irksome to the teacher, it is more irksome to his pupils. But the same anodyne is happily at hand for mental as for muscular training. So it is the general practice of teachers to import competition as an external interest to supply the interest that is wanting in the lessons themselves. To the teacher this competition is valuable, partly because it gives a sporting interest to his labors, partly because, if well managed, this can be made over to the pupils so that they forget the monotony and triviality of the work itself in a race for distinction. And every man is a "successful teacher" who manages to keep his pupils in active competition for the longest period at a time and on every sort of occasion. Public competitions were not the cause but the effect of this system, though they have had the effect of intensifying it and making it sacred. The result has been to increase the efficiency of our schools in certain directions quite valuable in themselves, but also to make the idea of a general education impracticable. For it frequently happens that a development towards one type makes the development towards another type more difficult than before, or even impossible. The type of education which we are developing at present is that which will secure the greatest possible quantity of examinable knowledge, and—perhaps one has to add—at the earliest possible age. Improvements in the examinations would gradually secure that this knowledge shall all be useful, and measures might be taken whereby more than a tithe of it shall be remembered for a long time. Such an ideal is by no means to

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be despised, and it would be easiest to realize in England at present. Besides, one may at times have sufficient optimism to believe that the frank adoption of it would result in a gain for general education, because parents, being then without excuse, might seriously study and set themselves the task. At any rate, the frank adoption of the system throughout the school would give the easiest stimulus to both teachers and pupils,—a stimulus that would be as effective as personal interest could make it. And certain subordinate ideals would be realized at the same time; the teacher would get his "full credit for his work," the poor man his "fair field and no favor," and the general public, as well as the school-owner, the man whose faith is in organization, and the man who measures wisdom by the practice of the universities, their "all work to be tested by an independent authority."

III.

But educational reformers must believe that the supreme purpose of the school is to give a general education, and at present we find two proposals being urged: that secondary schools should be inspected, and that teachers should be encouraged or required to study the principles of education. They think that by these means teachers would be induced to look as much to the character of their teaching as to the quantity of examinable knowledge. The proposals are nothing new; let us consider how far they are likely to be effective.

It is not to be supposed that bad methods of teaching are always or even commonly taken in ignorance of better methods. It is easy to find head masters who deplore the number of subjects taken up by their own pupils, and who see no reason, for example, in the general custom of beginning boys in Latin at eight, in French at nine, in German at ten, and giving each of these forty minutes or so twice or thrice in the week. But they plead constraints of various sorts. And it is still more common to find assistant masters teaching English, modern languages, geometry, and the rest on methods which they readily admit to be inferior. But they claim to

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take the most practical methods in the circumstances. There is the demand for examinations which, the more elementary they are, become the more magisterial in specifying certain methods of teaching. And another reason is yet more imperative: it is that whatever method is adopted must be adopted throughout the school. If the pupils pass from one hand to another within a year or less, as is usual at present, it is only by continuity of method and an understanding among the teachers that much waste of time and energy can be avoided. The method has to be the one best suited for examinations, and it has to be the one that all the teachers can adopt. Under present conditions it is clear that only one method can satisfy these conditions,—a strict adherence to text-books. Yet we call this a "slavish" adherence, wonder why teachers are without pride in their work, and advise individuals to follow impracticable courses.

Hence the proposal of inspection. This it is argued would stimulate the part of education which every one says is the most important and allows to be beyond the range of public competitions; it would take special notice of the methods of teaching, and would thus act upon the teachers as a counter-irritant or a counter-temptation to the stimulus of public examinations. The private school-masters as a body, along with many others, make strong objection, fearing a prescribed syllabus of studies and a body of inspectors with such autocratic powers as we have in the administration of elementary education. The fear of a syllabus is groundless, and the objectors do not seem to be aware that the syllabus for elementary schools is itself in process of dissolution. If the secondary school-master makes his own syllabus, the most he has to fear, besides an examination of his premises, is an inspection of the sort which many schools invite every year, and which is required of endowed schools. But the value of inspection is a different matter. Will it mitigate the present evils and make a general education, if not necessary, at least practicable? Towards the beginning of this paper I have said that it has failed to establish general education in the elementary schools. Under the system of payment by results an

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inspector had little time to see anything but results, and in his "surprise visits" he was merely a detective. Now he has a much freer hand, but one seldom hears of his acting differently; and it is significant that the National Union is arguing for the abolition of the "annual parade" as a drawback on efficiency. So far as we can gather, it is the general opinion with inspectors as well as with teachers that the best kind of inspection would be by occasional visits in which they observed the ordinary working of the school. With this system it would naturally follow that the teacher had as free a hand as he could desire in forming his syllabus. But though these are the only conditions of inspection under which a general education can thrive, there are few who would not hesitate to say whether the majority of elementary schools would at once become better or worse. The expensive system on which secondary schools are now inspected is so far identical with this in idea, but in reality it is very different. Though the head master submits the syllabus on which his school is to be examined, the inspection is really an inspection of results. It might, of course, involve an inspection of methods too, and a criticism of the curriculum; but even if there were time for the former, the inspector knows that methods and curriculum are fixed by the necessities which I have already explained. The inspection is in fact a very formal affair, and no one is agitated except now and then when an inspector does not understand the conditions. But an official inspector would tend to magnify his office, and we must sympathize with the teachers who fear that they may have to serve a new god in addition to the present mammon.

Finally, he is a very sanguine man who can believe that by a nice balancing of inducements we can make a teacher the zealous minister of general education. Yet what other meaning has our educational policy? Our reforms run all to organization, and our organization is all an offering of inducements and "encouragements" to the teachers, for we are quite convinced that they cannot take a spontaneous interest in their work of sufficient liveliness. We are sure that it is only by spurs and inducements that they can make their pupils learn;

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we are also sure that it is only by spurs and inducements that they themselves can be made efficient; and we believe that it is at the proper switching of inducements that they direct the course of teaching this way or that to our satisfaction. We define the end of education to be morality, and we expect the moral teachers of our manufacture to manufacture their pupils in the same way into morality. Yet we blame them for adopting our own policy, and we want to measure their success by the interests which have been cultivated in the will, the taste, and the intellect of their pupils. Therein teachers are apt to distinguish between theory and practice; and Ascham's complaint is still to be made, if now without complaint: "they say our reasons serve only to breed forth talk and pass away time, but we never saw a good school-master do so."

IV.

It must now be evident—if, indeed, so many words were required—that a general education is impossible under present conditions, and that reforms are futile so long as we hold to the root-idea of our educational system. It remains to ask whether that idea is inevitable. If it is, if we must assume that the teacher cannot take a spontaneous interest in his work, and must always be schooled by external interests, it is absurd to expect him to give a general education. And we have seen that our efforts at compromise or palliation tend either to uselessness or to crippling the kind of efficiency which we undoubtedly have by the system of our adoption. Of course, there are teachers who need no external motives, who feel cramped and not stimulated by the paternal government, and who take more or less courage to defy it. But the majority are glad of it, and are eager to admit that their schools and classes would deteriorate if it were abolished. Therefore the question whether a general education is possible is the question whether teachers can acquire a spontaneous interest in their work, such as would not merely give it a superior quality in their hands, but such as they would feel to be more stimulating than the easy prudential interests with which they are plied at present, and with which they ply their

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pupils. It is the question of a professional education for teachers. From what has been said, it is easy to see that the measure of value for such an education is not the quantity of knowledge which it conveys, but the character and permanence of the interest which it creates. Knowledge is, indeed, the ground of any abiding interest, but not all knowledge nor every way of coming by it. It is possible to suppose that all the teachers in England had passed an examination in methods of teaching and skill in "handling a class," without their being the nearer to so much as a desire of giving a general education. Yet it is no less possible that the present Royal Commission will think it sufficient for registration that, in addition to his general knowledge, a teacher shall have passed a professional examination. Another public examination,—that is how we reform, and an order of merit,—that is how the reformed are kept from saying, What a bore! If a professional education is to be of any real value, it must give the teacher an effective scientific interest in his work, with some feeling of its importance and something of the enthusiasm with which great teachers have been animated. It must give him that pride in his office which is now to seek, which at present he can hardly be expected to feel except in moments of ecstasy and *sub specie æternitatis*, but which has never been absent from great teachers whether their pupils have been young or old. From a teacher's point of view there is no doubt that what is wanting in his profession is, more than all, a sufficiently absorbing interest, and I do not hesitate to measure the value of a professional education for teachers by the degree in which it creates this interest.

It would be ludicrous to compare the interest shown in their business by the medical student and by the future teacher; of the new-made doctor and the new-made teacher it would often be fair to say that the one feels he is beginning a career, the other rather that his is over; and yet the new-made teacher usually excels other teachers in enthusiasm. But I know how irritating these comparisons are. For there is no comparison, it will be said, between doctoring and teaching. Yet why not? I have chosen this comparison not only

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to avoid being met with the feeling for a divine mission which graces the church and the feelings of the various sorts which enliven the law, but because the feeling in the medical profession can be seen to have grown with its educational demands. It is not so long since the practice of medicine, and especially of surgery, was as lightly esteemed as ever was the task of the school-master; and those were the days when the demands upon candidates were insignificant and purely "utilitarian," when apprentices were content to pick up knowledge as it might come, and when few of their own will took anything like the course that is now a matter of obligation. But it will still be objected that the comparison should rather be between nursing and teaching,—both monotonous and temper-trying. That is quite true at present; only the purpose of a teacher's education is to add the interest of the doctor to the work of the nurse. Certain physiologists who have studied the mental development of infants like to point out a sort of normal insanity in them. Suppose we say that boys and girls are still only getting rid of their insanity; then we may at least compare the teacher with the mad doctor. But he is the doctor who, above all others, is interested in his work, and who retains his interest longest. He had a long course of education. If we are to seek in his school for the men and women who take the attitude which we suppose to be the only one possible for teachers (who are not "born" with it!), we should have to look to the attendants. But then they are uneducated.

Now the learning of any learned profession consists in what will enable the student to make the most of his experience and opportunities when he comes to practise. It is partly theoretical, or matter of knowledge; partly practical, or matter of skill. And the theoretical part is much greater—occupies much more time—than practice or the attainment of skill. The latter is, of course, the more important, but it is intentionally left to later experience. The curriculum set before the student is to qualify him for making the most of this experience, and while he is on it he only samples experience. The curriculum is not intended to make him perfect,

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but to make him at once perfectly competent and perfectly willing to carry on his own education. It enables him to appreciate the value of what others do and say, and to treat his own experience rationally, so that he may have the benefit of it. What the student sees and does of practical work bears about the same proportion to the knowledge he has to acquire that experiments bear to a lecture in physics. The practical work is mostly for the sake of illustration, and what practice or experiments the student himself conducts are mainly to secure that he understands, what he has read or heard or seen done.

I have said that the learning which constitutes the curriculum of the learned professions is far more concerned with knowledge than with skill. But surely, it will be said, the knowledge is limited to what will be of use in practice. That is true if it is meant to include the purely scientific interest which it gives to the practitioners; otherwise it is anything but true. The larger part of what a medical student learns, for example, will have little "practical use" for him, and it is increasingly so in all the learned professions. And why? Is the object of a purely scientific knowledge to keep down competition and secure a high standard of comfort for the profession? If that were all, we should have but a sneaking way of securing heavy entrance fees. The actual purpose, of course, is to give interest to practice. It is meant to substitute for the monotony and disappointment of the work the stimulus of rational insight; it aims at making a man an authority or a judge of authorities, and giving him the feeling that he knows the best to be done in a difficult business; it gives him pride in his occupation, and creates a world for him in his ordinary work, where he may continue to find all the interest of which it is capable.

These are the characteristics of the professional education of a learned profession. As for the method of conducting it, one might show that it has failed when the student is merely an apprentice picking up skill and knowledge, when the education is merely voluntary, and when it is conducted by private study or by coaching with a view to meet the questions of

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an examination. But important as it is for the students of other professions to work together, I need hardly say it is indispensable in the education of teachers. And in case, as seems likely, the genius of our past reforms persists in being present, it is well to remind ourselves of the value of public examinations in a subject like the principles of education. Here, as in psychology, ethics, or any "moral science," the number of fair questions is very limited, and the crammers and the candidates can nearly always defeat the examiners by collections of correct, if slight and heterogeneous, answers.

In this, as in certain other studies, a public examination cannot be so searching as one conducted by the teacher of the candidates, and in all such studies the examination is but one form of test, and a very restricted one. I make this remark because it may appeal to those who cannot conceive the reform of education but by spurs and inducements; for it is an important matter that the spur should be on the right foot. But if they think that the professors of education themselves need the spur, one can only ask why teachers should have a professional examination at all.

V.

The purpose of this paper has been accomplished, if I have made clear the fundamental distinction between the two types of school education with which we are familiar, the one in practice, the other in theory; if I have shown the forces which necessarily produce the one and the only means of establishing the other; and if I have also shown the futility of adding these means to those forces in the hope that a complex of extraneous motives might somehow so combine themselves in a teacher's mind as to form that intrinsic interest in his work, without which he must be quite inefficient for one type of education, though he may have zeal and interest enough for the other, and can always be made to have more. I am satisfied if I have demonstrated the conclusion that if a general education is possible there is only one way of securing it,—a thorough professional education for teachers, and thereafter *Lehrfreiheit.* For if that is the conclusion, it is the thorough-

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ness of this professional education that must be the centre of our school reform, and not a still further development of extraneous motives. But, if it is not thorough, the extraneous motives would have to be retained, and then any use it might have would be quite superficial. I say so to meet the question that is now being raised about "a minimum of professional education," and the plea that we must begin in "a small way." Small ways have frequently been tried, both at home and abroad, and the wonder is that the idea of a professional education for teachers has survived their repeated failure. To many minds it has not, but it is a pity they should continue to believe in the possibility of general education. But perhaps they mean general knowledge.

I cannot hope in the remaining pages to give a full answer to the questions in what a professional education for teachers should consist, and how through it we might even now proceed with some rapidity and not so much undoing to the type of education upon which, in theory, all are agreed. I can only select what appear the main things to be said and the main difficulties to be met. I shall take first the professional education. It would consist of instruction, demonstration, and discussion. The first comprises instruction in the principles, the practice, and the history of education.

The principles of education are based upon a teleological treatment of the growing mind. The risk is that this treatment may be so trivial as to be of neither scientific nor practical interest; for educational psychology has so often been an "elaboration of the obvious" that it is usually understood to be written for such as are of weaker capacity. That the fault is not in the subject but in our "small ways" appears at once when we consider that the fundamental scientific problems, as well as the practical interest, of psychology centre in education. The "critical" question for psychology is, How is education possible? It is precisely analogous to the questions set by Kant to the other departments of philosophy; it is such as Darwin put to biology, and as every science which treats of growth tries to answer when it has accumulated material enabling it to try. And it is the question which, in psychology

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more than in any other department of knowledge, converts the languid interest in descriptions, classifications, and their formulation in laws into the living interest and the spirit of investigation that come with the hope of mastery. Of course, the analysis of adult consciousness must come first, and the stages of growth from infancy onward have to be collected and compared,—studies which have their own interest if they are thorough enough. But they are only what descriptive geology and geography are to a science of nature, or what anatomy is to physiology and pathology. The final and permanent interest comes with the genetic point of view, and is none the less for the difficulties it presents. I have adverted to the effect that a purely scientific interest has had upon the learned professions. For teachers the practical value of this scientific interest would not be confined to feeling, which might turn out to be short-lived if the interest were only scientific. This brings us to the second subject of instruction,—viz., the practice of education.

It is concerned with two topics,—the curriculum and the methods of teaching. Under the former are discussed the best material for instructing and exercising the various activities into a desirable character, the selection of this material for different classes of pupils and schools, and its proper arrangement in a school course. Instruction in the methods of teaching carries the idea into detail by a minute treatment of the material as matter of knowledge and means of discipline. It hardly needs saying that the completeness with which this practical instruction can be given to students depends on the thoroughness of their studies in psychology. The more the mind remains to them a congeries of mysterious faculties, somehow obeying laws somewhere derived, growing in secret by means of other laws entirely unknown, the more superficial and meaningless must be any such instruction.

The third subject of instruction comprises the history of educational practice and of educational literature. It is mainly a reading of social history from the state of education,—a point of view as central in its way as those adopted in political, constitutional, and economic histories. The value of the

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study is not in the "lessons" that it contains for present practice, though these are numerous and as much to the point as the "lessons" from other species of history. And if a teacher were to ask what use the study would be to him, one might not be so far wrong in giving the tempting answer,—None; though Professor Laurie, whose practice will be recognized in this sketch, once said that the best way of training a teacher, if his training must be short, would be to shut him up for a week with Mr. Nettleship's article in *Hellenica*. No one who knows the value of "church history" in a theological education or of the history of philosophy to the students of that subject will refuse the history of education in practice and literature a considerable place in the learning of teachers. Under this head would also fall to be studied the current educational practice of different countries as regards administration, curriculum, methods, and appliances. Would it not have been well if our experiments in education during the last twenty years had been enlightened by a large and wide-spread body of expert opinion on such matters? Not till this knowledge becomes general among teachers will they have a clear claim to the hand in their own government which is given without demur to the other professions and to the highest branch of their own.

The second part of the professional education consists of demonstrations in the practice of teaching. This is the part which in every country has presented the greatest difficulty. It is the question of providing a school that shall bear the same relation to instruction that a hospital bears in medical education. But no one who studies the history of medical education during the last two centuries will think the problem insoluble or be satisfied with such make-shift arrangements as are usual at present. It is positively gratifying to know * that the earliest efforts at clinical teaching failed to make themselves popular and were discontinued; that it was about the middle of the seventeenth century before the effort was made (at Leyden), which succeeded and did spread; that the spread

* Puschmann, "History of Medical Education," pp. 410, *ff.*

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was so slow that the middle of the eighteenth century was reached before there was clinical teaching even at Vienna and Edinburgh, and that as regards America, "in 1810 the statement that a hospital was absolutely essential to a medical school had to be proclaimed as a novelty." * Further, there is not one difficulty connected with a practising school that has not been overcome in the use of a hospital for clinical teaching. The school should be under the direction of the professor of education or whoever has chief control of the professional instruction. The number of pupils is comparatively immaterial if they are enough to form a good series of classes; but the more pupils the better. The main consideration is that the class-rooms should be somewhat larger than usual to admit of students being present. The organization, curriculum, and methods would demonstrate at every stage the value that was claimed for them. Why some people suppose the demonstrations would consist in series of experiments any more than the demonstrations in a hospital one fails to understand. The presence of the students would be a stimulus to a teacher rather than a distraction. Their first work would be to see all that the school demonstrated. That implies a great deal,—not at all what is intended by going about from one school to another. A student ought to take up each subject of the curriculum in detail, beginning with its appearance in the lowest classes and proceeding up the school. In this way he would see how difficulties were being approached, how surmounted, where failure threatened most, and so forth. He would see all the stages of a method, all the advantages and disadvantages which time developed, lying simultaneously before him. He would also have to serve as assistant under masters assigned him. But, it is argued, with the students at least, we should have experimenting. This is the only serious argument against such a school; and parents, it is said, would not have their children experimented on. The contrary has been the case in practice, both as regards the efficiency of the school and the feelings of parents. The argument is serious

* *British Medical Journal*, December 2, 1893.

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only because, if frequently repeated, it might at the outset—the most difficult time—take effect upon parents; and for this reason it would be a mistake to call the school a "practising," a "model," or a "normal" school, though even the associations now attached to these words might soon be outlived. Still, nothing need be allowed to obscure the fact that the school had nothing to distinguish it from others that was not to its advantage. Under the make-shift arrangements which prevail at present the only exercise of real value is the "criticism lesson," and its value is extremely limited compared with what it might be. The student-teachers are ignorant of the precise points at which a class has arrived in its ordinary studies; they are very likely ignorant of the methods adopted by the regular teacher, and the lessons which they prepare to teach have, therefore, to be more or less outside the regular curriculum. There is little in this arrangement that can be called a demonstration of principles and methods, and, obviously, it would not long remain attached to a course such as I have indicated. Consequently the usual procedure is for a university to confine itself to giving instruction, and for the students to go either to an ordinary school qualified to admit them, or to some sort of "normal" school, to learn the practical part of the business. Necessity is the only argument for the divorce, and it is only under very exceptional conditions that we find success.

The third part of the professional education would consist of conferences at which psychological and practical questions would be discussed, reports read by students on what they had seen and done, and criticisms made on any part of the work. This is quite as essential as the other two parts of the course,—instruction and demonstration,—for reasons which I have already mentioned. One might say it is more essential, but the value of the conferences depends on the thoroughness with which the other two are done, just as the value of demonstrations depends on what I have included under instruction.

All this, it may be said, is a castle in the air. I think that it is, and that it should be left there if we mean to persist in

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our present type of education; if, that is to say, we persist in our present attitude to teachers, and retain our present method of keeping them efficient. But if we really desire a general education there would be little difficulty in instituting every part of the professional education which I have given in outline. A natural place would be at the universities and university colleges. The latter will probably become more and more the centre of educational districts, and every sufficiently large district promises to have such a centre. It is to the teaching profession that their faculties of arts and sciences will have to look for the bulk of their students. Why not include this subject of education among those which qualify for a degree, as has now been done in Scotland? It is not at all to be expected that students will take it in addition to their degree work unless they are compelled. Even if it did qualify for a degree, it would not be an over-popular subject, unless, like philosophy, it came to be thought "easy," because it has, and at present can have, but small market value. But suppose we go further and say that all who are to be registered teachers must take a course such as I have indicated, having first given proof of their competence in point of knowledge. Well managed it could be overtaken in a year, and even the payment of this time-tax would of itself exclude many undesirable candidates from the profession. It should be easy to get a school from whatever sort of board may be intrusted with the secondary education of the district. But, again, I would protest against the notion of beginning in a "small way" and waiting for the operation of our *dictum de omni* at the next reformation,—the "evolution of existing forces." What chance of success or survival would a divinity, a law, or a medical school have if it began in a small way,—with, let us say, a single teacher, scholarships, and attractions.

If teachers had to take a course such as I have sketched, devoting themselves entirely to it for one year, we should have the means of establishing a general education throughout the schools. It is impossible, as we saw, under the method of creating interest by spurs and inducements. It cannot be realized without freedom, but there would be no right to free-

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dom without a guarantee that the teacher was able to supply himself with the intelligence and interest in his work that are now forced upon him. There remains the question of inspection and public examinations. They will certainly have a place whether we wish them or no, partly because no reform can simply write off the evil effects of any history, and partly because the common experience that education affects knowledge only and not character will keep most people from simple reliance on a teacher's education.

Personally, I think that both inspection and examination are excellent, provided they are of the proper character and put to their proper use. The educational evil arising from public examinations is absent on these conditions: firstly, if the candidates merely pass or fail,—that is to say, if there is no order of merit nor even classification; secondly, if there is no prescribed work; and, thirdly, if there is complete option as regards the number of subjects taken and the standard in each subject. All these conditions are present in the leaving certificate examinations of the Scotch Education Department, which, indeed, adds a fourth in not publishing the names of the successful candidates at all, nor giving any special facilities by which the results of one school can be compared with those of another. If the three conditions are maintained, it is not of much consequence who conducts the examination; but if there are several bodies competing for the same schools the first and second conditions cannot long survive. Above all, it should be understood that the examination is a test of a pupil's knowledge in this or that subject, not a test of general knowledge, still less of general education.

As for inspection, it would be of service both to teachers and to district boards, provided the inspector is placed on the same footing as the medical officer of a county council. In that case he would be more an adviser than a judge; he would visit schools without making special reports on them, and hear teaching without having to assign its degree from fair to excellent; his first care would not be to measure his words of praise and blame; and he would not have to make entries in the degrading "parchment certificate." His reports would

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be on the general state of education in his district with a special treatment of anything notable, and they would go from his board to the central council. Of course such an inspector would require to have special qualifications.

One ought, finally, to argue that the present time is suitable for a bold institution of the reform which I have advocated, because we are now, as we have never been, at the parting of the ways. But the democratic principle is understood to mean that reforms should wait in conception for the pressure of popular opinion. Now parents show no anxiety in the matter, and there is no universal desire among teachers to give up their present interest and type of education for an intrinsic interest which they cannot hope to feel and a type of education which they take to be impracticable. But as one does not like to be entirely negative or pessimistic after so many words, I will mention an easy and inexpensive reform which, under the present system, would secure more for general education than either inspection or the small ways. It is that all home lessons should be abolished in favor of one,—the learning of pieces of literature by heart. There would be two advantages in this, both directly in the service of general education. One would be that the pupils were taught how to learn, how strenuously to exercise their understanding and their memory, so as not to cultivate that languid habit of reading and rereading to small purpose, into which home learning falls. The other advantage—the learning of English poetry and any other suitable literature—could also become a means of competition both within the school and without; and it is the one subject in which all parents could and would take a common interest with the teachers. Ten or twenty lines a day committed to memory with constant revision would give a training in taste, and even in morality, better than anything that is at present submitted to examination and public competition.

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THE REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE:

THEIR RELATION TO THE INTERESTS OF LABOR IN SWITZERLAND AND IN AMERICA.

IT is a curious fact that in Switzerland, almost alone among the countries north of the Alps, representative government did not arise spontaneously. In some other nations the elected assemblies were smothered by the growth of the monarchical power, but in Switzerland it may be said that they never developed at all. The reason for this is to be found in the condition of the cantons and their peculiar relation to each other; for they were divided into the rural cantons, which were small enough to permit legislation by means of *Landesgemeinde*, or mass meetings of all the citizens, and therefore needed no representative chambers; and into what may be called the city cantons, where the country districts came to be ruled by the dominant city, and the city by a few patrician families; while the confederation itself was so loosely organized that its diet was not a true legislative body, but rather a congress of ambassadors. It was not until after the French Revolution that representative institutions began to be copied from other countries, and the cantons did not get the full benefit of them before 1830. The result was that when elected assemblies were finally introduced, the Swiss were not accustomed to them, and had not learned to provide the needful checks and balances. They were jealous of the men they elected, looking on them as masters rather than servants of the public, and a feeling arose, especially in the German cantons, that the people ought to have a right to prevent abuses of power by their representatives. Hence, elected chambers had been instituted only a short time when the Referendum was devised in order to give the voters a direct check upon them.

The Referendum, as the name implies, is the reference of an act of the legislature to the people for ratification or rejection, and it may be used in either of two forms. It is sometimes provided that every law must be submitted to

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popular vote, and in this case the Referendum is said to be compulsory. Sometimes, on the other hand, such a submission is required only when a certain number of voters demand it in writing, and under these circumstances the Referendum is said to be optional. Each of these forms is actually used in Switzerland. Thus, for changes in a constitution, whether Federal or Cantonal, the Referendum is always compulsory; and in some cantons it is compulsory for all laws; while in other cantons and in the confederation itself it is optional for ordinary laws.

In its actual working the Referendum is no empty formality, but a most important element in legislation. The federal laws furnish a good illustration of its use in the optional form. Here a popular vote must be taken on any law if thirty thousand voters demand it; and from 1874, when the system was introduced, to March, 1893, such a demand was made in the case of nineteen out of a total of one hundred and sixty-nine laws; that is, on the average, in the case of one law out of eight. Of these nineteen, the people ratified six and rejected thirteen, or about one-twelfth of all the statutes passed by the legislature. The effect of the Referendum in the compulsory form is even more striking, although it varies a good deal in the different cantons. In Zurich, one of the largest and most democratic, the people ratified ninety-seven and rejected thirty-one of the one hundred and twenty-eight acts passed by the legislature between 1869 and August, 1893. In Berne the proportion of laws rejected has been a trifle larger, while in Aargau it is nearly twice as great. In fact, in the cantons where the compulsory Referendum exists, the proportion of laws rejected varies from a little less than a quarter to a little less than half.*

These figures prove that the Referendum is an effective institution, for they show that it prevents the enactment of a great many laws which the people do not like; and hence it is important to consider the character of the laws that are

* This condition of things is true only of the German cantons. In the French cantons the Referendum has been adopted in the optional form, and is little used.

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voted down. The history of popular voting in Switzerland reveals a marked tendency to reject radical measures, and this is a very instructive fact, because it means that the people are really more conservative than their representatives. To take a single illustration: in 1878 a law to give daughters an equal inheritance with sons in the estates of their parents was passed by the legislature of Zurich, but defeated at the Referendum by a vote of more than two to one; and it was not until nine years later that this simple act of justice was sanctioned at the polls. Strange as it may seem, the tendency to reject radical projects applies to labor laws and other measures designed to improve the condition of the working-classes, although laws of that kind are commonly believed to be highly popular with the vast majority of the people. For examples of this we may again refer to the canton of Zurich, whose citizens are largely engaged in manufacturing, and therefore furnish a peculiarly valuable index of the probable effect of the Referendum in other industrial communities where the suffrage is universal. In 1870 the people there rejected a cantonal law which reduced the period of work in factories to twelve hours a day, which protected the female operatives, and forbade the employment of children during the years when they were required to go to school. In 1877 they voted against a Federal factory law intended for a similar purpose. In the following year they rejected a cantonal law to establish a school of weaving, and in 1881 they voted down another law providing for the compulsory insurance of workmen against sickness, regulating their relations with their employers, and making the latter liable for injuries to their employees caused by accidents. Moreover, they have repeatedly rejected measures for increasing the amount of education in the public schools (1872, 1885, 1888, and 1891), and they have refused to sanction bills to provide free text-books for the children (1887 and 1888). All this does not mean that the people are certain to reject laws intended for the benefit of the working-classes; on the contrary, they voted in Zurich heavily in favor of the recent amendment to the federal constitution giving the confederation power to enact a statute on the compulsory

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insurance of workmen. But it does mean that they are far less ready to sanction measures of this character than the legislature is to pass them.

The conservative nature of the Referendum was foreseen by a few shrewd statesmen, who objected to its introduction on the ground that it would impede progress; and, in fact, the Radicals to-day are less anxious for its extension than the Reactionaries. A reason for this result has been suggested by Sir Henry Maine in his "Popular Government," where he says (p. 97), "It is possible, by agitation or exhortation, to produce in the mind of the average citizen a vague impression that he desires a particular change. But when the agitation has settled down on the dregs, when the excitement has died away, when the subject has been threshed out, when the law is before him in all its detail, he is sure to find in it much that is likely to disturb his habits, his ideas, his prejudices, or his interests, and so, in the long run, he votes 'No' to every proposal." The same truth may be stated in a more concrete form. Every law designed for the benefit of the working-man involves, or rather is liable to involve, a present sacrifice on his part; but the sacrifice is not evident so long as the principle of the law is merely stated in general terms. It is easy, for example, for the working-man to understand the wisdom of forbidding the labor of children of immature years, but it is not easy for him to see how he gains anything by losing the wages his son has been earning in the mill. Hence, the same man may very well vote for a candidate or a party that proposes to enact a labor law, and yet find himself bitterly opposed to that very law when it is presented to him for approval. Moreover the Referendum places in the hands of employers a means of exerting a direct pressure upon their operatives which a secret ballot has not the slightest tendency to mitigate. The rejection of the first factory act in Zurich is said to have been largely due to the influence of the mill owners,* and a little reflection will show how they might bring about the defeat of a labor law. Sup-

* Stüssi, "Referendum und Initiative im Kanton Zurich," p. 49.

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pose, for example, that an act limiting the hours of work in factories is passed by the legislature, and that a demand is made for a popular vote. Then suppose the employers announce that if the law is ratified they will be obliged to cut down wages. In such a case, many of the operatives, not caring to run the risk of a decrease in wages or a strike, will be likely to vote against the act and kill it.

The Referendum has a purely negative effect. It merely enables the people to reject laws passed by their representatives; but the Swiss feel that the legislature ought not to have the exclusive right to originate legislation, that the people ought to have power to propose laws directly, and for this purpose a proceeding has been devised called the Initiative. The method of operation is as follows: A certain number of voters have a right to demand that a measure they advocate shall be submitted to the people, whether the legislature is willing to pass it or not; and if the popular vote is affirmative the measure becomes a law, with the same force that it would have had if passed by the legislature and ratified at the Referendum. The idea of the right of everybody to take part in public affairs by proposing laws for the good of the country has something very attractive about it, but in practice it has not proved of value. This is shown by the experience of the Canton of Zurich, where the Initiative has been used more than anywhere else, and where, as we have seen, the Referendum has been very effective. Here the Constitution of 1869 authorized any five thousand voters to propose a law, and from that time through August, 1893, nineteen different measures were brought before the people in this way. Four of them the legislature advised the people to adopt, and of these two were ratified at the popular vote, and two were rejected; but of the other fifteen proposals which were disapproved by the legislature, only three were enacted by the people. One of these set up Houses of Correction for tramps, a measure the wisdom of which was much doubted; a second re-established the death penalty, but this came to nothing, for the people rejected at the Referendum the law that was prepared to carry it into effect; the third

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abolished compulsory vaccination. Of the measures proposed and rejected at the polls, some were good and some bad, but they are of no consequence to us, for what we want to know is the effect of the Initiative in producing legislation. The net direct result in Zurich during twenty-four years has been the enactment of only three laws to which the legislature was opposed, and of these one was of doubtful value, about another the people seem to have changed their minds, and the third was clearly bad.

The confederation has made a short and, so far, not an altogether happy experiment with this institution. Any fifty thousand people have recently been given a right to propose a specific amendment to the constitution, but the first use that has been made of this privilege is not encouraging. The required number of voters demanded an amendment forbidding the slaughter of animals by bleeding, a measure whose real object was not to prevent cruelty, but to harass the Jews. The Federal Assembly urged the rejection of the bill as opposed to the principles of religious liberty guaranteed by the constitution, but it was nevertheless enacted by popular vote.

Whether the Referendum has, on the whole, been a benefit to Switzerland or not, it has certainly been a success in the sense that it has produced the result for which it was established. It seems to have brought out the real opinion of the people in regard to the laws submitted to them for ratification. But this cannot be said of the Initiative. It would be absurd to suppose that the popular longings of the citizens of Zurich are summed up in the three measures to which this institution has given birth in their canton; and it would be an insult to the Swiss to assert that they desired above all other things a petty persecution of the Jews. We are forced to conclude, therefore, either that the wants of the people are satisfied by the action of the legislature, and if so the Initiative is needless, or that it has not enabled them to express their real wishes, in which case it is a failure. The advocates of the Initiative in Switzerland admit that it has not yet developed much efficiency, but they hope for better results in the future.

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Experience, however, does not indicate that it will prove valuable. It applies only to questions which the representatives of the people, who are quite sensitive to public opinion, refuse to pass, and it leaves no room for debate or for compromise and mutual concession. Hence the chance of enacting a law by this process is very small. The conception is bold, but in practice it is not likely to be of any great value to mankind; if, indeed, it does not prove to be merely a happy hunting-ground for cranks.

There has been a great deal of discussion of late upon the question whether it would be wise to adopt the Referendum in America. More correctly stated, however, the question should be whether its use ought to be extended, for not only does it exist here, but in its modern form it is older here than in Switzerland. As early as 1778 the General Court of Massachusetts submitted to the people a constitution, which they rejected, and two years later the present constitution was ratified by popular vote. New Hampshire adopted the practice about the same time; whereas in Switzerland no constitution was submitted to the people until this century, and the habit of taking a popular vote on ordinary laws developed later still.

Before discussing, therefore, an extension of the Referendum in this country, it is necessary to know how far it is already in use.* In the first place, the requirement of a ratification by the people for any change in a State constitution is now almost universal. In the second place, the Referendum has been applied in some States to a number of matters that do not in form involve any change in the constitution, but which are closely akin to constitutional questions. The power of the legislature to contract debts, for example, is often limited, any excess above the limit requiring a popular vote. The object of this is clear. The debt limit cannot be absolutely rigid, because occasions when it must be exceeded are sure to arise, and it would be highly inconvenient to prescribe a limit in the constitution, and require a formal

* Cf. Oberholzer, "The Referendum in America."

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amendment for the temporary purpose of sanctioning an exception to the general rule. The use of the Referendum in this case is, therefore, merely a convenient method of dealing with a constitutional question where there is an obvious reason why the ordinary process of formal amendment should not be used. The same thing is true of the provisions which require a popular vote for the expenditure of money above a fixed limit, for the levy of certain taxes, and for the alienation of public property. In some States there are also provisions authorizing the legislature to submit to the people the question of woman suffrage or of proportional representation; and it is very common to provide that the capital of the State shall be determined in that way. All these matters are such as fall usually and properly within the province of the constitution, and the provision for a popular vote upon them may be regarded simply an informal method of amending that instrument.

These cases substantially include all those where a constitution authorizes the submission of laws to the people of the State, with one exception. After the banking mania of 1848, several of the Western States adopted provisions requiring a popular vote on all acts creating banks, although such acts are clearly not of a constitutional nature. This was a specific remedy for a particular social disease, and has scarcely been adopted at all outside of the States that suffered at that time, —a fact which seems to indicate that it is not in harmony with our institutions.

There is another class of laws that appear at first sight to present a second exception. I refer to the acts that deal with local questions, the so-called local option laws. But this is not a case of true Referendum, because it involves no appeal from the members of the legislature to their constituents. However strongly the majority of the people at large may dislike a measure, they are given no power to prevent its enactment. It becomes a law without regard to their wishes, and the question of its application in any particular district is decided solely by the voters of that district. Such a system is therefore only a method of local self-government in

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which the administration of the affairs of a city, town, or county is intrusted to the whole body of inhabitants.

It may be stated, therefore, that, except for the anomalous case of the banking acts, the Referendum in the United States has been applied only to constitutional matters, and to others that are closely akin to constitutional matters. It may be observed, moreover, that the questions presented to the people are comparatively general and simple; and it must also be noticed that the popular vote is always compulsory, never depending upon a request on the part of the citizens. Now all this is very important, because, if the Referendum ought to be extended, it would presumably be wise to follow the lines along which it has developed naturally.

There are, indeed, a number of grave objections to the introduction in America of a general Referendum on all laws. In our political system, a careful distinction is drawn between constitutional and other laws, the former being the principles established by the people as the ultimate sovereign, the latter regulations made by its representatives within the limits of their authority. The power of the courts to hold statutes unconstitutional rests on this distinction, for in exercising their high prerogative, the courts are maintaining against the legislature the fundamental principles which the people themselves have enacted. But if all laws were alike ratified by the people, this distinction would disappear, and there would be no reason for regarding one class of laws as more sacred than another. The courts would therefore lose their power to hold statutes unconstitutional, and, indeed, they have no such power in Switzerland. With the fall of this keystone of our system the checks and balances of our government would disappear, and the character of our institutions would be radically changed. In short, an application of the Referendum to ordinary laws could not be engrafted upon our political system without changing its very nature. At the present moment the labor leaders in America are in the habit of speaking of the courts as mere bulwarks of capital, instruments to defeat the aims of the working-classes. But such a view arises from a grave misconception. The courts are the guardians of the law and of

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the rights of every one who is not strong enough to protect himself. It is their mission to preserve and expand the principles that are developed by the toilsome process of social evolution, and in our system, where the most deep-seated of these principles are embodied in the constitutions, it is the duty of the courts to prevent an arbitrary violation of them. Surely, a destruction of the limitations of our government which would allow absolute power to be wielded by any group of men who could get control of the State would not be a benefit to the working-classes. Such a change would offer in America a temptation for an unscrupulous use of money which no Referendum could effectually counteract; and, indeed, there can be no doubt that a decay of confidence in the integrity and authority of the courts would lead to a vast increase of corruption of all kinds. The strength of the courts is, therefore, of at least as much permanent importance to labor as to accumulated wealth.

Another objection to a general extension of the Referendum here arises from our traditions. Except for the broad and simple questions involved in constitutional matters, the experience of our people has been confined to passing judgment on men and on general lines of policy. They have not been in the habit of considering the wisdom of particular statutes, or determining the need for the various appropriations. Nor would it be possible for them to do so. In a community as complex as ours legislation is a very intricate matter, and requires a great deal of careful study. This is far less true in Switzerland, where the cantons are minute compared with our States, and where the variety of social, commercial, and industrial interests is much smaller. Moreover, the Swiss statutes are less elaborate than ours, the executive having power to supply the details by means of ordinances. Hence the Referendum in America would impose on the voters a far more difficult task than it does in Switzerland.

This consideration brings us to the practical question of the form in which the Referendum could be used here. In no Swiss canton does the number of laws presented to the people average ten a year, and in most places there are only half that

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number even where the Referendum exists in the compulsory form. But in the American States the acts passed in a single year are far too numerous to permit the people to consider them independently or vote intelligently upon them. They often run up into the hundreds, and fill a volume so large that the voter would hardly have time to read it through if he sacrificed all his leisure for the purpose. No doubt the quantity of our legislation is excessive, but, even if it were very materially reduced, a general Referendum in the compulsory form would still be out of the question. There remains the optional form; but this the Swiss themselves do not like so well, because the agitation involved in the effort to collect the necessary signatures has a tendency to inflame political prejudices, and thus prevent a true expression of public opinion. In America this form is open to peculiar objections owing to the large size of the States, and to the great development of political parties. It would probably be used chiefly in the case of laws that had aroused a good deal of party feeling and had been carried as party measures. In such cases the signatures could easily be collected by means of the party machinery, without which the task would be difficult. It is likely, therefore, that the Referendum in this form would be used mainly as a means of annoying the party in power by delaying legislation, and would become a party weapon. Viewed in this light it is hardly to be desired.

Moreover, there is not the same need of a Referendum here that there is in Switzerland. The Swiss have no executive veto, no judicial process for setting aside unconstitutional laws, and in the cantons only a single legislative chamber. Hence they are much more exposed to the danger of hasty law making, and have a greater need of a veto in the hands of the people.

It is perhaps needless to remark that none of these considerations apply to the use of local popular voting as a means of municipal government. Such a system does not tend to obscure the distinction between constitutional and other laws. It brings before the people questions which, if sometimes intricate, are at least comparatively familiar; and it does not present such a quantity of subjects that they cannot be con-

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sidered separately. In fact, as an extension of the principle of the town-meeting to larger communities, and as a method of educating the voters and increasing their interest in local government, the system seems to offer a possible remedy for the sad condition of our great cities.

In discussing the Referendum from the stand-point of the interests of labor, we must remember that it is essentially a check on legislation, a method by which the people can reject measures, but not in any sense a means of passing laws; and since at the present day the working-classes are not in danger of new legislation hostile to their special interests, it is not clear how the Referendum could be a serious benefit to them. On the contrary, it would probably result in the rejection of labor laws at the polls; for chimerical as such a danger might seem at first sight, the experience in Zurich shows that it is very real. The Referendum, therefore, could not produce legislation for the benefit of the working-classes, and would be likely to hinder it. The instrument designed for the popular creation of laws is the Initiative; but it is hardly necessary to discuss this institution at length. It has not been a success in its native country, and there is no reason to suppose it would work any better elsewhere. It may be noticed, moreover, that, of the few laws it has produced in Switzerland, not one, so far as I know, has been passed in the interest of labor.

If there is any one class in the community to which the Referendum and Initiative would be an advantage, it would not appear to be the working-class. But we must place ourselves on a broader ground than this. A political system that is not adapted to a community, that is not good for it as a whole, is bad in the long run for every part of it, and ultimately is worst of all for the poor. We may go farther still, and say that, if the Referendum and Initiative were instruments by which the laboring class could legislate for its own special benefit, they would be mischievous. Class legislation enacted by a class for the exclusive benefit of that class is absolutely inconsistent with democracy, which is government by the whole people for the benefit of the whole people. If history proves anything, it proves that a democracy in which

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any one class becomes too powerful is doomed. Such a government is certain either to be replaced by a despotism or to degenerate into anarchy, which means suffering for every one, and above all for those whose daily bread depends on their daily toil. If this country is to play a glorious part in the world, if future generations are to point to it as one of the great forces in the progress of mankind, it must make a success of democracy. Other nations may seek refuge under different forms of government. Germany can take shelter under her monarchs, France can return to a Cæsar, England can, perhaps, restore her aristocracy, but, as far as human foresight can reach, America has no resource but democracy, and to make democracy a success, the classes must learn to understand each other and to have mutual forbearance and sympathy. If we do not learn this lesson, our retribution will be decrepitude and ruin, and that retribution will have been deserved.

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THE CONSCIENCE: ITS NATURE AND ORIGIN.

1. In any matter of investigation, it is a great point gained to have obtained a clear idea as to what the precise problems to be investigated are. Kant's most conspicuous service to ethical science consists in his having secured a practically universal recognition for the fact that one of the things that any theory of the nature and origin of the conscience must account for is the absence of all consideration of personal consequences, in this world or the next, in action that can claim the sense of duty as its motive. Cudworth, indeed, in his day had entered a protest no less emphatic than Kant's against such conceptions of duty as Paley afterwards set forth; but it is due to Kant that they can never in their bald and undisguised form, at any rate, be set forth again. While, however, the mercenarian theory, as regards its application to a future life, is very properly scouted by most ethical writers at the present day, another

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variety of the same theory—Mr. Spencer's—which maintains that it is the experience of rewards and punishments accorded in this world during many generations to right and wrong action respectively that has evolved the conception of duty, is one that is very widely accepted.

2. Before going into special questions affecting the Moral Faculty more in detail, it will be well to draw attention to the nature of the general psychological hypothesis that such a contention postulates. It postulates the possibility, in psychology, of transformations that follow the analogy of chemistry; metamorphoses which we can observe, but which we cannot so much as attempt to understand. The two Mills, in express terms, put forward such a hypothesis, and thus arrived at the conclusion that, in mental science, every mystery which could not otherwise be solved could be adequately explained by the formula that it was the result of "inseparable association." In chemical investigation, however, our situation as regards the subject-matters that we deal with is very different from that which obtains in reference to the matters of psychological investigation. We know that the mixture of oxygen and hydrogen has been transformed into water, because we have the water still in the same jar in which the gases were, and because we can transform it back into the gases. In mental change, on the contrary, such connecting links between the phenomenon in its old form and in its new, supposing transformations to take place, are altogether wanting. We are left thus without the means that we possess in chemistry of discriminating between the transformations of one thing into various shapes, and the mere sequences of things that, in themselves, are entirely different. Hence, to admit explanations of psychological problems based on the analogy of chemical change would be really to give up psychology, and with it the scientific treatment of politics, history, or literature, altogether. Such a concession would, at once, open the floodgates to a deluge of paradoxes and absurdities. There would then be no such thing in mental science as the *reductio ad impossibile*. No conceivable statement could be so preposterous that it would be, at once, and of necessity, rejected. We

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should have to admit that it was quite possible that plurality and totality were the same thing as truth and goodness, that pleasures and pains might be nothing but flexions and extensions of the muscles, that Mind and Will might be merely the dummies of a conjurer, put forward to attract our attention, while what we imagined them to be doing was really being done by other agencies altogether. Every assertion, indeed, would be, for us, alike possible and alike meaningless.

3. It will not, however, I imagine, be denied that there is such a thing as the *reductio ad impossibile* in mental science, and it is worth while to examine, for a moment, in what circumstances its application is possible. Though we think of it as a special form of argument, it enters, in physics, into every process of reasoning by which any general truth is established. What Mill lays down, in regard to Deduction, is true of all reasoning. It always comprises an Induction, a Ratiocination, and a Verification. What we call the *reductio ad impossibile* is simply the contrary of the Verification. It is the refutation of a false induction by direct comparison with fact. The inductions of physics have, no doubt, an immense advantage over the inductions of the subject sciences, in the tangible and palpable nature of the facts, by comparison with which they can be tested. The latter must, however, be capable of being, in some sense, tested by comparison with fact also, otherwise our best established psychological truths would be no truer than the idlest fancies. At the same time, when we look into the matter, it is not altogether obvious, on the surface, what it is, in mental science, that corresponds to fact in physics. If any one contends that the specific gravity of lead is not greater than that of water, I can drop a piece of lead into water and let him see for himself that it is so. Even here, of course, there is the all-important postulate that he and I mean the same thing by lead, by specific gravity, and by water. We cannot adequately define either lead or water, but we have another resource for making certain that there shall be no mistake nor misunderstanding on that point. We can point them out, and in pointing them out and observing their interaction, we can practically point out what their specific gravity

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means also. If any one should give vent to some psychological absurdity, such as, for example, that Hope is a disagreeable emotion, we cannot deal with him in the same simple fashion. I can appeal to my consciousness, and say that I do not find it so. If he appeals to his consciousness, and says that he does, it might seem at first sight that there the matter must end. A recent school of psychologists, indeed, who profess to be more scientific than the rest of us, do, as a matter of fact, contend that further controversy in such circumstances is impossible. If, however, the world generally accepted that view in all parallel cases, then literature in many of its forms —all newspaper literature, for instance—would come to a stand-still. All controversy that is not controversy about physical facts must be controversy about mental facts. We cannot, indeed, indicate and exhibit examples of Hope and of the Disagreeable Emotion as we can examples of Lead and Water. As, however, psychological controversy, in one form or another, is one of the great facts of the world, it is quite certain that we can achieve, more or less perfectly, the same end in some other manner. What we have to inquire into therefore is, How is it that, in psychological inquiries, we can make certain that the things which are the subject of our inquiries are the same? That we can do it somehow or other is quite beyond question. What is it that, for instance, fixes the identity of the concept "Hope," regarded as the concept of different minds? We know what fixes the identity of a leaden bullet as between the perceptions of one mind and those of another. It is the physical fact that I can lay my finger on it, and that you cannot lay yours there while mine remains there. As regards Hope, we have no resource analogous to this to fall back on. What resource have we? When we are asked what lead is, as I remarked, we can point to a specimen. When we are asked what hope is, we can, perhaps, answer: it is the sentiment of the shipwrecked sailor when an approaching vessel appears in sight. That is to say, we can narrate a series of events which never fail to generate "hope," and can tell our interlocutor that he can know "hope" as being the sentiment that such a series of events generates.

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It seems thus that the citation of the circumstances on which some mental phenomenon is unfailingly consequent is that which, in psychology, stands in the place which actual indication occupies in physics. We learn the meaning of lead originally by having it pointed out to us. We learn the meaning of "hope" originally by having the circumstances that generate it narrated to us, and by being told that it is the emotion that they generate. It is thus obvious that, in psychology, the oral sign has a *double* function to perform; it has to perform the function that it performs in physics, and also the function that in physics is performed by indication. The appeal to fact, in psychology and the cognate sciences, can, therefore, be really nothing else but the appeal to the natural unstrained meaning of the oral signs made use of. This appeal, though its validity has never been formally recognized, is made on every page in all metaphysical controversies. It is made whenever a general statement is tested by its application to an individual instance. The natural meaning of such words as "Causation," "Object," "Quality," "Identity," is, in metaphysics, our datum and our starting-point; and is also, from another point of view, like the facts of physics, that which we have to explain and to account for. To assume the right, as Hume does, to call the same thing an "object" on one page and a "perception" on the next, is to assume the right to disregard all that we can have in the shape of fact to build upon, and means consequently to construct our philosophical systems in mid-air.

4. These considerations, it seems to me, put it beyond all question that, in psychology, causation, in order to be perceptible to us at all, must be intelligible. It must follow the analogy of mechanism, not of chemistry. We must be able to see the cause in the effect, as we see the pressures in the direction of the sides of the parallelogram, in the motion that takes the line of the resultant. If we do not see the cause in the effect, it is hard to see how we can ever recognize it to be the cause at all. An explanation that postulates a metamorphosis in which the new product has nothing in common with the old, is, in psychology, simply equivalent to no explanation

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at all. Who is there that will contend that the hate of Achilles for the man "with one thing on his lips and another in his heart" had in it anything in common with the desire of reward or the fear of punishment? If it had not, however, it is useless to tell us that the one was evolved from the other. Such an explanation is one that we could never have any reason for believing to be the true one. We might as well say that his hatred of lying seemed to us to have been evolved from the sense of humor, or from the circulation of the blood. The one description of statement is not a whit less verifiable than the other.

5. Putting aside, then, the theory that such a mental phenomenon as the conception and obligation of justice is derived either directly or indirectly from the fear of punishment, we have the problem before us—what is its nature and what is its origin? Even if, as regards the latter, we should agree that it is something ultimate and unanalyzable, there would still be many questions left to answer. Are we to view it under the category of a sense perception—the Moral Sense, as it is often called—or, with Cudworth and with Kant, under the category of Reason? The latter conception appears *primâ facie* to be so far the right one that the alternative view of it, as a sense, would leave us altogether at a loss to account for the fact that, in Jurisprudence, as well as in the more special province of Ethics, questions as to the justice and injustice of individual actions are decided by processes of thinking, to all appearance, perfectly analogous to the processes by which we decide as to the truth or falsity of individual assertions. If, however, we view it as Reason pure and simple, we are viewing it as a lever without a fulcrum. In speculative thought, the process of ratiocination has always something to work upon that is not the product of reason itself, and so it must surely be in ethical thought. Reason aids us to ascertain what is true and what is false, but it does not give truth or falsity their meaning. In the same way it aids us to ascertain what is just and what is unjust, but assuredly it does not give justice and injustice their meaning. What is it, we may ask, that in each case does?

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6. The difficulty of understanding what truth is, as contrasted with falsity—one of the long-standing problems of Metaphysics—will perhaps be simplified for us if we reflect that it is a wrong conception of words and their meanings to imagine that they were made for us to think by. Their primary object was the communication of knowledge between man and man, and their primary meaning must therefore always imply the facts of intercourse. The child gets his first conception of truth when he gets his first conception of falsehood. To begin with, he believes every statement that he understands. Presently, however, some statement is made to him which future comparison with fact falsifies. He is told, let us suppose, that on opening the door of a certain room he will see a ghost. He opens it and sees none. This gives him his first conception of what is false, and with it his first conception of what is true as contrasted with it. From this out, the notion of the true always emerges when an anticipation corresponds with fact, the notion of the false when it fails to do so. These conceptions of truth and falsity thus originally derived from the facts of intercourse are soon extended to the facts of inference. Tasting sugar, he infers that white powders are sweet; tasting salt, he is pulled up by a contradiction, and has to correct his over hasty generalization. Thus we proceed from the first rudimentary inferences of infancy to the latest discoveries of science, framing our hypotheses on the analogy of observed facts, and either correcting or confirming them by comparison with other facts. The process is always from narrower truth to wider truth. Hence it is possible for us to have a perfect and quite unhesitating assurance as to what is true and as to what is false in individual instances, while, at the same time, no one has succeeded in the task that many have attempted, of framing a universally applicable criterion of truth and falsehood generally. Kant's question, "What can I know?" seems to involve a contradiction in terms. It assumes the possibility of deciding as to what we can know to be true before we know what it is that is in question. Among the things, at any rate, which he decided that we could not know, was the law of the evolution of species,

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which it is the great triumph of biological science in our age to have established. Mill, too, who had his own criterion of what we can know, so applied it as to class the undulatory theory of light, a theory now as firmly established as gravitation itself, among the matters which lie beyond the scope of human inference. Thus the difficulty or impossibility of framing these universal criteria is not confined to Ethics. It is just as applicable to the case of truth and falsehood as it is to the case of right and wrong; and thus the fact of its existence need no more tend to invalidate, in particular cases, our judgments as to what is right and what is wrong, than it tends in particular cases to invalidate our judgments as to what is true and what is false.

7. Returning, however, to the ethical question on which we are immediately engaged, we have seen what it is that gives truth and falsehood their meaning; what is it, we have to inquire, that similarly gives justice and injustice theirs? Unquestionably the man who, to his own detriment, avoids an action simply because it is unjust must, as Kant strongly puts it, be held to have avoided it altogether for its own sake, and not even in any remote or indirect fashion, from the thought of any "hypothetical imperative." If it should appear even that he has avoided it from such a consideration as his fear of the disapproval of those whom he loves on earth, or of a God whom he reverences in heaven, his motive, no matter how creditable to him, is still a motive widely removed from the pure sentiment of duty. It is only when the inner law, "Thou shalt not," enforces its edict without any hint of consequences, that he is animated in the true sense, by the sentiment of moral obligation. That a law can enforce itself without a hint of penalties in any shape, in case of disobedience, was a phenomenon that justly excited the awe-struck wonder of the philosopher; and the fact will still always remain a marvellous one, even if it admits of something further being said in the way of its explanation.

8. The analysis of the facts of volition, a subject which has largely occupied the attention of psychologists, has made

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the doctrine familiar to us, that before any conscious act of a human being can become a fact of the outward world, it must have existed as a representation in the mind that contemplates its performance. It is further a psychological doctrine that may be regarded as well established, that the conception of ourselves is primarily moulded on the conception of our fellows, and not conversely. The earlier mental fact is the recognition of the personality of others; the later, the recognition of our own. There is a stage, indeed, in the development of baby life when the child naturally speaks of himself by his proper name. He will say, for example,* "Charles is going out for a walk," instead of "I am going out for a walk." It is only later that he elaborates a signification for "Me and I." Plainly, then, we should naturally expect to find all the incidents of the conception of external personality, in some way or other, applicable to our own; and we do thus find such mental phenomena as self-pity and self-distrust manifestly modelled on the pity or the distrust that is ordinarily directed by us towards others. Bearing this in mind, let us glance at the phenomena of resentment and gratitude, and at the nature of their possible reflected application. Suppose the child receives an unprovoked or treacherous blow from one of his fellows, a double reaction will result, one or other aspect of which, according to the idiosyncrasies of his nature, will predominate. On the one hand, there will arise the dread of receiving another such blow, and the thought of how to escape it or to guard himself against it. From this, no doubt, nothing but hypothetical imperatives can ever be evolved. On the other hand, however, there will arise the impulse to punish the offender, and with this, I think, it will be found that the case is otherwise. Our difficulty, indeed, in conceiving how it is possible that the inner law can enforce itself without the threat of consequences is due, we may find, to our leaving one whole side of our emotional nature out of account. This impulse to punish an offender extends far beyond the limits of humanity. It characterizes, as we

* The illustration is Mr. Sully's.

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know, the mental reactions of most of the higher quadrupeds and birds, and it has its analogies far down in the lower world. Returning, then, to the conscious act, let us suppose that we are tempted to obtain some advantage for ourselves by betraying the trust reposed in us by another. Necessarily we represent ourselves as doing the contemplated act before we do it; necessarily, also, our self-representation is made, if I may so put it, *sub specie alius*. Does it not follow, therefore, that the anger that such an act would arouse if done by us to another will, in some shape, emerge, in respect of ourselves when contemplated as about to do it to another? In all this there is no thought of consequences; merely the contemplated act is presented, and the sentiment of indignation, perhaps of hatred, towards the perpetrators of such acts, whoever they may be, is aroused. The sentiment may, of course, be overborne by other considerations, and the act be still perpetrated in spite of it. Mechanics, however, also familiarizes us with the conception of a cause, not only existent, but fully effective, though to all appearance its effect is overborne by some other cause. The transformation of resentment, become impersonal, into the sense of justice, the voice of conscience, the pangs of remorse, is no doubt a transformation that is not at the first glance obvious. It is not, however, one of the chemical type, but one of the mechanical. We need postulate, for it, no metamorphosis that is involved in insoluble mystery. The very meaning of remorse is self-hatred; its very etymology implies such a meaning. We can arrive at our conclusion deductively. The known facts of ante-volitional self-representation, together with the known fact of the emergence of anger at the experience of injuries, form a *vera causa*, a cause whose effect we must seek for somewhere. We find it plainly in the Categorical Imperative, in the simple "Thou shalt not" that meets us when we contemplate doing ourselves that which we should resent as detestable if done to us by others.

9. One of the weakest points in the Kantian theory lies in the fact that it takes account of nothing but negative virtue. The man or the woman, indeed, who deliberates, but eventu-

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ally does right, appears, in his system, to be viewed as occupying a higher plane of morality than the simple noble nature that never entertains a thought of baseness. His moral law—a law pure and simple—may give us the line that must not be transgressed, but leaves the sentiment that we entertain towards the conspicuously noble and heroic altogether unaccounted for. As the explanation of the prohibitive aspect of the Conscience is to be found in the transformation of resentment, so, I think, the explanation of its positive aspect, of the approval, carried to any pitch of enthusiasm, that we accord to virtue, is to be found in the transformation of gratitude. If another helps us in our time of need, and if our nature is not altogether base, the hope of returning the good offices received, takes its place among the purposes of our lives. If we see a bystander assisted, in his time of need, by a third, a modified form of the same feeling emerges, which we call admiration or approval. If we ourselves perform good offices to others, our own approval is necessarily reflected on ourselves. The same principle, plainly, that makes us condemn the treachery of a Clytemnestra, makes us admire the self-devotion of an Alcestis, or the lofty "scorn of consequence" of an Antigone.

10. We have been led by one of the greatest of our poets, and perhaps the greatest of our critics of the Victorian era, to adopt, as regards the historical aspect of morality, a sharp antithesis between Hellenism and Hebraism. From the Greek, we are told, we have derived æsthetic refinement and intellectual culture; from the Hebrew, truth and justice. Goethe's Iphigenia, it is often said, is no echo of the thought of antiquity; she is a modern Jeanie Deans in classical costume. Such a conception does scanty justice to our ancient cousins of the common Aryan stock. It suggests, too, the absence of that deep organic connection which assuredly exists between the advance of intellectual culture and the advance of moral ideals, as well as between national strength and national virtue. If the Greek character had really been what such a theory assumes, Greece would never have rolled back the tide of Asiatic invasion, nor, in a subsequent generation, have Grecianized Asia itself. Where is it that we find this absence of

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the moral ideal in ancient Greece? Not surely in her Philosophy. The strong point both of Plato and of the Stoics, as well, indeed, as of Aristotle, was their Ethics. Not surely in her Drama. It would be hardly too much to say that the Inner Law, the pure Categorical Imperative, has never been so nobly set forth as it was by the tragedian Sophocles. "Nothing," says his Antigone, the maiden who was "to herself a law," "can be so dreadful as not to die with honor." How wide a gulf she discerns between the edict of the Civil Magistrate and

> "the unwritten laws divine."
> "Immutable, eternal, not like those
> Of yesterday, but made ere Time began."

The theme of the "Philoctetes" is the struggle between honor and policy in the mind of the son of Achilles, the hero who hated a lie more than the gates of Hell, and it is honor that, in the end, gains the day. In spite of the casuistry of Ulysses, the type of the Utilitarian statesman, in spite of a case rendered almost overwhelmingly strong by the considerations both of patriotism and of worldly wisdom, Neoptolemus finds himself, in the end, incapable of carrying out his half-perpetrated fraud, and gives back to the obstinate, unreasonable, half-demented hero, the arrows, which he had only to retain to insure victory for his country and unequalled prestige for himself. With admirable truth to nature, Sophocles makes the sentiment of self-hate at the perpetration of a fraud only arise, in its full force, when the fraud is already half accomplished. In the modern self-conscious nature, such sentiments arise earlier. Hence, other things being equal, the advance of cultivation, and, with it, of self-consciousness, must go together with the increased efficiency of the moral ideal as a causal agency. The grandeur of the personages of Greek tragedy is, in the main, an ethical grandeur. The dominant fact is the absence, as a motive of action, of the "hypothetical imperative." Even the ill-fated Polynices, his country's enemy, when he is told of the prophecy of Tiresias, never hesitates, but goes forward to his certain doom, simply because such honor as he has is bound up with his sacrilegious enterprise. Tennyson

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strikes a note that sounds in unison with that of Sophocles in the words that he puts into the mouth of Pallas Athene.

> "Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,
> These three alone lead life to sovereign power.
> Yet not for power (power of herself
> Would come uncalled for), but to live by law,
> Acting the law we live by without fear;
> And, because right is right, to follow right
> Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence."

11. It is hardly necessary to say that in a paper like the present, it is wholly impossible to touch on many of the vexed questions of Ethical theory. What has been said, so far, has left almost entirely undealt with the great question of the criterion of right and wrong, except in so far as it has been suggested that it is in the highest degree necessary to discriminate carefully what we think of as such a criterion, otherwise we may find that we have set ourselves to the solution of a problem that is in its very nature insoluble; that we are in search of a philosopher's stone or a formula for squaring the circle. If we ask what is the criterion of truth and falsehood, the answer must be,—there is none universally applicable. If we ask, however, how is it that we discriminate between what is true and what is false in any of the innumerable cases in which, as a matter of fact, we discriminate without a moment's hesitation, we find that what we do, in the last resort, in such cases, is always to appeal to the concurrence of others. What is visible or even tangible to us alone may be an illusion; what is visible and tangible to any one similarly situated is certainly real. When the matter, the reality of which is in question, is something that is not visible and tangible at all, the test is of a much more complicated character. Similarly, in morals, it will be found that while what arouses the resentment or evokes the gratitude of ourselves alone need not necessarily be identical with what we call "bad" or "good," that which would arouse the gratitude or evoke the resentment of any one similarly situated will always be so. If we had to explain to any one who did not know it,* the meaning of the words "good"

* Nor, of course, a synonym in any language.

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or "bad," as applied to any action, we could only do it by narrating to him circumstances in which gratitude or resentment would naturally emerge in the mind of the individual who was the object of the action. We have thus, in such acts, the types of the "good" and of the "bad," as we have in that in the world of sense which exists alike for all, and in that which exists for ourselves only, the types of the real and the illusory. In both cases, these types are the foundation on which Reason rears her structures. Her mode of operation, in each case, too, presents innumerable analogies; or it would be more correct to say, it is the same process dealing with a different subject-matter. We think of the "Ought" feeling as something specially pertaining to Ethics, but "Ought" is the formula of Deduction in speculative truth also. We speak as naturally of what the answer to a sum in arithmetic "ought to be" as of what a man "ought to do" in given circumstances. The basis of all speculative reasoning is abstraction, the singling out of the one salient aspect of the fact that we are dealing with, and the exclusion of all others; similarly the judge, perhaps a Brutus sitting in judgment on his son, must exclude every consideration applicable to his son except such as he possesses in common with every other citizen. Hence the cultivation of the habit of accurate reasoning cultivates, beyond all question, a tendency of thought conducive to just action also. If we inquire on what ground is it that we hold all the innumerable beliefs which we do hold, but which yet can never be verified for us by comparison with fact, we find that, if we hold them with good reason, their ground is this,—that the evidence which we have for them is identical in character with the evidence which we have for the beliefs that are subject to verification. We have arrived at both by methods that are the same. Our ground is the parity of reasoning; and, working on the basis of this parity, we are continually able to widen the scope of the knowledge that we hold as valid. The same thing applies in Ethics. Mill says, with truth, that the possibility of extending knowledge beyond the bounds of observation rests on the fact that there are such things as parallel cases in nature. It was also by means of a parallel case

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that Nathan was able to bring home to David the recognition of his guilt. Like speculative truth, Ethical truth, by the parity of reasoning, is ceaselessly widening out from its centre. It is the characteristic of both, also, that every increase in the extent of the structure is necessarily accompanied by a more secure establishment of the foundations on which it all rests.

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THE DIFFICULTY OF TAKING SIDES ON QUESTIONS OF THE DAY.

No writer on popular government has been more suggestive to me than Sir Henry Maine. He had the peculiar gift of recognizing the significance of those commonplace facts which are liable to be overlooked for the very reason that they are constantly before us all the time. It would be impossible to forget the vivid impression made on my mind by his observation about the great influence exerted on the course of human affairs, from the mere "natural tendency of men to take sides." The truth of the assertion was at once apparent, and the evidences for it have been steadily cumulative through all my personal experience and study of men. But, on the other hand, as I have gone on in life, I have been impressed with the fact that there is a class of persons who show the contrary tendency and seldom take sides at all. They are reluctant to commit themselves on the great questions of the day, and oftentimes could not do so even if they made the effort. The existence of this latter class is the anomaly which I shall endeavor to analyze and explain.

An attitude of "suspended judgment" is especially characteristic of the scholar or man of letters, of the man who thinks and reads a great deal or has a wide acquaintance with facts. It accounts for the circumstance that social reform measures do not more often take their start from what we call the edu-

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cated classes. A singular inertness tends to steal over the mind after it has reached a certain stage of culture. Educated people are likely to be suspicious of reform measures and of the people who advocate them. They do not, as a rule, take the initiative, but prefer to cling to what is established, leaving it rather to other persons to begin the agitation. Even when they show a positive sympathy in favor of some measure, they are inclined to so "whittle it away," that little or nothing remains to call forth the enthusiasm of "the masses."

Social evolution would take place much more rapidly, hopefully, and happily, if this were otherwise. The scholar may have the insight; he knows the facts and understands the laws, but lacks either decisiveness or enthusiasm, and is not naturally a reformer. On the other hand, the average reformer lacks the knowledge of history; he is unacquainted with the facts on a large scale, but has the spirit of devotion and self-sacrifice; he can work for a cause.

Now and then the genuine instinct of the reformer manifests itself to some extent in the scholar. When this happens he will be a very unhappy man. There can be no peace or restfulness of soul for him on earth. He yearns for change and longs to go forward, but is held back by the knowledge of too many facts, and, therefore, cannot avow his support of any one theory. Those whose welfare he has most at heart will be the ones least disposed to listen to him, because he cannot agree with them in their measures. He wants to help them, but his own observations and reflections make it plain to him that many of the proposed measures would inevitably be a failure; and so, though eager for real reform, he is obliged to wait, and is in the unhappy position of being unable for a time to do anything at all. There is nothing more overwhelming than this sense of inability to act with others, from your consciousness that the measures proposed are such as you cannot co-operate with; and that if you offer other measures there would be no approval for them, because it would require so much time and patience to carry them out.

What a satisfaction it would be if one could think steadily for a while about any one of the great problems of the day,

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make up one's mind upon it, then lay it aside as settled, and never have your judgment on the matter call for a reconsideration. It would be such a relief to the overtaxed mind if we could put our opinions away in a cabinet, each in its own pigeon-hole, labelled, so as to be accessible whenever we cared to draw it out and make use of it. Some persons are capable of this, and I am sure that they are happy men and women. Yet it is doubtful if the majority of people, after taking sides, could explain how they came to their views. They have simply acted from the natural tendency referred to by Sir Henry Maine. They do not really know whether they have thought a great deal about a subject or not, and they could not say positively to which of their opinions they had come by sober reflection rather than by the accident of circumstances. They know what they think, but how they came to think in that way they do not know.

When one displays hesitation about expressing himself on important questions of the day, when he seems reluctant to have opinions, at once he will be considered by many persons as insincere. It will be said that he is afraid to commit himself. The public assumes that he *must* have made up his mind, because nearly everybody else has done so. Beyond any doubt, a lack of sincerity often exists among those who do not commit themselves. There is too much of such moral cowardice. One may not wish others to know that he has definite convictions, even when he has made up his mind, because it would be to his advantage if the public assumed that he was in a state of uncertainty. He understands the workings of prejudice, and sees that the present wave of opinion may die out altogether in a short time, or shift in an opposite direction. Yet, if he commits himself and opposes the transient prejudice, he may lose influence; so that a step of that kind would strike him as suicidal. How far this caution is legitimate we cannot say. I fancy that much mental suffering is experienced by those whose opinions are carefully watched every moment, and yet who wish to be strictly true and consistent in their attitude.

It is quite certain that if there is to be progress there must

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be a class of men who are ready to commit themselves, and take a stand on important issues, *fearless of consequences.* If educated people will not do this, then we must be glad that it is done by the uneducated rather than not to have it done at all. We must have reform. The agitation has to begin somewhere, even if the method be somewhat indiscriminate. Some one must go ahead, take the lead, be a radical, and insist on changes. Civilization can advance by no other means.

And yet, when the human mind is once possessed with this tendency, it is deplorable how liable it is to act utterly without bound or limitation. Social reform movements are often held back for generations because of this. The instinct for change becomes a mania. One begins, perhaps, by doubting the value of some one feature of our industrial system, and attacks it vigorously. Then, having started along this line and become eager over this special reform, he is led, erelong, to disbelieve in the whole system, and to doubt the very institution of private property. Or he may take up the methods of taxation, and become convinced that they should be radically modified. Yet he is not liable to stop there. He endeavors to look further and see the real cause of the evils, and finally concludes that there is something bad in the entire structure of society, and that the whole political system should be taken down and built over again. After having invaded the political and industrial world with his schemes, he begins to doubt as to the worth of existing social ties; he questions the value or sacredness of marriage; he would renovate or revolutionize the structure of the Family, and finally would overthrow all institutions of religion.

Few go the entire length we have been describing. Yet there are many instances of this tendency. From starting with one earnest measure of reform about which a man has become enthusiastic, and into the circumstances of which he may have made an exhaustive investigation, by and by he appears as the advocate of a whole "car-load" of reform measures. This lack of mental balance on the part of the reformer is a sad check on the progress of human society.

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He loses the sense of discrimination, and therefore fails to inspire confidence in his cause. His lack of care and judgment keeps men from sympathizing and indorsing important measures of reform. It is melancholy to realize that to be "emancipated" at the present time means often being opposed to anything and everything which has come to be "established," or, on the other hand, being in sympathy with the "new views" just because they are new. This may not imply *thinking for one's self* at all. It is almost as easy for certain minds to fall into the habit of showing sympathy with what is new because it is new, as for others to continue in the habit of approving what is old because it is old.

If we are going to take sides at all, it is vital that we should be able to put trust in one another's judgment, and use one another's knowledge and opinions. But we can only do this in so far as we are convinced that people have come to their convictions through sober reflection. The point to be remembered is that at certain epochs or on certain problems it may require moral courage *not* to take sides until we know exactly where we are. We, each one of us, have the cause of the social ideal in our charge, and we shall be responsible for any step taken by us which may interfere with its furtherance. We must be careful, therefore, lest we unintentionally create a prejudice against the very cause we have most at heart.

It is unfortunate, for instance, that many of those who are working especially for a higher *industrial* system should also be disposed to tamper with the sacred institution of marriage. It would surely be much better for their purpose if they would struggle with might and main for one great reform at a time, and make a thorough investigation of all the facts or circumstances connected with it. They forget that the antagonism aroused by their attacks in one direction also tends to be turned against measures they are advocating in another direction; and by this mistake they lose rather than gain sympathy for the chief aim they have in view.

Now, it is one thing to be eager to have society, with all its institutions, renovated from top to bottom, and quite another

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thing to be ready with a complete system of measures by which to bring about the renovation. We may be driven to acknowledge that the conditions are exceedingly bad, and that there is an evil all the way through. We may brood over the matter and yearn for a higher, deeper, purer humanity. This will be the attitude of every genuine idealist. But with many people it is very hard to recognize an evil and not be quick with a remedy. What really makes the thoughtful man hesitate is the very depth of his sympathy and the magnitude of the problem. He is confronted with an immense number of schemes, but does not know whose judgment or opinions he can trust. A multitude of minor influences are constantly acting upon men and inducing them to take sides. How far can the thoughtful man join forces with such persons and put confidence in their attitude?

It is only necessary to illustrate this situation by observing how quick men are to side with the class or profession to which they belong. It is sometimes asserted that the real tendency is always for a man to follow the lead of his personal interests. But I very much doubt this statement. There is a social consciousness; and the social consciousness which speaks in ourselves is very liable to be that of our profession or of our class. But it would be better, it seems to me, if men took sides chiefly from a consideration of their own interests. Under these circumstances each man would at least be somewhat under the check of his own conscience. A class-conscience is often very weak and unstable. One will forgive his class for conduct that he would never excuse in himself; he will allow himself to judge with his class when he would be ashamed to take such a stand all by himself. This is what makes class-judgment so menacing. It has a weak conscience, and is quite sure to take sides with its own interests. How often we know a man's stand-point in advance, simply by knowing the class, occupation, or profession to which he belongs!

When, therefore, people come to us urging us to join forces with them and enter the lists in the cause of the reform measures which they are advocating, or against measures which

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they are opposing, we may be compelled to hesitate because we fear they are acting under class prejudice. Every man who sides with his class should be far more cautious in judging as to the facts, and far more thorough in investigating them, than if he sides the other way. It is very rare for a man not to think that most of the wrong is on one side. If he is disposed to believe that there is wrong on both sides, he is in a pretty bad predicament. He must stand out in the cold or keep his views to himself; for no one wants to listen to him.

We are naturally prejudiced in favor of the judgment of the men of our class or profession. We are apt to think that they are better capable of forming trustworthy opinions. I think this explains the lack of accord between the scholar and man of affairs; although the lines of prejudice between these two elements are much less sharply drawn than formerly—especially in England. But there has always been more or less distrust between the practical man and the scholar. If the latter advances an opinion, he is said to be "a mere theorist." If the man in practical life contradicts him, or voices a different view, we may hear the remark, "Oh, well; it is the tradesman's stand-point; he cannot help it." The same unfortunate distrust often exists between the economist and the working-class. Many will deny this. But in talking with the working-class I have found a striking lack of confidence in the men who hold the chairs of political economy. It is asserted that they are allied with the possessing class, that they belong to institutions which depend on "good dividends," or on the favor of the wealthy for their very existence, and, therefore, that they would not take sides against the interests of their institutions. On the other hand, in talking with some economists, one meets with the statement that the working-class want changes just from mere restlessness, that they demand higher wages irrespective of improvement in the amount or quality of their work, that they will not look squarely at the facts, that, in a word, they are agitators rather than true reformers.

It is my conviction that this mutual want of confidence is a

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mistake, and that neither class of persons is what the other is inclined to believe about it. But I am only describing conditions and analyzing a situation. These conditions exist, and they are certainly greatly to be regretted; because they prevent the thoughtful man from being in a position where he can make up his mind without prejudice, while at the same time using all the knowledge and insight of other men which might be serviceable for that purpose.

It is humiliating to know that those whom one wishes to influence will not listen, unless they regard one as substantially in agreement with themselves. What is influence worth, after all, under these circumstances? A man who takes the other side may almost be ruled out of his class. He is a "black sheep" in their number, and they do not want him. Such men do not say to us very often "give us sympathy." We could do *that* with all our hearts. They say to us rather, "come and approve the course we have been pursuing." But if we do that, and gratify their wish, we may be conscious that we shall be their actual enemies and not showing them true sympathy at all. The very depth of our interest in their cause may compel us to disagree with them.

This is the disheartening feature in much of the agitation of the present day. We are reluctant to believe that the men who disagree with us really sympathize with us. Instinctively we turn to the leaders who take our side and put our cause in their hands. This situation of itself explains why the thoughtful and conscientious man finds it difficult to take sides at all.

It is singular how determined many persons are that we should come out squarely with a "yes" or "no" in reference to their one attitude. Some time ago I was met by a man, deeply interested in social reform, at the railway station in St. Louis, who turned upon me rather suddenly and confronted me with the question, "Now, give me a straight answer. Are you an individualist or a collectivist?" If I had given him a straight, unqualified answer, I would have been untrue to myself. It would have been done in order to gain his sympathy, or to make him feel that I had taken his side.

My answer would not have been straight to the point, because

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it would have been addressed to the real cause he had at heart, and not to his theory. My attitude on social reform takes its start not from enthusiasm for an abstract theory, but from my sympathy with the suffering and the stricken everywhere. As a religious teacher devoting my life and energy to the moral elevation of the race to which I belong, my heart goes out first and supremely to the weak, the struggling, to those who are least able to protect themselves. Whatever theory or system or measure would lift the struggling masses of my fellowmen to a higher level, advance them to a purer, nobler, happier condition of life, would be the measure or theory I would approve of. Ask me what my heart yearns for, and I can give my answer without qualification. Ask me what class of human society I want most to help, and I know on the instant. Ask me what theory I believe in,—that is another matter.

A study of the laws of social evolution has convinced me that there is no one special reform measure, no one system or theory which is adapted to the improvement of every class of society in every age or under all conditions. The method that would be most advisable for Germany is not the method that would accomplish the same results in the United States of America. The reform measure suitable in helping the struggling masses a thousand or two thousand years ago may not be the measure most serviceable or advantageous for the same purpose at the present day. The system which we might try at this time would, perhaps, not be the system most advisable two centuries hence.

Hence, one might be a collectivist for one country and an individualist for another; or, on the other hand, an individualist for one age and a collectivist for another. We can see that there is no one panacea which can be applied universally to every age or to all conditions of society. For this reason we cannot get much further ahead until we are more thoroughly convinced that there is a separate social problem for each and every country; yes, we might say for every city and community. We can see plainly enough that the same industrial system or the same political institutions could not be adapted

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indiscriminately to all the nations of the earth. The system to be tried will need to be adjusted to the dominant motives which have been prevailing in each community or in each age or country. A man might have to be an individualist in one century in order that collectivism might triumph in the next century.

One truth, however, comes clear and positive out of the discussions and experience of the last twenty-five years. The time has gone by when we can judge of the worth of a reform measure in the abstract all by itself. We cannot give a straight, unqualified answer to many of the social questions of the day. If we examine all the facts at our command or search through history for its law, it comes home to us that we cannot assume that one theory or one system may be altogether right or altogether wrong. It is idle for us at the present time to assert squarely that we do or do not approve of "trades-unionism." The system must depend on the country where it is tried, or on the special method it introduces. One trade-union may be altogether bad and another emphatically good. So likewise we can no longer assert that we do or do not believe in "strikes." This, too, is one of the great questions of the day; but the real point to be considered now is that each occurrence of this kind is to be judged by itself. And so likewise of the many reform measures and schemes being proposed in this country or Europe—the eight-hour law, old-age pensions, taxation on land or on income and inheritance, municipal ownership of street railways and water-works, high tariff, low tariff, or free trade, strong local government, or strong central government, a minimum living wage for the working-class, the nationalization of many branches of industry, more stringent divorce laws. Each great step or measure must be approved or disapproved according to the circumstances of the locality for which it is intended or the class of persons it is designed to help—that is, *on the merits of its specific case.*

This is surely one of the most important changes which must take place, if it is ever going to be possible for thoughtful men to take sides on questions of the day. It is essential

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that we abandon the wholesale method of judgment, and ask whether this special case or that special method was justifiable or unjustifiable.

And yet in this whole problem in reference to the difficulty of taking sides, the most vital consideration is not as to local conditions and circumstances any more than as to the merits of abstract theories. The fundamental cause of the whole embarrassment is that people do not know whom to trust or to believe in. They want leaders, but are afraid of those they have; this makes a direful situation.

A theory has very much less influence than the kind of men who advocate it. I know that this statement will strike many as a rather startling heresy. We have been told again and again about the influence of *ideas*. Nevertheless, experience with the world more and more confirms my assertion. Ideas and ideals have existed for thousands of years; but real *men* are rare. When the right man comes forward, then, for the first time, the ideal becomes a living force. It may wait for centuries before this will occur. Whether a theory becomes a menace or an encouragement depends on the character of the persons whom it influences. The trouble is that people do not know where to turn for genuine leaders.

Yet it is human society itself which is responsible for the lack of trustworthy leaders. Such men would appear if they were truly wanted. But pride of judgment or the instinctive disposition to take sides prevents men from accepting the true leader when he comes. They want a universal panacea,—a "cure-all,"—and they dream of a speedy coming of the millennium.

It is this weakness on the part of average mankind which tempts the ordinary leader to over-promise for the measures he is advocating. He knows at heart that these measures cannot perform one-quarter of what the people desire. But he must exaggerate their usefulness in order to get any attention at all. This tendency has demoralized political life so that the thoughtful man very rarely has any confidence in the great leaders in the arena of politics. On the other hand, the leader himself knows that his measures are sure to end in

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compromise, and that he must ask for a great deal in order to get anything at all.

This condition would surely be most disheartening if it were not for the fact that it indicates where the solution of the difficulty may ultimately lie. As men become more *true*, it will be easier and easier to take sides on questions of the day. The existence of civilization itself requires an ever larger degree of integrity in the individual components which make up the social organism. I believe for this reason that it will become less and less difficult, as civilization advances, for the thoughtful, conscientious man to be able to make up his mind, and to ally himself with the causes which he has most at heart.

We must always allow for a certain amount of human weakness in men's judgments. No person can ever altogether escape from the influence of his occupation or life-work. It would be unfair to expect that the business man should be accustomed to pause and delay for long intervals before making up his mind. In his occupation it is absolutely necessary for him to be quick and alert, able to pass judgment and decide with little delay. This ready intuition probably has a great deal to do with success in commercial life.

It is not surprising that the business man, who watches all the social agitation, should think first of its effect upon trade and commerce. He is there for the sake of making his business successful. How can he help being concerned with every change going on which might have an effect upon his efforts? But there is one very serious mistake often made by men of affairs, whether belonging to the working-class or to the possessing class. The necessity of forming opinions as to what course should be taken, at the very moment of greatest excitement, will often lead a man at the same instant to make up his mind on the fundamental principles. He becomes "set" along a certain line at the very time when sober judgment is least possible. In this regard the scholar has the advantage, and surely is more trustworthy in his views on the fundamental issues involved. The very fact that he is not compelled to take a decisive course of action at the moment makes it pos-

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sible for him to hold his mind in a state of "suspended judgment" at the epochs of greatest excitement. For this reason it strikes me that the man of affairs owes a certain deference to the judgment of the scholar on the fundamental economic laws and tendencies. I believe, for instance, that the political economist would be a far better judge than the man in commercial life on the question whether a reduction of the tariff would tend to increase or decrease the total production of wealth within a given country. But the man in commercial life would probably be a much better judge as to the effects of some specific tariff measure on the condition of trade at any one moment.

In connection with every scheme of reform, we must remember that it will be looked at from two quite opposite points of view, according to the persons to whom it is presented. On the one hand, there is the theorist or idealist who will judge it from its more ultimate effects on the character of the people rather than on their material welfare, and on the country at large or all mankind rather than on some one locality. On the other hand, the practical man will judge it by the immediate effects it would have on every-day affairs, or on purely "temporal" interests. But as every reform measure is brought forward with the intention of having it adopted and tried, we often have a very complicated problem in determining what scheme will be "along the lines of least resistance." The idealist is compelled to adjust his plans or measures of reform to the men who are inclined to view everything from the "temporal" aspect. When, therefore, two schemes are presented to us, we might be obliged to take sides with the one less near to our hearts, because there would be absolutely no hope of winning acceptance for the other at the present time. It implies that oftentimes we must choose the less satisfactory programme rather than have nothing done at all.

This is the saddest ordeal which awaits the idealist. He knows that he can never get exactly what he wants, and the problem is always facing him to what extent he shall give in and accept the next best measure. One has to grapple not

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only with a complicated set of facts, but also with his conscience. Many a strong and enthusiastic nature has succumbed and grown weak in the fight, from a constant surrender of this kind. If the man who does this is not a vigorous, strong character at the outset, he is sure to become utterly demoralized.

Yet there are times when we know that it would be a waste of energy to be constantly advocating a reform which the great majority of the people at the present moment would not consider or tolerate. If we are conscious that even after the adoption of a measure a large proportion of the persons affected by it would be antagonistic to it and seek for every possible means of opposing or evading it, then we may conclude that while this would be ideally the best system or scheme, practically we should accomplish little or nothing by trying it (because it would not be along the lines of least resistance). This is one reason, for example, why we have probably done well in America to abandon the proposed plan of an income tax, although it might seem ideally the most justifiable. In the place of this we may find it preferable to urge an extensive scheme of inheritance taxes, because there would be less disposition on the part of the mass of the people to shirk it or oppose it. Another similar difficulty in this country is always facing us in reference to ideal plans of reform, from our knowledge that even if they are adopted they may be thrown aside with impatience before the experiments have had a fair trial. A great deal of legislation has been wasted in America owing to lack of patience on the part of the people.

It is no mean problem, therefore, which confronts the man who wishes to take sides on questions of the day, and at the same time be sure that in doing so he will be working for the best interests of the human race.

We, each of us, may have a social ideal that we would like to see realized. No earnest mind will content itself with aims which have reference only to the welfare of mankind at any one time. He will be ever looking forward to the human race which will be existing ten thousand years hence. That will

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be the ultimate goal he will *actually* be laboring for. It will hold him as with a vice and never let him go. He may not have very much to say about it, because it would strike average minds as only a fanciful dream, which would make them smile if it were talked about a great deal. Yet every deep, earnest, thoughtful man is sustained by just such a dream. It is unreal only because it is so far away.

We know that the ultimate aim we are striving for cannot be accomplished until long after we have gone to our rest. The vision of the coming centuries will solace us for the slow determined struggle we must make at the present time. Much of our effort will be concentrated merely on building the stepping-stones. It is in the choice of these that we have the greatest difficulty in taking sides. Nearly all the reform measures of the day are of this character; and the man who thrusts his scheme forward as a final and immediate solution to all the difficulties which are interfering with the advance of the human race, is cherishing only an illusion. It is the humanity of all future time, and not this human race of our own century, which is involved in our problem.

Much anxiety prevails over the vast amount of agitation going on in reference to these schemes for social reform. Some are looking upon it as a menace to order and established institutions. They fancy that it either leads men to make up their minds too quickly, or else keeps them from making up their minds at all. I am satisfied that those who take this attitude are committing a grave mistake. Discussion in the long run will discourage more violence than it causes. The appalling danger comes from the possibility that the mass of the people may continue to take sides from sheer instinct or from downright prejudice. We want more rather than less discussion, more rather than less agitation. The human race will only begin on its true ideal march of progress when it has conquered the habit of taking sides from a mere natural instinct or tendency, and is disposed to act on the best judgment of the most competent minds who have had the largest experience and are best acquainted with the facts and laws of history.

It is manifest that I am not undertaking to give a solution

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to any of the great questions of the day. My aim has been to account for the existence among thoughtful men of this difficulty in taking sides. My purpose was to discover whether the trouble lies in human nature itself, in a lack of enthusiasm through increasing culture, in an inability to get at the facts, in the absence of true leadership, or springs from a new complexity in the problems themselves. All these causes are undoubtedly more or less at work.

It may seem as if my attitude were one of discouragement. It will strike many that I have been making a plea on behalf of a continuous state of suspended judgment. That would certainly be utterly outside my purpose. It would be moral cowardice for a man to hold himself indefinitely in such an attitude. My readers are mainly students or thoughtful people, men who want to be conscientious in their attitude. Undoubtedly the difficulties embarrassing such persons when seeking to take sides are much greater than ever before. Yet this can be no excuse for inaction. There is a way out of the difficulty, and at some future time I should be glad to face that aspect of the subject and treat it at length. The best clue that I have met with anywhere was given me by Dr. Felix Adler, in what he said to me in a recent conversation over the points of this article. I give his own words,—

"Action itself is the best means of discovering the principles that should determine action. We are not at liberty, indeed, to act blindly or on mere impulse. But having endeavored, with painstaking conscientiousness, to ascertain the Right, let us heartily and courageously begin to put in practice what we think so; always, indeed, holding our convictions subject to revision under the teachings of experience, and yet serving what we hold to be the Truth with unbounded devotion, because it stands to us, for the time being, in the place of the Absolute Truth."

But this would involve another chapter.

W. L. Sheldon.

St. Louis, Missouri.

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DISCUSSIONS.

THE COSMIC AND THE MORAL.

In his paper on "Natural Law, Evolution, and Ethics," in this Journal (July, 1895, p. 489), my friend Professor Royce presents, under the caption of "Discussion," an interesting attempt to reconcile the "cosmic" with the "ethical process," *apropos* of the current discussions raised by Mr. Huxley's much-talked-of paper on "Evolution and Ethics." The development given by Mr. Royce is based upon the well-known distinction between the "world of description" and the "world of appreciation" of the same author's work, "The Spirit of Modern Philosophy." He also refers to the article of his on "The External World and the Social Consciousness" in the *Philosophical Review* (September, 1894). The currency already attained by these views of Mr. Royce makes it unnecessary that I should stop long on the preliminaries of his present paper.

Briefly, the argument is this: All the formulas of natural science are descriptions of phenomena which are held together just for the purposes of natural science. The growth of the thought of the objective is, genetically, the sorting out and grouping by these formulas of the items of experience which have two general characters: they are capable of "description," and also of "social verification." The description is necessary to their being statable in interconnected wholes or groups: the verification is necessary to their being the matter of science, *i.e.*, objectively there for the discovery of all men alike. The remaining contents of experience, not presenting these characters, are not thrown together under the statement of natural laws, or "cosmic process:" they are capricious, in the sense that they are not describable; and they are subjective, in the sense that they are not verifiable. They are therefore set off against the "cosmic process": and when we come to see their characters as involving desire, with certain ingredients of the desirable known as "the ideal," the opposition crystallizes into that of the "ethical" over against the "cosmic process." The distinction is, therefore, entirely one of the method and flow of experience, and does not of necessity require a corresponding division or dualism in the nature of reality itself.

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So far Mr. Royce's discussion seems to me to be very clear and, in its main contention, true. I think the distinction in consciousness, when genetically considered, between the two points of view of "description" and "appreciation" is the root of opposition between the cosmic and the ethical. I am not able, however, to accept his tests of the objective; and it may not be out of place, in view of the active discussions now going on, to examine his argument a little in detail.*

In the first place, Mr. Royce seems, after getting consciousness into this dilemma of the necessary antithesis between the "ought" and the "is," to find no psychological way of getting consciousness out of it. He seems to say, "Remain a man of science and the moral sense is an illusion"—"remain a moralist and the man of science is a liar!" No man can be both at once. The only way that a reconciliation can be effected is by a philosophy which still recognizes the opposition, it is true, but is able to reinforce the statement of one side with profounder reasons. And the ethical process gets reinforced in Professor Royce's philosophy, and so the protest of the spirit is heard in the court of claims of ultimate reality. Science is tolerated, then, not justified ultimately.

Now this theory, it seems, does not "reconcile" the two processes: it merely gives us an interesting account of the genesis of the opposition. It seems to require, both in its account of the description of phenomena and in that of the meaning of desire, the same opposition between a unity which is merely recognized as there, and a unity which is demanded, although not there. Professor Royce leaves the desire urging on to something essentially indescribable and unverifiable. He says, "The object of our ideal is desirable *not* in so far as it is describable, and, again, *precisely in so far as it is not yet verifiable* (italics his). Herein, then, lies a double contrast between the natural fact as such, and the object of desire, as such." With this account of desire we should expect failure to get any real reconciliation: for it confuses the "object" of desire with the fact that with the object there is what we call, very obscurely often, the accompanying sense of an ideal. But when we come to distinguish between the object and this ideal accompaniment, we see that the object is both describable and verifiable; and then we see that through the attainment of it—if per-

* My brief note on his paper in the *Philosophical Review* may be referred to in the *Psychological Review*, November, 1894.

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chance we do attain it—we have brought the ideal which it stood for nearer to a similar construction. It, too, becomes now in so far also describable and verifiable, not now, however, as ideal, but as fact. The sense called ideal still goes on to attach to a further object of desire. But inasmuch as by this successful pursuit of this object, then and there, we have so far realized our ideal, in so far we have turned the "ought" into the "is"—we have made natural history out of the objects of our ethical cravings. May not this give a real reconciliation of the two points of view, rather than an account merely of the opposition which remains to plague Mr. Royce?

The sense of ought, then, from my point of view, is the anticipation of more experience, not yet treated under the rubrics of description; but as far as it is identified with any object of desire, it is thought to exemplify the canons of description of that object as being most nearly the sort of experience that expectation is reaching out after. And natural science, the "cosmic process," is *the same series* read backwards. It is experience fully described, and hence rid of that coloring of expectation and desire which, when it was looked at the other way, made it the vehicle for the realization of the ideal.

When we come to the metaphysical point of view we find the same criticism of Mr. Royce in order. What shall we say to a "reconciliation" which still, as I think, allows the two parties to the controversy each to establish his own side by cutting off half of consciousness and throwing it away? The positivist may say: "From profound philosophical reasons, I find consciousness justified in its descriptions; so it is under illusion in its appreciations." And the idealist turns the tables, justifying himself also on profound philosophical grounds. The reason that they can do this is found in Professor Royce's failure to find an actual identity anywhere between the experiences described and the good desired: instead of holding that the "is" always, in so far, is the "ought" (that is, so far as it is the legitimate outcome of the cosmic process, *i.e.*, is statable universally, and is not a mere accident); but that, by the very movement by which consciousness gets it as an "is," it has to transcend it in a search for a further "ought." But if this is true,—if the series is one and the antithesis arises from the two points of view, "prospective and retrospective," from which it is viewed,—then a being who could hold both points of view adequately at once, would know no such opposition. He could

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"appreciate" the world as good without being under illusion, and also describe it as true without being a liar.

This inadequacy, as I venture to think it, of Mr. Royce's theory, may be brought out also by the consideration of one other point. We may ask how one is to meet the objection that in giving a natural history of the distinction between the "is" and the "ought" one lays himself open to the charge of giving exclusive weight to the "is," after all. The very sense of appreciation is itself a cosmic product: how then can it have any meaning apart from the details of history out of which it has arisen? This very dilemma seems to me to be the fruitful source of confusion in Mr. Huxley's Address. He treats the "ought" in the body of the Address as in essential opposition to the "cosmic is"; and in an appendix says it is nevertheless due to the principle of selection. If it is due to selection, we may ask, must it not have existed as a fact, a variation say, before it was selected? But if so, how can it as a fact have been in essential opposition to the series of facts which the theory of variations—if we ever get one—presupposes? Now, I think Professor Royce's theory does not answer this question. He seems to leave a gap between the sense of the thing and the sense of its value; says, however, that the sense of value attaches to all things; and by making the essentially valuable aspect of the thing indescribable and unverifiable, he says in effect that it cannot be a natural history outcome.*

On the contrary, apart from details of natural history which I have tried to supply elsewhere,† I think the description of what "is," is the inadequate content of that which we feel "ought" to be, and the description of what "oughted" to be, *i.e.*, what was the object of description of a past "ought," is what "is." In short, the "ought" is a function of a mental content, of a descriptive "is,"—a motor function, I think,—and so like every other function of content has its own natural history as a single fact; but its meaning is progressive, prospective, and the discovery of its full meaning still remains a question apart from its evolution.

I can say, therefore, with Professor Royce, "Novelty is a *conditio sine qua non* of all ideal value when regarded from a temporal

* I know he gives it a natural history in the individual's private experience, but that seems to be apart from the cosmic movement.

† See my "Mental Development: Methods and Processes," pages 341 *ff.*

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point of view;" but I must add that novelty, as such, is not the only *conditio sine qua non.* Rather is the full fact what is called in his context the "interestingly novel." For an object of desire there must be enough description to make the thing interesting; and this description is the essential content. Realize the desire, and you in so far add to the description, and so set another content for farther desire. And it is just this progressively built up content, viewed first from the point of view of novelty, then that of history, then that of novelty again, that the final identity of reality must rest upon. An all-comprehensive experience would be appreciated as the all-good. So I say no to this sentence of our author: "There is no chance of reconciling the metaphysically real and ultimate universality of the so-called cosmical processes, or processes according to describably rigid laws, with any even remotely ethical interpretation of the same reality." Rather must reality, when viewed metaphysically, be both rigidly true and divinely fair—as far as metaphysics may allow us to hold to either category as more than a human analogy.

In conclusion, I do not think this is the only topic the discussion of which calls for a reconciliation of the same two points of view. I am endeavoring, in a paper now in type for the next (November, 1895) number of the *Psychological Review*, to find a general distinction of "prospective" and "retrospective" points of view under which that between "description" and "appreciation" may be subsumed. In general, I may add that the distinction, genetically considered, is that which I have endeavored to set out *in extenso*, and in part from a biological point of view, under the terms "Habit" and "Accommodation," in my recent work on "Mental Development: Methods and Processes." Under these principles, respectively, the "is" and the "ought" find their genesis. And with this the main idea of Mr. Royce is, I think, in harmony.

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Relation of the Ethical to the Cosmic Process.

Professor Royce has approached the subject of Evolution and Ethics, if not from a "novel," at least from a most interesting point of view; and although he disclaims the intention of attempting an interpretation of Professor Huxley's treatment of the sub-

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ject, in introducing us to the border-land which lies between physics and metaphysics, he has plunged us into the mental atmosphere where contradictions, such as those of which Professor Huxley stands accused, are naturally bred.

For this possible explanation of Professor Huxley's attitude we are deeply indebted to Professor Royce, since, as he has admirably shown, when a phenomenon is classified it is explained, it ceases to be "novel;" as a source of intellectual curiosity it may then be dismissed. But the subject itself is left just where it was before he took up his pen.

The burden of his argument—viz., that scientifically speaking there is nothing new, while the social consciousness (with which ethics has to deal) "is conscious of novelty, of progress . . . in ways which make the whole cosmic process a mere appearance of one aspect of the moral world"—would appear not only to place the social consciousness outside the world of reality (in which he declares there is never anything new) but to repudiate the opposition previously stated to exist between cosmical and ethical phenomena, since they are described as "different aspects of the same reality," thus also shifting the novelties of the moral sphere back again to the world of reality!

The attempt to establish a rational relation between the two modes of thought which deal respectively with physics and metaphysics generally ends in confusion. This is nowhere better illustrated than in Professor Royce's definition of "novelty" and the argument based on it. Is a machine which does something never done before a novelty? Is a plant which springs from a seed and builds itself up out of the soil and atmosphere a new plant? Contrasting the human brain with that of the lowest vertebrate, does it present anything "novel"?

Professor Royce would doubtless say that the reply in each case depends on the point of view. The ultimate molecules of which a machine, a plant, and a brain each consists are not new; to our understanding, these molecules are from everlasting and to everlasting—the same yesterday, to-day, and forever—but, regarded as an individual, each of these objects is new; the molecules of which it consists have never before met in precisely the same combination; *the relations between them are new* and *the results are therefore "novel"* whether we speak in the language of physics or of metaphysics, for both science and philosophy have to deal with relations and results as well as with molecules.

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Now, ethics is above all a matter of relations. *Progress* consists in the establishment of new relations among the social elements,—the development of new imperatives which are higher and nobler than previously existing ones. Thus the moral ideal itself grows with "the ripening of the suns;" the new heavens and the new earth ever recede farther and farther from the original Utopia;

"Hills peep o'er hills and Alps on Alps arise,"

with our advance in the ideal as in the physical world.

Moral progress thus consists not alone in "a gradual approach towards a conformity of given facts to given ethical ideals" (Professor Royce), but in a constant *correction of our ideals* by the results of experience; the path of progress is strewn with abandoned ideals. But this kind of growth results from the interactions between the social consciousness and its environment, as truly as the coral reef results from interactions between the coral insect and the water in which it lives; and our ideals, gradually built up on "the stepping-stones of our dead selves," supply a conspicuous illustration of the *modus operandi* and the results of the cosmic process; they have been evolved under the influence of existing conditions; they have grown out of the situation; and the results, though "novel," belong, nevertheless, to the world of reality.

"The ultimate universality of the so-called cosmical, *i.e.*, physical processes," thus requires no reconciliation (declared by Professor Royce to be impossible) with "an ethical interpretation of the same reality"—since, although the materials concerned are different in the various ranges of cosmic activity, the method—the process—is the same whether we regard the growth of a plant, of a society, or of the mind of man.

It is true that the so-called "laws" of the physical sciences have been more definitely formulated than have those which prevail in the sciences distinguished as psychical; but modern investigation has done something towards discovering order in psychical phenomena also, and there is no room for doubt that these phenomena occur in orderly conformity to "law" in the same sense in which the term is applied to physical phenomena.* The observable progress from the amphioxus to man is not more orderly in case of the

* A law is merely a statement of observed uniformity in the occurrence of the phenomena concerned; given certain conditions, certain results always follow.

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structure—*i.e.*, the physics—of the animal series than in the case of its activities—*i.e.*, its conduct or ethics.

It cannot then be admitted that the ethical point of view is peculiar in that it "desires essential novelty, progress, and the thus far unattained," since these belong to the very idea of evolution; and I have already pointed out that the struggle for the ethical life in society is only a higher phase of the general struggle for existence. Neither can it be admitted that ethics and physics fare differently when subjected to a metaphysical analysis. If "the ethical consciousness may admit that its view is, in the last analysis, illusory," so also may the consciousness which testifies to the existence of a material world external to itself,—a world which has been metaphysically annihilated again and again, but which nevertheless continues its appeals to our consciousness in an altogether satisfying and convincing fashion.

Professor Royce states that although the ethical consciousness lives in illusions, it "uses" the rigid cosmic laws which belong to the world of reality.

But enough of this intellectual see-saw; the attempt to plant a foot on each end of this fascinating, albeit somewhat giddy, instrument of exercise and thus to swing to and fro between the solid ground of "positive considerations" and the illimitable ocean of metaphysics, speaks volumes for the intellectual courage and acumen of any one who is willing to undertake the feat. In the present instance, the effort has no doubt been crowned with as high a degree of success as the situation will allow. It is, after all, merely a restatement—and a very able one, so far as I can judge—of the everlasting conflict between the doctrines of "necessity" and "choice,"—the "foreordination" and "free will" of the old theology. Calvinism sublimely accepted both; it classified foreordination as an exercise of the sovereign will of the supreme arbiter of human destinies, and also held the poor sinner responsible as freely choosing the necessity to which he was foreordained from the foundations of the world, but only in case it turned out to be eternal damnation; the salvation of the elect was accredited entirely to free grace,—a fine instance of the confusion which inheres in the border-land philosophy!

The first question discussed by Professor Royce may then be answered as follows:

The "ethical process" is emphatically a "part of the cosmical process," since it is concerned in the development of *new relations*

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among the factors with which it deals, and therefore in the securing of *new products* of these factors.

The second question could have been put only on the ground of the foregone conclusion of a negative answer to the first.

The answer to the third question is, I think, contained in the statement already made as to the nature of progress, the development of new imperatives, etc. This point is, however, most lucidly brought out in the foregoing note by Professor Baldwin when he shows that the apparent opposition between the ethical and the cosmical processes lies in the fact that "the progressively built up content" (that is, the conversion of the "ought" into the "is" and the setting up of "another content for further desire") is observed in the one case from the point of view of "novelty," and in the other, of "history;" that the one view is "prospective" and the other "retrospective;" that the ethical process and the cosmic process represent "the same series" read respectively forward and backward, the difference being in the point of view.

In other words, the ideal (itself constantly developed by experience) ever tends to become the real.

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MR. RITCHIE ON FREE-WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY.

THERE is a passage in Mr. Ritchie's discussion of "Free-Will and Responsibility," in the last number of the JOURNAL, which tempts me to make a few observations, because he very naïvely assumes an antithesis where there is none. There would be no reason for speaking of it were it not that so many people are constantly led astray by the negligence of philosophers who set up for men's guides and are often as blind as their followers. I mean no disrespect by this language, but only to speak strongly in regard to the almost universal habit of discussing complicated problems without respecting the necessity of analysis and without any attempt to evade the bogs of equivocation. Let me quote the passage and then comment upon it.

"People sometimes speak as if 'free-will' were not true, or at least were incapable of being proved true, and yet were, in this same sense, a doctrine necessary for morality, a useful lie. Now this is a somewhat dangerous attitude of mind, which accepts a fundamental contradiction between science and morality. But is it so certain that the free-will doctrine is more favorable to the interests of morality than the necessitarian? Robert Owen urged the doctrine of neces-

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sitarianism in the interests of his endeavors after social reform. The free-will doctrine,—the notion that at any moment any human being is 'free' to choose between right and wrong, and that all moral evil and a great part of the physical evil in the world are due entirely to the wrong choice of individuals who might equally have chosen rightly,—this notion has undoubtedly helped to blind people to the necessity of putting individuals in good surroundings, of giving them strong motives to choose rightly. . . . The idea that at any moment we are free to choose aright leads to a neglect of the fact that habits are gradually, though silently, growing up which may make it almost impossible for us to choose a year hence in the way in which we may be able to choose now," etc. (July number, pp. 427, 428.)

A very long discussion might be carried on about various conceptions and propositions in this and other passages of the article from which I have quoted, but I mean to limit myself to one or two. It is quite evident that Mr. Ritchie here assumes an antithesis between "the free-will doctrine and the necessitarian doctrine." But taking his conception of necessitarianism as indicated in the reference to Robert Owen in comparison with free-will as capacity to "choose between right and wrong," I must wholly deny the antithesis. There is no opposition between the capacity for alternative choice, and the existence of any amount of limitations or restraints reposed upon human action. We can get this opposition only by conceiving "freedom" to mean exemption from restraint, or exemption from the consequences of choice, and this is the idea in Mr. Ritchie's mind at times. But it is at the same time confused with the notion of capacity for alternative choice, velleity, as I choose to call it, as shown in the constant allusion to "choice." Now, I have only to remark that responsible freedomists do not always take this conception of freedom, though I admit that they do not respect analysis and definition in their discussions as often as they should. The necessitarianism which they oppose is not that which advocates limitations to impunity in choice, but which denies the capacity of choice at all in the sense that it is between equal motives. Moreover, Robert Owen is not a person to quote seriously in the discussion of a philosophic problem like this. He knew nothing about the psychological and philosophical meaning of the question as discussed from the time of Plato to Kant. Like all charlatans in philosophy, he picked up the first conception he found and confused ordinary minds by intensifying equivocations which it should have been his business to evade. Nobody need dispute his doctrine of "necessitarianism" as here indicated. We should simply laugh at the ignorance which mistook it for true philosophic necessitarianism. It is this that is utterly incompatible

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with morality, simply because it renders any sort of voluntary adjustment to environment impossible, and consequently responsibility and corrective punishment. I see absolutely no reason for discussing this threadbare question of free-will and responsibility unless we distinguish carefully between the various meanings of the term. We can never get to any satisfactory conclusion whatever until we do so. The contradictions, paradoxes, and confusion so often complained of as making the problem insoluble are nothing more nor less than the result of equivocations, which it is the first business of the philosopher to get rid of. They are due either to intellectual indolence or an imperfect knowledge of logic and psychology, and nothing is so annoying as to see men arranging themselves on two sides of the question when there are probably as many as half a dozen sides to it or more. Of course, it would not make any difference, were it not that readers who have to rely upon authority for their convictions are constantly led astray by half truths and ally themselves with false movements for the lack of the means to protect themselves against illusions. Those who do not realize the equivocations in the discussion draw conclusions in regard to responsibility that would easily be avoided if they were warned about the ambiguity of the premises.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

ASPECTS OF THE SOCIAL PROBLEM. Edited by Bernard Bosanquet. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

This interesting book, as the preface tells us, is meant to fill a gap—the gap between trained observation in the social field and reasonable theory. The trained observation is represented by a dozen lectures or papers by Miss H. Dendy, Mr. C. S. Loch, and Mrs. M. M. McCallum, which are full of the reality which comes of direct personal contact with social fact, and the theory by six chapters which are admirable specimens of the firm philosophic touch, reassuring earnestness, and cultivated, clear-headed sincerity of Mr. Bernard Bosanquet. It would, however, be an injustice to treat these aspects as two, and most of all an injustice to writers with whom it is a conviction that facts, however impressively arrayed, are, apart from theory, barren if not misleading, and

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theory, apart from facts, unreal and empty. The observers here see with their minds, and the theorist, himself an acute and experienced observer, at times startles us by his suddenness of descent from philosophic discourse on social organization and moral character to homely illustrative detail drawn from the nursing of the poor, or the pauperisation of the unemployed: "To me, at least," he characteristically remarks, "the concrete and inclusive point of view is always truly idealist" (p. 105). It is, in fact, just in this way that "the gap" is filled. Rightly Mr. Bosanquet predicts that "ethical economics are not to be constructed like Dicken's Chinese Metaphysics;" rightly he hazards the home-truth that "much of the writing of our reforming publicists and economists gives me the impression of the work of students who have not experienced the look and feel and reaction of character in classes other than their own" (p. 106). As rightly does Mr. Loch begin his contribution upon "Returns in Social Science" by the animadversion that figures are used "as sticks, staves, missiles, or professor's pointers," and end it by the suggestion that in statistics that touch the domain of character we need "finer instruments and a finer use of instruments;" and even more impressively, in "The Children of Working London," "Old Pensioners," and "The Meaning and Methods of True Charity,"—chapters full of practical pity, discrimination, humor, and charm,—does Miss Dendy show how to the instructed eye of the genuinely human worker "cases" may be transformed into the lives, sometimes tragical, sometimes comical, always interesting, of flesh and blood men and women. The contents of the volume are, in short, though on first glance a trifle desultory, bound strongly together by the central principle that "the individual member of society is, above all things, a character and a will," and that therefore "in social reform character is the condition of conditions." "Though men may suffer," says Mr. Bosanquet, "through the character of others, they can gain and retain no permanent advantage excepting through their own" (Preface); and it is this principle which runs through these "Aspects," alike in observation, in criticism, and in theory. For to Mr. Bosanquet and his collaborators, the moral point of view does not begin and end in a question of desert or want of desert in their unfortunate fellow-men. "Which amongst us," asks Miss Dendy—in a context where she suggests the substitution of "helpable" for "deserving," —shall we elevate to the awful position of arbiter as to who is and who is not deserving?" (p. 171). Or, again, "Perhaps it is be-

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cause we have so habituated ourselves to regarding character from the point of view of merit only, that we rarely attempt to approach it as impartial students of cause and effect" (p. 169). Rather it is the burly moral spirit that takes the concrete individual as it finds him in garret, refuge, back-court, or work-house, studies him, helps him, or refuses to help him (for it is part of the menage of these good Samaritans to testify against "the bad Samaritans"), being in all it does, or refuses to do, increasingly convinced that all hopes of permanent betterment can only come through action on the character.

It follows that the book is, in a sense, profoundly individualistic. "Those may sneer at strength who do not believe that reason in the ultimate power," writes Mr. Bosanquet, "but those who hold a different conviction cannot but judge that the survival of the most vigorous in the struggle for the existence which is aimed at is, on the whole, the survival of the most reasonable" ("Socialism and Natural Selection," p. 297). Or, again, "I desiderate for every one, for their own sake, some possibility of falling into distress by lack of wisdom and exertion" (p. 300). Or, again, "I desire to call attention to the frightful dangers that attend any overriding of what is relatively natural selection through family responsibility, by the direct interference of administrative or other philanthropy" (p. 301). Or, again, "I have heard of a lad who was morally murdered by benevolent ladies" (cf. context in "Character and Causation" (p. 117). No one who knows the drift of his thought will take these passages to mean that Mr. Bosanquet has been perverted to the fallacies of abstract individualism. This could not be. His two opening lectures on "The Duties of Citizenship" bid us hark back to Greece, so that, lost in the chaotic wilderness of modern interests, we may thereby learn "to understand our whole lives in the light of citizen ideas" (p. 9). He writes a chapter to refute our social atomists by proving "the Reality of the General Will." It is part of his credo that the State by its initiative may develop the lives of its citizens (p. 291). He even, with perhaps an undue truculence, would have Mr. Spencer, for his dogmatic biological pseudo-individualism, consigned to the lowest circle in the inferno (p. 295).

Yet the substantial fact remains. From first to last in his treatment alike of voluntary and State intervention, in his handling of the family, in his justification of private property, he is fearful of the unwisdom which, working havoc in the name of help, may

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cut the sinews of individual responsibility. He has short shrift for the cry that "something can be done" for the industrial residuum; he declares that "nothing can be done, so long as we teach by precept and in practice that to fit yourself for a positive function is not the only avenue to life in a civilized community" (p. 116). He is at one with Mr. Kidd (though somehow he seems unnecessarily uneasy at finding himself with such an ally) in sharply distinguishing the true socialism that furnishes the opportunity for competition and the false socialism that suppresses it (p. 291). Particularly interesting in this connection is his chapter on the General Will. To him the general will exists in "the actual tendency of the whole process in which the necessary organizing ideas of all individual minds in the community are factors" (p. 327). But then he is far from holding that actual tendency is conscious tendency. And it is striking to find one who is nothing less than an apostle of enlightenment, confessing that, "on the whole, we are to the structure of legal, political, and economic organization like coral insects to a coral reef" (p. 328). If we are, especially if we reflect that the human coral insect has a rare faculty of blundering, we have surely here a reason why the best of us should think twice before enforcing on society our conscious ends, whether they take the shape of what has in these pages been called "social surgery" or that of some less organic operation. It is just here, indeed, that we find in Mr. Bosanquet's doctrine a sharp antithesis. It is manifestly a main part of his purpose to enjoin what he says is the true task of an Ethical Society—"the task of *learning to see* in the world of ethical realities" (p. 104). He is not the man to fear that the task is vain. Assuredly in his own person and practice he furnishes a proof to the contrary. As little is the insight gained to be the mere spectator's interest. For he is as practical as he is penetrating, and he would have others, if they take care to understand what they touch, be practical likewise. And yet we are —coral insects, or, not unduly to press a simile, unconscious workers in a process which "always needs the future to explain its real tendency" (p. 329). This, of course, need not mean that the light in us is darkness, and that an ordinary citizen cannot see the duties that lie nearest to hand—see them, and, if he will take pains, understand them. But assuredly it furnishes a presumption against all sweeping schemes of collective interference.

In this connection it is further characteristic of Mr. Bosanquet that he has an evident preference for the life of the citizen who

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unobtrusively lives a home life and works among his neighbors, trusting to the opportunities of human intercourse which willing eyes may always find, and something like a distrust of the more self-conscious and pretentious movements which are so apt to be headlong, puny, and uninstructed. "I confess," he says, "to a certain feeling of terror when I think of the increasing number of centres where groups of inexperienced young men or young women have come together burning 'to do good,' and, so far as I am aware, without any special provision for acquainting themselves with the conditions of their task" (p. 25). "It is an illusion," he tells us, to think "that duties which deal with public matters are the only public duties." This is needful doctrine. Nor is it the least of the merits of these papers that, in the light they give as to how this personal and more private work is done—with how much human interest, patience, knowledge—and likewise as to why it ought to be done, they furnish a strong appeal, not the less suasive because indirect, which ought to enlist in social work that best kind of recruit, who to brotherly kindness adds charity, and to charity unobtrusiveness, and to unobtrusiveness enlightenment.

It is unreasonable, perhaps, when so much is good to ask for more. But it ought, perhaps, to be said in conclusion that, in a volume which deals to so considerable an extent with the basis and justification of social work, many readers would welcome some fuller recognition of the value of religious agencies and religious ideas. "Any one," says Mr. Bosanquet, "brought up with an exclusive feeling for any visible church has a great difficulty in grasping a spiritual connection with the community as such" (p. 7). If "exclusive" here refers to a peculiarly deeply dyed and repulsive sectarianism, the statement need not be disputed. But this does not alter the fact that many persons who belong to them think that even visible churches go far to bring into men's lives precisely that sense of membership in a larger life, and that recognition of the worth even of the worthless, which social thinkers and workers like Mr. Bosanquet so powerfully enforce. But be this so or not, it is the very spirituality which runs through Mr. Bosanquet's doctrine which encourages readers to wish for some further considerations to sustain their practical respect for men who have ceased to be respectable, and to confirm their devotion to communities upon whose woful imperfections the satirist and the reformer are so well agreed. Theory must, no doubt, in a volume

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of this kind, be kept within bounds. But when it can be made so practical as it is here one cannot help, for the sake of the work of social reform, wishing for an additional chapter upon the spiritual basis of social and individual life.

JOHN MACCUNN.

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EINLEITUNG IN DIE MORALWISSENSCHAFT. Zweiter-Band. Von Georg Simmel. Berlin: W. Hertz, 1893. Pp. vii., 426.

The author's stand-point with regard to the elaboration of the particular ethical concepts into a systematic whole is again made unmistakably apparent in this, the second volume of his work. It might be called a negative stand-point.* Respecting all the various ethical concepts which he has exhaustively criticised, Simmel says, "I have thus endeavored to show in my present inquiries that every one of these fundamental ethical ideas includes a number of heterogeneous contents and meanings, that they are partly the rough summings up of the phenomena, partly mere names for them, names which, in consequence of the illusion of which Platonism is the typical example, have been taken for explanatory causes." Instead of a "science" of Ethics, Simmel calls for a study of the given phenomena of the moral life. To use an expression of G. Th. Fechner's, what he wants is "ethics from below," rather than "ethics from above."

It is the same demand which has long since received recognition in other branches of science; in political economy, for instance, where the historical school opposes this method to the old systematic treatment of economics. It is the demand for induction, as opposed to the self-sufficiency of system-making deduction. For example: "The history of English factory legislation," says Simmel, "is a better means of teaching the relation between Egoism and Altruism than the most acute analysis of these ideas. The relation of Religion and Morality cannot be so clearly revealed by any philosophic construction, however sympathetic, as by an ethnological inquiry into their origins and the mutual influence which they exerted upon each other in their earliest forms."

Starting from this critical point of view, and with the deliberate

* See review of vol. i. in the JOURNAL of October, 1892.

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purpose of proving that the fundamental ethical ideas are differently interpreted and treated according to the psychological process which contributed to their formation, the author discusses in his Second Volume the "Categorical Imperative," "Freedom," "Unity and Conflict of Ends." His criticism is acute and developed in an interesting manner, but what he sets out to establish thereby is not really proved. In order to demonstrate that the most subtle analysis of the ideas Egoism and Altruism does not materially assist us, it was incumbent on Simmel to show that such analysis leads to no profitable results whatever. And yet in his own inquiry into the idea of Freedom, Simmel himself reaches decidedly positive conclusions, such as he by no means could ever have drawn directly from a study of English factory legislation or other concrete phenomena of the moral life. If Simmel really has so much confidence in the truth of his moral principle of the maximum of freedom: "act so that the freedom you exercise, together with that which your act enables or allows others to exercise, may be a maximum of freedom" (and certainly he endeavors in various ways to demonstrate the truth of this maxim)—does he not thereby furnish the most convincing proof that one may arrive at tangible results by means of a thorough critical examination and elaboration of ideas?

Even admitting, as we can hardly avoid doing, that "any attempts to base morality upon a single principle is at bottom nothing but a symbolization of the ethical *status quo*"—nevertheless, the setting up of such a point of view is of the greatest methodical importance so long as we do not possess the data of moral experience empirically acquired and scientifically arranged. And we are as yet far from possessing such data.

The whole book is very interesting and suggestive, and especially the discussion on the antinomy involved in the problem of responsibility. "Neither from freedom nor from determination can responsibility be deduced without contradiction." But how if we should reverse the matter? What it is to be responsible we know. "An individual is responsible or accountable when the punitive reaction following his act accomplishes in him the object of punishment." This is the first point to be attended to, the point from which we must start. And we can then go on and say that "he is free who can successfully be held responsible, while he is not free who cannot be so held." This is carefully worked out by Simmel. "To be sure, here, too, he posits a true innermost self," that is, an

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idea, which has only been won by process of abstraction from inner experience.*

But even if these psychological deductions should not always commend themselves to entire approbation, no one can read this book without finding in it much to stimulate his own critical thinking and to incite him to further effort in the same direction.

J. HIMMELBAUR.

VIENNA.

THE STUDY OF ETHICS: A SYLLABUS. By John Dewey. Printed for the Author by the Inland Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1894. Pp. 151.

In a prefatory note Professor Dewey explains that this Syllabus was prepared for the use of his students, the edition of his "Outlines of Ethics" having been exhausted. Informal as is this publication, which is precisely what the title indicates, viz., a syllabus of lecture-notes, the value always attaching to our author's work, however got into shape, justifies some account of the little book here. It supplements and extends the "Outlines," which were reviewed in this JOURNAL at their appearance.

The subject-matter of ethical theory is defined as "judgment concerning the value of conduct." This value must not be judged, however, according to any "absolute or separate ideal" (p. 34). A customary defect of the moralist has been to "split the self into two selves, and attribute the impulses and appetites to one, the actual urgent self, and the ideal to another self, a higher or rational or spiritual self in general." This is what Kant did. Green, although recognizing "the objection to splitting the self," was still guilty of separating too much the "whole self" as the ideal from "any possible development of the particular impulse as such." But all such theories make "a dualism, practically unbridgeable, between the moral and the scientific phases of our experience." But fact and ideal must not be thus sundered. "Recognition of value is not denial of science,"—*i.e.*, the ethical point of view is not essentially opposed to the physical point of view, but is merely a fuller account of the whole truth about those very facts of experience of whose contents the physical sciences give their own relatively abstract description.

* And here, too, our author travels along lines the purely subjective validity of which he has just been setting forth.

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Professor Dewey, in the earlier chapters of his Syllabus, gives an interesting "psychological examination of the process of active experience,"—*i.e.*, a summary of the psychology of the will, as a basis for his own statement of this relatively realistic ethical doctrine. The psychology is here not very novel, but its prompt application to the definition of the ideal is stated in a very attractive form, despite the somewhat Aristotelian brevity of these very business-like notes. Character develops by the organization of impulses. Impulses have their primal character as responses to the environment. But all such responses "induce experiences," which in consciousness thenceforth get woven into the web of the original impulses. These impulses can now no longer be aroused in their primitive and untutored way, for whenever circumstances arise which tend to make them once more nascent, one is conscious of the consequences that will follow upon their being carried out. This consciousness of the "induced experiences" that have in the past attended the impulsive acts, is, however, as Professor Dewey very ingeniously reasons, not a separate sort of consciousness, arising over and above the consciousness of the primal impulses themselves; but, on the contrary, as I recall the results of my former more impulsive deeds, my recall is itself the conscious accompaniment of a physical activity; and in my whole active state, at the moment of the recall, the old impulse, and my past experience of its results, appear in an organic union, as the conscious aspect of a really transformed activity, which is neither the old impulse, nor yet merely this old impulse plus a disposition to check it, but which is rather a resultant of numerous factors, and so not any mere summation of primitive impulses and acquired inhibitions. The old impulse really gets submerged in the larger whole which experience has mediated. The impulse is "idealized" (p. 15). "The impulse mediated, that is, given conscious value through the reference into it of the other experiences which will result from its expression, constitutes volition proper."

"The worth of an impulse is, psychologically, the whole set of experiences which, presumably (that is, upon the best judgment available), it will call into being. This, *ethically*, constitutes the goodness (or badness) of the impulse,—the satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) which it carries" (p. 17). One must thus estimate and modify "any particular expression of impulse by the whole system of which it is one part." As to the concrete act which expresses impulses thus fully "mediated" by a consciousness of their prob-

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able consequences, Professor Dewey asserts (p. 17) that "In its complete character, as affording satisfaction, and, at the same time, fulfilling its organic interactions," this act "is *right*, and the agent which it expresses is *free*."

But the consciousness of the value of our impulses, while it thus accompanies the gradual transformation of our impulses through the workings of experience, is not identical merely with the conscious aspect of our acquired habits as such. Habit means completed transformation of primitive impulse through the "reaction" of experienced consequences upon primitive impulses. But in our lives the most important deeds are those accomplished in situations too complex to be completely dealt with in a merely routine fashion. Where expected consequences and present impulses are not yet finally woven into the unity of our wholly settled habits, but stand apart in such relatively undetermined relations that we have to become conscious of our general plans, and to "think over" the situation, before we can express ourselves with any unity, there is the sphere of moral conduct. "It is the tension between the habitual and the more variable factors that constitutes the significance of our conduct morally" (p. 19).

A moral judgment is itself, as follows from the foregoing, a moral act, since, as Professor Dewey throughout insists, we are always active while we are conscious, and all our conscious activity, except the primitive impulses and the finally settled habits, involves a process of weaving into one whole our original impulsive tendencies and the modifying results of the "induced experiences." But the particular character of the moral judgment depends upon the fact that, as we thus reflect on the relation of partial impulse and whole experience, we observe (p. 22), "That some acts tend to narrow the self, to introduce friction into it, to weaken its power, and in various ways to *disintegrate it*, while other acts tend to expand, invigorate, harmonize, and in general organize the self." Here is the sole moral criterion. It is impossible (p. 23) to classify "the impulses into a hierarchy of higher or lower." "When an act is right there is no higher or lower as to the impulse from which it proceeds." "The good man, in a word, is his whole self in each of his acts; the bad man is a partial (and hence a different) self in his conduct."

"Self-realization" is thus indeed the moral goal, only the self to be realized is not a "purely general self," whose "blank scheme" is to be filled in. The self to be realized is the actual self of this

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individual, with these impulses and "induced experiences," and consequently with just this real opportunity to weave his life into one whole. He must note his situation, and his qualities,—*i.e.*, he must be aware both of his impulses and of the consequent experiences; and his moral consciousness, like his moral conduct (for the latter is the expression of the former), might be embodied in the rule: Live this your life as the life of one whole self. The following of this rule will satisfy, not the desires of every moment, but precisely the reflective decision of the whole man himself.

This must suffice for a sketch of the fundament of Professor Dewey's doctrine as here stated. The contrast with the various forms of the "abstract ideal" is sketched; the contrast with hedonism, a doctrine which, in every form, Professor Dewey altogether opposes, is more fully and very skilfully developed. Extremely interesting is also the discussion of the problem of freedom.

That our author may soon give himself a completer expression, in place of these rough-hewn and fragmentary notes, as well as in place of the too brief "Outlines," is the earnest wish of the present reviewer, who both agrees and disagrees with Professor Dewey in too many and too varied respects to make a discussion of the *pro* and *contra* here possible. Ethical realism seems to the present reviewer an essentially partial doctrine, and not the "whole" for which Professor Dewey so frequently contends. But of great value, in the present state of controversy, is a statement of a decidedly realistic form of ethical doctrine which is still in a sharp and conscious contrast to the hedonistic interpretation of the facts of the moral consciousness. As a sketch of such a theory, the present volume, despite its hasty form, seems worthy of this somewhat extended notice.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS. By James H. Hyslop, Ph.D. Instructor in Ethics in Columbia College. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895. Pp. ix., 470.

In sharp contrast with Professor Dewey, Dr. Hyslop, in his decidedly minute and extended work, proceeds upon the basis of a definition by virtue of which (p. 5) "The chief function of Ethics is to do this, to determine what is an ideal existence, and to promote its realization." The preface announces that "the present work is designed as an introductory treatise upon the fundamental

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problems of theoretical ethics, and therefore to obtain standing-ground from which to consider the practical questions that are affected by general principles." The elaborateness of the treatment is admitted to be greater than might be expected in an introductory book, but this Dr. Hyslop justifies by the "complications of ethical problems," and by the variety of the opinions that have been current regarding them. The "analytic method" has been followed in order to determine the precise meanings of terms, and in order to define the precise nature of ethical problems, and Dr. Hyslop admits that his book "may try the patience of those who desire synthetic and comprehensive results."

As a fact, few of our ethical text-books in English contain more detailed analyses of the meanings of terms, or more lengthy classifications of the various theories relating to ethics. Herein lies the strength, and also the weakness, of Dr. Hyslop's book. It may well be questioned whether the student's best intellectual interests are served by a method which, after taking him through seven long chapters, wherein the "elementary principles," and then the problems of Freedom, Responsibility, and Conscience have been discussed historically, critically, and with great detail, still has to tell him, on p. 349, when three-fourths of the book have been finished, that "the definition of terms has thrown much light upon what the human mind means by morality, but it has not determined anything in regard to the nature of the highest good, or ideal end of conduct." Hereupon, in Dr. Hyslop's text, follows a classification of the "theories of morality," whose sub-classes are thirteen in number; and only after the "analytic method" has thus received such full justice does our author permit himself to go on to a positive decision as to the respective merits of the views that fall under these thirteen sub-classes. Now, it is indeed doubtful whether one is altogether wise to appeal in this way to the "patience" of the undergraduate; but, after all, every teacher must judge such things for himself. At all events, Dr. Hyslop's student will be well introduced to the art of suspending his judgment.

On the other hand, while Dr. Hyslop's method is certainly unfavorable to giving any elementary student a "synthetic" grasp of the connections of the subject, it is, in its decidedly thorough scrutiny of various points of view, in general most laboriously fair and judicial in tone; and herein, again, lies its strength, as a discipline in fair-mindedness, and an example of the judicial attitude. To be sure, it must be observed that the moments in Dr. Hyslop's

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text where he at length comes to a decision (as concerning freedom, pp. 190–219, or concerning the nature of morality, pp. 393–397) often leave us less satisfied with his actually stated reasons for just this decision than we had been with his foregoing statements of the views among which he decides. And here one does indeed come to doubt whether Dr. Hyslop has always really understood his opponents as well as he has meant to do. For example, in the matter of freedom, one feels a strong doubt whether Dr. Hyslop can have ever fully appreciated the case of the partisans of necessity as Spinoza or as Schopenhauer would conceive such case, when one finds our author at length deciding, on p. 204, against the "objective determinist," on the sole ground that if the latter "reduces all causation to the purely mechanical form he must deny the fact of deliberation, because the law of cause and effect requires an immediate nexus between the two terms;" while "on the other hand, if he admit the fact of deliberation, he must surrender his theory." Surely one has stated in vain, with judicial coolness, the case of the "objective determinist," if one has not seen that the theory in question supposes deliberation to be a process subject to its own psychological necessities, like any other process. And if a theory has already supposed that psychological necessities are, at bottom, of the "mechanical" type, one has no more reason to give up this hypothesis on account of the existence of deliberation than in view of the existence of any other psychological process. I have sensory incitements *a*, *b*, *c*, and they lead directly to acts, *p*, *q*, *r*, without intervening deliberation. So far I am on a relatively low level of psychical life. The "objective determinist" thinks this to be a mechanical process. Later on there come to me the same or other stimuli. But my externally observable response is now very slow in coming. Within me I observe what I call deliberation. An external observer sees me apparently inactive. After a long time I respond to the stimuli, try acts so complex that nobody, in the present state of psychology, could have predicted their character. Is there here a process that you cannot interpret mechanically, *even if* you hold that the first process, that of prompt reaction to stimulus, was determined by conditions which are mechanical and outside of the subject's consciousness? Not at all. The same reasons that impel you to call the first process mechanical may apply, quite as well, to the second process. One who deliberates is, from the determinist's point of view, not suspending any causal nexus. All the while the supposably mechanical

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processes are going on in his life. Acts, or their psychical equivalents, fill up all the intermediate stages during which he is supposed, by a superficial observer, to be inactive. Regard him, in a now customary fashion, as a psycho-physical mechanism, and you may affirm that all the while that he is said to be deliberating he is really engaged in motor processes,—just as genuinely such as would be his most active muscular contractions, only that these processes, by mutual interference, prevent any externally visible motor result excepting the attentively preserved attitudes of deliberation. Is the supposed causal nexus of my activities, affirmed by an objective determinist, shown to be suspended because, while I deliberate, I do nothing more than knit my brow, move my eyes, or cross my legs, or sigh? No, just these *are* the acts which outwardly express my deliberation, and the mechanical theory views *these* intermediate acts as necessarily determined, and as involving no suspension of causal nexus. On the other hand, if you regard a man's mind in Herbartian fashion, as the conscious resultant of a mechanical interaction of psychical elements, themselves largely existent outside of consciousness, then the fact of deliberation is once more just as easily, just as much, and just as little explained as is any other psychical process. The *Vorstellungsmassen* act and react, until the decisive configuration occurs, and one's mind is made up. That is the mechanical nexus supposed by such a determinist. This nexus is nowhere suspended. Such theories may be false, but the mere existence of deliberation cannot be quoted against doctrines which explicitly undertake to explain deliberation itself as a portion of a mechanical process.

The present writer notes these imperfections in Dr. Hyslop's argument about freedom as examples of the occasional speculative imperfections of our author's method, and does so with all the more readiness because, in the end, he agrees with Dr. Hyslop in asserting the inadequacy of mechanism to express the ultimate nature of the conscious process, and because, although for other philosophical reasons than Dr. Hyslop here adduces, he would also hold that there exists in the universe a kind of freedom corresponding to what Dr. Hyslop skilfully defines as Velleity. Moreover, much of the analysis in this chapter on Freedom is of an excellent sort, and the chapter is well worth writing at a time like the present. But here, as elsewhere, the general judgment regarding the strength and the weakness of this volume seems to hold good: Dr. Hyslop's conscientious and detailed analysis do honor to his

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fairness, and make his work an extremely thoughtful one; but in matters that concern speculative skill of a constructive type this book is often, to the present reader's mind, distinctly unsatisfactory.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

A SYLLABUS OF ETHICS. By William M. Bryant, M.A., Instructor in Mental and Moral Philosophy, St. Louis Normal and High School. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co., 1894. Pp. 82.

Briefer, but in its chosen form more finished than the Syllabus of Professor Dewey, this little work, by the author of the treatise entitled "The World-Energy and its Self-Conservation," and of several other philosophical essays, represents, with a somewhat individual and relatively independent development, an idealistic ethical theory. This sketch, the author tells us, "has been prepared with a view to meeting the needs of the St. Louis Society of Pedagogy in so far as one of the Sections of that Society is organized for the express purpose of studying Ethics." The concept of "self-realization" is central in the discussion. "Conscience is a fundamental aspect of mind in its totality" (p. 28), and so is no separate faculty. It develops with the whole mind, and is not an initially perfect guide. On the other hand (p. 34), "Man (in so far as he is mind) must be conceived as descending from (that is, arising through, and constituting the culminating aspect of) the creative self-unfolding of the primal perfect mind," and so "must be credited with fundamentally the same characteristics as those inhering in the primal mind itself." And "self-determination is the central characteristic of that mind." In "deliberation" man learns to repeat this character of the primal mind; but deliberation, in its developed form, involves a conscious and as such a conscientious conforming to law,—a submitting of conduct to reason. Accordingly (p. 40), "Virtue consists in a *normal life*,—that is, it consists in practical and progressive conformity on the part of the individual to the universal norm or type of human life." And this norm is of necessity identical with the "divine law." The specific virtues, on their subjective side, are defined as temperance, courage, and justice. The "objective aspect of Ethics"—*i.e.*, the theory of rights and duties in their social aspect—is discussed from p. 47 on. The little treatise is, to the present reviewer's mind, a little too fond of an ineffectively abstract manner of statement, which is increased by the great brevity to which the author has here con-

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demned himself. He would be more satisfactory were his statement lengthier and more concretely illustrated.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

MORALITY AND RELIGION: Being the Kerr Lectures for 1893–94. By the Rev. James Kidd, B.D., Minister of Erskine Church, Glasgow. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1895.

The Kerr Lectures are a foundation in the United Presbyterian Church in Scotland. They are delivered triennially by distinguished ministers of this denomination. It may be said at once that, if this course and that of Professor Orr, which preceded it, are to be taken as specimens of the work which the lectureship is to accomplish, it will prove one of the most valuable foundations of the kind. The main characteristic of the book before us is its analytical grasp. Mr. Kidd takes hold of a problem and does not let it go till he has surveyed it from almost every possible side. He also has ideas of his own with respect to it, and he holds by these with most admirable tenacity.

The plan of the book is both simple and effective. In Part First, entitled Morality, the author discusses "Conduct and Motive;" "The Moral Ideal." In Part Second, entitled Religion, he treats the Religious Sentiment exhaustively. In Part Third he examines the relations between Religion and Morality at length; while in Part Fourth, which is more distinctively theological, he considers the "Testimony of Christ" in its bearings upon the subject under review. To readers of this JOURNAL, Parts First and Third are of most direct interest; though, curiously enough, I am inclined to think that the best portions of the book are the Second and Fourth Parts. Here, in a semi-theological sphere, Mr. Kidd seems most at home, and speaks with greatest authority. Of these two portions the Second is better than the Fourth. It is less dogmatic, less sentimental. Probably many will be attracted by its criticism of recent Gifford lectures, and some will find themselves in substantial agreement with Mr. Kidd's strictures. But, whether they agree or not, they will be compelled to admit that Mr. Kidd is a man to be reckoned with. His book is undoubtedly the most effective and authoritative statement on the subject it discusses which has yet been published.

No one can fail to be struck by the independence, the characteristic caution, the wide learning, and the religious spirit of this new

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writer. Perhaps he tends sometimes not to see the wood for the trees. But this is an occasional blemish only. It is much to be hoped that he will go on pursuing the investigations into which preparation for this lectureship has led him. Much still remains to be done, even although within the limits of a brief notice it is impossible to do anything like justice to the suggestiveness and, in some points, the natural sagacity displayed here. Mr. Kidd's notable book ought to be read by all who interest themselves in this aspect of the subject. It is its own best commentary.

R. M. WENLEY.

UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

THE PATHOLOGY OF MIND: A Study of its Distempers, Deformities, and Disorders. By Henry Maudsley. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895. Pp. 571.

Dr. Maudsley concludes his interesting and suggestive study of the pathology of mind with a reference of an autobiographical character to the helplessness of the physician before the dark and discouraging problems of mental disease.

"A physician who had spent his life in ministering to diseased minds might be excused if, asking himself at the end of it whether he had spent his life well, he accused the fortune of an evil hour which threw him on that track of work. He could not well help feeling something of bitterness in the certitude that one-half of the disease he had dealt with could never get well, and something of misgiving in the reflection whether he had done real service to his kind by restoring the other half to do reproductive work. Nor would the scientific interest of his studies compensate entirely for the practical uncertainties, since their revelation of the structure of human nature might inspire a doubt whether, notwithstanding impassioned aims, pæans of progress, endless pageants of self-illusions, its capacity of degeneration did not equal, and might some day exceed, its capacity of development."

Whatever Dr. Maudsley's personal feelings may be with reference to the manner in which he has spent his life, he may rest assured that the studious public will always be grateful to him for his unwearied labors in the domain of mental disease. It is to be recollected that the pursuit of truth for its own sake is an ennobling occupation. Truth no doubt destroys many illusions, and sometimes shatters our fondest hopes, but all these drawbacks are counterbalanced by the fact that it teaches and compels us to look at things as they really are. Illusions of all kinds place us in a false relation to the world, and are often the forerunners of real calami-

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ties; truth, on the other hand, however disappointing it may be, has at least the merit of helping us to adjust ourselves to the inevitable conditions of our lot. Dr. Maudsley has undoubtedly spent his life wisely and well if he has placed one single stone upon the edifice of truth. It may not be the stone which we might like to see there, but if it is the stone which ought to be there, we must accept it at his hands with gratitude.

The value of Dr. Maudsley's volume to the non-medical reader lies in its earlier chapters. In these chapters he devotes himself to an examination of the various conditions which tend to produce insanity. These conditions he divides into two classes: sociological and biological. In our opinion, it might have been wise to include cosmical conditions. It is unquestionable, for instance, that the tendency to become insane is affected by variations of season and temperature. In France, according to the researches of Cazauvieilh, mental alienation descends to a minimum in the colder months; it commences rising in the spring, and, after a more or less feeble and ephemeral descent, attains its maximum in May or June. It is no doubt true that sociological conditions change with the change of the seasons, but it is hardly likely that the higher ratio of insanity in the spring and summer is entirely due to a mere variation of social circumstances. Attempts to commit suicide in England are also most prevalent in the summer months. The recently published volume of criminal statistics shows that attempts at suicide are at their lowest in January. As the spring advances they continue to increase and culminate in July, when the number is between two and three times as high as in January. In August the period of descent commences and goes on almost without interruption till the end of the year.

In dealing with the social causes of insanity, Dr. Maudsley says that adverse social circumstances, acting in combination with individual conditions, have a powerful effect in augmenting the ratio of madness. It is interesting to observe that this is also the opinion of a government committee which has just presented a report to the Secretary of State on the conditions of English prison life. In a paragraph on prison dietary, the committee express the view that it is among prisoners who are most frequently subjected to a low and innutritious dietary that cases of mental instability and unsoundness are most commonly found. In a memorandum on the subject of insanity in prisons a member of the committee endeavors to minimize its extent. But the contents of this memorandum

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will not bear examination. In the first place, the writer, in order to prove his case, assumes that there are more wandering lunatics at large now than twenty years ago. This assumption is contradicted by the facts of every-day experience, and also by public documents, which conclusively show that there is a greater readiness to commit lunatics to asylums than existed a generation ago. The increased numbers of these inmates are an incontestable proof of this. In the second place, the writer omits all cases of lunacy which occur within a month after admission into prison. But, inasmuch as three-fourths of the local prison population are committed to prison for less than a month, it is evident that all calculations based upon the omission of three-fourths of the facts must be absolutely fallacious. Finally, no account is taken of the effect of previous imprisonment in producing insanity, although the committee emphatically state that it is among the previously imprisoned that mental instability and unsoundness are most commonly found. A reference to these facts is sufficient to show that the question of insanity in prisons deserved more careful examination than has been accorded to it by the writer of the memorandum.

An examination of the conditions which tend to produce insanity is the only way to acquire a knowledge of the means by which this most fearful of all diseases may be avoided. Dr. Maudsley believes that the best preservative against madness is to possess what he describes as "a good, sound animality, a wholesome solidarity of body and mind." This opinion at once brings the subject within the sphere of ethical considerations. A wholesome solidarity of body and mind can only be attained by the harmonious education and cultivation of all our faculties. Mental balance will tend to increase in proportion as practical efforts are made to realize this great end. It is only by efforts of this character that the tendency to degeneration in human nature can be prevented, in the words of Dr. Maudsley, from exceeding its capacity for development.

W. D. Morrison.

London.

The Melancholy of Stephen Allard: A Private Diary. Edited by Garnet Smith. Macmillan & Co: London and New York, 1894.

Whether this be a genuine Diary, of the Amiel type, or a book written by Mr. Smith, it possesses distinct interest. The diary

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form has certain obvious advantages. Curiously *naïve* statements are made which throw light, perhaps more unexpectedly than the author intended, upon the fundamental assumptions—mostly fallacious—of pessimism. These may fairly be taken as affording compensation for the absence of anything like systematic treatment of the subject. The book is one to be dipped into occasionally rather than to be read straightforward in the ordinary manner. Its strength lies most of all in the extraordinary variety of information possessed by its author, and in the often luminous suggestions which he makes respecting the writers with whom he has familiarized himself. Some of his remarks about Marcus Aurelius and the Stoics, about Pascal, Hegel, and other notable thinkers are admirable, and show an unusual amount of insight. They are frequently put with a freedom from prepossession which is at once refreshing and stimulating.

To the ethical student the most attractive feature of the work will most probably be found in the witness which it half unconsciously bears to the essential unreasonableness of melancholy. Passage after passage of this nature might be quoted, but one or two specimens must suffice: "Beauty is but an accidental, momentary harmony in a world of almost constant discord, and woe to him who cannot make shift to endure the discord." "To be a man is to be self-conscious; and to be self-conscious is to be diseased." "*Pectus facit theologum;* it was the heart that made me a Christian—though a Christian without a creed. Solitude was best, *beata solitudo—sola beatitudo.*" The interest of the work is literary rather than philosophical; but it is well worth perusing, and it can be kept beside one for reference—which is more than can be said for most of its kind.

R. M. Wenley.

University of Glasgow.

Law in a Free State. By Wordsworth Donisthorpe. London: Macmillan & Co., 1895. Pp. ix., 312.

The author's preface is characteristic and worth quoting.

"Twenty years ago I took a census of the individualists in this country, and I found that they could all be seated comfortably in a Bayswater 'bus. Twelve years ago I took another, and I found that their number had increased to about three hundred. This increase I attributed mainly to the teachings of Mr. Herbert Spencer. At the present time the individualists of England may be counted by thousands, and perhaps tens of thousands. I attribute this further increase

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partly to the same cause, partly to the efforts of the Personal Rights Defence Association and the Liberty and Property Defence League, and partly to the visible effects of the practical State Socialism of the Legislature."

Mr. Donisthorpe addresses himself to those who have not yet found salvation in philosophical anarchy,—that is, those who although sufficiently "English" to prefer liberty are inconsistent enough to look to Socialism as a nearer means for certain ends. At the same time he admits that there are many "nuts" which individualists find it very hard to crack: these essays, therefore, are offered as "nut-crackers" for the use of individualists. "Certain individualists of the absolute sort propose to solve all social problems by applying the principle of liberty. But there they rest. They will not, or cannot, tell us *how* to do it." And certainly the author has deserved well of the public—it may be of Socialists—in showing us individualism at work. As to whether he has succeeded in making the "system" more reasonable or more attractive, opinions may well differ. If any one thinks that "revolution" is all on the side of Socialism, a glance at Mr. Donisthorpe's chapter on marriage would convince him that the individualist can "go one better" than any "social democrat." It is certainly interesting to find such an extreme left to the "Liberty and Property Defence League:" but it is not the first time that the principle of liberty has been found to do duty for social and political "extremes." Mr. Donisthorpe would in any case be a dangerous as well as an uncertain ally. It looks as if individualists of his type might find a hansom cab quite roomy. He throws over Mr. Herbert and others of the true faith, now for going too far (as in "voluntary taxation"), now for not going far enough (as in the conception of marriage): it seems only right and proper that individualists should differ, but Mr. Donisthorpe considers these and other "relapses" as only incidental to the transitional period through which we are passing on our road to a society "which will be held together (*sic*) on the principle of absolute philosophical anarchy."

What, then, is the principle of "philosophic anarchy"? It is never explicitly stated, but it may be found in the following statements gathered at random:

"The whole duty of man is his duty to himself. Every apparent duty to others is merely derivative; and the duty of the citizen to obey the law is merely based on the self-regarding prudence which warns him not to resist an overpowering force" (p. 127). "Do not lie. Do not steal. Do not hurt your neighbor's feelings without cause. And why not? Because, as a general rule, it will

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not pay" (p. 74). "Why should I conform to its dictates (justice)? Because it is a virtue? Nonsense: *because it is expedient.* Why should I tell the truth? There is no reason why, except that it is expedient for me, as I know from experience. There is no baser form of lying than fly-fishing. Is it wrong? No. Why not? Because I do not ask the fishes to trust me in the future. That is why" (p. 113).

Mr. Donisthorpe may be satisfied that he has established his claim to be a consistent follower of Hobbes: it was not even necessary to revive the theory of the Social Compact. This being the moral basis of individualism, it would seem superfluous to try and obtain some principle which should serve as "a guide to the solution of political questions." The author finds one, however, in "the grand doctrine of political liberty,—that every citizen should be allowed the fullest and widest possible freedom in all things, so long as he or she does not infringe on the equal freedom of fellow-citizens." Mr. Donisthorpe does not seem to see that "citizen" and "equal freedom of fellow-citizens" are not provided for in his philosophy. However, he triumphantly advances this principle as a "solution," for example, of marriage,—which, in a sense, it certainly is.

It is a little late in the day to criticise the implications of Mr. Donisthorpe's somewhat *naïve* individualism; nor can he be said to have succeeded in making a "consistent individualism" consistent with itself, though he has thrown much humor into the attempt. "The Woes of a Politician," with which he concludes his volume, suggest that he is not too satisfied with it himself. A writer who is not conscious of a distinction between the ideas of the "State" and "Society," or of the "State" and "Government," is not likely to be very coherent, or very instructive, however amusing the spectacle of "the State" as a kind of "Aunt Sally" for Mr. Donisthorpe's gibes may be. (It is the Great National Pickpocket, he says, in one place: only the State, he tells us, could invent the word "Analyst.")

Hopeless as the author is on the ground of principle, he is really not much more helpful either in his view of social development or of modern social policy. Occasionally he makes a real point (after Mr. Spencer), in showing how machinery may often give a new occasion to old evils; but just as he conceives of Socialism as mere restriction, he rarely regards individualism as anything higher than mere liberty. Thus conceived, Socialism and Individualism are equally vicious abstractions, and have no moral significance at all. If individualism does not result in a higher form of social order,

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and if Socialism does not yield an increase and extension of liberty and individual development, they equally err in regarding the State "not as a society organic to good life, but as a machine subservient to individual's needs *qua* individual." Mr. Donisthorpe fails to recognize that "organization" and "liberty" (in his sense) are merely means to an end that can be defined indifferently, but not exclusively, in terms of either individual or social progress; at any rate, an end which can only be secured through the medium of the State as representating society organized for the attainment of the common good. The kind and the amount of liberty and "organization" that are required can only be measured by the needs of human progress as a whole at any time, and the sovereign condition of human progress is the development of character. But the author gives us no measure either of "restriction" or of "liberty."

For the rest, Mr. Donisthorpe admits that "no one with the smallest claim to attention has been known to affirm that this or any other nation is yet ripe for the abolition of the State," or "that 'No Government' is not a sufficient practical rule for us at the present time." It is from this point of view that he considers "the Duties of the State" and the "Limits of Liberty." "Duties" and "Limits" are only "transitory" conceptions destined to pass away with "the State." Under the first head, Mr. Donisthorpe surveys the functions that are or may be appropriated by the State; the treatment is unmethodical, and loses itself in digressions; it certainly (and naturally) fails to give us any clear line of demarcation between the things that are the "State's" and the things that are the "Individual's." It is noticeable that Mr. Donisthorpe does not consider that the method of raising taxation by "the circulation of the hat" is adequate at any rate to a "transition." As far as we can judge, he would restrict the "transitional" duties of the State to the maintenance of an army and navy, courts of justice, and a police force. He would abolish the post-office, but concedes (with reluctance) that "the criminal department will for some time yet remain socialistic." (Crime is another transitional conception.) With regard to the "Limits of Liberty," the author admits again that "we cannot draw a hard and fast line between the proper field of State interference and the field sacred to individual freedom." We must rest content with "those middle principles which originate in expedience and are verified by experience;" and all history "teaches us that there has been an increasing tendency to remove the restrictions placed by the State

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on the absolute liberty of its citizens." But Mr. Donisthorpe fails to recognize a distinction which would put his appeal to experience in another light. The kind of restriction which the State has removed has no relation to the kind of restriction which the State has (as a matter of history) an "increasing tendency to impose." An argument against "Factory Legislation" which rests upon an appeal to the experience of "Sumptuary" legislation is singularly inappropriate. Of the remaining essays, the chapter on "Adulteration" contains some good, if somewhat inconclusive, instances of the imperfections of legislators and the frailties of inspectors,—in fact, of "officialdom," generally; it is in this reference that the individualist's hostility to the "State" (meaning "executive") has good sense and is never inopportune. The chapter on "Education and Instruction" is excellent. Mr. Donisthorpe gives it an unexpected connection with his main argument by the triumphant demonstration, that in supporting a British museum which arranges cats upon principles of natural selection, socialists are "taxing themselves for the teaching of individualism," and are committing "a petty fraud upon the simple taxpayers." The chapter on "Marriage" cannot be summarized without injustice. Some people might call it fantastic, others absurd, but no one can fail to admire its frankness and vigor and ability. The chapter on "the Status of Children," if less exciting, is equally suggestive and certainly more practical. "The Future of Labor" contains a further explanation and indication of the author's theory of "Labor Capitalization," and whatever may be the difficulties in its application, the principle is one which must be somehow or other embodied in any "future of labor." "All (that the principle) asks is that the worker shall cease to sell himself by time for any kind of work, with his eyes shut, to any employer who chooses to engage him, and that he shall in future be responsible for the work at which he labors." Mr. Donisthorpe's peculiar setting of this principle is certainly much more suggestive and distinctive than it appears at first sight. "The Woes of a Politician" read almost like a palinode: anyhow, they should not be taken as an example of the author's humor at its best.

Mr. Donisthorpe's book is often diverting, occasionally suggestive, at all times perverse, but allowance ought to be made for the difficulties of an "anarch" whose "time has not yet come."

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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THE EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRY. By Henry Dyer, C.E., M.A., D.Sc. London: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

"Both politicians and economists are beginning to recognize, although in a somewhat vague manner, that industrial society will not permanently remain without a systematic organization, and, further, that the mere conflict of private interests will never produce a well-ordered commonwealth of labor" (p. 241). Dr. Dyer's book is a description and an estimate of the various forces which are making towards a systematic organization of industry, and forms the most serviceable general introduction to the study of modern industrial development which I have seen. The introductory chapter, in which Dr. Dyer lays down the physical and biological bases of social progress, contains a sound and philosophic statement of certain orders of fact which have been either ignored by "progressive" thinkers or have been mishandled by writers of the calibre of Mr. Kidd. The physical laws which underlie the relations of effort and satisfaction, and which form a "natural" determinant of the reward of labor, the biological laws which require the maintenance of "natural selection" under rational human conditions, are enforced with great vigor by Dr. Dyer, who establishes their consistency with the ethical conditions of a progressive society. The use of certain scientific and philosophic formulæ in his opening pages indeed promise a somewhat deeper and subtler treatment of social forces than is actually presented in the body of the book, which is occupied by a wide and very lucid general description of modern industrial movements, adapted rather to the intellectual stand-point of the "general reader" than to that of the close student of "economics." Not that the latter, who is commonly a narrow specialist, will not learn much from the outspoken criticism and large-minded interpretation which Dr. Dyer adopts. His insistence upon the futility of a Science of Economics which endeavors unscientifically to isolate phenomena connected with production of material wealth, and upon the subordination not merely of the practical side, the art of economics, but of the theoretic side, the interpretation of facts, to a wide human science, might well occupy the attention of those who imagine that the scope and method of economic science have been clearly and finally determined. The greater part of Dr. Dyer's work, however, is devoted to a description of the different movements making for integration of industry and a statement of the chief problems

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involved in their organization. The following statement of his general view will indicate his method: "A careful study will show that individualism, co-operation, trade-unionism, and the various forms of municipal and State control are alike necessary for the social and industrial organization of the future; and although, in some respects, they may seem to be opposed, they are all tending to a state of society in which the welfare of all the members will be the chief object kept in view, and under which the conditions will allow, at least in the artistic products, the free play of individuality, and without which there can be no real pleasure to the workers." In his separate estimate of these various tendencies, Dr. Dyer seems to me to assign excessive value to the experiments in co-operative workshops and to the several forms of "profit-sharing;" animated by a general idea that all these things are making "in the right direction" by giving a stronger economic position to the workers, he slurs over the essential difficulties which arise from the establishment of sectional "vested interests" which are likely to clash with the general social interest in various ways. Even in his treatment of industrial training and his interesting chapter on Industrial Guilds, one does not always feel sure that Dr. Dyer has a very clear conception of the unity of what one may be allowed to call "the industrial organism." For example, on page 236 he wishes to make "the conditions of work and of the workers the basis of all our proposals and actions," while on page 279 he adopts what is surely the sounder position that "the true starting-point of economics is the qualitative development of consumption by the great masses of the people." Practically there is no inconsistency between the two positions, but logically we must assign to consumption rather than to production the chief part as generator and determinant of reform forces. It is interesting to recognize how strongly not only the spirit but the practical proposals of Ruskin have influenced Dr. Dyer, whose idea of the development of Trade-Unions and Boards of Conciliation into permanent and powerful Guilds for the ordering of work and the determination of wages and hours of labor follows clearly the outlines, though not the details, of Ruskin's suggestions. It is right to say that Dr. Dyer is alive to certain dangers of sectional action. "At the same time care must be taken that they do not degenerate into narrow castes, which not only sacrifice the individuality and variety of their members, but also laminate society into disordered strata."

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On one "economic point" I cannot agree with Dr. Dyer. In his right and reasonable zeal for improved efficiency of labor he repeats the commonly-accepted dogma that "without increased production or greater economy and efficiency, a general rise of wages or return to all concerned is impossible" (p. 101). The same notion underlies an argument on page 224. It is, of course, true that "all concerned" cannot be gainers unless the product is increased; but it is not true that a general rise of wages is absolutely conditioned by a rise of efficiency, so long as there exists any economic rent of land or any monopoly elements in high interest or high profits which successful organization of labor might convert into wages. It is important to recognize that these monopoly elements, forming a "surplus" which in competitive trade falls to the strongest party, prevent the complete harmonizing of the interests of capital and labor which otherwise might come from a more intelligent understanding of the common interests and a habit of working together so as to secure them. Setting aside certain small points of disagreement, I cannot speak too highly of the interpretation of industrial forces in Dr. Dyer's work. It is clear, comprehensive, and interesting; and, while the author is in strong sympathy with what may be called "progressive Socialism," he nowhere assigns an undue power to collective action, always recognizing as the true criterion of social progress the increase of individuality in the members of society.

JOHN A. HOBSON.

LONDON.

COMTE, MILL, AND SPENCER: An Outline of Philosophy. By John Watson, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Queen's College, Kingston, Canada. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895. Pp. xx., 302.

The title of this book is, I think, unfortunate, if not somewhat misleading. It certainly would not lead us to expect "an introduction to philosophy as a whole," which, according to the preface, the book is meant to be. It is also difficult to see why the name of Kant in particular should be omitted, seeing that the greater part of the book is taken up with an account and criticism of his views.

To write an introduction to philosophy as a whole, which may with advantage be placed in the hands of beginners, is certainly a

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task of great difficulty. In the case of a subject which is at once so complex and so wide, it seems almost impossible, within the compass which Professor Watson has allowed himself in the present work, to combine a clear analysis and statement of separate points, such as beginners can appreciate, with the philosophic unity and compactness which are necessary to make the subject as a whole intelligible. In most text-books, the latter, though implicitly present, is from the point of view of the reader subordinated to the former. And the more complex the subject, the greater would appear to be the difficulty of giving the beginner a true view of the trees *and* the wood. Professor Watson's book, though it may not possess the charm of novelty for some readers, is eminently clear and readable; it is a book which attests on every page the ability of the author to present his subject in a lucid and attractive way. I think, however, that it would be very helpful to the reader, and especially to the beginner, if the author indicated more clearly what the connection is between different parts of his treatment. In the preface, certainly, we are told that the method followed "is to attempt to show that the ideas which lie at the basis of Mathematics, Physics, Biology, Psychology and Ethics, Religion and Art [why not Theology and Æsthetics?] are related to each other as developing forms or phases of one idea,—the idea of self-conscious Reason." Again, on page 20, we are told that "existence may roughly be divided into the three great related spheres of Nature, Mind, and God (whatever these may ultimately be found to mean)." We are told so, and that is all. On the whole, the book, able in most of its parts though it is, strikes us as a collection of lectures, connected certainly by an underlying unity of *view*, but written without reference to a progressive unity of treatment. The chapter on Religion, in particular, is very meagre and inadequate. Indeed, it is hardly on the subject at all. It seems to have been tacked on to give the book a kind of superficial completeness. To what the author calls the "Philosophy of Nature" 107 pages are devoted; to the "Philosophy of Mind," 44; to "Moral Philosophy," 87, and to the "Philosophy of the Absolute" (Religion and Art) only 21 pages.

There is one other more special criticism with regard to the connection of parts which I venture to make. I would suggest that the "Philosophy of Nature" as dealt with by Professor Watson is but a part of the "Philosophy of Mind." Under the title "Philosophy of Nature" he discusses the question of the possibility

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of a mathematical, physical, and biological *knowledge of nature*, which he says is but the general question of the possibility of a real knowledge of nature, put in a special way. In his "Philosophy of Mind" he merely discusses the more general question of the relation of subject and object. Such a distinction is, at least without further explanation, somewhat confusing. The theory which Professor Watson upholds is that which he calls Intellectual Idealism, the theory, viz., that knowledge and morality are but deeper interpretations of nature; mind and matter, reason and desire, though opposed to a superficial observer, are really one in principle. This view he enforces not by an immediate appeal to facts, but "partly out of respect for their eminence and partly as a means of orientation" both for himself and the students under his charge, by an examination of the views of Mill, Comte, Spencer, Darwin, and Kant (the two latter are included in the preface).

The first and second chapters are general and introductory. The first deals with the "problem of philosophy," which is shown to be different from that of the Sciences. The Sciences never ask whether the principles upon which they rest are principles of reality or not, or else assume that they are. Philosophy has to take up this problem, and as such does not deal primarily with objects, but with the knowledge of them. The second chapter is devoted to a criticism of Comte's general position. This, according to the author, is necessary at this stage, because there are some thinkers who maintain "that man is by the very nature of his faculties forever incapable of knowing reality as it ultimately is; and it is, therefore, thought advisable to begin by asking whether this sceptical attitude in regard to the object of philosophy has any rational foundation, or whether it does not rather rest upon an untenable assumption." I am not sure, however, that this chapter would not fall more naturally under the "Philosophy of Mind," seeing that there we have the same problem dealt with, only more exhaustively.

In the next chapters, which treat of the "Philosophy of Nature," we have the Idealistic Theory set forth, as has already been pointed out, in greater detail. The views examined and combated in this part are mainly those of Mill (in Mathematics and Physics) and Darwin (in Biology).

In the one chapter on the "Philosophy of Mind," Spencer's view of the relation of subject and object is criticised with great acuteness and force. Some portions of the chapter, however, seem to

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lack the precision and clearness which mark other parts of the work. The author (on pages 171, 172, *e.g.*) does not sufficiently distinguish between a feeling and the consciousness of it, or rather, in emphasizing their connection, tends to ignore their difference. "If the life of consciousness as it exists in man presupposes the life of sensation and impulse, it is plain that any attempt to isolate the conscious subject from the sensitive subject must result in emptying consciousness of all content. For in his sensitive life man expresses the life which pervades and gives meaning to all objective existence." "If in the sensitive life the objective world as a whole is implied, to turn away from sensation is to turn away from the objective world." All this is perfectly true; sensation is a condition of consciousness, but it is not its content, as the first sentence in the above quotation implies, or, at least, may be made to imply. The author is fully aware of the distinction, but does not at all times make it clear.

The next chapters deal with Morality. That on "Duty," though full of good matter, is, I think, the loosest in the book. The main conception is the same, viz., that Desire is not opposed to Reason, but is the condition of the self-realization of Reason. The opposition of good and evil is not an opposition of nature and spirit, of particular and universal, but of spirit and spirit, or of universal and particular made universal. The treatment is wanting in compactness, however, and contains much useless repetition.

The remainder of the book is an account and criticism of Kant's views, and, as the author says, is little more than a condensation of parts of the Master of Balliol's well-known work on Kant. The book as a whole, indeed, may and ought to be welcomed as an able and reliable introduction to the larger work of Caird on Kant. As such an introduction it will supply a much-felt want in our colleges, and will be found useful by many teachers and students.

E. Keri Evans.

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John Stuart Mill: A Study of his Philosophy. By Charles Douglas, M.A., D.Sc., Lecturer in Moral Philosophy and Assistant to the Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1895. Pp. xv., 274.

Dr. Douglas's little book is a sympathetic attempt to elucidate certain aspects of Mill's thought. As he not unjustly complains,

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the criticism to which Mill has been subjected has too often been "rather a controversial disproof of certain theories, common to him with other writers, than an attempt to discover the distinctive ways of thinking to which his philosophy owes its special interest" (p. 2). The significance of his work Dr. Douglas finds in the growth of idealistic elements upon the uncongenial soil of individualistic empiricism. Instead, therefore, of treating such points as Mill's admission of a permanent self or of qualitative distinctions among pleasures as mere inconsistencies, to be forthwith hurled at his head, we are asked to regard them as the expression of the really vital and progressive tendencies of his thought, which indeed he did little or nothing to harmonize with the rigid outlines of his inherited system. Undoubtedly, in the case of Mill especially, the gladiatorial method of criticism is as unprofitable as it is easy. The sympathetic critic, however, who would take his subject by the hand and convict him against himself of being after all a child of light, is liable to dangers of his own, which militate as much against historical accuracy as does the polemical attitude. He is apt to persuade himself that there are signs of repentance where none really exist. Dr. Douglas has on the whole avoided the mistake of reading into his subject more than can fairly be found there. But exception must be taken to the representation of Mill's denial of the separate existence of the concept as an indication of freedom from "epistemological individualism" (p. 53). The denial does not occur "in his discussion of judgment," and it is not in favor of "the synthesis of judgment" but of the concrete image that Mill would abolish the concept as a separate existence. Nor is it necessary to explain Mill's defence of introspective psychology by any special regard for the value of personal life.

As Dr. Douglas rightly perceives Mill's chief interest was an ethical one, and accordingly more than half of his book is concerned with Mill's practical philosophy. It would have been well, both here and elsewhere, if Dr. Douglas had carried his own analysis a little further. Thus, we certainly cannot regard the very rhetorical and metaphorical quotation from Bentham as a statement of psychological Hedonism which "left nothing to be desired or achieved in the way of definiteness or thoroughness" (pp. 84–85). Further explanation, too, might have been given of the meaning attached to such general terms as "Idealism" and "Individualism." In conclusion, I cannot better characterize the general spirit of the

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work before me than in the words which its author applies to Mill, as "eminently free, fair, and candid."

JAMES GIBSON.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS.

A COMPANION TO PLATO'S REPUBLIC. By Bernard Bosanquet. London: Rivington, Percival & Co., 1895.

In his Preface, Mr. Bosanquet tells us that the idea of writing this volume was suggested to him by Mr. Walter Leaf's "Companion to the Iliad." The commentary is intended for English readers, and primarily for University Extension students, and it is based accordingly upon Davies and Vaughan's translation, not upon the Greek text. It is surprising to find that the class of students Mr. Bosanquet has in view take so much interest in Plato; but it is not unnatural after all, and it is certainly gratifying to all who believe that Greek philosophy is still a living power.

It must not be supposed, however, that this is merely a popular handbook of the common type. The Platonic student who can learn nothing from this little book is either to be envied or pitied. And the book is a model of style. Mr. Bosanquet's careful diction, which makes his writing so difficult to some and so luminous to others, stands him in good stead as an interpreter. Plato is himself the master of this style, and he often seems to be saying nothing in particular when he is really making a great revolution in philosophy.

It is impossible to say anything worth saying about an ancient philosopher without reference to the times in which he lived. Philosophy makes profession of detachment from its surroundings: but, just for that reason, we must know the surroundings from which it is detached. Mr. Bosanquet's interpretation of Plato has plenty of background, and many of his remarks throw fresh light on the Athens of Plato's time. Take this on the fourth century B.C. The word decadence "only applies to it in that liberal spirit in which speculation marks a decadence compared with action, or saintliness compared with citizenship" (p. 2). Or this on the Sophists: "To ask a fee for such teaching was, therefore, to a Greek gentleman, much what it would be to-day for a man to require payment for his talk at a party." Or again: "Plato seems to have lived at the right moment to seize the connection between the magic of savagery and the sacerdotalism of civilized society" (p. 76). The book is full of such suggestive sentences as these.

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Every one will wish to know Mr. Bosanquet's view of the "Theory of Ideas." Those who look for a convenient formula in which to sum it up and pack it away with other philosophic lumber of the like sort will be disappointed. Mr. Bosanquet has been content with trying to explain to us what Plato really meant to say. But the drift of his interpretation may be gathered from such sentences as these: "The sharp separation between one and another use of the word 'form' or 'idea' is wholly artificial" (p. 80). "To isolate all texts which seem to have a mythical sense, and say that Plato's doctrine must be determined by them alone, is a mutilation of the data by which the hypothesis should be tested" (p. 141). "It is all-important to read Plato's text as simply and correctly as possible, interpreting it in the first instance by the primary requirements of philosophical thought, and dismissing from our minds the conceptions which have been derived from Aristotle's account of the doctrine, from clearly mythical passages in Plato himself (as in the myth of the 'Phædrus'), and from vague echoes of Kantian 'things-in-themselves'" (p. 206). Most significant of all, perhaps, is the reference to "the materialized image of, so to speak, a common-sense earth and a philosophic heaven, which disfigures the whole current interpretation of Plato" (p. 217).

Every student of Plato will differ from Mr. Bosanquet here and there, but all must admit that his work is one of the most valuable contributions to the subject that has been made for a long time.

JOHN BURNET.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

NEW BOOKS.

THE FEMALE OFFENDER. By Professor Cæsar Lombroso and William Ferrero. With an Introduction by W. Douglas Morrison. Illustrated. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1895.

PUNISHMENT AND REFORMATION: An Historical Sketch of the Rise of the Penitentiary System. By Frederick Howard Wines, LL.D. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1895.

NATURE VERSUS NATURAL SELECTION: An Essay on Organic Evolution. B Charles Clement Coe. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1895

THE SEXES COMPARED, and other Essays. By Edward von Hartmann. Selected and Translated by A. Kenner, M.A. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

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VIA, VERITAS, VITA: Lectures on "Christianity in its most Simple and Intelligible Form." Delivered in Oxford and London in April and May, 1894. By Principal James Drummond, LL.D., etc. London: Williams & Norgate, 1894.

AN INTRODUCTION TO HERBERT'S SCIENCE AND PRACTICE OF EDUCATION. By Henry M. and Emmie Felkin. With a Preface by Oscar Browning, M.A. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1895.

ECONOMICS AND SOCIALISM: A Demonstration of the Cause and Cure of Trade Depressions and National Poverty. By F. U. Laycock, LL.B. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1895.

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THE HEGEMONY OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY.

I.

THE cardinal point in the Kantian philosophy is, that if science is a function of mind, it is neither the sole nor the most important function. There are limits between which scientific exposition may be applied, but beyond these rests a vast territory in which our speculations must be controlled by entirely different principles. Such is the fundamental idea of Kant. On the contrary, it is on the established or probable data of science that Auguste Comte proposed to construct what he denominated the cerebral unity of mankind. To which of the two must we grant the true intellectual hegemony? This problem still profoundly interests minds not only in France but in all those countries which concern themselves with the future. In our day, we have seen, after the philosophers, critics, novelists, poets, and then professional scientists take up the question of the relations of science to belief. These excursions of scientists and men of letters into the domain of philosophy have served the purpose of reviving interest in great problems. The single drawback is, that neither side has always given sufficient attention to defining their terms, to properly stating the question at issue, to avoiding hasty solutions. Men of letters are too often unable to go beyond the vague idealism with which Renan contented

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himself, or professional scientists beyond the narrow positivism of a Littré. We have seen very recent illustrations of this danger in the discussions which have arisen on several occasions between men of letters and scientists over the so-called "bankruptcy of science." Those who have maintained this thesis have employed subtle tactics: they have arrayed on the one hand the positive results of special sciences,—they have confined themselves in the meanwhile to physical and natural sciences,—and then, on the other hand, they have pointed us to religions with their replies all ready to the problems of life and conduct. The scientists, in their turn, have vaunted the benefits of science, and its discoveries in the material and industrial order, as if morality were a mere question of physical well-being or of pure hygiene. We should indeed be led to conclude that a philosophy or a system of ethics had never existed unless in theologies and mythologies of all descriptions or in mathematics, physics, and physiology. This would be making too cheap a disposition of history; it would erase at a single stroke of the pen the sciences, so justly called moral, from psychology and ethics to philosophy proper. Most certainly, if it be true that physics and natural history, as such, ever engaged to furnish a philosophy of the world and of life, we should be justified in concluding that these sciences have bankrupted themselves, that they have meddled with that which in no way concerns them. In the same way, chemistry would bankrupt itself, should it pretend to explain the movement of the stars, the precession of the equinoxes, the eclipses of sun or moon. And by the same reasoning, theology went into bankruptcy when it presumed to decide that the sun moves around the earth, since Joshua once stopped its course. Every usurpation of one science on a domain foreign to it, is sure to end in such discomfitures as these. These bold adventures, it is true, are too common on the part of scientists, who, in the pride of their special discoveries, imagine sometimes that they have discovered the universal secret; fortunately, these scientists do not constitute science. Should all bankers become insolvent, arithmetic would still be as trustworthy as ever. Perfectly legitimate as

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it is to restrict each scientist to his own territory, it is as truly illegitimate to hold Science (with or without the capital) responsible for the false bills of exchange drawn in its name. It is ignorance and not science which in such cases always goes into bankruptcy. The bankruptcy of science could by no possibility consist in aught else than this pretension to usurp the place of philosophy; for in its own domain scientific truth is worthy of our respect, even of our love, since it contributes to our intellection of things. Saint Augustine says: *valde ama intellectum.* Neither the gates of hell nor those even of paradise shall prevail against science.

A few years ago, the youths in our schools were divided between the neo-idealists and the neo-positivists. In an eloquent discourse to students, M. Zola declared himself a "hardened old positivist," and felt under obligations to apologize for science. "Did it promise happiness?" he inquired. And he replied: "I do not believe it. Science promises truth, and the question is to know whether we shall ever be able to manufacture happiness out of truth. In order to be at peace some day, we need a great deal of sacrifice, the absolute renunciation of self, a serenity of intelligence satisfied, which, as it seems, is possible only among the elect few. But as we wait, what a cry rises from suffering humanity. Shall we ever be able to live without lies and without illusions?" M. Zola conceded, in the course of his address, that in literature the naturalist school had "too much narrowed the horizon." "Personally, I regret that I ever became a sectary in my desire to confine art to truths that were capable of demonstration." Would not M. Zola be forced to admit that in philosophy also, positivism has too much narrowed the horizon? And can we admit the pretended positivist definition which M. Zola gives us of the ideal? "What else is the ideal," he asks, "than the inexplicable, those forces of the vast universe in which we bathe without knowing what they are?" No; the ideal cannot signify the unknown; it is the direction—cognizable at least in part—of the reality as it arrives at a consciousness of itself in man. M. Zola concluded by counselling his hearers to forget the "malady of the infinite." He advised

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those who suffer from the "mysterious" to throw their life "into some gigantic labor," which would bring good results even if they never saw the end of it. But thus presented as a daily duty, without any principle to justify this duty, work becomes at bottom only a means of intoxicating yourself, a means of "diversion," as Pascal said, more hygienic (in general) perhaps than gaming and dissipations of other sorts, but the true moral sense of which escapes us for the lack of some philosophical doctrine which fixes for the individual his place in human society and in universal society. M. Alexandre Dumas appeared on the scene of action, and was not afraid to predict that men, after having tried everything else, would end, "and that very soon," by applying seriously to life the law of brotherly love, that they would even be swept away "by the madness, the rage of love." He declared that he discerned already among those phenomena which seemed so menacing to us, the signs of these love-tendencies which spring up among men. Tolstoï, who leans towards an analogous optimism, affirmed that "the more men believe that they can be led by some exterior force operating outside of their own will in transforming and ameliorating their own existence, with the greater difficulty will this amelioration take place." M. Brunetierè demonstrated with his habitual ardor that the physical and natural sciences have not succeeded in explaining the nature of man as man,—that is to say, as a being endowed with feeling, thought, and will; and still less the origin of those genuinely human attributes, of that which constitutes man as such, and that in consequence these sciences have failed to reveal to us the future destiny of the essentially human in man. But the eloquent writer went beyond the goal which he had set for himself by pushing the offensive too far; in thus confronting religion and science, he seemed to forget philosophy. This was in the eyes of Tolstoï the principal defect in the address of M. Zola. "On the contrary, the more they believe in what Dumas predicts, that the time will come, infallibly and soon, when men, inspired by brotherly love, will modify of their own volition the whole of their existence, the more rapidly will this time arrive." Relying on the force of

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ideas, Tolstoï concluded that "by announcing this modification in human sentiments, we shall realize it the sooner." Very recently still, this question of science and faith appeared in France in a still more sharply accentuated and ringing form. The following are the principal arguments produced in this debate. "We are not able," declares one, "to conceive of man without morality, without language, and not in society; and these are the very elements of the definition which surpass the means, the methods, and the pretensions of science." Of purely physical science, yes; but can psychological and moral sciences teach us nothing as to the origin of society, which, as it appears, springs from the social instincts of men, just as in certain animals from social instincts less highly developed, and which have nothing supernatural in them? "Science," declares another, "has not sufficiently accounted for the origin of man." Nor that of the insect or of the bird. Must we for that reason suppose a miraculous origin? "Science has not entirely explained the origin of human language." Nor the origin of the nightingale's song. Must we then conclude that God was its singing-master? The questions of historical origin acknowledge a mass that is unknown, but never miracles and mysteries. The metaphysical origin of matter and thought is a mystery only for our intelligence; but science has never promised to unveil this mystery, nor to make known the unknowable. The positivism of Comte and the evolutionism of Spencer have given to the unknowable even an exaggerated *rôle*. The Mosaic hypothesis of creation, we must admit, "gives us a reply to the question, whence we come, and the theory of evolution will never give us this answer." But the hypothesis of the emanation from the bosom of Brahma, and, generally speaking, religious narratives of all sorts, give us likewise a reply to the same question. How, then, are we to choose without summoning philosophy to our aid?

If our intelligence is not above suspicion, what are we to say as to our feelings and our imagination? These faculties which you declare incapable of real integrity when philosophy and science are concerned, will they suddenly become veracious when the question is of religious myths? And are we

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to argue that men of science are inferior to aboriginals like Moses, because the latter had more imagination and knew less?*

Science, unfortunately for it, has been defended by scientists. One of the most illustrious of these has reminded us that we are indebted to science for the telegraph, the railroad, and even "dyestuffs"! M. Berthelot adds, that "he adheres to the moral code of duty and of the honest man." His morality has its origin neither in "egotism nor fanaticism." Of course. But is that a reason why this code should not rest on some philosophical principle? Does it imply none in its principles or in its conclusions? That is what the scientists do not tell us. To the question of what we are, M. Morselli thinks it sufficient to answer, "We are vertebrates, mammals, primates of

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* Nor have the philological sciences been able in their turn to keep all of their promises. If it is true that the Hellenists "formally engaged to show us in the philosophy of Greece and Rome the whole of Christianity," the Hellenists were certainly very presumptuous. But I fail to see that Ernest Havet has ever appeared to believe that the whole of Christianity is in Hellenism. Progress is undeniable in humanity. One is justified in saying that there will always be "something in Christianity which Hellenism cannot explain," but whether explicable by natural means or not, is an entirely different question. Shakespeare cannot be explained by the literature which preceded him, and which contains nothing which adds to his genius; but we are not to conclude from this that "Macbeth" and "Hamlet" were composed under the dictation of the Holy Ghost. Likewise, the Hebraizers have not explained the Bible by the Mahabharata; but we must grant also that the Orientalists have just as little explained the Mahabharata by the Bible; all of which does not go to prove that the Mahabharata is a supernatural work, but only an original work. "There is something in the history of the people of God which is not to be found in that of any other." That is certain. And we can also say that there is something in the history of the Greeks which cannot be found in that of any other, not even in the history of the Hebrews. It does not seem to us that we have here, either for Greek or Hebrew, proof of anything "irrational" or "marvellous." History, also, has not discovered "a law of history," and this though historical sciences are mere "idle curiosity," if their least researches do not tend to "a philosophy of history." But this philosophy is the task of philosophers; and if Condorcet, Turgot, Comte, Vico, Herder, Kant, and Hegel have not revealed some single law of history which was absolute, they have nevertheless discovered a multitude of partial laws which leave this to be inferred. Moralists *a priori* can declare this law, and sociologists *a posteriori* can with more and more ease discover its operation in the bosom of actual societies.

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an order but slightly different from that of the quadrumanes."* To the question, "whence we come?" M. Morselli replies, "We come from earlier forms which, in the adaptations to the conditions of life, have acquired the small number of specific characteristics by which we distinguish other anthropoids." At this moment one has just discovered a form which is probably intermediate between man and the primates,—the "*Pithecanthropus erectus* of Sumatra." M. Morselli did not perceive here that he was replying to questions of a purely biological character which teach us nothing of what we are morally and intellectually.

II.

In this entire discussion, in which the point at issue is to determine whether or not science is to have the final leadership of humanity, one thing has been neglected,—the definition of science. This term has a broad sense and a restricted sense. A *science*, in the broadest acceptation of the term—or at least a *cognition*—is a rationally established system of facts and ideas which, over a given range of objects, confers certainty, assurance, probability, or even a doubt that knows why it doubts. To know that we do not know, and why, is none the less to know; a negative solution is, after its fashion, a solution. To know that a thing is possible, or, better still, that it is probable by virtue of such and such reasons for it and such and such reasons against it, is always to know. Thus it is that belief founded on reason enters the category of science. Science is then each legitimate product of the intelligence operating freely with the aid of what the theologians call "natural reason." Thus understood, science includes universal philosophy as well as special sciences. It is belief alone, founded on the authority of others, not regulated, and incapable of demonstration, or on the imagination or feelings to which a supernatural bearing is given, which must be excluded from the domain of knowledge and of science in the broadest sense of the word.

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* "La Pretesa Bancarotta della Scienza," Parma, 1895.

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Apart from the antagonism of natural intelligence and supernatural belief, we can establish in the domain of the former a new antagonism between the pure sciences and philosophy.

Science, in the true sense of the word, hinges on the relations of objects to each other independently of their relation to the sentient and thinking object. This last relation, at least, is understood. Among the ancients, as M. Boutroux has excellently demonstrated, science is the cognition of that which *is*, of that which subsists amid all changes. For them, it is the substance, the essence, the completed form or act; it is the efficient cause; it is, above all, the final cause. That is to say, science is philosophy itself. As we moderns understand it, science becomes, by detaching itself from philosophy, the perception of the constant relations between things, such as these appear to us, independently of what they may be in themselves. Science hinges, above all, on the laws of growth and change; on the laws, at one and the same time both practical and theoretical, of the *production* of things.

Bacon confines himself to the problem of material production: what phenomena must we assume, indeed, as the antecedent in order to produce some consequent phenomenon, without our being able to know in the meanwhile *why* the antecedent involves the consequent. Descartes, in his turn, assumes as a standard what has been termed the ideal production of mathematics, which undertakes to explain why this consequence is enveloped in this particular principle; considering every empirical fact as a consequence or effective solution of a mathematical problem, he endeavors to ascend to the data of the problem in order to establish the necessity of the sequence.

Unquestionable it is, that the positive sciences, as thus understood, will take an ever-increasing part in the utilitarian and even moral direction of humanity; for the world and life cannot present themselves with the same uniformity to a society in which the sciences have reached their maturity as to a society in which they are still in their infancy. Scientific ideas, moreover, are the only ones which are identical between indi-

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viduals. The moment an element of faith enters among these ideas, individuals begin to disagree. When we appeal to the sentimental prejudices which frequently enshroud confused, imperfectly elucidated, and in part unconscious ideas, we appeal unquestionably to a considerable force, but to one which is sure to enclose a multitude of individual divergences. Sentiments which are the correlates of scientific ideas are those which have the most chance to fuse into a single and collective sentiment. The domain of peace increases, then, between minds with the domain of science, at that exact point where the light shines, whatever division may remain possible in other directions. Science is nothing else than that social knowledge which is one of the essential elements of social consciousness. That which is scientific, no one any longer disputes; it becomes henceforth part of the collective experience and the collective reason. Geometry, for example, is a social possession in the intellectual order, an integral part of an universal intelligence: society thinks and acts geometrically. Of course, the individual must rethink geometry and reconstruct it in order to understand it; but while his intellect thus puts itself in harmony with universal truth, we can say that it harmonizes also with social intelligence in which this truth is henceforth living and conscious. We are justified in concluding that each science socializes truth. While it is a step in advance towards the objective synthesis, it is also a step in advance towards the subjective and human synthesis; it contributes to the formation of the collective soul. It is not merely social intelligence which thus becomes richer and more systematic, more varied and more unified, but also social sensibility and social will. Finally, the sum total of social ideas of every kind engenders, along with correlative sentiments, correlative actions, not only in the individual but also, and above all, in the universal consciousness. Thus each one has a share in modes of action which are the property of all; different minds coincide in those truths which awaken them to common sentiments; they form thus a spiritual organism. Science is one of the constitutive factors of society; society is in its turn one of the constitutive factors of science. Man,

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reduced to individual isolation,—if such isolation were possible,—would be about as incapable of science as the beast; he would have only a germ of it, imperfectly developed by a restricted experience. Science implies a society of consciousnesses which are exercised reciprocally and towards exterior things; it is a triple harmony with each and with the whole. The idea of an "organization by science" can merit only universal assent, because, as we have just seen, every scientific discovery is an enlargement of the social consciousness, and at the same time of social sympathy and social synergy.

It remains now to ask, whether the individual sciences are sufficient to found the true "cerebral unity" of the human race. This problem, which so profoundly engages the thought of to-day, is in the main exactly the one which Comte offers in the law of the "three estates." Man, as they say, dies when he sees his own ghost; thus, according to Comte, theology sees its ghost in metaphysics and dies; and metaphysics then sees its ghost in science and dies in its turn.

In this difficult problem three hypotheses are possible; we may admit, either that theology and metaphysics will eventually be absorbed in positive science, or that they will continue to co-exist with science; but that they will have a domain more and more circumscribed, an influence more and more restricted, or that, while confining themselves more and more to their own domain, without infringing upon science, they will increase proportionably with the increase of science itself; so much so, that each scientific progress would not be a reduction, but an extension of true metaphysics and of true theology, or if you will, of true philosophy and of true religion. There is a development by negation and destruction; there is also a development by affirmation and construction; there is finally a development by the synthesis of the two into a single more comprehensive idea. It is in this method that true evolution consists, and the dialectic of Hegel is here in accord with the evolutionism of Spencer. If by metaphysics you mean the explanation of the facts of experience by means of entities and of causes which cannot be verified by experience or established in a definite relation with it, then it is

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manifest that metaphysics, thus understood, ought to disappear, since it is only an erroneous way of construing scientific explanation. But we must distinguish ontology, which is an abstract mythology, from pure philosophy, which seeks its support in the real, embraced by consciousness.

That true metaphysics is to grow ever poorer and then disappear in the abstract, is hard to conceive when we pass from Heraclitus to Plato, from Plato to Aristotle, from Aristotle to Descartes, from Descartes to Leibnitz, from Leibnitz to Kant, from Kant to Hegel and to Schopenhauer. Metaphysics has surely been despoiled of its ontological character, of its entities, just as religion has been of its grosser myths; but its contents, far from having been impoverished thereby, have been enriched in the meanwhile under the twofold relation of extension and comprehension. True metaphysics contains, moreover, an element which cannot be reduced to the category of pure science, and which thus assures its perpetuity. We have seen that science concerns itself with the mutual relations of objects, considered independently of their relation (1) to a sentient and thinking subject; (2) to the whole of existence. This duplex relation is assumed, at least, but once for all; after which the phenomena, just as they are, being given, science engages to determine their objective relations, while it eliminates as much as possible the subject itself, the consciousness for which they exist and through which they are known. Such a point of view is partial and abstract, since it does not embrace the whole of the reality. What we term reality must be at one and the same time both objective and subjective; it is, the unity of things with the mind which knows them. Pure sciences are partial in still another respect, in that, even in the sphere of objects and their relations, they are restricted to fixed species of objects and to fixed categories of relations. After abstracting the thinking subject, they abstract still further all objects other than the one which is to be considered; the mathematician disregards all relations other than those of magnitude and extension; the mechanist all relations other than those of movement, and so on. These limits are essential to science as we understand

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this in modern times, occupying, as science must, a special point of view. It is to these very limits that science owes its perfect certainty, for at the outset, it takes something for granted without mounting higher, and it stops at the given conclusions actually obtained without being obliged to anticipate what is to follow. Hence, also, its rigorous method, which, exercised between clearly determined boundaries, has only to seek generous ties between particular facts or particular concepts. Sciences consider thus simple "aspects" or simple "phases," never wholes. Comte, therefore, observed that to explain the slightest object,—an explanation which must always remain incomplete,—the scientist must summon to his aid a multitude of sciences: mechanics will account for a first aspect, physics for a second aspect, chemistry for a third, etc. When man is in question, nothing less than the totality of sciences will suffice. We are warranted, then, in affirming that the subjects of science are always finite. Positive science, content with making clear the relation of finite things to things finite, never deeming it necessary to embrace the infinite, the whole. The world always remains for science a broken mirror, while philosophy, by piecing together the fragments, strives to catch a glimpse of the grand image. Comte himself has declared that abstractions and "preliminary simplifications," without which there could be no science, in the true sense of the word, always require a corresponding process of recomposing, since we wish to arrive at prevision of the fact in its actuality. We are obliged, in order to thus previse, to re-establish the concrete unity of nature. But what is philosophy, if not a step further in the same direction? Philosophy corrects the abstraction which has thus been made of the thinking subject, re-establishes the unity of nature and of thought. It has been correctly observed that when science destroys the unity of the objective world, it does so, as a rule, consciously. The abstraction, on the contrary, which philosophy endeavors to correct, is generally unconscious. The geometrician knows well enough that the ellipse does not exhaust a planet's conditions of existence; but in revenge, he can very easily conceive that we can search for the laws

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of the intelligible world without once taking into account the necessary relation of this world to intelligence. He can conceive, furthermore, that the intelligible laws of geometry would continue to exist unimpaired even if there were no sort of intelligence at the base of the real world. The province of the philosopher is to determine to what extent the real is thus possible without the intellectual.

Purely empirical psychology isolates the mind of the world, and considers it as an object among the objects which it must contemplate. Metaphysics or pure philosophy regards mind as "a part of all that it knows," that is to say, as conditioning what it knows at the very moment when it is conditioned by it. Philosophy is not then like science, a pure abstraction, but rather the integral re-establishment of the *concrete*. To philosophize, says Hegel, is to think the totality of things, to conceive of things in unity which is greater than their divergences, and accounts for these. Philosophy, even when it considers isolatedly the unity and the subjective movement of thought, just as geometry considers abstractly the relations of space, so acts in order to discover more surely and the more clearly this unity and this movement in all the *objects* of thought.*

If philosophy, as Auguste Comte has defined it, is the effort to arrive at a full cognition of the world, it is, according to Hegel, the effort to arrive at a complete "self-consciousness." The two points of view are true, and they are inseparable. We have a completer knowledge of ourselves in proportion as we know the world which acts on us and in us, and we have a completer knowledge of the world in its reality and in its intelligibility in proportion as we possess the fuller consciousness of that standard of reality and of intelligence which is in us, which is ourselves, and according to which we necessarily judge every other existence, every other thought. Philosophy may claim, then, over against the sciences that perennity of which Leibnitz spoke. And, furthermore, however incomplete the present philosophical conception of the

* See Caird, "Social Philosophy of Comte."



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world and of life may be, it is nevertheless to philosophy that the intellectual hegemony in the practical order belongs, because the rational basis of morality depends neither on the positive sciences nor on religious faith, but on philosophy itself. Theoretically, we are unquestionably not obliged to philosophize; we may take the abstract point of view of science, and say, "Movements are conditioned by such and such laws which we formulate in this or that symbolical manner. That which actually moves, I do not know; why and how, I do not know." We are then like one, who, confronted with other men and animals, should say: "When I give a blow to these extended and mobile forms, I receive one in return which causes me pain. What there is back of the forms which thus resist me I do not know; why they strike me when I strike them I do not know. Could it be possible that my blows cause them something analogous to the pain which I experience? I do not know, and I do not wish to know." The attitude of the pure positivist towards nature is something like this; he is not willing to inquire whether behind the movements of these beings which he ranges under the category of inanimate matter there is not something analogous to that back of the movements of beings called dumb brutes and of beings called men. Just as he pleases! He is not forced to speculate on the real conditions of phenomena, in so far, at least, as no problem of practical morality demands a solution of the philosophical problem.

But as regards men and even animals, we are indeed obliged to assume the existence of the psychic behind mechanical appearances. If I looked on men as machines which did not feel, neither morality nor society would be any longer possible. The necessity of reasoning by analogy is here practically obligatory, and it receives its justification theoretically in the fact that *all takes place just as if other men felt and willed like ourselves.* For animals, the verification is the same, though less sure; so much so, indeed, that Malebranche could persuade himself that his dog did not feel.

With respect to beings called inanimate, the verification becomes more and more difficult, and even impossible. And it

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is for this reason that we can here dispense with inductions and analogies. Practically and scientifically it is enough, then, to act according to the abstract laws of mechanics, without concerning ourselves with the inquiry whether these so-called inanimate beings are but the mask of some rudimentary form of psychic life. But as for the philosopher, this abstraction is not sufficient for him; his vocation is to make hypotheses, not, of course, upon the unknowable, but upon the unknown. When verification is no longer possible, he declares, exactly the reverse of Newton, "*Hypotheses fingo.*" And that hypothesis, moreover, which is the immediate and natural prolongation of experience, that is to say, sensation and impulsion, instead of springing up suddenly from nothing in animals, are already existent there under less developed and more stagnant forms,—at first in vegetables, then in minerals, and, generally speaking, in the molecules of which animals themselves are only more complex combinations. In other words, in the domain of positive science we are content to infer one relation from another relation without touching on the question of what reality lies beneath or beyond. To positive science, the proposition that "a stone is heavy" has in nowise the signification that the stone makes an effort of any sort or encloses in itself a *force* analogous to that which I feel; it expresses merely a normal relation between *phenomena;* but I am obliged to animate it, to spiritualize it in a certain fashion, just as I animate and spiritualize you in order to conceive you as *real.* When I examine objects that are supposed to be *inanimate,* when I conceive them philosophically in themselves, and no longer scientifically in their exterior relations among themselves or with me, I can represent them to myself only as *forces, tendencies, appetites, activities,* more or less obscure wills, in a word, as rudimentary sorts of self, as sub-conscious and quasi-mental existences; for mental existence is the only sort which cannot be resolved into phenomena and relations. When it is a question of similars, as we have seen, no more hesitation is possible: I throw myself completely into these, and they are for me other egos which, like me, suffer or rejoice, act, live, and wish to live. This induction which rests

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on the actual, this objection of the mental, which is the single truth *an sich* which I can apprehend, because it is in me, because it is myself,—this induction is the first condition of a system of ethics. To act morally, then, is no longer to act according to appearances and the relations of appearances; it is to act in the world of realities and according to the inductive cognition which we have of this world.

This is why we have often said a moral act implies a philosophy, while the construction of a bridge or of a steamboat implies none at all. Without question, whatever hypothesis we make as to the "underlying principle of morality," practically we shall always be obliged to give it the wider interest in order to reach some conclusion with reference to it; without question, moreover, this wider interest stands in the same relation to the unknown groundwork of morality that, in the word of the Gospel, love to our neighbor seems to stand to the love of God: the only method of determining its contents, the only way of giving it a practical expression. But, again, we need some hypothesis or some more or less conscious philosophical thesis as to the ultimate significance and sense of morality in order to defend morality against egotism. "In science," as has been objected, "the empirical groundwork of things is confused with the formula; for the physicist heat is the movement itself which permits us to determine its laws." Yes; because the physicist has need of nothing more than this; but the moralist is bound to determine whether "the wider interest" is a real good instead of merely seeming to be a good; when we are summoned to renounce ourselves, we cannot be satisfied with the merely seeming. We must form for ourselves some idea, some representation of the reality and of the ideal direction which results from the very nature of reality. There is nothing either truly human or individual or social without an ideal which determines it. There is no ideal without a more or less explicit conception of the reality itself, that is, without a conscious or unconscious philosophy, in a scientific or religious form, of which morality is only the translation into sentiments and acts.

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III.

Does it follow from the foregoing definitions and distinctions that science will have the moral hegemony of humanity? Purely objective science, no; science at once objective and subjective, with philosophy as its indispensable crown, yes. But when we affirm that philosophy and science must have the moral and intellectual hegemony in future societies, we do not mean by that to deny the influence which must also belong to sentiment, especially to the religious sentiment. In the first place, great philosophical and scientific ideas are accompanied by æsthetical and moral sentiments which give them their practical worth. Then, again, practice is not merely the application of a theory; it is still more a complex action; it is a new synthesis in view of a new end, in some sort, a new theory; it is obliged indeed to take into account other elements than the merely intellectual. Scientific and philosophical knowledge, remaining, as these always must do limited, there will always exist beyond them a sphere which is open to beliefs which are based on intellectual valuations and on sentiments. Hence what we call moral faith, which is the foundation of all religious faith.

According to Bossuet, "when the reason which forces our assent is in the object itself, this is knowledge; . . . when the reason for believing a proposition is derived from him who proposes it, there results belief or faith." The criterion of all faith, according to this early theory, would be affirmation on the testimony of others. But, even then, faith is only an application of knowledge. The reasons which determine the assent are always objective; the other individuals, their moral and intellectual value, their own relation to the fact which is to be established, their competence, their impartiality, etc., all this is the object of our judgment, whether this be probable or certain, but the object, in fine, of scientific judgment. The "assertions without proofs of the wise and experienced man," says Aristotle, have great value, chiefly in moral questions; but, as has been answered, this is not because these assertions are actually without proof, but because he who affirms them has expe-

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rienced them, and has reasons for affirming them. Very different is that faith based on testimony, that purely moral belief which according to the followers of Kant constitutes true faith. Moral faith, they say, brings to the philosopher an increase of assurance, an "increase of knowledge." For example, freedom, from the point of view of pure reason, is at best only possible; but from the point of view of the practical reason, it becomes not merely better known, but certain, and is in this sense an object of faith. Faith, as has been said, affects the moral character of the judgment, it furnishes no new judgment.* But faith, even in this form, is, as we think, always an application of knowledge, and is valid only in proportion as it includes cognizing elements. An increase of assurance can come only from an increase of reason, and so of knowledge. That I may have the assurance of freedom from a practical point of view, I must know some moral principle like duty, which makes freedom necessary, and the assurance of freedom will be subordinated to the knowledge of duty as certain and as implying power. I shall not content myself with changing the modality of the judgment; I shall pronounce new judgments. The value of my belief will be in direct proportion to the value of my knowledge. So far as its validity is concerned, faith then is a sort of confused knowledge, merely probable, or assurance limited at certain points. So far as all else is concerned, faith is a sentiment, a passion, a habit. We believe, indeed, not solely with our intellect, but with our sentiments and our innate or acquired impulses. It is incontrovertible that our sentiments and our impulses, the result as they are of a social *action* prolonged through centuries, contain a hereditary store of truth, though a truth mingled with much error. If it were necessary that each individual should with his hypercritical reason doubt everything, and, like a Descartes in miniature, refuse to remember that men had ever existed before him, we should be in great danger of having something very different from what Descartes was. It is then most important that we should take into account the social

* M. Darlu, *Revue Philosophique*, October, 1892.

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heritage in those questions which concern others and ourselves. In this sense, it will often be much better for him who does not pretend to be a philosophical innovator or creator to follow the dictates of his heart, not to break too suddenly with the "wisdom of nations." The philosopher himself, who has learned from Socrates and Kant how circumscribed our knowledge is, will hesitate to elevate his personal opinion above the universal conditions of the society in which he lives. In this sense, faith is most legitimate; but nevertheless this legitimacy is still founded on reason: assurance of a sum of truth inherent in the moral and social discipline, assurance of individual fallibility, assurance of the impotence of abstract reasoning when exercised on problems that are too complex, etc. Moral belief remains here, nevertheless, the *rationabile obsequium.*

In questions, even, which do not concern morality, we cannot always analyze all; a man of business who launches himself into an enterprise, acts according to a belief, that is to say, according to a probability which carries with it some risks. He sees reasons for and reasons against; it seems to him that the "*fors* carry it," perhaps because his desire is on this side; and he ventures. But is the conclusion from such reasoning against science? If we could only have a veritable science in all practical affairs, we should all act scientifically. Because we lack this, we all act just as intelligently as we can, and there, where intelligence becomes silent, we follow our instinctive sentiments which are intelligence stored up by life; among these instinctive sentiments, it is always surer and more rational to give the preference to the altruistic, which have been formed by the experience of the ages themselves, and which represent the action upon us of entire society. A "good sentiment" is collective reason, instead of being reason in detail; but it is none the less reasonable for never having been reasoned out. Can you explain to a child all the reasons of what you enjoin upon him? When this is possible, you ought to do it; but is this always possible, his mental status considered? When you have him learn Latin towards the age of nine or ten, can you make him understand all the good

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he will derive from classic studies? Does he possess the elements necessary for the solution of the problem? Likewise, these grown children whom we call the people, can they begin in the morning by doubting everything in order to act for the rest of the day in the full glare of the goddess Reason? We must shed abroad as much light as possible, but what if we cannot make it penetrate there where that other form of light, heat, exists? Will you extinguish the fireside because this warms the whole body but does not especially dazzle the eyes? Belief is also very often an æsthetic sentiment, with its own peculiar evidence which it is impossible to explain in detail. Can you prove *more geometrico* that the Venus of Milo is beautiful? Suppose a negro should prefer a Hottentot Venus, by what train of reasoning will you be able to convince him? Correctness of taste, trustworthiness of judgment in things of art go as little by systematic reasoning as does the marksman who strikes the target.

It was in this sense that Pascal could correctly say, "The heart has reasons which the reason knows not of." But whose heart? The heart of the savage cannibal? The heart of the civilized man? The heart of the Mussulman? or that of the Christian? All depends on the degree of intelligence in this heart, either in the reflective condition or in the condition of heritage received by tradition and education. The pretended conflict between intelligence and the heart is in reality the conflict of one form of intelligence with another, of the reflective with the spontaneous. By itself and in itself, the word heart has no meaning: sentiment without intelligence has no definite contents. Only blind corporal appetite, like that of hunger and thirst, can dispense with intelligence and with much more! The true reasons of the heart can, therefore, become intelligible to the reason itself, doubtless not to the mere abstract reason, but to the reason which takes into account all the real data of a problem, that is to say, the data of all the reasons. Because we cannot always enumerate, one by one, these complex and profound reasons which present themselves so tumultuously to the inner glance, and are none the less reasonable for that, must we con-

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clude that we act blindly? He, who embraces a totality at a single glance and acts accordingly, is not for that reason blind.

Reason, in fine, can exist under a synthetic and an analytic form. The latter gives account to itself of itself. There are, unfortunately, problems in the moral and social order so complex that our analysis, can never be exhaustive. In this case, we are constrained to trust to a synthetic view. If we had to analyze everything to the bottom before acting, we should never act at all. The reason demi-science is often more dangerous than ignorance, is because it is an unconscious and half-way analysis, which nevertheless thinks that it is complete and assumes to rule our action. Such a science may be compared with a merchant who should forget half the columns in his bill and act accordingly. He could not fail to be speedily ruined. Nevertheless, demi-science, with all its disadvantages, is a necessary moment, a stadium in evolution. The misfortune is that our human science is always demi-science; and hence, the very legitimate *rôle* of sentiment and of belief. But never should belief revolt against science and put itself in opposition to it. Science remains, as we have seen, a true social possession; it is a domain the limits of which are unquestionably uncertain, but the interior of which is none the less uncontested and incontestable. In ethics, there is always to be found a part which is truly scientific, that part which relates to the essential conditions of human development, and especially of social development. The domain of sentiment, on the contrary, remains the most indefinite. Where is the seat of the authority here? and where the certitude? Science, it is objected, "concerns itself only with the past," and has only a feeble, practical influence; to belief belongs the future. Those, who make this objection, forget that the peculiar province of science is exactly this, to forecast and to realize the future. Its two methods, induction and deduction, with the verification which completes them and the hypothesis which precedes them, enable science to forestall the future and to direct it in the line of our desire. Static science, which seems to be only of the past, represents all

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that is stable for to-morrow and εἰς ἀεί; dynamic science, truly opens up the future and follows change itself, but by means of law.

It is a human duty *par excellence* to seek for the greatest possible amount of certitude. But there is no other true certitude than intellectual certitude. Undoubtedly we must love truth in order to seek for it: if Pythagoras had not loved geometrical truth, he would never have discovered his theorem nor immolated his hecatomb; but the preliminary condition of intellectual exercise is not this exercise itself. So long as Pythagoras confined himself to loving, he discovered nothing. Love and good-will can supplement in a practical way the imperfection of knowledge, but they do not render certain what is uncertain except by an illusion which cannot be erected into a rule, either of moral or of intellectual conduct. The first rule is sincerity towards yourself and others. That faith is "efficacious" is incontestable, but its efficaciousness does not constitute its truthfulness. We can move mountains in the name of an error as well as in the name of truth.

The Mohammedans have gained battles in the name of false beliefs. We often have personal or national prejudices which we erect into universal and permanent needs of the human conscience, without remembering how often the "exigencies of the conscience" have varied with the ages. We cannot make these prejudices a criterion of the value of theories; besides, it is not belief alone which engenders action; it is action also, the fact accomplished and often accomplished, which engenders belief. Belief, far from having the right to always judge the act, is often itself only the product of the act, of ancestral routine. How, then, may we accord the hegemony to belief, since it may be just as truly the product of a secular error as the principle of a truth which dominates practical life? "Mind," said Comte, "ought to be the minister of the heart, never its slave." Hence the condemnation of all dogmatic and authoritative faith. Freedom ought to remain the essence of belief even when this, under the name of religion, becomes collective and social.

According to Auguste Comte, religions become less and

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less concrete, and go on becoming more and more abstract, until, like metaphysics, they end in complete negation. But we must distinguish here between the imaginative elements and the philosophical and moral elements in religions. The fact is incontestable that religions progressively lay aside their mythology and become more and more spiritual. But it has been rightly observed that the fetichism of savages, in spite of its apparent luxuriousness of folly, is, in reality, very poor and very monotonous from the point of view of the imagination and of æsthetics. Nothing is so much like the fetichism of the Papuans as the fetichism of the Bushmen, or that of any other inferior tribe. But religions have a metaphysical, moral, and social significance which, far from decreasing with time, becomes, on the contrary, the richer for this. It has been rightly observed how much more complex than the Hebraic idea of Jehovah or the Hindu idea of Brahma, is the Christian idea of the God-man, who lives in us and for us, and in whom we live in our turn. We can say, therefore, that religions themselves continue to become more universal and, at the same time, more individual; they follow the simultaneous law of integration and specification. Then, too, if the tendency of mythology is to disappear, the immediate result of this will not be a tendency on the part of religion to disappear, nor is it proved that the religious sentiment lost in complexity, in depth, in universality, when from fetichism it became pagan, and from pagan Christian.

Meanwhile, there is in this problem great cause of embarrassment. We may indeed ask ourselves whether religion, in so far as it is distinct from metaphysics and from ethics, is not composed of precisely this mythical and imaginative element, of the anthropomorphic representation of the deity, and of miracles united to mysteries. In this case it is certain that religions assume in our time more and more of a philosophical aspect as they lay aside their mythic element. In this respect, we must admit that Protestantism is incontestably nearer to pure philosophy than is Catholicism. Comte would have the right, then, from this point of view, to maintain that religion, in so far as it is only mythology and human representation,

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tends to become absorbed in metaphysics and ethics; these being conceived, it is true, under the form of social and collective, and not merely individual, beliefs. Will philosophy and religion take then, as Comte believes, the scientific, positive form? Here, again, all will depend upon our definition of science. If you conceive of science as objective, after the fashion of mathematics and physics, it is impossible to hope for such an objectizing of that which concerns, on one side, the thinking or willing subject and, on the other, the final unity of the subject and of the object in a relation which is truly universal. Philosophy even has not the same point of view as pure science. Much less, still, can religion become objective science if we understand by religion a belief, a sentiment both collective and personal, a union of minds and of wills towards a supreme end. Religion is a philosophy of sentiment and of imagination which is chiefly social, although it addresses itself to the individual; it is a poetry of consciousness seeking after the loftiest universal ideal. Here, again, the point of view has no longer the objective and exterior character of those verities which Comte calls positive. Thus, Comte himself makes an appeal in the religious order to the subjective method, but one incompletely understood and too utilitarian.

We certainly cannot demand of philosophy what these positive religions pretend to give,—positive knowledge as to the mysteries of existence. But in these religions themselves, we see the empire of dogma ever decreasing. Protestantism allows freedom of investigation, and freedom of investigation extended to all, is philosophy itself. Philosophy is not an immutable dogma; it is a progressive movement. Progress is not in philosophy a sign of inferiority, but of superiority. There are Indian tribes who believe that the soul of one who sleeps, is really on a journey, and that he must not be awakened before his soul comes back, at the risk of cutting short his existence. In the same way, we must not awaken the people too suddenly out of their mythological dream: we must give their reason time to return.* Philosophy like science ought none the less to accomplish its work, to be

* See Guyan, "Irréligion de l'avenir."

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solicitous of nothing save the truth, to cherish no feeling of hostility towards positive religions, and at the same time make no hypocritical compromises.

It is the consciousness of the unity between our true self and the law of the universe which constitutes religion, philosophically interpreted. To admit, in other words, that the true consciousness of self is reached only through the moral consciousness, and this through the social consciousness, and this through the law of the universe, is to admit the very principle of all true religion, under whatever form one may represent to himself this moral unity of the world. He is moral who says: Do the good, let come what may. He is religious who says: The good will arrive soon or late to all; and morality, far from being an illusion, is the true revelation of the universe. But this idea of a supreme synthesis between the natural and the moral is at bottom thoroughly philosophical, and it pertains to philosophy to justify it. Instead of drawing sceptical or mystical conclusions from this present debate as to the value of science, as is now done in France and England. we should rather form a superior conception of science and its *rôle.* We have been, and that for a long time, one of those who rebel against the conception of science as purely representative; a conception which is intimately bound up with that of a purely reflective intelligence exercised on objects independent of itself. He who maintains that the idea is a force, ought to maintain likewise that science also is a force, that is to say, an action and a production, not merely a reflection of objects.

One of the errors of science and of philosophy in the intellectualist form which they have taken in our epoch, has been precisely this, to overlook the fact that philosophy and science are not solely speculations, but also actions and productions.* They are so not merely by their possible consequences or by the exterior end which they have in view, but indeed in themselves and by themselves, in their own essence and in their formation.

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* See "Evolutionnisme des Idées-forces."

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Science, indeed, discovers new solutions only by asking new questions, and it is here we must declare: Every question, well asked, is half answered. Moreover, a question asked of nature is always an idea of mind, a directing idea, an idea-force. The question is worth as much as the idea, and the reply as the question.

When Plato sought for universal forms in things, when Aristotle sought there the individual act, and its final cause, when the middle age attempted to find there the quiddity, the substance-form,—the directing ideas led to very different questions from the one which distinctively modern science asks: how? according to what law? After all, then, philosophical ideas govern science. In other words, it is the subjective development of the human intelligence and the self-consciousness which it attains which permit it to propound, an objective world of new questions and to reply, knowledge of the world being inseparable from self-consciousness. We have here a double development, the two elements of which are in partnership. We must know ourselves better and better in order to interrogate nature; we must know nature better and better in order to interrogate ourselves. Philosophy and science, without ever being confounded with one another, are always united: the progress of one is the progress of the other. The world becomes what it is to our cognizance only by the development of our own consciousness: we can find in it nothing which we are not prepared to ask it by virtue of our own internal development. And not only is the power itself of interrogating nature characteristic of thought; but yet more, after having taken the initiative in the question, it ought very often to take that of the reply, under the form of hypothesis at first, then that of verification, then under that of application. We have repeated many times, while giving it a broader sense, the saying of Aristotle: "To know is to act." Bacon has declared in vain that we must passively obey nature in order to command her. Even in physics, we must reconstruct by the instrumentality of our thought an ideal nature, and act on this in order to determine later whether real nature co-operates with our action and we

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with that of nature. The conception necessarily precedes the experimentation, and what we call truth is the result of co-operation, an efficacious collaboration, not a passive registering of mere inert impressions. Psychology is far less passive than physics. It also is a production of facts, an experimentation which combines and calls forth phenomena. We act always in psychic facts. It is through ourselves, at least in part, that they exist: in observing them, we modify them, often even evoking them. But some one will ask: How shall we apprehend, then, an independent reality? We answer, that we do not create psychic facts; and that if our effort to know them by reflexion modifies and changes them, this is by virtue of regular laws, by virtue of a determination which can become the object of consciousness. Besides, in psychic facts there is the sensitive element which is passive, and which is introduced into us from without, an object of possible study. The relations of our sensations, of our pleasures, of our pains, all this is also an object of possible study. It is doubtless not an isolated subjective phenomenon which we are examining, as none such exists without an objective element. But it is legitimate and possible to study interior facts, not as the reflex of exterior objects, but only in so far as these are the expression of the profounder subjective phenomenon which underlies them. If we are unable to make of this inner subjective phenomenon an object of discursive science, and even if we are obliged to consider it as an ultimate datum, it is still true that we can draw ever nearer to this remote subjectivity and organize interior facts in their relation to it, and not in their relation to the outer world. Thus is a psychology possible; not a psychology that is separated from all physiology, but a psychology, whatever special name we may give to it, which is a knowledge of ourselves such as we become, such as we make ourselves under the action from without and the reaction from within. For a still stronger reason, the active character of intelligence is still more manifest in general philosophy where absolute verification becomes impossible. When science has discovered law and order in nature, it has not yet acquired its highest value nor its greatest interest. Science, to reach

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this, must appear in essential relation with intelligence even and with will. The part of universal philosophy is to re-establish this relation which has been neglected or despised by positivism. Philosophy alone is the study of the reality itself both as fact and consciousness. The contemplative consciousness? or the active? Not the former, for by the very fact that it contemplates and reflects, it changes and abstracts; but in the second, in which we are the whole of ourselves, in which, along with the sentiment and the action of practical life, we obtain the most intense sentiment of reality. This reality, moreover, is not immobile and as if crystallized in the past; it is in the process of becoming and determines the future. It embraces then as one moment the *done* and the *to-be done*, the realized and the more or less conscious ideal which realizes it.

The reaction against science will not have been in vain. It will have served to prepare a *philosophy of action* in which the thought is no longer merely a reflection and a copy of the model subjectively presented, but a creation of new effects in harmony with those already existing. We believe, then, that if we attribute a "force" to the "idea," we can conciliate all that is exact in the intellectual theory of truth which makes a "harmony" of the two, and in the volition theory which makes an "action" or an "active belief" of them; truth is the simultaneous and individual harmony of actions and of ideas, the determinism of which is the manifestation, the will not being any more unintelligent than the intelligence is inactive. We conclude, therefore, that the true hegemony belongs to the intelligent volition of universal ends, a volition which exists as obscure consciousness in religion, but reaches in philosophy and in science the clear consciousness of its goal and of its means.

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SOCIAL EVOLUTION.*

THE question that I propose to consider—at least in some of its aspects—is this: What light do biological theories of evolution throw upon the history of human society and on the practical problems of human society? The phrase "social evolution," as generally used, implies the assumption that biological conceptions do throw *some* light on social phenomena; it generally implies, also, that without biological theories and conceptions social phenomena cannot be properly studied nor social problems scientifically dealt with. It is very often assumed that some knowledge of biological conceptions is a sufficient equipment for the study of social phenomena; and it is sometimes even implied that with the help of a few formulæ that have, or seem to have, the sanction of biological science, the sociologist can solve theoretical and practical problems which have baffled historians and politicians for centuries.

At first sight there seems something reasonable in the view that biology supplies the key to sociology. Whatever else human beings may or may not be, at least they are living beings, subject to the laws of biology, or (to express the matter without any element of misleading metaphor) illustrating the same laws as all other living beings do. On the other hand, the greater complexity of social life among human beings, as compared with what may be found even among the social animals,—still more, as compared with anything that may be found among plants,—may well suggest that biological conceptions cannot without criticism, perhaps not without considerable modification, be applied to social phenomena. There is an important truth suggested in Mr. Spencer's description of society as "superorganic." A consideration of the superorganic character of human society may help to explain the suspicion with which the historical student, im-

* This paper was read before the Cambridge (England) University Ethical Society.

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mersed in his particular problems, is apt to regard the generalizations under which the "sociologist" is in haste to bring the chaos of miscellaneous facts accumulated by the industry of antiquarians and the enterprise of travellers. The sociologist (especially when he is simply the biologist sociologizing) is apt to regard the historian as merely occupied with the higher gossip: on the other hand, the contempt for distinctions of time and place, and the unscholarly use of authorities, which too often characterize the sociologist, are apt to make the very word "evolution" stink in the nostrils of the genuine historian. "Evolution" and "development" seem only grand names for history treated inaccurately.

It is worth noting that in every period the prevalent notion of what constitutes "scientific" treatment depends upon what happens to be the predominant and victorious science of the time. In the seventeenth century, to treat a subject "scientifically" meant to treat it mathematically, however ill adapted the material might be for such treatment. The warmest admirers of Descartes and Spinoza do not generally think that their treatment of philosophical and ethical questions gained from the fact that the ideal of the mathematical sciences was always before their minds. In a later period, we know how the analogy of chemistry influenced the associationalist psychologists. Biological conceptions are certainly less inadequate than mathematical, physical, or chemical conceptions in the treatment of the problems of human society; but an uncritical use of them in a more complex material means a constant risk of mistaking metaphors for scientific laws. To adapt a phrase of Bacon's, we might say that the conception of evolution which is adequate in the biological sphere, is nevertheless *subtilitati rerum humanarum longe impar*,—"no match for the subtilty of human history."

Let me illustrate this by considering the applicability of the idea of *natural selection* to human society. Whatever view be held as to the truth or falsehood of the Lamarckian theory of use-inheritance, all biologists and all sociologists would admit that natural selection is a real cause at work in human society. The only question in dispute is as to the range of

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its operation, and as to the degree in which it can explain the phenomena. The question for the biologist is: What other factors, if any, are there in organic evolution? The question for the sociologist is more complicated; for he must not assume without proof that there are no other factors in social than in organic evolution, nor that natural selection means exactly the same thing in human society that it does among plants and animals.

There is an error that is still not uncommon in the popular application of biological theories to social questions. The phrase "struggle for existence" is often taken as if it applied specially to conscious struggling or fighting. Now, industrial and commercial competition is far more closely analogous to the struggle for existence in the organic world than is a war between tribes or nations. The "peaceful" or "friendly" rivalry, as it is sometimes called, between individuals competing for employment is the struggle for existence in its strict biological sense. Such competition, if unchecked, ends in the survival of the fittest, *i.e.*, of the fittest to survive under the particular conditions, and in the starvation of the unsuccessful. If the competition does not end in the starvation of the unsuccessful, that can only be because there are other factors at work than natural selection. On the other hand, although war is one aspect of natural selection among human beings, the military organization of a tribe or nation for the purposes of attack or defence necessarily involves a mitigation and partial cessation of natural selection within the tribe or nation. So far as the history of the world has yet gone, war has been a more important factor than industrial competition in producing social *organisms* as distinct from mere social *aggregates*. We can see this even in the purely economic sphere. As the carcase brings the vultures together, so the material of an industry and the presence of consumers may collect the workmen; but it needs a struggle with employers, or with some other set of workmen, *i.e.*, it needs industrial war to produce organization among them, and to make them something else than merely competing individuals.

In using the phrase "social organism," it is necessary to

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remind ourselves that in all human societies, except the most rudimentary, every individual belongs to more than one social organism, and that a struggle is possible between the different organisms to which the same individual belongs. Family, clan, city, nation, church, university, club, social caste or class, each of these is a social organism, competing with like organisms and often with one another in the struggle for existence and in the struggle for the allegiance of their individual members. Now to this there is nothing analogous in the purely biological sphere. The domestic animals, with a divided allegiance between their kindred and their human friends or masters, are "an exception that proves the rule;" for they are slaves of mankind, and so quasi-members of human societies. Thus, in applying the conception of natural selection to human beings, we have to recognize that there is not merely the struggle for existence between individuals competing for food and for the opportunity of producing and rearing offspring, but also, and to some extent interfering with this "natural" struggle, there is the struggle between societies; and, secondly, we have to recognize that these societies are of different kinds, so that an individual may belong at the same time to flourishing and to decaying social organisms, and the same individuals may be rivals in certain relations and allies in others. When, therefore, the biological moralist tells us that certain things are injurious to the social organism, it becomes important to ask him "to *which* social organism?"

Natural selection, in its biological sense, means the death of the less successful. So far as the conception in this sense is applicable to the explanation of human history, it means that certain races and certain customs have survived because other races and those observing other customs have perished. But it would be strangely to ignore the facts of history, and of the world that we know in our own experience, to suppose that it is only through the slow and deadly process of natural selection that the various elements in our civilization have been produced, preserved, and diffused. Even among the higher social animals lower than man, a great many habits are

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due to imitation and not to instinct, *i.e.*, they are transmitted in the *social inheritance* of the race, and are not dependent on *heredity*, in the biological sense. Thus, birds learn how to build their nests, partly at least, by example and individual experience. It has been noticed that young swallows do not build so expertly as older birds. Among pigeons, the art of bringing up a family is learned by the less experienced from the more experienced. Among butterflies, on the other hand, all habits that make for the welfare and success of the race must be due to inherited instincts (the butterfly, *e.g.*, never sees its offspring as butterflies; education is thus impossible); and if "natural selection" accounts sufficiently for such instincts, that means that individuals not possessing the necessary instincts in sufficient degree are constantly perishing. Among human beings, on the other hand, while inherited instincts, produced and preserved by natural selection, undoubtedly exist, we must avoid the mistake of exaggerating their number and range; for social inheritance is relatively more important as we advance in the scale of development. The prolongation of infancy makes education necessary and possible; and the helplessness of the young may thus be regarded as the source of civilization, *i.e.*, of all that separates man from the mere animal. The rudiments of social inheritance, as I have just pointed out, already exist among the vertebrates lower than man; but language enormously extends its power and importance. Tradition, acquired experience, and definite institutions can be handed down from generation to generation altogether irrespective of biological heredity, and may therefore be handed on from one race to another.

Now, in all this there is nothing inconsistent with the theory of natural selection. The helplessness of infancy, the rise of language, the possibility of transmitting experience irrespective of heredity may all quite well be said to be themselves due to natural selection. But we must recognize that the existence of these elements in human society makes social evolution something very different and much more complex than what can be accounted for by natural selection, as that is understood in the purely biological sphere.

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Consciousness and reflection *may* be explained *historically* as the result of natural selection. Our simian ancestors who first happened to have brains which enabled them to adapt means to ends, instead of simply following their instinctive tendencies, got a great advantage over their less reflective brethren. The use of tools and of language separated them off from the others; but while securing the success of the tribe as a whole, this separation undoubtedly led to a diminution of the stringency with which natural selection had hitherto weeded out the animals less fitted to struggle unaided with one another and with the rest of nature. Reflection *may* have originated through natural selection: once originated, it can be adapted to purposes which seem to have no bearing on the advantage of the individual or the species in the struggle for existence; such purposes, for instance, as mathematics and metaphysics, which to Mr. Russel Wallace seem inexplicable by natural selection. What is originated for purely practical ends may be adapted to ends that are of no obvious or immediate practical utility; and thus we should be prepared to find in human society many phenomena that cannot be accounted for directly by natural selection, and some even that seem to conflict with its operation, at least through considerable periods and over large areas. Reflection directed to individual and social utility may suggest the adoption of courses which prove in the long run to be socially injurious and lead to the injury or extinction of the race that has adopted them; but in other cases reflection may lead to the alteration of injurious customs whose ill effects natural selection would have proved too late for its lessons to be of any use. Thus in social evolution natural selection is often supplemented and partially supplanted by artificial selection: such artificial selection being sometimes injurious and sometimes beneficial. Natural selection tests the social utility of customs and institutions too late for the benefit of those concerned: utilitarianism—if by utilitarianism be understood a consideration of *social* well-being—is the attempt to anticipate and avert, where possible, the cruelty of natural selection. But in asserting that human society presents many phenomena that cannot be

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accounted for by natural selection in its purely biological sense, I am not denying the truth of the theory, but rather extending its range. There is going on a "natural selection" of ideas, customs, institutions, irrespective of the natural selection of individuals and of races. Below the level of conscious adaptation of means to ends, a habit, which was once beneficial but which through change in the environment has become injurious, can only disappear through the extinction of all the individuals practising it. Where there is consciousness and reflection, the *habit* may be changed without the extinction of the *race*. Thus, we have to notice two marked differences between human and sub-human evolution: (1) As I have just been pointing out, customs and institutions may perish without the necessary destruction of the race that practised them, and (2), as I pointed out before, customs and institutions may be handed on from race to race, and may long survive the race among whom they originated.

When we find any persistent characteristics in a species of animal, *e.g.*, an organ shaped in some particular way, a particular color or arrangement of markings, a peculiar habit, etc., we are justified in using natural selection as a clue to an explanation. That is to say, we are justified in asking ourselves, What advantage does the species get through this peculiarity? But even in the case of organic evolution we must be on our guard against the supposition that everything is due to natural selection. Thus, certain peculiarities may possibly be due to sexual selection,—a luxury which is permitted to certain species where natural selection is not too severe. Certain peculiarities, again, may be survivals, which are harmless, or at least not sufficiently injurious to have disappeared. Thirdly, wherever we have any relative cessation of natural selection, we have *panmixia*, *e.g.*, where animals are under domestication we have a greatly increased variation in color and markings; apart from any special artificial selection, this is due simply to the animals being defended against their enemies of the wild state, so that those without the specially protective colorings are not killed off. Now, in human society it is reasonable to expect that every one of

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these causes will operate more largely than in the sub-human sphere. The formation for purposes of attack and defence of compact groups of human beings causes a diminution of natural selection within each of the groups; artificial selection of all sorts goes on under the influence of ideas and sentiments of various kinds, religious beliefs, caste prejudices, etc. *Survivals* are rendered still more possible than in the biological sphere, because of the relative cessation of natural selection within large groups; and, for the same reason, there occur variations of all sorts and "bye-products" (Weismann's phrase) which are not constantly weeded out by natural selection.

Thus the theory of natural selection when applied to human society sets a problem, but does not solve it. In illustration, let me take first the case of religion. Everywhere human societies have some sort of religion; if we adopt a sufficiently wide definition of religion in order to cover the enormous diversity of practices and beliefs which for the purpose of scientific study we have to include under the name, a diversity so great that the acts which are commanded by one religion may be condemned by another, and that what seems essential to religion in the minds of some people (*e.g.*, a belief in a future life, or a belief in a personal God) may be altogether or nearly altogether absent from the religions of other great sections of mankind. Now the theory of natural selection suggests, as it has suggested to Mr. Benjamin Kidd, that religion must everywhere further the success of a society. Religion, according to Mr. Kidd, is what induces the individual to subordinate his interests to those of the social organism. This opinion is, I take it, arrived at solely by a deduction from the general theory of natural selection. At least, I do not find that Mr. Kidd has made any attempt to prove from history that *all* religions have had that effect in *all* the societies which have practised them; and it is in that wide form that the proposition would need to be proved in order to justify his statement inductively. Religion exists everywhere among human beings; therefore, it must be due to natural selection; therefore, its essence is to further social utility. Such, I take it, is Mr. Kidd's argument. The curious thing is that ex-

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actly the same argument might be applied to the case of reason. Reason exists everywhere among human beings; but Mr. Kidd regards reason as everywhere antagonistic to the interests of the social organism. I do not intend to press that objection, however, because, in the one case as in the other, I regard the statement as far too general and sweeping to be of any scientific value. I shall quote Mr. Kidd's definition of religion "in the sense in which alone science is concerned with religion as a social phenomenon:" "A religion is a form of belief, providing an ultra-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing." Now, with regard to this statement, there are some questions one would like to ask. (1) *Which* race? the whole human race, or a particular race? (2) *Which* social organism? the particular political society to which the individual belongs, or some future society? The interests of a particular race are not identical with the interests of the human race as a whole: an individual might be furthering the interests of the human race as a whole while helping on the destruction of his own particular race. And, as I have tried to indicate already, an individual may belong to many social organisms, and some of these may be wholly or partly antagonistic to one another; so that conduct which furthers the interests of one may be directly or indirectly injurious to the interests of another.

I need not apologize for referring specially to Mr. Kidd's views, as "social evolution" is at present, in every one's mind, associated with his book. Mr. Kidd has certainly done a good service by calling the attention of the general public—the public which has given his book so cordial a welcome—to the significance of religion for the science of sociology, in all its branches, and in both its theoretical and practical aspects. He is indeed under a strange delusion in thinking that scientific students of society have ignored the social significance of religion. The opening passage of Professor Marshall's "Politi-

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cal Economy" might be cited as a conspicuous testimony: "The two great forming agencies of the world's history have been the religious and the economic." What is quite true is that the place of religion in human history is too often the subject merely of ecclesiastical or of anti-ecclesiastical declamation; or, else through fear of giving offence, it is left severely alone. This last attitude has been the preparation for the scientific attitude, but is not itself scientific.

But I cannot see that anything is to be gained by discussing the question of the significance of religion for social evolution in such a highly generalized form as that in which it is put by Mr. Kidd. Indeed, if we define religion as he does,—as something which necessarily tends towards social progress,—it becomes meaningless to ask what the social significance of religion is. That is already answered in the definition, although, as I have just shown, the words "race" and "social organism" are left ambiguous. But the really important and interesting question remains unanswered: Which of the religions of the world, known to the ordinary man and to the scientific student of religions, are "religions" in Mr. Kidd's sense of the term? One of the problems which most puzzles the careful student of human history is presented by the apparently anti-social and injurious elements contained in so many of the world's religions. This very matter has been urged as an objection to the applicability of the theory of natural selection to the explanation of social evolution. Has not the fear of the gods, from which the brutes are free, stood in the way of mankind in their struggle with nature? The pursuit of science, which has surely in some cases been of some social utility, has in all ages exposed men to charges of impiety. It might be plausibly argued, indeed, that pilgrimages, by promoting pestilence, exercise a severe natural selection, and that cannibalism, which is in most cases connected with religion, has produced the survival of the toughest; but it is difficult to see how human sacrifices, mutilation, extreme asceticism, the perpetual celibacy of large numbers of picked persons, have promoted the social efficiency of the races which have adopted such practices under religious sanction,

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—least of all, if social efficiency is mainly promoted, as Mr. Kidd seems to think, by a teeming population multiplying in excess of the means of subsistence.

Now, I do not think such objections so fatal to the social utility of religion generally as they may at first sight appear. The conditions of social well-being are very complex, and great gains in certain directions may compensate for many drawbacks in others. Thus there can be no doubt that in all primitive conditions of society religion is the strongest bond of social cohesion. Elements in it which, taken by themselves, are anti-social or injurious in character, if they have tradition and long-established custom in their favor, may persist without doing sufficient injury to outweigh the social gain that comes from the religion as a whole. But the social utility of such a religion comes not from its irrational character, but in spite of it, and because it is the *common* religion of the whole tribe or nation. That is why primitive religions, though they may contain very little dogma, cannot tolerate dissent from the customary observances, and are apt to be jealous of the introduction of new, *i.e.*, foreign, gods. Religions of the primitive type are thus among the strongest of conservative forces in a society, and among the strongest of bonds uniting its members to one another, and at the same time separating them from those of other societies. But religion is certainly not the sole bond of union between human beings, nor is a conservative force necessarily under all circumstances beneficial. Independent of and prior to all religious sanctions there is a social instinct, which exists among all gregarious animals; the observance of a common ritual enormously strengthens the unity of a social organism, but it is not something that comes into existence out of nothing. On the other hand, it must be noted that what under certain conditions promotes social well-being may, under changed conditions, come to injure it. Extreme conservatism and antagonism to outside influences, which are a strength in certain relations, prove a weakness in others. This is true not only of primitive tribal religions, but of religions professedly universal in character. Thus some of the very same elements which make

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Mohammedanism promote the social efficiency of its converts from lower tribal religions, make it socially injurious when confronted with Western civilization. So, too, the organization of the Latin church in the middle ages provided the rigid discipline which alone could mould the barbarians who had overthrown the Roman Empire into orderly and civilized nations; but this same mediæval system, wherever it remained unaffected by rationalism in regard to beliefs about nature and the supernatural, and in regard to the conduct of politics, has proved an impediment to national progress and prosperity.

Universal religions, including Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity, present a much more difficult problem to the sociologist than primitive tribal religions, or than the national religions of the great peoples of antiquity. A universal religion, so far as it is true to its ideal, breaks up the bonds of nationality and even of kinship, although it may go on to create a new social organism,—a church, *i.e.*, a community of creed, not of race or political allegiance. What we actually find is, of course, a compromise between such an ideal and the older type of purely tribal or local religions. We find a universal religion professed which influences human conduct to some extent, while the greater part of people's lives (I am speaking of the ordinary, average person, not of the enthusiast nor of the criminal) is regulated by the social inheritance of their particular country, or of the class or caste to which they belong.

Thus, if it be asked, "What is the effect of religion on the interests of the race or on the interests of the social organism?" it seems to me all important to know not merely *what* race and *what* social organism are meant, but *what* religion. Nay, even if the question be asked about the Christian religion, it is still necessary to know *which* Christian religion? The religion of the hermits of the Thebaid is not quite the same thing, for the purposes of sociology, with the religion, say, of the ordinary English or American citizen of the present day. And if one wishes to settle any definite question,—say, how far the spread of Christianity led to the decay of the Roman Empire, or how far the decay of Spain

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was due to the ruthless suppression of heresy,—it is surely better to consult the historian who has made a special study of the particular causes at work in each case than to have recourse to any sweeping formula about religion in the light of biological science, with whatever oracular solemnity that formula may be propounded.

The antithesis which Mr. Kidd, like many other people, finds between reason and religion seems to me based on a very inadequate psychology and on a very curious reading of history. Reason may often lead individuals to act in an anti-social fashion: does not religion, especially if it be of an irrational kind, often lead them to act in a fashion quite as anti-social? The religion which has helped to create and further so many movements of social reformation in modern times is a religion which had inherited a large part of the rationalism of Greek philosophers and Roman legislators, and which, at least in Protestant countries, has come more or less under the influence of modern science. It may be perfectly true that mere anti-religious rationalism would in the long run lead to a selfishness destructive of social cohesion, and so become a cause of national decay; but it is equally certain that, under the conditions of modern life in civilized countries, in proportion as religions remain uninfluenced by rationalism, they become sources of national weakness and not of strength.

But when we speak of "national decay" or of "social progress" there is an ambiguity in the phrases which the biological sociologist is apt to overlook. From the point of view of biology and of natural selection in its biological sense, the only matter of interest is the continuity and persistence of the race. For the sociologist there is an important difference between a race and a nation. Nationality is usually based on race, to some extent at least; I do not think the facts of history justify us in considering it as necessarily based on race. If a people think they are of the same race, and if they speak the same language, have the same traditions, and through geographical conditions or the pressure of economic and political circumstances have come to have a community

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of interests and of aspirations, these are far more important factors in the sentiment of nationality than a racial identity such as would satisfy a careful ethnologist classifying mankind according to the shape of their skulls and the characteristics of their hair. Switzerland shows that a nation may exist in spite of diversities not merely in race, but in language, in religion, and in past history. Switzerland is a living refutation of merely ethnological solutions of political problems. A nation (*Volk*) is, to use the convenient term of German political science, a *Culturbegriff*, not a *Rassebegriff;* it implies a community of civilization, not necessarily a community of race. Now we have already seen that in social evolution the transmission of a type of civilization is possible independently of the continuity of the race; so that a race may be even dwindling in numbers whilst its type of civilization may become more and more diffused, because more fitted to survive in the struggle for existence with other types of civilization. Thus the decay of a race is not *necessarily* the same thing as the decay of the nation with which in some past time that race was identical. I do not mean to deny that in the struggle between nations the dwindling of a once dominant race may become a very serious source of weakness; whether that be so or not depends on many other considerations. What I wish to urge is, that for national continuity the assimilative power of the national civilization may be of far more importance than the mere numerical increase of the race which originally formed the nation. When the Spartan race dwindled, the Spartan state necessarily decayed, because the race was the state. On the other hand, every one of the Roman families that fought against Hannibal might have been extinct in the time of the Antonines; but the "Roman people" was becoming nearly identical with the civilized world. If no descendant of the "pilgrim fathers" survived on the American continent, the main characteristics of the New England type of civilization might still predominate over the vast multitudes from all lands which that type of civilization is assimilating. To the biologist, the dwindling number of births in France and the rapid increase of the German people

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are the sole significant factors; they are not the only factors of which the sociologist should take account. Nearly every foreign immigrant into France is, if he settles there, assimilated by the French nation. Run over some names recently conspicuous in French politics: MacMahon, Waddington, Gambetta, Spuller, Waldeck-Rousseau, etc. On the other hand, nearly every emigrant of the overcrowded population of Germany is lost to German nationality, and is in a few years speaking the English tongue, and becoming an heir to the institutions and traditions of the United States or of some British colony. There is one part of the world where the French race remains almost entirely under the influence of a religion which is sufficiently non-rational to satisfy Mr. Kidd's definiton; and there the race certainly increases with a rapidity that outruns the means of subsistence. They would increase more rapidly still were it not that (as Mr. Goldwin Smith has remarked) under the influence of their religion they trust to little images of the Virgin instead of to vaccination as a security against the ravages of small-pox. It is, of course, possible, though it seems hardly likely, that the French Canadians will become a more important factor in the history of the world than the French nation has been. But I can fancy many a patriotic Frenchman, if the choice were offered him, preferring that his country's literature should be admired throughout the civilized world rather than that his descendants should be swarming in the tenement-houses of American manufacturing cities. And if we recur to the case of Germany, I think the influence of the German universities on the picked students of America is a far more important element in determining the German factor in American civilization than the swarms of Teutonic immigrants.

In arguing for the possibility of national progress irrespective of racial increase, and even of racial continuity, I must guard against misunderstanding. I do not mean that a community consisting mainly of Negroes, or perhaps even of Mongolians, could carry on our "Western civilization" without that civilization suffering in quality. I only mean to urge that mere increase in numbers is not necessarily the sole or the best way of preserving a type of national existence

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that seems worth preserving. A people may be more socially efficient whose "standard of living" is not perpetually lowered by an increase in excess of the means of subsistence, provided always (and this is the commonly neglected element in the population question) that natural selection is not replaced by an artificial selection of the unfittest.

This brings me to the last point I intend to consider, viz., the bearing of the theory of natural selection on the question of socialism. According to Mr. Kidd, the tendency of the movement now proceeding in the Western world is not towards socialism, as that is commonly understood; social evolution does not diminish competition, but brings all mankind into the rivalry of life on conditions of equal social opportunities. Competition seems certainly most in accordance with natural selection in its biological sense, but Mr. Kidd speaks of natural selection becoming "humanized" through the operation of the "altruistic sentiment" which has permeated society as the effect of the Christian religion. Now, two questions suggest themselves: (1) How can natural selection be humanized without ceasing to produce the survival of the fittest? All philanthropic interference with the starvation of the unsuccessful means a certain amount of artificial selection, which hinders the racial progress that would be produced by unchecked natural selection. To get the real benefits of natural selection, we should require not merely to give up all philanthropy, but to abolish all such institutions as inheritance of property, marriage for life, probably all law and order,—everything that separates us from the animals. Simply to abolish all factory acts and land acts and sanitary acts—in fact, so far as Great Britain is concerned, all the laws passed since 1846, with perhaps the disestablishment of the Church and the abolition of the House of Lords thrown in—would leave us still very far away from the region of unimpeded natural selection. Biological students of society see perfectly clearly that all humanitarian legislation brings with it a certain deterioration in the vigor of a race,* unless those

* See, *e. g.*, Professor J. B. Haycraft's "Darwinism and Race Progress."

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unsuccessful individuals whom altruistic sentiment will not permit us to see eliminated by starvation are rigorously segregated from the vigorous portion of the community, and prevented from producing offspring. This latter course would be a method of rational artificial selection by which we could bring about in less cruel fashion the race progress that otherwise can only be obtained by leaving natural selection to do its work unchecked. The difficulty in the way of any nation adopting such rational artificial selection will probably arise mainly from the non-rational religious sentiments which Mr. Kidd thinks essential to social progress. (2) How can "equal social opportunities" be secured for all mankind, or for any portion of mankind, without a complete organization of industry being undertaken by the state, *i. e.*, without collectivist socialism? If the "friendly rivalry" on conditions of "equal social opportunity" only means that the well-equipped and the ill-equipped in mind, body and estate are to be allowed to start together in the race, the loser to be killed by starvation, that is certainly natural selection, but the "equal social opportunity" is a mockery and a sham. If, on the other hand, the loser is to be treated through altruistic sentiment as kindly as the winner, the work of natural selection is frustrated, and the well-being of the race is injured. If the equal social opportunities are to be made a reality, and such deterioration in the quality of the race is to be avoided, we must, in the first place, have a socialistic organization of industry, and, in the second place, a system of artificial selection such as the average socialist, who is apt to be an anarchist at heart, has hardly ever contemplated,—a system, however, which was proposed long ago by Plato in his "Republic" when he argued that the breeding and rearing of citizens should be regarded with at least as much care as the breeding and rearing of dogs and horses.

These are problems of social evolution which I do not think can be profitably discussed in disregard of biological science, but I do not think they can be settled by any dogmatic application of biological formulæ.

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THE ETHICAL LIFE AND CONCEPTIONS OF THE JAPANESE.

In the mental activities of the Japanese people, ambition, sentiment, good sense, and artistic taste play an important *rôle*. The race of conquerors, who, coming over from the mainland of Asia and led by the first Emperor Jimmu-Jenno, subjugated the fierce aborigines, and in the name of Heaven took possession of the islands, forever left the stamp of their imperious temper upon their descendants. Japan must strike for a first place among the nations of the earth. Eminence and honor are dearer to her people than life itself; and how much more so than wealth or luxury! Utilitarian morality will never find wide-spread acceptance among this people. It will forever be sentiment which moves them. "A thousand hill-tops and ten thousand mountain summits," sings a poet, "are all covered with grass and shrubs. Where, in what peak of particular distinction shall I plant my staff? This long-cherished ideal of manhood—where shall I find its fit illustration? Where, but in the first summit of Mount Fuji?" A prince of the great house of Tokugawa, himself the lord of a large domain, once invited a famous actress to perform a series of dances for the entertainment of his invited guests. As she danced, the whole assembly was charmed with her skill and beauty, and the highest hilarity prevailed. Yet, at the close of the dance, the prince himself sat absorbed in thought, pensive and gloomy, and was noticed even to shed tears of grief. When he was asked by a trusty servant for the reason of this strange behavior, he answered, "This person is but a woman, and an actress, yet she has attained a position of national reputation, while I, a prince and a son of Iyeyasu, have not attained a first place among men." It is due to this spirit of ambition that there is to-day so much earnest purpose, steady application, well-balanced judgment underlying certain tendencies to foolish imitation and occasional outbursts of shallow excitement. This ambition takes little note of immediate

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worldly consequences. It seeks nobility and greatness for their own sakes. It would be ashamed if it turned back from the pursuit of its aims because of risks. It is sentimental in the highest and best sense of the term.

To temper this spirit of ambition, Buddhism has contributed an element of pessimism and taught the people the wisdom of contentment and resignation. It has never ceased to remind them that this life, with all its interests and ambitions, is impermanent and vanity, and that only "in Buddha, the law and the order," is to be found the Nirvana, the true life—the life of permanence and calm.* The sounds of evening-bells slow measured and melancholy, coming from some distant elevation or hill-top, and reverberating through the whole town; the great halls of temples, clean-swept and empty of all furniture; the clean-dressed and clean-shaved monks calmly engaged in their daily devotions; the innumerable names and stories of men and women, some of them of highest stations in life, who forsook the world and obtained rest for their tired spirits,—all reminded the people of life, beauty, and peace which are not of this world. The idea gradually prevailed that in youth and the prime of life the spirit of noble ambition should rule, while in old age the spirit of resignation and contentment. This latter idea of resignation to fate, or of contentment with one's lot, was no doubt sometimes practised too readily. Men and women became too easily discouraged and too soon tired of life. The life of retirement became at times

* Buddhism was introduced into Japan in 552 A.D., in the thirteenth year of the reign of the Emperor Kimmei. The powerful Soga family espoused its cause at the court, and the Prince Shotoku Taishi became its strong patron as well as its illustrious expounder. Early in the ninth century the powerful Tendai and Shingon sects were introduced; in the latter part of the eleventh century the Zen sect, which soon gained great popularity among the soldierly class on account of its pathological method of self-mastery; and in the latter part of the twelfth century Shinran and Nichirin began their great careers in the founding of the popular, and only strictly Japanese, sects of Buddhism,—the Monto-Shin Shū,—which allows the marriage of its clergy, and the Hokké Shū, noted for the methodistic fervor of its piety and the zealous propagation of its doctrines. With this came to an end the palmy days of Buddhism. Since then any creative work by the Buddhists was rarely ever done, either in the line of speculation or of founding new sects.

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a thing of fashion, so that men felt, or pretended to feel, old prematurely, and young men too often had thrown upon them the duties of life for which they were little prepared.* Yet, on the whole, Buddhism rendered a good service in counteracting and ennobling the spirit of fierce strife and of worldly ambition. It helped to create in the souls of men and women a longing for the life of the spirit, however inadequate its philosophy of salvation may have been. I said above that Buddhism has tempered our philosophy of life; but it has not enslaved it, or we might have been to-day "like Sodom and Gomorrah." Buddhism, which has made, according to H. Dharmapala, "Asia mild," was a blessing in our own case, because it did not succeed in making us *too* mild. It is highly creditable to the mental virility of the people that they were able finally to assert themselves against the Buddhistic domination and declare their mental independence. It shows their good sense that they knew when and where to stop following the teachings of the Hindoo sage. Thus resulted a happy fusion of activity and calmness, of ambition and resignation, of desire and contentment, which is so well typified by our national flower—the cherry-blossom. "Among men the Samurai, among flowers the cherry." When its season comes, behold! all hill-sides and valleys, all the gardens of cities are at once covered with its blossoms. Yet in a few days the white petals begin to fall, and, being blown by gentle breezes, sometimes present a veritable snow-scene; thus they go in supreme unconsciousness, without leaving behind any trace of a greedy hold on life. The flower is loved for what it typifies as well as for its own beauty.†

This life-ideal has, however, enriched itself most largely by

* It was not unusual a generation ago in Japan to find persons regarding themselves old at forty-five or fifty, and retiring from the active duties of life, throwing over the cares of their households to their sons, and devoting themselves to writing poetry, to horticulture, to tea-drinking, or the games of *gō* and chess.

† The life of Prince Hosokawa Fujitaka, otherwise called Yūsai, a poet, a philosopher, a warrior, a courtier, and a statesman, all in one, is a typical example of this phase of Japanese life. He lived in a period of transition (1532 A.D.–1600 A.D.) leading from Ashikaga to Tokugawa Shōgunnate. I am sorry there is no space here to give some account of his exceedingly interesting life.

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accepting the ethical system of Confucius. The sacred books of Confucianism, which are almost exclusively ethical, social, or political, and above all practical, in the nature of their teachings, were greatly serviceable in lines where both Buddhism and Shintoism lamentably failed. To Confucianism Japan owes that richness of ethical content in her life and thought for which she will be forever grateful. To be sure, the influence of Confucianism, after its brilliant success in establishing itself,* during the seventh and eighth centuries of the Christian era, in the court and the departments of state, suddenly declined and gave its place to Buddhism; yet, with the inauguration of the last era of peace, under the shōgunnate of the Tokugawa family,† it not only regained its influence, but became predominant. If for the seven centuries previous to this it had to content itself as a parasite of Buddhism, depending for its preservation upon the kindness of the priests, it was not long after the new era before great minds arose to uphold Confucianism‡ and assert its independence against

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* Confucianism was introduced into Japan, according to tradition, in 284 A.D. in the sixteenth year of the reign of the Emperor Ōjin. But it seems to have made little headway till the coming of Buddhism in 552 A.D. The latter seems to have gained strong adherents from the very first, because probably of its promises to confer temporal and spiritual blessings. The study of the sacred books of Buddhism, which were all in the Chinese translation, gave stimulus to the study of the Chinese language, and most naturally led to a study of the Chinese classics; and, besides, the very antagonism which the rapid spread of Buddhism called forth led to the study of the classics on the part of those who wished for something to appeal to against the Hindoo religion. During the seventh century we find troops of eager young men going out to China, braving the winds and waves of the Yellow Sea, in order to learn the literature, arts, laws, and institutions of the great Tan period of Chinese history. It was through the efforts of these young men that the first systematic form of administration was established and the first Japanese code was framed and promulgated.

† The era of peace extended from the installation of Tokugawa Iyeyasu into the office of the Shōgunnate (or the generalissimo of the empire), in 1603 A.D., to the restoration of the Mikado to his rightful authority, in 1868 A.D. It was during this period (usually called the Tokugawa period) that the institutions of feudalism were developed to perfection; that the arts and literature made their final great stride, and the distinctive civilization of Japan was consummated.

‡ The great names—Yamasaki Ansai, Nakaye Toju, Kumazawa Hanzan, Ito Zinsai, Kaibara Yekiken, Ogiu Sorai, Muro Kiuso, Oshiwo Heihachiro, Sato

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the domination of Hindoo speculation. At the close of this epoch men were found in every village and hamlet who read "the four books and five classics," and who, like the Jewish rabbis of old, gathered disciples around them and expounded to them the moral teachings of the great sage. These teachings, which were formulated into the doctrine of the five relationships, could very easily be mastered by the people. They were: 1. Between father and son let there be love. 2. Between king and subject let there be duty. 3. Between husband and wife let there be proper distinctions (of functions). 4. Between the old and the young let there be orderliness. 5. Between friend and friend let there be faithfulness.

The great merit of Confucianism was in the positive and ethical nature of its teachings. It dwelt on the importance of the daily routine of life, and invested with almost religious significance the minor, commonplace events of existence. As an offset against the pessimism and the speculative vagaries of Buddhism and the unmoral, or too often immoral, superstitions of the popular beliefs, the influence of this practical system of positive morality can hardly be overestimated. If we must characterize the influence of Buddhism as negative, as we have already seen it to be, that of Confucianism was decidedly positive and vitalizing.*

There was yet another feature in the teachings of Confucius which has had a very important and far-reaching influence in Japan; it is the teaching respecting *kcun-tszi*, or a man of

Itssai, Fujita Toko—which have adorned this period would confer glory to a similar epoch in any country. This was verily the era of renaissance for Japan.

* Confucius persistently refused to speculate on the high and mystic regions of the unseen, and confined his observations and discussions to matters of daily life. He was born in a troublous time, and his merits as a sage and statesman were little appreciated; yet, unlike many men of the time, he refused to forsake the world. His courage and heroism in the cause of righteousness are something truly wonderful. If he was not a philosopher like Plato, or a prophet like Isaiah, it was no mark of inferiority that he was "a transmitter, and not an originator," because the positive morality he exemplified and the honest, heroic grandeur of his character have proved to be the strongest bulwark against the enervating influence of the sentimental and speculative pessimism of India, both in China and Japan, for all these years.

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complete culture. It formed the ideal of the Sage himself and of all his disciples. It meant a man who, through learning, culture, and self-mastery, attained a state of harmonious and complete development of all his faculties; who was therefore worthy to be intrusted with the affairs of the state, or to be made a teacher and guide of the people. The Confucian idea of social and political reform was to create a class of cultured men—men of "sweetness and light," as Matthew Arnold would say—whose mission it was to uphold before kings and princes the ideal of a righteous state, to undertake the duties of government whenever called upon, and to teach and guide the people to walk in accordance with the doctrine of the five relationships. This was indeed a grand and inspiring ideal, and it has helped to produce in Japan those enlightened princes and scholarly statesmen to whom the country owes many a salvation in times of crises, and to whose examples we owe that ideal of enlightened and upright public service which is to-day yet proving so influential. Thus was added to our philosophy of life another element which enriched what was already so beautiful and made it strongly ethical.

In the practical application of Confucian ethics the Japanese have differed very significantly from the Chinese. Among the latter it was the principle of filial piety rather than that of loyalty to the king which has been the basis of all their morality. In the Analects of Confucius it is said: "A man of true culture (*keun-tszi*) endeavors to lay the foundations. When the foundations are laid, then is the path of truth secure. Filial piety and brotherly goodness—are not these indeed the foundations for the establishment of righteousness?" Confucius taught more fully and more explicitly on the subject of filial piety than on that of loyalty. The reason for this is not difficult to see. Confucius and his disciples lived in a time of almost total anarchy, and they went from one prince to another, tendering their services, but meeting with little honest response, so that there never grew up between them and any of the princes a deep sentiment of attachment. Confucius once playfully compared himself to a jeweller with a precious stone to sell, and said, "I would sell it, I would sell it; I am only wait-

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ing for a proper price." Besides, from earliest times the Chinese have lived under constant changes of dynasties and governments. and, notwithstanding all their remarkable conservatism, they were forced to embrace a theory of society which justified rebellion. As the modern Chinese social system, notwithstanding its unmitigated form of absolutism in central government, contradicts itself by having within its local administrations many elements of democratic self-government, in the same way from time immemorial the Chinese held to the doctrine of the divine right of kings, yet held at the same time that rebellion was justifiable whenever the reigning dynasty lost the favor of Heaven. The case of the saintly King Woo,* who, though subject to the reigning imperial house, yet rose against it and in the name of Heaven destroyed it, compelled the scholars of succeeding periods to give up the extreme theory of legitimacy forever.† It is evident, therefore, that in such a society as the Chinese the only bond of unity and continuity (there being no religious bond as in the case of the Jews) was the bond of family relationship; and we find that Confucianism as a national system of Ethics laid the

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* The Chow dynasty, of which King Woo was the founder, lasted 1123–255 B.C. "The traditions now become decidedly more trustworthy, although still largely mixed with fable. Woo-wang [or King Woo] was brave and upright. Under him a momentous change in government took place. By him the kingdom was divided into seventy-two feudal States."—(Fisher.) The principles of government, the rites and ceremonies of State and of festivals, as well as the entire social order and ideas of this Chow dynasty, were forever idealized and crystallized through the writings of Confucius, who lived at the close of this long period, and in midst of social dismemberment and anarchy. In Shu-King, or the book of history, Confucius devotes a large space to the story of King Woo.

† The theory of kingship in China was very much like the idea underlying the kingship among the ancient Jews. The difference between the two was in the fact that in one case we have *keun-tszi* or cultured men, as the transmitters and scribes of the wisdom of the ancients; in the other case prophets as the seers of approaching events and the proclaimers of the will of God. Confucius, indeed, looked to Providence to guide him to some prince who was appointed to reign and restore peace, but he never heard the voice of God telling him to arise, find a king, and set him up. In the mean time the only thing which a *keun-tszi* like Confucius could do was to prepare and make himself ready, through culture, for any call of service, and wait patiently for such an opportunity.

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greatest importance on filial piety. Thus, the teachings of Confucius and the social conditions of China both led that people to regard the principle of filial piety as the first and the last. Indeed, we cannot but admire the remarkable longevity of a community of three hundred millions of people, who have preserved intact their traditions and customs, as well as their immense territory, for three thousand years and through twenty-four changes of dynasty. It seems as if here we see the confirmation of the truth of the fourth commandment in the Mosaic decalogue, which promises longevity as a reward of filial piety.

The case was different with the Japanese. They indeed held in theory that filial piety was the foundation of all virtue. Yet in practice they laid the greatest emphasis on the principle of loyalty. The claims of the King or the State took precedence of all other claims, and the almost religious devotion to the cause of the Mikado or of the State was the mainspring of all virtues. Probably one of the most remarkable things in the history of the world is the unique place the Imperial House of Japan has occupied in the estimation of the people. Think for a moment of one royal family ruling over an energetic and progressive people from the very beginning of their history, for some twenty centuries! It is true, indeed, that during the large part of this long period the chief executive duties rested upon the heads of different powerful clans, and in some cases the emperors were compelled to abdicate or sent into exile. Yet never was the throne occupied by any but the members of the imperial family. To the Mikado always belonged the right to confer ranks and to make appointments, and if in practice he was not always free to act as he chose, in theory at least his authority was never disputed. The principle of loyalty, however, as almost the sole foundation of all virtues, found its wider application after the establishment of feudalism,—from the thirteenth century onward.* For feudal-

* The founder of feudalism was Minamoto-no-Yoritomo, who, after his victory over the rival clan Taira, assumed in 1192 A.D., by appointment of the Mikado, the office of Seii-Jai-Shōgun, and established the government of the empire at Kamakura, not far from the present capital, Tokyo. He took away

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ism created so many grades of masters as the nearer and more tangible objects of loyal service that it soon made this principle the all-pervading bond of social life. The Mikado had his immediate court officials and his vicegerent, the Shōgun; these had their own immediate retainers, these latter again in turn their own trusty servants, and so on. In a large number of cases the bond of attachment between a master and his servant was the heritage of many generations, and was even closer than blood-relationship. "A faithful wife never seeks a second husband, a loyal servant never serves a second master." A true retainer to a daimio (lord of a domain) never offered himself to the service of another suzerain, even in case he was expelled through no fault of his from his master's household, or where his master's house, through some calamity, came to extinction and he was left a "homeless wanderer." * But as the people advanced in intelligence and civilization, and the idea of nationality gradually dawned in the minds of the leading men, the Mikado and his cause came increasingly to be the watchword for national unity; and when feudalism was finally overthrown as the result of the restoration of 1868, the Mikado became the one and sole object of popular devotion. He represents to-day to each one of his forty-one millions of subjects the unity, interests, and glory of the whole. For this evolution from petty, divided, and often conflicting claims of loyalty into the enlightened and united loyalty of to-day, and, in fact, for the deep-rooted affection of the people towards the imperial house, Japan owes a debt of gratitude to Shintoism, which was in its earliest beginning probably either Shamanism or the simple worship of the heavens, and which very early developed into Mikadoism, or the worship of the Mikado. We owe this service especially to the later remarkable Shintoist revival, extending from the

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from the Mikado and his court in Kiyoto all real power and authority. Kamakura is now a deserted village and a summer resort.

* A servant became often so attached to a family that he remained all his life in the service of that family, sometimes serving three or four generations of masters. Such a servant was at times led to undergo martyrdom for the cause of his master's household in cases of emergency.

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middle of the eighteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century, the influence of which was permanent and far-reaching, finally leading to the realization of our national unity under the restored imperial authority.*

Thus stands the contrast: the Chinese emphasizing the duty of filial obedience, the Japanese that of loyal devotion. The one finding their popular ideal of virtue in the twenty-four patterns of filial piety, which can best be described as caricatures of the great virtue, the other in the story of the forty-seven *ronins* † who avenged the death of their prince in the face of the greatest difficulties, each of whom, in order to accomplish his object, "hated his father, mother, wife, and children," and when it was accomplished committed *harakiri* in calm satisfaction. We see yet more the difference between these two peoples in the fact that among the modern Chinese, while patriotism and official probity seem to be singularly wanting, there exist in striking contrast to this some virtues of a private and personal nature. Thrift, perseverance, honesty in business, seem to follow from their devotion to the interests of their household, and the trustworthiness of the Chinese merchants has already become almost proverbial in the Far East. The criminality of the universal official swindling seems to lose something of its great heinousness when we remember that these same swindlers have the good of their aged parents or of their wives and children at heart.‡

* This Shintoist revival was led on its religious and literary sides by three remarkable men,—Kamo Mabuchi (1696 A.D.–1769 A.D.), Moto-ori Nobunaga (1730 A.D.–1801 A.D.), and Hirata Atsu Tane (1776 A.D—1843 A.D.). They were each exceedingly individualistic, but had one common aim, which was to uphold the national dignity of Japan through the revival of native literature as against the supremacy of Chinese learning, and the worship of the gods as against the domination of Buddhism. This movement had, moreover, its political counterpart in the Shintoistic Confucianism of Yamasaki Ansai (1615–1682 A.D.), and his disciple Asami (1712 A.D.–1771 A.D.), in the History of Japan by Rai-Sanyo (1780 A.D.–1832 A.D.), and in the rise of the Mito-School of learning, whose leading spirit was Fujita Toko (1804 A.D.–1855 A.D.). It was altogether a great movement, and did more than anything else to prepare the way for our national unification through the restoration of the imperial authority.

† Read Saito and Greey's "The Royal Ronins."

‡ When, after the close of the recent war, the Japanese took possession of the island of Formosa, there was presented the humorous and significant spectacle

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A great deal of scepticism formerly and of surprise latterly has been expressed at the real success of reforms in Japan. New Japan is, however, a solid reality now, and is fast becoming an important factor in the affairs of the world. To what do we owe all this success? Is it due to some peculiar native endowment of the people? Is it due to the climate, situation, and surroundings of the country? I answer, that the achievement of the Japanese in the reorganization of their social and political institutions is due chiefly to their peculiar ethical life. In the first place, we must take into consideration the deep-rooted feeling of loyalty to the Mikado which animates the hearts of his subjects. When the restoration took place, his will forthwith became the law of the country. He was not only absolute in power, but almost worshipped as a divine personage. The most enlightened public opinion of the time stood before the people incarnated in the person of the Mikado, and all forms of conservative opposition were one by one swept away before his successive edicts. In the second place, we must take note of the existence of "the authority of right reason" which the cultured class, whose ideal was *keun-tszi*, represented in all matters relating to the welfare of the country. The mass of the people were indeed still slaves of ignorance and superstition, but they possessed one good quality, that of knowing whom to follow. They were humble because of the consciousness of their own ignorance, and gladly took the better-informed men, in a large number of cases their juniors in age, as leaders and guides. The stiff-necked, blindfolded "Philistines" have had no existence in modern Japan. Probably no other people in modern times have proved such humble learners. Yet their humility was not unaccompanied by some solid mental qualities, other-

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of rich, well-fed, and well-dressed Chinese inhabitants, who had not contributed a cent towards the prosecution of the war which led to their subjugation, looking down with contemptuous smile upon the frugal fare and cheap dress of the conquerors, whose countrymen at home voluntarily contributed, aside from regular taxes, over ten millions of yen towards the maintenance of the war, the number of the individual contributors amounting to one-fourth of the total population.

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wise they might have been humble learners yet unable to accomplish so much. We must, therefore, take into consideration, in the third place, the intense spirit of patriotic ambition which has characterized everybody, from the emperor down to his meanest subjects,—the enlightened and the ignorant, the high and the low, all classes of people alike,—and which led them to undergo every hardship, give up every prejudice, sacrifice every personal interest in order that they might contribute, each in his own way, towards the reformation of the country. Why did the last of the Shōguns, with the large fighting resource yet behind him, submit so meekly to what he at first regarded with justice as not the true will of the Mikado, but the dictation of certain powerful clans? Why was the Civil War which accompanied the restoration so easily brought to a close and harmony so soon restored? Why did the Imperial Court itself, in all countries the bulwark of tradition and conservatism, lead the people in our own case, by introducing modern ideas into its rules of etiquette, the emperor himself readily condescending to appear before his subjects, dressed, moreover, in European costume, a man among men? What was the one last argument which decided the initiation of those innumerable radical reform-measures which were so much needed, yet were so diametrically opposed to the popular prejudices of the times? That one argument was, "This is necessary." Necessary for what? Necessary, in order to make the country civilized and strong. Imagine, for a moment, the depths of pain and humiliation into which this proud and ambitious people were thrown when they were compelled to realize the utter powerlessness and destined collapse of Asiatic nations before the superior civilization and strength of those "red-haired, blue-eyed Western barbarians." The clearer they saw the situation the stronger became their determination to rise with one supreme effort out of this hell of shame. Nothing is impossible to those who are determined, "since nothing is impossible to him who believeth." Is it any wonder, then, that this people have astonished the whole world in these latter days of the nineteenth century with what

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they have already accomplished, and yet more with the possibility of what they will yet accomplish?

The position of woman forms a very interesting as well as a very important topic in connection with the present discussion. It is not unusual to hear some writers discuss this subject in a way which seems to be entirely misleading. I am free to admit, in the first place, that the theory of womanhood as it was popularly expounded by our moralists would make it appear that the Japanese women have suffered from the same kind of religious and social despotism as the women of India or China. The Hindoo theory of threefold obedience —" when young, obey your parents; when married, obey your husband; when widowed, obey your son"—and the Chinese theory of seven reasons for divorce* were indeed popularly taught and accepted. Yet it must be remembered that here again the native good sense of the people never permitted these theories to be strictly applied in practice. The original native ideas of womanhood were extremely healthy, and there never existed any theory of woman's inferiority to man until the alien systems of religion began to prevail. We have had several empresses to govern us, among them Jingo-Kogu, the conqueror of Corea; numbers of female poets and authors† whose works are among the acknowledged classics to-day; mothers and wives without number whose chastity, wisdom, and nobility of character will bear comparison with the world's best types of womanhood. The marriage of widows was looked upon with favor, especially if they were young. The wife, if she was in subjection to her husband, was yet at the same time the mistress of the household and the revered mother of her children. Polygamy, though it was practised more or less among the highest classes, was never practised

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* The seven reasons for divorce are: 1. Disobedience to the husband's parents. 2. Childlessness. 3. Licentiousness. 4. Over-jealousness. 5. Leprosy, and other kindred diseases. 6. Over-talkativeness. 7. Committing of theft.

† The names of Ono-no-Komachi (who flourished in the ninth century), a poetess, and Murasaki Shikibu (who flourished in the tenth century), the authoress of "Genjimonogatari" (translated into English by Suematz Kencho. London, Trübner & Co., 1882), stand pre-eminent.

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among the large body of the people, including the larger number of the Samurai class. Women freely walked out on the street, those of better classes always with escorts, and their lives at home were pleasant, contented, and happy. Young ladies of the Samurai class not seldom practised the use of a halberd, which made them healthy, strong, and courageous.

It is not my intention to defend the Chinese theory of the seven reasons for divorce or the Hindoo theory of threefold obedience; yet, in justice to them, I must say that the fundamental principle lying at the bottom of these theories was not, in my judgment, the intrinsic inferiority of women (as the popular and later expositions certainly make it appear), so much as the superior claims of the family or household above all individual rights. The family, under the patriarchal system, was a unit which no individual member of it had a right to break up. If a wife, therefore, proved herself, by her character, act, or physical condition, to be hostile to the true interests of the household, it was her duty, "having come from another family into this," to leave it; in fact, neither her husband nor anybody else could keep her, if they meant to be dutiful to their ancestors. Just so with regard to woman's duty of obedience. The wife obeys her husband because he is the head of the household; the mother obeys her son because he is the head of the household. The father did the same if he had resigned his place as the head of the household and was living a life of retirement. These things sound, I have no doubt, very harsh to those who live in a community where modern ideas reign; yet the Japanese old-time ideas of womanhood, and their practical consequences, should be judged, not from the modern Western stand-point, but rather from their own stand-point; for it makes a world-wide difference whether a son succeeds to his father's estate as his right or as his duty. In our case it was his duty to so look after the affairs of the household that his mother, brothers, and sisters were as well provided for as in the days of his father. It not infrequently happened that a young man was obliged to divorce his wife, whom he really loved, because the peace of the household demanded it. I am not defending the system

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of ideas which leads men and women to act in so many unnatural ways. What I wish to point out is the fact that, under all these mistaken notions, there was pervading throughout the sense of duty, devotion, and self-sacrifice; and also this, that the practical working of our theory was not near so bad as is sometimes imagined.

No discussion of Japanese morals can be complete without mention of a very popular phrase which represents—conjointly with the principle of loyalty—the ethical life of the people. I refer to the phrase *giri-ninjio*, or reason and humanity. It expresses the antithesis which so often exists in life between one's natural feelings of love, on one hand, and the call of duty on the other, when one is expected from the stand-point of ethics to pursue the path of duty, even though at the sacrifice of his natural instincts of humanity.* There is nothing remarkable in this idea, nothing peculiar to the Japanese, except that they have carried out its application in some cases to singular and fantastic extremes, so much so that their highly self-sacrificing and moral acts not seldom seem immoral looked at from the modern stand-point. We read in popular novels and romances, in dramas and stories, of persons being "compelled through the sense of *giri* or reasonable duty" to commit certain acts which were entirely opposed to their natural instincts. A wife has two children to care for; the one is her own, the other the child of her husband's former wife. The latter is, therefore, a child of *giri*, and she is twice as good to that child as to her own. A nurse to a child-prince realizes the imminent danger to which he is placed through the wicked designs of his enemies. She has her own child at the court as the playmate of the prince. The time comes when she can only save the life of the prince by sacrificing her own child as his substitute. Two young women are in love with one young man, each not knowing the other is in love with him. By and by one of them learns that the

* The popular romances and novels by such authors as Bakin, Tamenago, and the dramas of Chikamatsu, are all full of this idea. See Mitford's "Tales of Old Japan," which gives some very interesting stories illustrating this principle.

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other is his destined wife because of an engagement entered into by the young man when he was adopted into the family of this girl. Obeying the dictate of "reason" she gives up the cherished object of her affection and blesses his union with her rival. Many a woman thought that she was performing her "reasonable duty" when she sold her purity and freedom, as the only thing she could do, "being but a woman," to help her poor invalid parents or her beloved unfortunate husband. If the term *chugi* (or loyalty) was aristocratic in its origin and gradually permeated into the lower strata of society, the term *giri-ninjio* was plebeian in its origin, and was found most largely in use among the masses of the people, though it extended upward through the influence of romances and dramas into the female circles of the higher classes. The term used by the aristocratic class, which corresponded almost completely to *giri-ninjio*, was *setsu-gi*, or the reasonable principle of action. The *setsu-gi* has commanded many a *harakiri* in the course of Japanese history.*

History presents few parallels to the wonderful, revolutionary effect which the coming in of modern thought produced in

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* Here in this connection the two other phases in which this *giri* feeling manifested itself need to be noted. I mean (1) the right of revenge, or *kataki-uchi*, the killing of one's mortal enemy. The saying, "with the murderer of one's king or father one does not live under the same heavens," reigned supreme in the ethical thought of the Japanese. The romantic story of the forty-seven ronins mentioned before is a notable example of this. Another very famous story, over seven hundred years old, is that of the revenge by the Soga brothers of the murder of their father. Sometimes a wife revenges the murder of her husband; sometimes a brother that of his brother. If the son who starts on the search for his father's murderer is young, some one who hears of it, perhaps a perfect stranger, is so moved by it that he volunteers to accompany him and aid him in the noble endeavor. This idea of the right of private revenge has died out with the establishment of the new *régime* and the prevalence of modern ideas. (2) *Otokodate*, or, literally, "to establish one's manhood," was a friendly association of brave men, with one at the head of the guild, whose word was law. Its principle was to help the needy and the oppressed, to resist the oppressions of the strong. It flourished mostly in large cities, among classes below the Samurai, and it was in many cases the back-bone of plebeian morality. The utmost stress was laid on the sacredness of a promised word, and on the duty of fulfilling the trust of another. The working of this principle produced some unique and heroic figures.

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Japan. The utter collapse of the feudal institutions, the sudden overthrow of the old religious systems, the introduction of the ideas of political right, of civil liberty, the inauguration of the constitutional and representative forms of government, above all, the phenomenal rise to influence of the industrial class—all these have necessarily wrought havoc with those ideals and conceptions of morals which once reigned supreme. In practice, indeed, the principle of loyalty and patriotism, of *giri* and *setsu-gi*, are yet to-day held to with deep earnestness and dogged tenacity. In fact, it is not without reason to think that both the Restoration, by bringing forward the one supreme object of devotion in the person of the Mikado, and the opening of the country to the intercourse of foreign nations, by acquainting the people with the national dangers from without, helped greatly to enlighten and deepen the feelings of loyalty and patriotism. Yet as an ethical theory and system the old conceptions have entirely lost their logical ground and may be said with truth to have completely broken down. Besides, in the light of the new situations and conditions, some grave criticisms can well be brought against them; and if the Japanese are to have a new and dominant ideal of ethical life, it will probably be the product of the same independent and peculiar working of the Japanese mind, in which will be found at the same time the best elements of the old system, and the essential elements of Western civilization, existing side by side, fused into one harmonious whole. It is interesting to note that the process of ethical reconstruction has already begun, and is, I believe, bound to succeed. New Japan is to-day confronted, among other great and pressing problems, by the problem of a new ethics, upon whose right solution rests ultimately her destiny as a new civilized power in the Far East.

The reader might, perhaps, inquire how far Christianity has contributed, or will contribute, towards the solution of the ethical problem in Japan. Does it, or does it not, bring some elements of ethical truths which were not found in our old system? The question is somewhat ambiguous. Christianity may mean in the mind of the inquirer either the religion which

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has already contributed so much to enrich the ethical ideas of the peoples of Europe and America, or the Christian Church in Japan, including the native pastors and foreign missionaries. If we understand the question in the former sense, Christianity *has* certainly contributed a very important and essential element to Japanese ethical thought. I refer to the idea of individuality or personal liberty. This idea is now at the foundation of our political, legislative, and social order, and it is something our people never knew before, at least never knew in the breadth and depth of its meaning. We did not learn it, indeed, from reading the Bible or directly from Christianity; we learned it through the law, literature, and institutions of the West. Yet, since the development of this idea in Europe is due in no small degree to the influence of Christianity, we might say with truth that this is one important contribution Christianity has already made to Japan. If, however, we take the question in the second sense, what shall be our answer? It seems to be one of the many burning questions of the day, whether or not the Christian missions have done any good.* One party claims that the movement is an utter failure, the other that it has had a very important share in the progress and enlightenment achieved by the countries of the East. Our question does not concern the religious side of the missionary

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* Protestant Christianity was first introduced into Japan in the year 1859. During the first ten years the prospect was exceedingly dark, but with the Restoration of 1868, and the full opening of the country to Western civilization, the outlook greatly improved. From 1880 to 1890 it made the most wonderful progress, which brought the Protestant population from five thousand in 1880 up to thirty thousand in 1890. Its influence on the nation at large is disproportionately strong compared with its numerical strength. The Greek Church (the Russian) has been very industrious, and at one time was very successful in obtaining converts. It has a membership of twenty thousand. Its actual strength is not at all comparable to the Protestants. The Roman Catholic Church, after its great success in the sixteenth century, at the time of Francis Xavier, and its subsequent entire extermination (about eighty years after the beginning of the mission), began its mission again after the recent opening of the country. It has a body of very devoted and zealous missionaries, and its membership is forty-five thousand. Its adherents are, however, almost exclusively from the lowest and the most ignorant classes, and as yet it has not shown any traceable influence on the community at large.

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movement at all, but only so far as the movement may or may not have contributed to the enrichment of moral life and ideas of the Japanese people. I think it is not difficult to point out several features in the movement which have been disappointing, especially from the ethical point of view, to many thoughtful men who expected much from Christianity. This refers, however, to the negative side, to what was missing, to what might have existed in order to be more complete. But, taking the body of foreign missionaries as a whole and the native churches as they are, there is one particular in which they have succeeded in impressing on the mind of the Japanese people a very important ethical truth. I refer to the principle of monogamy and personal purity. I do not mean to say that the Japanese people have been, as a rule, polygamous, or that womanhood among them, especially in the better classes, had not a very high ideal of faithfulness and chastity. But monogamy as the only true principle of social order, and purity as obligatory upon men as upon women, were never clearly understood. If to-day our best ethical opinion has practically endorsed these truths, we must give a large measure of credit to the foreign missionaries who have been living among us for nearly forty years. To be sure, we have had among us other representatives from Europe and America; but, unfortunately, with some marked exceptions, they have, as a rule, too readily conformed to the loose ideas current around them, and, instead of being helpers towards progress, have become corrupters of our morality. But the missionaries have lived good, honest lives, and been careful not to give occasion for scandal; the native Christians, as a rule, have in their lives been consistent to their profession. All this has been an object-lesson to the people around them. Besides, during this epoch of revolutionary changes, when the old structures of society were crumbling on all sides, when many young men openly proclaimed that to free themselves from all restraints of morality was a mark of enlightenment, and when, moreover, the idea prevailed that there existed no morality in Europe and America, and that those countries were powerful only because they had superior military equipments, during this time of transi-

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tion, I say, it was a very great and noteworthy thing that there should be these men and women from the Far West to represent to us the ethical and spiritual side of their civilization. By their very presence they reminded us of the importance of morality and religion in the life of a nation. In this respect their silent, unconscious influence was beyond all estimation. I have no doubt that with the further progress of Christianity in Japan, and the consequent more perfect adaptation of its teachings to the need of the people, it is destined to exercise a yet more thoroughgoing influence in the development of our ethical thought.

Before concluding, I will make a few criticisms on the old ethical ideas by considering them in the light and situation of to-day, and try to indicate the lines along which the new ethical idea will probably develop.

It seems to me a just criticism against the old system of ethics that it was too one-sided in its enforcement of duties. While the teachings about the five relationships seem, when theoretically considered, to be well balanced, yet in their practical application they often proved to be too partial and unequal in the distribution of duties. The duties of father, king, husband, or elder brother were unfairly light compared with the duties of subject, son, wife, or younger brother. It could not, perhaps, be otherwise; for the practice of morals could not but correspond with the social conditions of the time. And just for the same reason that the Confucian system of graduated morality was so well suited to the feudal forms of society, the new time and the industrial revolution, as well as the prevalence of the ideas of political right and personal liberty, will demand a new presentation of the old truth set in a system of philosophy which will correspond to the new social environment. Such a philosophy must start, in the first place, with an ethical conception of the rights of man, must give, so to speak, an ethical valuation of the individual. Modern Japan has been acting under higher impulses, in freeing the outcast *êta* class from social and political opprobrium, in freeing the serfs from the burden of innumerable feudal exactions, in giving political rights and social privileges to all

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classes of people. But there has not yet been formulated a self-consistent ethical theory of man. Why is a subject to be treated with respect and granted his due right by the Mikado? Why are children to be treated with respect and reverence by their parents? Why are the commonplace, every-day virtues of chastity, honesty, thrift of such great importance? Is it not because we are human beings before we are fathers, sons, kings, or subjects? It is the idea of man as an ethical personality equal before Heaven, entitled to all the privileges of existence, to equal opportunities in the pursuit of the aims of life, which should be at the foundation of every true and enlightened social order. This ethical conception of man teaches us that not only are we to work for the best welfare of the community, but that every one is to work for the noblest development of his own personality. His life is not his own, but belongs to an ideal. His body, too, is an ethical property; he must keep it pure. No public service, or an act of loyal devotion, is perfect if it is performed at the expense of private virtues. He only is a free man who keeps his mind and body pure, and who looks alike upon all, high and low, great and small, with sincere reverence, because of the ideal that is in each and every human being.

In the second place, in the course of this reconstruction we need an ethical conception of human society. Why should we work for the good and glory of our own country? Why should we live and die for the good and glory of our emperor? When the question was asked in old-time Japan, it was promptly answered by saying, "We repay in this form one ten-thousandth part of the benefit we and our ancestors have received from the king and the state." It was essentially a feudal idea, according to which the feudal subjects render dues to their suzerain for the fiefs they hold. The sense of duty and obligation was felt most keenly by those who, like the Samurai, were in immediate relation with the sovereign, but not to an equal degree by other classes of people. We need a satisfactory philosophical ground for our patriotism, so that our service to the country may not end in a larger kind of selfish ambition. What relation do the glory and good of

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Japan hold to the glory and good of other nations and peoples? Shall our attitude towards other peoples be that of self-assertive, self-glorying ambition, or one of righteous purpose and fraternal good-will? There is probably but one answer to these questions: that is, that the history of the human race is one vast, organic, ethical process; that it is an evolutionary process towards an ethical end, so that all times, all peoples, all men, are to contribute towards the realization of those states and conditions which are the ultimate goal of all history, and the fulfilment of the visions and prophecies of the best men of all the ages. One nation is but a member of the whole fraternity of nations, so that it and they are all working, with different missions and sometimes in temporary conflicts of interest and purposes, yet overruled by Providence, towards the accomplishment of one great historical process. No progressive social order can long endure without resting on some such self-consistent ethical conception of human existence. As the sunlight of an early spring morn scatters the fog which has covered the hills, valleys, and villages like one vast sheet over sleeping figures, so must these great truths of God and man shine upon the peoples of the Far East, and scatter those systems of philosophy which make arts, civilization, and the wisdom of man altogether vanity and vexation of spirit. This is the problem, nay, the conflict, which is now calling forth the most earnest efforts of the best people of Japan.

These new ideas, it will be noticed, are the essential elements in the ethical conceptions of the modern democratic Christian West. They are already present in Japan, together with other ideas of Western civilization, and will make themselves felt yet more and more powerfully till they permeate through the length and breadth of the whole social structure of modern Japan. It took old Japan one thousand years to take in and assimilate the old ideas from China and India and develop her own distinct ideal and conception of life. It is but reasonable to suppose that it will take new Japan at least a century to take in and assimilate the new ideas from Europe and America and develop her own and a more complete and

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perfect philosophy of life. And when she succeeds in this attempt, then will she have attained that ideal of national greatness and glory about which the present generation of her people are but dreaming, for the realization of which they will be all willing to die. The good angel of destiny seems to be standing with a smile upon her face and pointing to the road the New Japan is to take.

TOKIWO YOKOI.

TOKYO, JAPAN.

THE SOCIAL QUESTION IN THE CATHOLIC CONGRESSES.

THE reports of the Congresses upon social questions in the Roman Catholic Church, together with the literature which these gatherings directly inspire, already furnish illustrations of inestimable value as to the part that organized religion is likely to play among the industrial and economic forces. It is the purpose of this article not to describe the various local, national, and international Congresses upon the social question, but rather to show the content and development of thought and discussion upon economic and industrial issues which the Church is raising. As early as 1862, Dr. Döllinger advised the Church to take social questions into more definite consideration. A further step was taken in 1869 by Bishop von Ketteler in recommending the clergy to study political economy as a part of their training for priestly duties. This counsel received the sanction of the assembled Bishops at their conference in that year. After the war of 1870–71, several teachers introduced economic and social science studies into their seminary courses. Though these subjects had been touched at two previous Congresses, it is after this date that the real interest begins. It is not confined to one country, but shows itself in Austria, Germany, France, and Belgium. Two young officers returned to France from German prisons * resolved to rouse the religious leaders

* The Count de Mun and his friend, La Tour du Pin Chambly.

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to some sense of the importance of openly recognizing social problems as a responsibility which the Church could no longer ignore. In the earlier Congresses, a single address appears during the three days' session. This allotment of time gradually increases until other questions are so crowded out that special sessions are decided upon at which the social problem alone is discussed. In the north of France, a single yearly gathering of three days has been found too scant, and thus two meetings are held in the year.

The subject-matter at these Congresses differs in some degree in different countries. It is of great significance that both theory and practical proposals are profoundly modified by the stage of industrial development. English Catholics would not dream of parliamentary agitation in favor of compulsory guilds for the regulation of industry such as has been secured by the Catholics of Austria. Where industry is most highly developed and open to the widest competition,—a competition that shows how vast and yet how sensitive is the interdependence of trade interests,—there we find invariably that the traditional Catholic remedy of a restored type of guild regulation is least valued.

The same variations in theory and practice are introduced by the different political ideals that prevail. The kind of alliance which the brilliant Ultramontane, Decurtins, forms with the Swiss radical democracy is possible because it is in Switzerland. Whether the government is in Protestant or Catholic hands naturally modifies the Catholic doctrine of State interference. The proposals for land reform are strongly colored, if, as in Austria, the Jewish question (everywhere at bottom not a religious but an economic question) is bitterly rife.

The form which a militant Socialism takes (as in France, Germany, Belgium) acts at once upon the whole policy of the Church. The largeness and elasticity of the Catholic view may be seen by comparing the discussion and legislative activity in Austria with the social activity which has express Papal sanction in Switzerland and France. This is in keeping with the doctrine of time, place, and circumstance as

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determining factors, which is laid down in the Encyclical on Labor.

Beneath these differences there are others common to all programmes,—arbitration and conciliation, housing of the poor, benefit associations, co-operation and profit-sharing, various schemes of mutual insurance, factory and even tenement-house inspection, loan funds, credit associations, and every form of saving institution to create and strengthen the thrift habit. These familiar reforms are doing service in scores of places, and are everywhere pressed for further development. Agencies are also established for furnishing the freest information to employers who may wish to adopt one or other of these remedies. It is noticeable that conservatives at the Congresses invariably recommend changes through these commonplace reforms. Everywhere something like a revolt of opinion appears, more frequently among the younger clergy, against the sufficiency of these routine proposals. The alternative succor is invariably some form of restored guild with power to compel its members or an increased supervision and activity upon the part of the State. Especially, within the last ten or twelve years no Congress has been held (upon the social question) which has not been agitated, often to the danger point, by the introduction of proposals to shorten the labor time, establish a minimum wage, to give legal personality to trade-unions formed only of laborers. The method of the Church is to work through such groups. Shall the Church (as is the case with the "Social Union" of the English Church) welcome these trade-unions and co-operate with them? How else, it is said, can the Church get at the workingman. Everywhere this form of labor union rapidly outgrows the unions made up of employer and employed together. The independent union moreover includes, in large towns, the *élite* of the workingmen. Yet few issues have given rise in the Congresses to more prolonged and heated debate in Continental countries, where such unions are largely Socialistic.* This is the terrible

* The powerful and growing labor unions known as the *Fachvereine* in Germany are practically all Socialist.

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dilemma which the Church has to face; how to reach the workingmen—those who have influence with their fellows—without adopting the methods of the unions. These methods, like weapons shaped in the exigencies of war, have grown out of the long struggle with the employer. Never in any instance has the Church persuaded a union to give up its methods or in any important way to modify them. To go over onto the ground won by the unions is to take sides, and thus forfeit the sympathy of those who chiefly support the Church and the charities.

Again, what duty has the Church towards strikes? To frown upon them is to lose at once all sympathy from organized labor unions; to smile upon them is as dangerous from the side of the employer. The bolder spirits in the Church take middle ground, and resolve to stand by the strikers "where they are right." This implies some organized method of examination of special cases, with all the delicate responsibilities which such decision enforces. This keeps the Church constantly between two fires,—now from labor, now from employer.

The bold stroke of Cardinal Manning in taking sides for the dockers made him for the time, with multitudes of Protestant workingmen, the real Primate of England; but what would have followed if, in another great and passionate strike, he had as fearlessly sided against the strikers? Or shall the Church stand aloof and merely recommend arbitration? This is usually the counsel of the cautious, but the more aggressive spirits in the Church answer that this safe timidity is the one sure way to lose the last uncertain hold which the Church now has upon the working-classes.

Again, every concrete question of wage payment rouses hot discussion. There was little friction in the earlier Congresses, partly because the employing class did not take this new concern of the Church with seriousness, partly because some years elapsed before the proposals as to wages became at all definite or legislative enactments were put forward. The maximum or minimum wage and all friendly suggestions about "fair wages" are not only tolerated, but enjoyed, by

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intelligent employers so long as the discussion is general. Until about 1886 scores of employers, mine owners, bankers, directors of iron-works and factories were found at these Congresses, listening amiably, and even giving their applause, to discussions of wages, hours of labor, treatment of operatives, etc., because the proposals were for the most part purely voluntary, or so far abstract in character as not to threaten any specific business with immediate discomfort.

Employers would sit at ease under any measure of good advice. They showed little opposition to the discussion of really test questions so long as the changes suggested depended only upon their free consent. If they were told that fair wages should be paid, they were not offended, because the employer believed that he had never failed in this respect. If justice were urged upon him in all his relations to his workmen, he was likely to feel very honestly that he had not been remiss in fulfilling this law. Every word of ethical import, like "fair" and "just," is not merely relative, but various interpretations from wholly different stand-points are possible. The employer who feels himself the victim of a pitiless competition which threatens the very existence of his business will have his own idea of a fair or just wage to his employés. The only significance which an employer sees in such terms is a wage which the conditions of the market make possible. Nothing can shake his conviction that wages are determined by competition with his rivals in a vast market over which he has little or no control. He is justly incensed against any one who assumes that he can pay what he likes independently of such conditions. A large part of the economic discussion at these first assemblies took for granted that the changes were to be "patronal," *i.e.*, freely initiated and controlled by the employer.

When in these discussions the voluntary principle begins to yield to some form of compulsion or outside interference, the employer is roused to antagonism. As in the English factory legislation from 1802 onward, the great majority of employers have doggedly opposed every step of interference which took the form of compulsory change in their business. This oppo-

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sition will continue for a reason which brings out the conflict between the ethical or social point of view and that of the private individual employer. The stand point of the Church is always that of the community rather than that of the individual,—always that of the "long run" as against the short run. The concern of the employer is invariably with the "short run,"—his pecuniary advantage in that short period (of weeks or months) over which commercial conditions give him the slightest real control. Practically, every business is struggling for the profits of a very near future. The fierce heat of competitive rivalry compels the employer to concentrate attention on those business possibilities that are just before him. Whatever may be thought of the needs of the larger social whole and of a more distant future, it should be clearly understood that the average employer rarely sees his relation to such social whole or to such far-off future. The view of his relations is determined by an economic struggle in which the near and more immediate alone has any reality to him. It is within these sharp limits of the short run that every system of "economic harmonies" has been conceived; nor can it for a moment be denied that in the actual work of the world this "identity of interest" between employer and employed—also between both of them and the community—has been so far practically real and true as to justify much of the enthusiasm which the theory has inspired. It has, however, come to be the dreariest commonplace that no conjuring à la Bastiat can turn this philosophy of proximate pecuniary advantage into a theory that is in the least adequate to the situation. Occasions are so constantly arising in industry of sharp and hopeless conflict between instant personal gain and some value which society esteems superior to individual profit that this pleasant optimism is no longer taken seriously by any first-rate economic thinker. It is to the credit of Catholic scholars that this view from the beginning has been rejected. However strenuously opposed to State interference (Le Play and Périn) and to all forms of Socialism, the doctrine of economic freedom, as a sort of final good, has met with steady opposition by these

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writers. It is this attitude which heightens the interest in the social and economic discussions at these Congresses. We seem always to be placed at that point in the conflict between the narrower and the larger good from which distinctly ethical questions spring into view.* The disturbing change which takes place as discussion develops in the Congresses is the tendency of a vigorous minority to abandon the older social method of *patronage*,—the voluntary application of such remedies as the employer finds possible. Under *patronage* the conflict of interest does not appear, because the employer controls every change that is made. Under this method even very radical proposals leave him unconcerned. But let the test questions—trade-unions, shorter working time, support of strikes—be urged in such form that the control is to be placed elsewhere, so that the employer must submit to a decision which he can but slightly, if at all, direct and determine, then he is at once in arms. It is no answer to him to say that the good of the working-class, or that of the community, demands this outside interference with affairs that seem to him private. Only in the rarest cases will he or can he see that his business interests are not one with the interests of others. Even if theoretically convinced that shorter hours, higher wages, stricter State inspection of his factory or workshop, etc., are probable advantages, he knows that the risks at least of admitting such changes are considerable, and may easily put him to such disadvantage with his competitors as to destroy that small margin of profits on which success depends.

These changes in raising the standard of labor are "long-run advantages," and it by no means follows that in any

* If the reader wishes to see this truth amply illustrated, let him look at the following reports in which strikes, hours of labor, wages, labor legislation, etc., are fully discussed. "Congrès des Œuvres Sociales à Liége, 1890." Imprimerie, 8 rue St. Michel, Liége, Belgium. "Conférences d'Etudes Sociales de Notre-Dame du Haut Mont," Nos. 1, 17, and 18, Juillet 17, 18, 1893. Also Report No. III., 23, 24, 25, Nov. 1893, published at Lille, 78 rue de l'Hôpital Militaire. "Compte Rendu du deuxième Congrès Ouvrier Chrétien," Reims, 1894, 24 rue Pluche. Also a "Mémoire" of great value published by employers upon "La Situation de l'Industrie en Belgique," rue Treurenberg, 46 Brussels.

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specific case the application of the remedy will prove propitious. There is just now no nicer question involved than this attitude which the Church should take towards external interference (or, if the word is an offence, regulation or supervision) from the side of the State or other foreign organization. Yet the Church seems to have committed itself irrevocably to the principle that this control from without is a necessity in modern industrial life, so that the eternal perplexity of specific application to concrete cases cannot be ignored. This movement begins in demanding that the clergy shall be instructed in economic studies. The second step is the consideration of means through which a social doctrine may be taught. The final step concerns practical voluntary and legislative activity. At the last gathering of which the writer has any report, that at Saint-Quentin in September, 1895, the paper of the Abbé Roux, on the social training of the clergy, seems to have called out unanimous applause.* It is there not merely assumed, but aggressively proclaimed that direct and positive action should follow in social questions. To accept this responsibility of positive social activity that must to some extent thrust itself between employer and employed in time of strife,—to take such responsibility in countries like Germany, France, and Belgium, where the social question has come with a sort of fury into practical politics,—must inevitably bring out the points of conflict into sharp relief. So long as persuasion and "voluntarism," self-help, and charity are thought to be sufficient, no antagonism need arise between any reforming body and the employing class. Every generalized doctrine of "self-help" or *patronage* assumes an identity of interests among all classes of workers, but if two steps are taken, we emerge where the whole scene changes. Let it be once admitted that (*a*) the present economic individualism is so organically diseased that the acrid censure of the Socialist

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* "Mais l'heure a sonné pour le clergé comme pour l'église d'opérer, dans tous les domaines de la vie sociale, une entrée victorieuse et complète." "Que le prêtre sorte de la sacristie,—que le prêtre aille au peuple."

"Tout le travail social s'exécute en trois parties; les études, la propagande, l'action." The Abbé Roux at the Conference at Saint-Quentin, September, 1895.

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is found none too harsh to express the feeling of the clergy so that they merely adopt and repeat it, and (*b*) that such depth and magnitude of evil is beyond the healing of moral appeal, self-help, and charity, then the situation has but one logic,—recourse to compulsion, under which the diversity of economic interests spring into irritated activity. This, which is easily susceptible of theoretic demonstration, may now be seen in actual experience which removes all doubt as to the seriousness of the situation. The "left wing" at the Congresses taking, as the whole Church must, the stand-point of society, or the long run as against what the individual interprets as his immediate interest, brings into the field its list of proposed remedies: normal working-day; minimum wage or higher wage; assistance for strikes that appear to be justified; total discontinuance of Sunday work; entire elimination of married women from factories, etc. Having admitted that State action and legal compulsion may be necessary for the realization in practice of these changes, they fall at once into the area of party politics. If it were possible to compel all competitors to adopt the shorter working-time or the higher wage, many of the employers' objections would cease; but that feat, even within the smallest country, is not yet practicable. The beginnings have to be made at some place and in some specific business. This brings out the angry retort, "You are crippling me with my competitors; force them also to shorter hours, higher wage, and improved conditions." M. Harmel, from his own splendid patronal achievement, cries out, with eager sincerity, "My men do work too long; I would rejoice to have the shorter hours, but my margin of profits, as all may see, is so narrow that my competitors would at once take my business; make our Belgian and English rivals adopt the same regulations, and I will gladly comply." It is thus admitted that the larger good would be served by the lessened working-time, but M. Harmel thinks of his business interests during a future of three or four months. Unless his business has a monopolistic character or is exceptionally successful, he must take the short-run view rather than of the long run, which is the social and the Church view.

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There is thus far but slight indication that the advanced party in the Church realizes in any fulness what honest defence can be made by the *average* business man against those who would introduce (wholly beyond sanitary measures) compulsory changes into his wage and time relations with his workmen. Even the compulsion of large trade guilds does not leave him free. The issue has an importance so vital and so urgent for those who would act wisely and bring the Church into no merited discredit, that further illustration should be given, not merely to show the difficulty of this more adventurous social reform, but also to show that the cry of immediate business interest cannot be allowed to set limits to industrial reforms.

Much space has been given at a score of Congresses to Sunday labor in industry. It was one of the earliest reform proposals, and one concerning which the unanimity of opinion has been most complete. It was observed that competition was forcing an ever wider and wider use of Sunday labor, with consequent injury to the family and the Church. Conservative leaders who agreed that such labor must be checked, yet believed that employers could be induced by moral suasion to discontinue a practice so unmistakably pernicious. Much encouragement was given by the speedy conversion of a number of high-minded employers. Here, however, the reform stopped. As Von Ketteler reluctantly admitted that funds for his cooperative scheme could not be won by moral entreaty to the faithful; as the Positivist remedy of "moralizing the upper classes" has been found to be a very partial and imperfect solution, so it appeared that these abuses of Sunday could scarcely be touched by moral forces alone. Experience showed that two classes of employers were beyond the reach of any voluntary influence—(1) those who recognized the evils in much of this Sunday labor, yet who felt themselves victims of a competition which compelled it; (2) the sharper and less conscienceless class eager to make every concession of their rivals an occasion of unfair advantage, as in the history of "early closing." *

* Of course many exceptions of inevitable work are seen to be necessary.

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It is this palpable failure of free moral inducement to control the evils of Sunday work which has driven such numbers within the Church to turn to the State. Law, it is said, may compel the recalcitrant and introduce uniformity, so that the burden shall fall on all alike. Years ago Professor Périn prophesied * that if this principle of State help were once admitted, it would drag the Church into Socialism: "l'entraînement vers l'organisation socialiste est fatal." This was also the view, though with different reasons, of Le Play. It was the opinion of the most distinguished Catholic economist in France, the late Professor Claudio Jannet.†

It is certain that this principle of State intervention has been accepted, and must henceforth be taken with all its risks. This principle is admitted in the case of children and women. At the Catholic Congress at Breslau in 1886 ‡, appeal was made, by the sanction of the majority, for State help in regulating the hours of labor for men.

It may be said that this fairly characterizes the sentiment of the leaders in the German Congresses since this date. In the French and Belgian Congresses the discussions have roused far more violent differences of opinion. Before it became evident that the employers and corporations would organize instant and powerful resistance against State intervention, even Conservatives like Monseignor Freppel favored such control. At a gathering of *l'Œuvre des Cercles* in 1886, this influential prelate seemed to side with the Count de Mun in demanding further activity of the State for the Sunday rest and for insurance of workingmen, but in 1891 the agitation had so clearly brought out the practical bearings of such intervention upon certain great industries that he even voted against the law which extended merely to women and children. The Congress at Liége in the previous year had made it clear to all that the practical consequences of appealing to the State were momentous. It was observed that the great

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* "Le Socialism Chrétien." † "Le Socialism d'État," ch. i.

‡ This is the residence of Cardinal Kopp, often called the successor of Von Ketteler.

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remedy of the Church (corporate associations of free patronal type) gradually lost its interest as the doctrine of State help strengthened. The eloquent French parliamentarian, de Mun, the unquestioned chief of the progressives, made feebler defence of the "corporation" each year, and demanded with increasing confidence the enlarged activity of the State.

It was observable, also, that as the adequacy of *patronage* and self-help was lightly or even scornfully spoken of, so the sufficiency of charity was questioned in terms which recalled too vividly the gibes of the Socialists. Professor Périn insisted that charity is the final remedy for social ills; that mercy and good-will may meet every want. The need of a larger and a tenderer charity is not denied by the most hardy radicals in the Church, but it is strenuously denied that charity stands in any proper relation to many of the most stubborn evils with which the Church is called to deal. There is scarcely a Catholic Congress at which it is not maintained with apparent unanimity that economic conditions are so vicious as to produce unfitness, weakness, and poverty among the working-classes. Shall such victims, it is said, be held blameworthy? If not blameworthy, they should have "justice," and not charity.

At Maline, in 1892, the words of "the leading group of Catholic sociologists" are quoted with hearty favor. Society is economically "diseased, running to ruin under the wasteful influence of plutocracy." The proletariat is held to suffer "unmerited" (it is the Pope's word) misery. "We deny that drink is the chief cause, or the decay of religious faith, or the rise of Socialism. The evils spring both from the economic and moral disorders."

Wherever these views obtain as to the "cause of poverty," charity becomes intolerable as a general or final remedy. So far as society and circumstance are at fault, so far, it is urged, every victim should have "justice" and not charity. Nothing more characterizes the speeches of the progressive party than this claim that justice, not charity, should be organized for the great mass of those who suffer under "the system." The active Abbé Naudet calls his paper, *La Justice Sociale.* In his

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book, "Notre Œuvre Sociale," he begins with a chapter on justice as the fundamental idea from which the Church should start. This talk of justice excited little attention until its practical implications began to appear. As the demand for State activity grew at the Congresses; as the proposals for shortened hours, regulated wage, elimination of night work, etc., grew more definite and *appeared in actual political programmes*,* this distinction between justice and charity suddenly acquired new meaning. Charity comes as a favor; it is voluntary; it seems to imply gratitude as for something not quite deserved. Justice asks no favors, does not come cap in hand, but as an equal to demand a *right*.

But more embarrassing still are the practical bearings of such "rights" when the line separating the abstract from the concrete, theory from practice, is passed. Once *apply* justice with its rights to actual cases in the programme of social reform, and it follows that under either ideal of this Church movement (*a*, large labor corporations; *b*, State interposition) compulsion is a necessity. An example is seen in the insurance of workmen against accident, sickness, and old age. This is claimed in the name of common justice, and the weight of opinion at the Congresses is for compelling such insurance, even though the State be not called in, as it is in Germany. Or is justice to require the exclusion of all married women from factories by a State law, with fixed penalty for disobedience? If opinion at the Congresses grows steadily away from mere moral exhortation, away from voluntary trade associations toward corporate and legal force, justice, as actually applied to wages and conditions of labor, will mean a series of changes against which the average employer will stubbornly fight, because those near and immediate business interests which are most vital to him will seem to be disturbed and threatened.

To this point the activity of the Congresses has brought the whole discussion upon the social question. A great many theories, principles, and phrases about labor and capital have

* The recent great extension of the suffrage in Belgium increased the anxiety.

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been "discussed into clear consciousness." As these abstractions were forced into the field where definite proposals are made for their application to specific business and social conditions, the elements of conflicting interest among those concerned can no longer be concealed. The supposed interest of society, of employer, of labor, of larger future interests, and the pressing interests of business, one and all leap out for their defence. This stage of the inevitable strife has now been reached, and no page of the history which has led up to it is without proof that the economic basis of society is of almost limitless influence in determining the character and direction of reforms.

Marx, more powerfully, perhaps, than any other, has stated this doctrine, though with less clearness than Engles, to whom the meaning, in his own words, is "that view of the course of history which seeks ultimate cause and the great moving power of all important historic events in the economic development of society, in the changes in the mode of production and exchange, etc." This is not merely the thought of the ablest Continental Socialists, but is continually asserting itself with great force among recent writers. It fills Professor Loria's book * on Society. It constantly appears in Professor Lamprecht's new "History of the German People." It is fundamental in the strong and skilful work which Professor Patten is doing from the side of consumption. If it is true that the material side of the problem gets from these writers much overstatement, it is even truer that their opponents have underrated the part which the strictly economic element plays in shaping and limiting those energies which seek to express themselves in reform, whether educational, political, or social. It is not merely that every bearer of heroic remedies is brought back, somewhat bruised and sobered, to a painful reckoning with the hard realities of business, but it is also true that the kind of remedy which the real powers within the Catholic Church seem more and more to sanction is a remedy which accepts the present eco-

* "Les bases économique de la Constitution Sociale," Alcan, Paris, 1893.

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nomic order, with the wage system, private interest, rent, and profits. This remedy is one through which it is sought to turn the wage-earners into property-owners by making credit and small investments possible,—building and loan associations, savings and credit banks, profit-sharing and co-operation, and reforms of similar character. This all follows from the highest and most authoritative utterance upon the sacredness of private property as laid down in the Encyclical, and in such books as Professor Hollaind's "Ownership and Natural Rights," to which Cardinal Gibbons and Archbishop Corrigan give their most definite approval. Cardinal Gibbons, acknowledged to be a leader in the liberal interpretation of labor questions in the Church, yet speaks of the "principles which fence in the rights of private property * as a sacred trust confided to the Church by God."

One of the chief results of the long agitation within the Congresses has been to bring out the meaning of these principles as they bear upon practical issues. While this agitation has made the essential remedies—for broader distribution of property among the masses—far more definite upon the one side, it has upon the other driven the advanced party to change the emphasis and form of their demands without yielding anything essential to their radical character. The discussions bring out each year with greater distinctness, for instance, the direct difficulties of international competition. Belgian employers, in highest standing with the Church, submit elaborate evidence to show the intensity of their struggle with England in case of certain iron and textile industries employing hundreds of thousands of men. While it is known that this plea of the employer has been set up for a generation against every proposed change, the facts, in these special industries, are so convincing that they cannot be ignored. In the entire Catholic movement, moreover, the employing class has, through its co-operation and activity at the Congresses, great influence; the result is therefore to shift the centre of demand for reform onto *international* ground. As the papers and debates

* See Open Letter published in Professor Hollaind's book.

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brought out the supposed difficulties of an enforced change within a given country of hours of labor, normal working-day, discontinuance of night and Sunday work, etc., the necessity of other countries adopting the same regulations grew clearer. Thus the Swiss leader, Decurtins, brought his plan of international action before the Federal Council in 1887. The dream of an international understanding upon industrial affairs is of much earlier date. Bismarck often coupled the two internationals—the black and the red; but no definite form is given to it, nor is there anything like common enthusiasm for it until its apparent necessity was brought out by the work of the Congresses. In Germany, the necessity of such larger understanding is proclaimed with much unanimity in 1885.* In 1882 the French Council of the *Œuvres des Cercles* urge the same step.† The claim is put forth anew by Kolp in Vienna, in 1890.‡ At the three National Congresses (Austria, France, and Germany), the feeling for the "international of labor" found the strongest expression.

Now, it is evident that the employer is not likely to oppose this braver enthusiasm to bring the whole world to some common action upon labor regulation. So far as it could be effected, he would doubtless accept it; but there is little evidence at the Congresses that he has the least anxiety upon this point. Better than the reformers he sees the immense obstacles to any such action *that can be enforced.* There is even evidence that this fervor for international understanding and regulation is directly encouraged as a kind of safety-valve for the more revolutionary spirits. "The more," says one employer, "they try to manage Europe the less they will interfere to manage my cotton mill."

Results thus far reached are (1) much clearing up of uncertain issues about the facts of competition as it now acts in a

* See "Jahrbuch der freien Vereinigung Katholische Socialpolitiker," 1887.

† "Association Catholique," 1888 (1).

‡ See full account of this movement in Grégoire's "Le Pape les Catholiques and La Question Sociale," pp. 221-231, Paris, 1893, and "La Question de la protection ouvrière internationale," Berne, 1889.

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world market; (2) more definite knowledge about the application to business of such principles as "justice," "equity," "fair wage,"—a realization that, unless business conditions first admit of a given change, the applied "principle" is likely to prove harmful for all concerned, and therefore not just or equitable;* (3) a new sense that wherever reforms are put in practice, at least three points of view must be considered,—that of the community, that of the employer, that of the laborer; that while these interests, "as God sees them," may be identical, they are by no means in all cases identical as man sees them, that consequently much knowledge of detail is a vital prerequisite for all industrial reorganization. All this is but saying that something of the vastness, the diversity, and complexity of business interdependency has been brought out by the study and the discussion at the Congresses. Upon the negative side this is the greatest good thus far accomplished.

It would be obviously unfair to assert that no other results had been attained. Many actual social experiments of extreme value have sprung directly and indirectly from the Congresses. An educational force of the first magnitude has grown into strength through at least a thousand clubs (in the countries where Congresses have been held), composed of workingmen, boys, employers. These clubs in great variety exist because the social question exists. They are directly related through their chief activities to some phase of the social question.

But aside from these results, others of perhaps more significance are making themselves felt. Though the employer is vehement against enforced changes in his business,—changes which are to be controlled from without,—he is by no means uninfluenced by this organized pressure for reform, which speaks in the interest of some good larger than his own. Indeed, most of the employers' organizations for rais-

* It was shown, for instance, after much debate and many papers of more general character, that in certain industries the eliminating of married women would work serious injury; that no *general* proposal applied in all places and to all businesses could possibly result in good.

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ing the condition of their laborers can be traced directly to this constraint of the surrounding public appealing in the name of religion, humanity, the social welfare, for a more wholesome human life among the toilers. As employers, scornful of "consumers' leagues," are yet ill at ease until their names are upon the "white list," as they will even hasten to make voluntary improvements in store and shop, so the pressure of a strong public demand leads business men to initiate other reforms within their free control which are often more fruitful of good because they are felt to be free and self-directed. This type of industrial amelioration is certain to extend under the constraining influence which acts through these Congresses upon the social question.

Nor is it unlikely that these "indirect persuasions" will prove to be the best service which the new sociological instincts within the Church can render to the cause they champion.

JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

NATIONAL PREJUDICES.

THE recent international courtesies at Havre probably signify little, but that little is certainly in the right direction. England and France have just now some important matters in dispute, yet their leaders can be friendly and pleasant together. It has not always been so, and it is well to notice that we do seem at last to be making some progress, though it be little, in these respects. Nations do not seem to hate each other quite so bitterly as formerly, and every year's continuance of peace enables them to know one another better and despise one another less. "Are the English as great fools as the French?" said the German Candide in his day to Martin. "C'est une autre espèce de folie," replied Martin. "Vous savez que ces deux nations sont en guerre pour quelques arpents de neige vers le Canada, et qu'elles dépensent pour cette belle guerre beaucoup plus que tout le Canada ne vaut."

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Martin did not seem to think that there was much to choose between them. The English, however, he thought, were not very amiable,—"fort atrabilaires." * And when the two travellers arrived on their coast, they found them engaged in shooting Admiral Byng, as it was a habit of the Islanders "occasionally to kill an admiral in order to encourage the others." But a century has passed since then, and ignorance is not quite so dense and general.

A little time since, Lord Dufferin attended a meeting of the Franco-English Guild held in Paris, and made a genial, sympathetic speech, cordially approving the purpose with which the Guild has been founded. This purpose is to enable English and French people to know each other better through the medium of lectures, classes, and other means. He said that this was the best kind of service which could be rendered to two great nations: "half the misunderstanding and the recriminations that break out from time to time in the press of one and the other country were due to the false views of the manners, customs, feelings, and history of each of the two nations prevailing in the other." If the British minister can by his advocacy and support help forward a movement of this sort, it will be one of the most important services of his distinguished career.

For there is no doubt that the chief cause of national antipathies is ignorance. The farmer, crossing the mountain in the fog, beheld something approaching, which at first affrighted him with its monstrous appearance: as it got nearer, however, it became smaller and clearer, though certainly it resembled a wild beast. Nearer, it became more like a man,—no doubt a bandit! But step by step, as distance diminished, the terrible figure revealed itself as a quiet fellow-traveller, and finally as his own brother John. This is the kind of disillusion which most of us experience on nearer approach to persons of other nations. "That hearty contempt and aversion for all foreigners which is natural," disappears or diminishes, and we find him a human being much like the rest,

* Voltaire, "Candide," ch. xxiii.

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having the same needs, passions, sympathies, sins, and sorrows as ourselves.

These international prejudices are generally unjust, and sometimes are "quite curiously the reverse of the truth." Consider, for instance, a man of the genius and knowledge of Swift writing thus:* "The greatest Inventions were produced in times of Ignorance; as the use of the Compass, Gunpowder, and Printing; and by the dullest Nation, as the *Germans*." Think of the extraordinary perversity of ignorance which could speak of the Germans as being *par excellence* the dullest of all nations! Is not the statement itself to be considered as a "great Invention in a time of Ignorance"? Partridge, in attacking Swift, would surely have been revenged for the almanac business if he had called him a German, instead of weakly accusing him merely of being "a foreigner," "a Frenchman, a papist . . .," and so forth. Again, how could the impression have ever originated which caused us to sneer at "Dutch courage," and use the terms to indicate something approaching cowardice. Whatever else we may lay to the charge of the Dutch, it seems absurd to sneer at the courage of the people who withstood the all-conquering Roman Legions; who flooded their country with blood and salt water to maintain their independence against the enormously superior power of the Spaniards; who had the hardihood to brave the might of the English in the Thames with a handful of men in De Ruyter's ships, and who joined with us under the valiant and illustrious king, whom they had bred and reared for the time of our emergency, to save all Europe from the ambitious lust of Louis XIV. The typical idea which the mass of the ignorant in continental countries hold of John Bull, we trust we can say is also not only untrue, but the reverse of truth. The brutal and blundering John Bull of old time who scattered his guineas about has been supplanted by the representation of a treacherous, grasping, fat old man, with rabbit-teeth, who makes himself by his hypocrisy the Pharisee of the nations in order that he may

* Miscel. I., 259.

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mask the evil deeds of "perfidious Albion." We find many of the things foreigners say of ourselves very unpleasant. We think them grossly unjust, based on solid ignorance; and we are grateful to those among them who give us a better character because they know us better. We can submit to a few rebukes from men like Lemoinne, Max O'Rell, and Jules Simon when we see that their criticisms are on the whole fair and kindly.

But if foreigners have been mistaken in their representation of us, let us admit the possibility that we may have been also mistaken as to them. And, in fact, we have made a little —though not much—progress since Swift's time in these matters. The genial spirit of his countryman Sterne has not been without its effect. His advice to Smelfungus * (Smollett), who had been travelling over the Continent and saw everything in a jaundiced light, cannot be too frequently quoted. Smelfungus had found everything miserable, all barren from Dan to Beersheba. "I'll tell it," he cried, "to the world!" Sterne counselled him to tell it to his physician.

The events of the French Revolution, however, threw us back a century in this respect. Poor France! It was bad enough for her to have a trouble of that sort on her hands, without having all the other nations on her back, with their hands in her hair (to use Petrarch's figure concerning Italy). No wonder she went mad for a time. Why didn't they let her alone to settle her own affairs? Napoleon would have died an artillery officer; Trafalgar and Waterloo had never been fought. A flood of international rage and hatred broke loose. Even the broad and capacious mind of Burke is tinged with its stain, though in his bitterest reproach he spoke of the French as "a nation of gallant men, a nation of men of honor and of cavaliers." But few were as temperate as that. Coleridge's abuse of foreigners was pretty general. The Germans, indeed, he knew something of, and therefore he is not so hard on them; but a German never was wholly in the

* "Sentimental Journey."

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right; he had "never met a German clergyman who was a Christian." * The Russians, however, were "brutal." The Dutch were "animals," and very dirty. The Belgians, "as impudent as they were iniquitous," consisted of "four million restive asses." † But all this was a mild form of adverse criticism compared with his perpetual abuse of that "shallow-hearted people," the French. In a phrase as brilliant as it is malevolent, he says, "Frenchmen are like grains of gunpowder: each by itself smutty and contemptible, but mass them together and they are terrible, indeed!" ‡ Coleridge, however, was far ahead of his contemporaries in appreciation of the progress of the Americans and the difficulties which such a young country, with an immense surface to be guarded, has to surmount; and he deplores the unfriendly and unfair way in which English writers attacked them.

A little farther back, *la bête noire* was America. Dr. Campbell asserts that Dr. Johnson said of the Americans in 1769, "Sir, they are a race of convicts, and ought to be thankful for anything we allow them short of hanging." § He is pretty strong against foreigners in general. "What do you expect, dear sir," he says of the French, "from fellows that eat frogs?" ‖ Scotland "was a vile country, to be sure," and when asked mildly whether, after all, God had not made it, he replies, "Certainly He did; but we must always remember that He made it for Scotchmen; and comparisons are odious, Mr. Strahan, but God made Hell." ¶ In his calmer moments, though, Johnson expressed himself less uncharitably. He scouted the idea of nations having any fixed peculiar characteristics. "There is no permanent national character," he said; "it varies according to circumstances. Alexander the Great swept India; now the Turks sweep Greece." ** Then he goes on to say some things more appreciative of the French: though not the highest in any department of literature, yet in every department they were very high. He was

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* "Table Talk," 128. † Idem. ‡ Idem.
§ Montagu, "Johnsoniana," 34. ‖ Idem, 313. ¶ Idem, 297.
** Idem, 59.

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"willing" (when in these moods) "to love all mankind, *except an American.*" Of the Irish he usually spoke with a kind feeling and appreciation, very exceptional for those times,—or till a century later. "He had great compassion," says the writer quoted, "for the miseries and distresses of the Irish nation, particularly the Papists; and severely reprobated the barbarous, debilitating policy of the British government (of that time), which, he said, was the most detestable mode of persecution." *

In a treatise by the German writer, Georg Ludwig Kriegk, entitled "Schriften zur allgemeinen Erdkunde," there is a good deal of information as to local and national contempts and hatreds. Each country has its *bête noire* among the others, which changes as time goes on; and each country has within its own boundary usually some province of which it makes a butt for its not very good-natured jokes and witticisms. Thus in Italy it is the Lombards; in France, the Gascons; in Austria, the Magyars, who have the misfortune to be the subject of the nation's jests. In Belgium it is Mecheln at which people laugh; in Holstein, Büsum; in Prussia, Schildau (but I think in Germany generally Saxony seems to be the butt). Honest John Bull has always a good many people on hand for butts. He is "blunt," and says out what he thinks. He calls the Hindoos, of whom he governs hundreds of millions, "black men," and that settles their business. He is quick to detect the blemishes of his brother Scots or Irish, and makes a good many jokes of more or less good taste on what he supposes to be their peculiarities; but why should he invent the proverb that "Taffy was a thief"? Was it because he himself took little Taffy's country from him by promising he should have a Welsh-born prince to reign over him, then bringing his own wife into Wales to be *accouchée* of a son in order to give him the rule? Yet John might, and perhaps sometimes does, recollect that Welshman, Scotchman, Irishman, and Hindoo have all contributed to the glory of his magnificent empire.

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* Montagu, "Johnsoniana," 227.

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The learned Kriegk, however, does not confine himself to these countries in regard to this subject. Why should he? All the world is before him. And when all the world is before the German professor, he usually proceeds very deliberately—*ohne Hast, aber ohne Rast*—to amble in a gentle, elephantine manner through it. He likes to exhaust his subject; and if, in doing this, he exhausts his reader as well, so much the worse for the reader. *Festina lente.* "Hurry is Sheitan," say the Turks.

Thus Kriegk gives us a catalogue of *die geographischen Spitznamen und Spöttereien* used in lands many and various, *pays différents, mœurs différentes;* but it is to be feared that we are all rather badly mannered in the way we use nicknames. We do not give ourselves the trouble to think that, as the Hindoos say, contempt pierces the shell of a tortoise. With the Greeks every foreigner was a barbarian, which name was innocent enough at first, but soon changed into a term of disparagement and contempt, precisely as our word "outlandish" has come to signify everything ridiculous and clownish, though it originally merely meant "foreign," in the innocent sense in which the Germans still use the word (*ausländisch*), and the Dutch, *uitheemsch.* Thus the term by which the Chinese express their hatred and contempt of the foreigner is *Tatse;* the Hindoo, *Yavanna;* as Christendom has stamped the words "pagan" and "heathen" to describe all outside, so to the Jews all other peoples are *Gojim;* though the sacred books of both Christian and Jew give no countenance to such parochial patriotism. The law-giver of the Jews commanded that mercy and courtesy should be shown to the stranger within their gates; whilst their prophets looked forward to a time when all nations should be blessed out of Zion; and the Christian Apostles foretold the assembling of all kindreds and peoples under the celestial benediction of the Most High.

Whether we listen to Science or Revelation, the statement is the same; that "God hath made of one blood all nations;" that human nature is essentially the same everywhere, though local circumstances and conditions doubtless tend to modify,

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develop, or distort it. Is it not time that we began to hate and injure one another less and appreciate one another more, to spend more of our time in seeking to assuage the unavoidable miseries of mankind, and less of it in fostering and stimulating national antipathies, and in designing new weapons of slaughter and destruction? Nations can no longer excuse themselves by saying that they are led into wars by "sovereigns and statesmen." The will of the people is now so strong that sovereigns and statesmen cannot act independently of it. Therefore is the necessity the greater that true information and candid interpretation as to our brethren of other nationalities should be diffused among us. How long, for example, have the Russians and their ruler been held up to our execration as having incessant designs upon our existence, yet recently we heard Lord Dufferin, who is the highest diplomatic authority on the subject now living, speaking thus: "Many publicists held the opinion that the contingency of peace and war depended mainly on the czar.* If this were the case, the peace of Europe was in safe hands, for each day gave fresh evidence of that sovereign's wisdom, moderation, and peaceful intentions." Lord Dufferin had long known him to possess these admirable qualities. He remembered at a public dinner, shortly before he started for India, that he ventured to express his admiration for the character of his Imperial Majesty: "In some quarters considerable dismay was felt that a person so manifestly under the spell of Russia as himself should be sent to safeguard British interests in Hindostan."

The result, however, fully justified his predictions, based on his knowledge of the emperor's character. On his return he was able triumphantly to point out that not only had the attitude of Russia on the Indian frontier been correct and friendly, but that during the formidable crisis of Isak Khan's rebellion against the Ameer of Afghanistan the czar displayed his accustomed magnanimity and high sense of honor. If Russia had chosen, she could then have done England some

* The late czar.

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mischief. He then spoke some graceful and appreciative words of the French expressions of sympathy when the catastrophe to the battleship "Victoria" occurred, and of English expressions of sympathy when the gallant MacMahon died. He would spare no pains, he said, in his official capacity to promote good understanding. He had reason to be grateful for the courtesy, good-will, and conciliatory spirit of those with whom he had to transact important business.* No wonder that both the French and the Russians have expressed wide-spread pleasure and satisfaction at the speech. The old definition given by Wotton was "An ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the commonwealth." Is not the time come when we can remove the emphasis from the word "lie" to the word "honest"?

And is not the time coming when, instead of fastening our attention on the faults peculiar to the different nations, we can find satisfaction in the recognition of some good characteristic? Enlightened men abroad no longer use the word "perfidious" to characterize Albion. We do not care much for their calling us a nation of shop-keepers, nor do we mind their retention of Froissart's expression, "Ils s'amusent tristement selon la contume de leur pays." We hope the times of furious invective of men like Félix Pyat are going by, and recognize with pleasure and gratitude the generous eulogy of a noted French publicist recently on our administration in Egypt. But even if we do not find ourselves judged justly by foreigners, let us set them an example in this,—as we may say with satisfaction we have given them examples in some other respects,—that we are willing to acknowledge the truth wherever we find it, and to confess the insufficiency of the creed we used to hold,—that all foreigners were "Mossoos," and that all Mossoos perpetually perpetrate evil deeds, eat frogs, and talk jargon, it being their nature to do so through their having been constructed in a peculiar manner from a cross-breed of monkey and tiger. We are getting to distinguish, too, a little. They are not all the same, though there

* Speech of Lord Dufferin to British Chamber of Commerce in Paris.

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is a good deal of human nature everywhere. If they have each peculiar failings, they have each some peculiar features that are worthy of our observation, sometimes of our admiration.

Not only may we appreciate the inventive power and enterprise of the Americans, the brilliant intellect and dashing courage of the French, the sterling valor and plodding industry of the Germans, but in those nations whom we have been inclined to be most bitter against, or most contemptuous towards, may we find something favorable. The stolid patience and loyalty of the Russians in their terrible sufferings from war, famine, and pestilence during the last sixteen years is a stupendous fact, hate them as we may. The passive courage with which the Asiatic or American Indian will calmly submit to the most horrible tortures is equal to what we know of any ancient Stoic of them all. We may be mistaken in saying that a whole people, even the inarticulate Terra del Fuegans, can produce nothing good. A recent writer was hoping that this race would soon disappear from the earth. But, as Swift's madman said to the soldier who told him that his sword was to kill people with, "Leave them alone, and they'll die of themselves." These Terra del Fuegans, it seems, are a horrible people: a husband crouched over a fire in a boat under a snow-storm, while the wife, entirely unclad, was rowing the boat, and at the same time suckling a baby which she sought to protect from the piercing wind with her own body. Well, so long as there are women among them who could, under such terrible conditions, show the beautiful attributes of maternal love and solicitude, I think we may let them "die of themselves." I am not sure but that there are some highly respectable mothers in Belgravia or the Faubourg Saint-Germain who might learn something from that poor "savage."

The Greeks scoffed at the ignorance and stupidity of the inhabitants of Bœotia, yet out of it came Hesiod, Pindar, and Plutarch. The devout and honorable Nathaniel said, "Can there any good thing come out of Nazareth?" yet out of it came that magnanimous philosopher who sent forth his Mes-

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sage of all-comprehending charity impartially to every nation on the earth.

JOHN CODE BAYLY.

LONDON.

DISCUSSIONS.

"IS LIFE WORTH LIVING?"

In the last number of this JOURNAL, Professor James, in his delightful, mettlesome style, undertook to deal with this question. Instead, however, of treating it in a universal, impersonal way, and seeking to make an answer emerge from an exhaustive discussion of the import of life, as it reveals itself in man, and of worth, as an attribute of such life, he has preferred to suppose the question put by a person in a certain pathological condition,—"a fellow mortal who is on such terms with life that the only comfort left him is to brood on the assurance, 'you may end it when you will.' What reasons," he continues, "can we plead that may render such a brother (or sister) willing to take up the burden again?" (pp. 5, 6.) In other words, what cure can we find for that "religious disease" (p. 7) called pessimism, that "definition of the world" (p. 22) which leads a man to the brink of suicide? To the question, so formulated, the answer naturally comes in pathological terms, and in such Professor James has answered it.

The answer seems to amount to this: If your patient is not past power of reflection (if he is, he is hopeless), there are two possible cures for him. Either (1) through the rousing of certain pathological conditions, pride, hatred, etc., inducive of absorbing activity, "the longing to read the facts religiously may cease, and leave the bare facts by themselves; or (2) supplementary facts may be discovered * or believed in which permit the religious reading to go on" (p. 8). In other words, you may either cause your patient to desist from reflection on life, as a whole, altogether, or

* The possibility of cure through the *discovery* of supplementary facts Professor James here alludes to, but in the sequel entirely ignores, and I shall do the same. Of course, the discovery of facts that would justify or compel a hopeful, optimistic interpretation of the world and life would lead to a perfectly rational, instead of a pathological, cure; but such a cure Professor James, so far as I can see, does not consider possible (pp. 21–24).

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you may by beliefs so transform the world, as he knows it, as to make him interpret it in an optimistic sense. If we ask how these beliefs are to be imparted to him, the answer is: By making him realize that while "our Science is a drop, our ignorance is a sea" (p. 17), and encouraging him to conceive that in the oceanic unknown there may be isles of bliss whose delights would more than outweigh any amount of suffering here. And this conception may even be rendered plausible by certain analogies, which "vividly suggest" to us "that our whole physical life may lie soaking in a spiritual atmosphere, a dimension of Being that we at present have no organ for apprehending" (p. 20). Having thus transferred confidence from the little garden of Science to the boundless domain of Nescience, you can say to your patient: "Now take any of the *maybes* of Nescience you please as realities, struggle to reach them as if they were such, and you *may* (who knows?) find that your very struggle has actually made them such." Thus it seems that the best cure to be found for pathological pessimism is a hopeful agnosticism, and a hypostatic faith (see Hebrews, xi. 1) in the objects of hope. In other words, when men find it impossible to live by the grace of Love for the world that they do know, you may save them from suicide by inducing the graces of Hope and Faith in the world that they do not know. The only difference between this and the old-fashioned Christian cure seems to be that a harmless bread-crumb pill has been substituted for a drastic physic compounded of heaven and hell. But this is certainly a great advantage, although, until the new cure has been extensively tried, we may be unable to say whether it is as effective as the old.

However this may be, I should not dream of disputing with so distinguished a psychologist as Professor James on the efficacy of cures for religious diseases, or any other pathological degeneracies. I am entirely willing to believe that his proposed remedies will accomplish all he claims for them—under the given conditions. It is, therefore, not because I have any quarrel with him that I now write, but because I think that the question which he has treated as a pathological one, and therefore answered by *argumenta ad hominem pathologicum*, may be treated as a philosophical one and answered in terms carrying conviction to the normal, rational man. There seems to be some danger that, when the question of the worth of life is put in universal form by a man of genius, a member of the philosophic faculty in our oldest university, and then receives only a pathological answer, many persons will unwarily conclude

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that this is the only sort of answer that can be given, and that all our warrant for leading a noble life, or indeed a life at all, comes from the dim, chaotic *maybes* of the formless unknown. Now, such a conclusion—namely, that life, as a whole, is a mere speculation, a mere game of hazard, in which, no matter how well you play, you are as likely to lose as to win—cannot, in my opinion, fail to be injurious, especially to reflective young men, such as those for whom Professor James's paper was originally written. This is all the more true that the hazard involved is of no ordinary kind. People who play games of hazard nearly always know that, however many lose, *some* are certain to win—that winning is possible; but in the hazard-game of life, even according to Professor James himself, it is not certain that anybody has ever won, or will, or can win. I have accordingly accepted the invitation of the Managing Editor of this JOURNAL to say a few words on the other side, that is, in favor of a conviction of the *infinite* worth of life, based upon rational science.

It seems to me that the reason why Professor James is compelled to seek the warrant for the worth of life in the "grand pentêtre" of the unknown, is that he limits the domain of the known and (with our present faculties) knowable to the region of physics. This comes out clearly in a passage already quoted, which identifies a "spiritual atmosphere" in which "our whole physical life may lie soaking" with a "dimension of Being that we at present have no organ for comprehending." (The metaphors here being a little mixed and material, I am not sure that I completely understand them.) This is the reason why he finds that "the order of Nature, taken simply as science knows it, cannot be held to reveal any harmonious spiritual intent. It is mere *weather* . . . doing and undoing without end" (p. 16). Accordingly, he casts the god of Nature, along with the god of Hebrew revelation, into a common limbo of obsoleteness.

Now, one might perhaps contend that even the weather reveals an harmonious spiritual intent, in that it contributes to the development of spiritual beings by supplying their bodies with food, while it is somewhat difficult to conceive how any one believing in the doctrine of evolution, as Professor James may be presumed to do, can altogether deny the presence of an harmonious spiritual intent in Nature—intent being taken to mean immanent teleology (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), and not conscious purpose distinct from execution. But, letting this pass, may we not fairly ask why he confines the

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term Nature to physical phenomena, and excludes from it the whole of man's spiritual nature? Is it not possible that in the latter might be found a rational and, therefore, universal answer to the question touching the worth of life? Indeed, since the worth of life means its worth for the bearer of that life, can we deal with the question at all intelligently without a clear understanding of the nature of that bearer? If the bearer of life be essentially transient and unprogressive, life will have one kind of worth; if he be eternal and progressive, it will have another and far higher kind.

Now, I am forced to believe that any one who, without prepossessions and in the light of modern philosophy and psychology, studies the nature of the human spirit, will discover that it is essentially eternal and progressive; that only an eternal being, a being standing above time, space, and causality, can think at all, and that physical nature, which, when regarded as something standing for itself, "reveals no spiritual intent," is dependent for its very existence on the activity of spirit,—is a mere manifestation of spirit. It is needless to say that I cannot here offer a demonstration of these truths,—that would require a treatise,—but I can safely say to every inquirer regarding the worth of life: Before you conclude that the warrant for a noble life can be found only in the domain of Nescience, and therefore is pathological in character, be sure that you have exhausted the domain of Science, and especially that portion of it which treats of the nature of the bearer of the life in question,—that is, of the intelligent spirit. If any one should contend that such science is "mere metaphysics," and therefore "unverifiable" and "unscientific," one may admit the premise and yet deny the validity of the conclusion. As Professor James has so ingenuously admitted in his delightful work on psychology, metaphysics is only correct thinking. The truth is, metaphysics, as the science of the necessary conditions of thought and knowledge, is not only the most scientific and verifiable of sciences, being directly self-verifying, but is also the guarantee of the truth of all other sciences. Hence the science which lies at the basis of all others is the very same that demonstrates to us that the essential condition of all science is a being standing above time, space, and causality. In other words, the eternity of spirit is the condition of science.

If it be maintained that metaphysics demonstrates the existence of only one such spirit—God—of whom human spirits are mere transient creations or manifestations, depending for existence upon

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his "grace," the reply is that such contention rests upon a Hebrew myth involving a materialistic notion of spirit as an effect due to a cause, and that, in order to account for obvious facts of an intellectual and moral sort, spirit must be eternally one and many, the many as real as the one. Spirit which should be merely one would not be spirit at all, since there could be no relations and no truth for it; whereas "created spirit" is a contradiction in terms, creation being an act in time, while spirit is above time.

If what has been said be true, then we may not only conjecture that "our whole physical life *may* lie soaking in a spiritual atmosphere, a dimension of Being that we at present have no organ for apprehending," but we may say with absolute certainty that physical life is but the manifestation of spirit, and that we know the spiritual "dimension of Being" better than any other, since it is the essential condition of all knowledge whatsoever. To those who clearly see this, the question whether life is worth living can never present itself except as a purely theoretical one, to which only one answer is possible. Indeed, since life is the condition of there being any worth at all, the question is equivalent to asking: Has the essential and constituent condition of all worth itself any worth?

In conclusion, let me say again that, in these brief remarks, I do not claim to have demonstrated the eternity of spirit and consequent infinite worth of life. Far from it! I have merely wished to point out the direction in which a universal answer to the question proposed may be found, and a way opened out of that agnosticism, hopeful or hopeless, which must always be the creed of those who cannot recognize that they themselves are the "spiritual atmosphere" in which "physical life lies soaking." *

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

PROFESSOR JAMES ON "NATURE."

I HOPE that the ethical experts, with the large-mindedness which their science develops, will pardon what may be a mere misunderstanding in this protest from a biologist in regard to some remarks on "Nature," in Professor James's beautiful article, "Is Life worth Living" (October number, pp. 1–24).

* For a further development of views similar to mine, see Professor Howison's recent address on "The Conception of God," before the Philosophical Union of the University of California.

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The remarks, which I shall immediately specify, would not have surprised me if uttered by an orthodox Darwinian, but they did surprise me from the famous psychologist of Harvard, who has had, I believe, a biological education, and whom one would have expected to find free from what appear to me the prejudices of the schools. His remarks form part of a suggested argument to the effect that Natural Religion is hopelessly bankrupt,—a conclusion, which, though repugnant to myself, is not likely to excite many biologists. But when the Professor proceeds to say that visible nature is "all plasticity and indifference,"—"a multiverse, not a universe,"—"a harlot,"—and "mere weather," and so on, I cannot refrain, though it seems rather grotesque to stand as apologist for Nature, from denying the libel.

For *plasticity*, I should read order; for *indifference*, "selective synthesis;" for *multiverse*, a progressive cosmos, and delete the "not;" for *harlot*, mother; for *weather*, evolution. But then, as he says, "the good-will of the men of science exceeds their perspicacity."

But is not the biggest fact in Nature the cumulative progress of things—by differentiation and integration—from simple to complex, from carbon atoms to diamond, from aggregate to integrate, from Protozoa to Man. He, the first really to awaken to the drama of evolution, has, quaintly enough, become suspicious that it is an immoral spectacle.

The orderly progress is plain both in individual development and in the history of a race. We see the crystal arising out of a solution, with an apparent breach of continuity, but forming itself definitely, a product of "selective synthesis," in Lloyd Morgan's phrase, becoming an orderly, beautiful integrate. We see the germ-cell divide and redivide, in definite, orderly, often rhythmic fashion, until it becomes such a perfected integrate as a butterfly or a bird. We have, from American biologists alone, sufficient evidence to show that organic variations have often been quite definite, sufficient evidence to lead us to disbelieve that the phrase, "a chapter of accidents," used by some, is an adequate expression of evolution. And we know, above all, the long result of time, the world-becoming, the ascent of life. In this progress each step is beautiful, the metakinetic is more and more expressed, mind grows over matter, and the primeval altruism, of which the non-sentimental Spencer speaks, rises gradually to greater prominence, moderating egoism, and is itself originative.

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If it be said that organic progress is wholly the result of the natural selection of fortuitous variations in the struggle for existence, I should answer (1) that this interpretation has many limitations and difficulties; (2) that a *secondary* or directive factor, such as natural elimination in the struggle for existence is, must not be spoken of as if it were a *primary* or originative factor, nor magnified into a formula for Nature's sole method of progress; (3) that the struggle for existence is a function of numerous variables, and is often better described as an endeavor after well-being on the part of kin-bound, socially-bound creatures, whose egoism is not satisfied until it becomes altruistic.

There has been a great discussion of late, in this JOURNAL and elsewhere, in regard to the relation of the ethical process to the cosmic process, but in this discussion what has impressed me most has been the trustful manner in which so many have assumed that our lost leader said the last word on what the cosmic process really is. Now Professor Huxley's view of Nature, as expressed, for instance, in his essay, "The Struggle for Existence—a programme," and in his Romanes Lecture, was Darwin's, without the grace of Darwin's saving-clauses; and Darwin's view was, or was greatly modified by, an unconscious projection upon Nature of a generalization induced by the competitive conditions of the industrial age, as Geddes has pointed out. I yield to none in reverence for the master, but I agree with the few heretics who believe that his picture was too red in its color. The copies certainly are. Hate and death are the universally accredited factors; to insist on love and life is "bio-optimism," "sentimentalism," or imposture. But it would be difficult to prove Herbert Spencer guilty of these vices, and it is long since he stated the case for altruism in Nature. Fiske, Geddes, Kropotkine, Drummond, and others have corroborated Spencer's position.* At any rate, when "our science is a drop, and our ignorance a sea," as Professor James says, one would think there is room for legitimate doubt as to whether the cosmic process has yet been adequately appreciated.

But, granting *disease* (especially when man interferes), *ugliness* (only when man causes molecular discord, or in relatively rare monstrosities), *cruelty* (our estimate of which is apt to be unduly anthropomorphic and Pharisaical), *parasitism* (not nearly so loathsome as

* Since this protest was written, I have tried to state the case briefly in *Natural Science*, December, 1895.

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among men), occasional *internecine struggle* (much oftener assumed than observed), and so on,—all the seamy side,—I, though with no temperamental optimism, cannot help being most impressed by the definiteness, the selectiveness, the order, the beauty, the progressiveness of Nature. I see no harlot, but the mother of us all.

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THE MEANING AND ORIGIN OF SOCIETIES.—NOTES OF SOME RECENT SOCIOLOGICAL DISCUSSION.

HAVING been recently engaged in certain fundamental political inquiries, and having found myself conducted to the conception of a number of men making up a unity or whole, a social body or society, as a prerequisite of political formations,—a conception the investigation of which, however, might be said to belong to sociology rather than to specific political science,—I have looked with interest upon whatever treatment of the subject I might find in such recent sociological literature as I was able to get hold of.

I.

As it happens, some valuable discussion has been going on as to what is (or, shall we say? shall be) the precise meaning of sociology.* Involved in this question and, I should suppose, lying at the root of it, is the question as to what "society" itself means. For it goes without saying, I imagine, that sociology is the science of society,—this whatever its more exact definition, whatever methods it is to pursue, or whatever be its final purpose. But what is society? In one sense the answer can only come at the end of extended special investigation. But in another sense we must have a notion of what the word means before we can even know what we are to investigate. We must have some idea, however general, associated with a word before we can profitably use it at all. It does not help matters much that we are all using the word, when we may mean different things by it. I trust that it may be of interest to others, as it has surely been to me, to learn something

* If any one wishes to see what need there is of discussion of this sort before any edifying use of the term can be made, he should read the jumble of opinions gathered into an article, "What is Sociology?" in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, July, 1895. Unhappily, the editor, at whose solicitation the opinions were given and who comments at length upon them, seems to be more or less confused himself.

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of the sense in which a few recent sociological writers use this fundamental term of their science.

I have remarked on the vagueness with which the authors of "An Introduction to the Study of Society" use the word in a review of their work elsewhere in this JOURNAL. Once they tell us, "Society is a complex of activities and movements originated by the energy of those physical and psychical attributes which determine human motives" (p. 55), though this is hardly meant as a definition. Again they say, "The reactions which result from voluntary or involuntary *contact** of human beings with other human beings are the phenomena peculiarly social as distinguished from the phenomena belonging properly to Biology and Psychology" (p. 60). But "contact" is still rather a vague word, as the authors seem themselves to feel. More definitely they go on to say,—

> "There remain unique classes of social facts which we may distinguish, in general, as facts of co-operation. When men find themselves in proximity to other men, they instinctively attempt to adjust themselves to necessities or advantages which the association involves or permits. *The activities properly called social* may be said to consist of acquiescence in the requirements of physical and psychical contact between human beings, and appropriation of the opportunities of such contact between human beings. In calling attention specifically to *man as a co-operating animal*, the reference is to those social facts which arise when men begin to take conscious account of each other, *in attack and defense*, purchase and sale, *mastery and obedience*, emulation, rivalry, organization, authority, persuasion, *assent and dissent*, with all further relations involving volitional combinations of man and man" (p. 61).

An advance is made here, but there is still apparently some confusion. "Co-operation" is plain, and would seem to come very near what we ordinarily have in mind when we speak of one being standing to another in a *social* relation. But what sort of co-operation is that in which beings attack one another or defend themselves against one another, or in which one masters others and compels them to obey him without regard to their own good? These are indeed phenomena of contact, but are they of social contact? We should hardly speak of man-eating apes as making a society with their victims, though they were in unquestionable contact with them; and I see not how the phenomenon becomes any more social when it is between beings of the same kind,—

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* The italics in these notes are mine, save where otherwise indicated.

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that is, when both are, for example, human beings. Cannibalism may properly be examined as a primitive custom, but it would be rather grim to characterize it as a *social* phenomenon.

The authors of "An Introduction to the Study of Society" appear to have a sense of the inadequacy of these definitions (or descriptions); in any case, they at least imply in other passages much clearer and more definite notions. For example, social aggregates (as distinguished from organs) are described as being "held together in certain relations by various *bonds of common interest*" (p. 203). The positive problem of social welfare is thus formulated: "How shall the society of competent and willing men co-operate to the largest individual and social advantage?" (p. 80) and a perfect society is by implication regarded as a "fellowship of reciprocally helpful co-operation" (p. 82). In such suggestions a tolerably definite conception of social phenomena as phenomena of co-operation and mutual help seems to be contained. The authors once make a noble statement of this social idea: "The proper task of society . . . is such perfection of social fellowship that each individual capable of a social service shall contribute that service to social welfare, and in return shall have the amplest assistance from society in the realization of his manhood" (p. 79).

It is gratifying to find two such distinguished thinkers as Professor S. N. Patten and Professor F. H. Giddings agreeing substantially in a conception of the meaning of "social" similar to that just mentioned. In speaking of what I may call the looser and stricter senses of the word "sociology," Professor Patten says,—

> "In the one sense, sociology treats of the phenomena due to the occupation of a common environment by several individuals,—the phenomena of mere contact in a physical environment. In the other sense, sociology treats of the phenomena resulting from certain subjective feelings which bind men together. In the first sense, hostile men or a beast and its prey are parts of one society and 'associate' with one another. In the second sense, only friendly bonds create a society. It is a relation existing between a number of similar beings united for common ends. The one is the phenomena of hostile contact, the other that of friendly contact. Professor Giddings calls both these classes of phenomena 'social,' and treats them as though they were co-ordinate phenomena belonging to one science. Evolution of 'the good old way' of survival through conflict is grouped together with that secured through such bonds as those which bind a mother to her child." *

* *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1895, p. 118.

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Though he does not say so, it is evident here, and is indicated in so many words elsewhere, that the phenomena of "friendly contact," of "union," of co-operation are, in Professor Patten's judgment, those which are properly called "social," and that it is only they that give rise to "a true society." Professor Giddings alleges that Professor Patten misunderstands him in the above quotation, and, on the point now under consideration, he reaffirms Professor Patten's essential conception. His words are:

"Dr. Patten is mistaken in thinking that I would call the hostile contact of a beast and its prey 'association,' or regard creatures of different species as parts of one society, or group such phenomena together with the bonds that unite the mother to her child; and it is this misapprehension which leads him to say that my thoughts would give to the words 'social' and 'association' 'a new meaning opposed to all usage,' and so 'confuse two concepts which must be kept distinct.' I have never thought or spoken of mere physical contact, hostile or friendly, as constituting association or a society. It is association *if*, and *only if, accompanied by a consciousness on the part of each of the creatures implicated that the creatures with which it comes in contact are like itself.* This consciousness of kind is the elementary, the genuine social fact; it is sympathy, fellow-feeling in the literal as distinguished from the popular sense of the word." * (The italics here are Professor Giddings'.)

On the other hand, I find Dr. G. Simmel, in a notable article on "The Problem of Sociology," contributed to the *Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale* for September, 1894, somewhat uncertain in his conceptions on the subject. Dr. Simmel holds that sociology should include in its consideration all the forms of relation between men,—not only associations in the strict sense (in the sense of co-operation and harmonious unification), but also combat and competition ("la lutte et la concurrence"), since these, too, establish, or rather are, relations, reciprocal reactions, and show, despite the difference in cases, a likeness of forms and evolutions (p. 502, n). At the same time he says that sociology properly so-called studies "exclusively that which is specifically social, the form and the forms of association as such" (p. 499). Moreover, he speaks of "the particular causes and ends without which naturally there is no association" (p. 499), apparently suggesting thereby the idea of common interests. What sort of an association can be said to be constituted by combat? Combat is indeed a case of

* *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March, 1895, p. 98.

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"reciprocal reaction," but what does this show save that "reciprocal reaction" is altogether too vague to serve as a mark of distinctively social phenomena? One may quite sympathize with the drift of Dr. Simmel's remarks (namely, that sociology, if it is to be a special science and not an *omnium gatherum* of information about society in general, must isolate the distinctively social in human phenomena, study the form of association as such, leaving the contents to be treated by the special historical and material sciences,* and even restrict itself to what *comes about by society*, as distinguished from what *merely happens in society*), and yet feel a lack of precision in his manner of dealing with this fundamental conception.

But, after all, it may be said, the phenomena of hostility, combat, and war surely belong to human society, and in this way must come within the scope of a sociology which is the science of society. "Human society," however, in the sense just used is too vague a thing to serve as the subject-matter of a new and distinct science. Society, so far as it lends itself to treatment by such a science, must be understood as equivalent to societ*ies* (or as an abstract term for what they have in common). It means families, tribes, clans, communities, nations, or the general type of social relationship exemplified by them. Sociology may, of course, consider the phenomena of combat and war as taking place *between* societies, and as having great and perhaps decisive effect upon the fortunes of societies, but not as themselves social phenomena. In the same way it may consider combat between individuals in the same society, and may trace its effects in weakening or perhaps undoing the societies, but cannot class it as itself a *social* fact. Professor Small attempts to meet the difficulty by inventing a new word, "societary," which shall cover what we may call the unsocial phenomena among men, as well as the contrasted phenomena. He says, "Whether we assume or not that sympathetic feelings are characteristic of societies as such, we have to deal with societies in conditions in which the spirit of hostility is more demonstrative than the spirit of co-operation. We obviously

* *Cf.* the drift of Professor Giddings's language: "Sociology therefore may be defined as the science of social elements and first principles. It is not the inclusive, but the fundamental social science. It is not the sum of the social sciences, but the groundwork, in which they find a common basis."—"The Theory of Sociology," p. 18.

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need, then, a word plainly appropriate to the phenomena of societies as such without prejudgment of the content or quality of the phenomena. We have the word already made. Whatever is *of or pertaining to society* is "societary." * (Italics are Professor Small's.) But he forgets that, so far as societies have more of the spirit of hostility in them than of the spirit of co-operation, they are to this extent not really societies, but simply individuals juxtaposed. To speak of "the phenomena of *societies as such*, without prejudgment of the content or quality of the phenomena," is to admit that mere juxtaposition constitutes society, and thus to empty the word of any distinctive significance. Why, I may ask, is it not enough to consider the phenomena of hostility (so far as they are between individuals in the same society) as simply marks of the imperfection of the development of the society, or (so far as the conflict is between societies) as simply indicative of the failure as yet of the several societies to become component and co-operative parts of the one greater society, which shall include the human race? In this way it is equally possible to take account of the facts and yet not to introduce confusion into our fundamental ideas.†

II.

Another interesting subject of speculation in some of the articles above referred to is as to the forces that ultimately produce social phenomena. On this point, Professor Patten and Professor Giddings (in the course of an argument as to the logical priority of economics and sociology, which of itself need not detain us) appear to take somewhat different views. Professor Patten says,—

"The social feelings are but a developed type of a large class of feelings due to the love of means by which ends are attained. The hunter loves his dog

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* *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1895, pp. 123–4. Professor Small, in speaking of the discussion between Professor Patten and Professor Giddings already referred to, appears to be mistaken in saying that "Professor Giddings is attempting to vindicate the claims of a science which deals with phenomena embracing all the variations of hostility as well as of fraternity" (p. 121). *Vide supra.*

† *Cf.* Carlyle's language: "We call it a society, and go about proposing openly the totalest separation and isolation. Our life is not a mutual helpfulness; but rather, cloaked under due laws-of-war, named competition and so forth, it is a mutual hostility." Here there is no confusion between the facts and the idea,—this, whether the facts are somewhat one-sidedly stated or not.

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and gun, the herder his cattle, the mechanic his tools, the farmer his lands, the merchant his business, and the lawyer his profession. Animals love their master or the persons who feed them; they even have an affection for the place and time which are associated in their minds with the presence of those on whom they depend. There is therefore nothing peculiar about the rise of social feelings as soon as beings are placed in a position where they must resort to indirect methods to satisfy their wants." *

In a similar way, Mr. Herbert Spencer sees men leaving the state of nature and submitting to political subordination "through experience of the increased satisfaction derived under it." † Society, so viewed, is not a simple primitive fact, but a means to an end, an expedient, the advantages of which are experimentally learned and the pleasures connected with which arise by association.

On the other hand, Professor Giddings holds that "the beginnings of the social feelings and of social actions are as primitive as the beginnings of individual instincts." ‡ More particularly, and as marking clearly the issue, he says,—

"The issue then narrows down to this: Is a consciously hostile conflict for food, among creatures of like kind (a conflict so consciously carried on that it can result in the discrimination of degrees of utility), antecedent to a consciousness of identity or likeness of kind and its accompanying phenomena of imitation; or is the recognition of kind the earlier and more elementary phenomenon? This question goes to the very root of the subject. Upon it must divide those who hold by the doctrine of Hobbes, that rampant individualism and remorseless conflict preceded all society and all social instincts, from those who believe that the germs, at least, of fellow feeling, of social instinct, and of association, are as old and evolutionally as primitive as the individual, and that from the first they have contributed to the psychic development of the individual." §

Professor Patten is thoroughgoing in the view above stated. He, indeed, objects to Professor Giddings defining society "as though its only characteristic was the phenomenon of imitation," and does not admit the issue in exactly the form which Professor Giddings, as just quoted, has given it. But he reaffirms that "the

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* *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1895, p. 121.

† This is said, it should be noted, of *political* society; as to society, or rather the social impulse, in and of itself, however, Mr. Spencer apparently holds that is as original as the impulse of self-preservation. *Cf.* "Data of Ethics," § 75.

‡ *Annals, etc.*, March, 1895, p. 101.

§ Ibid., pp. 100, 101.

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instincts which lead to conflict [even among those of the same kind] are older than the social instincts."* He thinks that beings of like kind may become hostile to one another now as soon as they are "conscious of an opposition of interests."† Let me endeavor to give a brief statement of the historical order of development as maintained by Professor Patten.

We start with beings capable of pleasure and pain. They may evolve in either of two ways,—by becoming adapted to their local environment, each for itself and by means of a competitive struggle, or, if the local environment is not sufficiently favorable, by unitedly appropriating the benefits of a wider environment. In the former case, progress is secured by the increasing perfection of the individual organism, in the latter by the development of social impulses and habits. All depends on the character of the environment or, more specifically, the peculiarities of the earth's crust, as to which way will be taken. If, owing to the conformation of the earth, nothing is to be gained by trying to make use of a more extended surface, the social impulses will not arise, or at least attain any development. To quote Professor Patten's own words,—

> "The crust of the earth to which society must adjust itself must be so constituted that an ever-increasing advantage is secured by enlarging the environment of society, and thus securing more points of contact with the surface of the earth. *Without these conditions, social progress would be undesirable.* It would be better to strengthen the individual in functional activity and desire through greater local adjustments."‡

In such circumstances social impulses would remain "mere adumbrations."

Under contrasted circumstances, however, they not only arise, but in time create a social fabric of laws, institutions, customs, and ideals,—which relatively to the individual makes another environment that has equally to be considered with the primary objective environment, since only by harmony with it can adjustment to the objective environment be accomplished and the goods of the latter be appropriated. Under an evolution of this sort, the individual organism may not be so highly developed, and single pleasures may not be so keen, but on the whole the lot of

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* *Annals, etc.*, May, 1895, p. 117. † Ibid., p. 119.

‡ *The Failure of Biologic Sociology* (No. 121 of Publications of the American Academy of Political and Social Science), p. 88.

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the individual is improved (Would it not be more accurate to say that the lot of the mass is improved, though not of certain single individuals? Professor Patten's language is, "In this process there is perhaps a loss of function and of the intensity of individual desires, but the harmonious blending of the many products secured from the general environment creates for the individual a better consumption than any local environment could afford." *) According to such a view, societies become an economic expedient or necessity in certain defined circumstances, just as indeed, under other circumstances, a highly developed organic mechanism may be so regarded; or, to put it differently, sociology and biology alike "rest upon economics as an underlying science, and are [deal with] particular means of increasing utilities and goods."†

In another connection, Professor Patten gives a somewhat different and yet not inconsistent account of the matter. After saying that there are at present organisms without social instincts (*e.g.*, the cobras), and that "it is easy to see how millions of generations could have passed away before organisms began to associate for common ends and learn of each other through suggestion and imitation," he asks, How do hostile individuals "conclude to become social"? I cannot do better than quote his answer in full:

"The answer to this question is not difficult if we look for a solution among those objective conditions that determine a progressive evolution. The objects that are goods to each species are unequally distributed throughout the environment. The stronger animals of each species secure for themselves the localities where these goods are most abundant. The weaker animals are forced thereby into unfavorable localities where their food is scarce. They must, therefore, resort to new means to secure it or perish. They find this means in co-operation, and thus new relations grow up between them that are absent from the stronger animals which occupy the better localities where individual exertion can secure the needed food. Social bonds at first arise, not among the victors, but among the vanquished. They are the means by which the vanquished outwit their conquerors."‡

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* *The Failure of Biologic Sociology*, (No. 121 of Publications of the American Academy of Political and Social Science), p. 83.

† Ibid., p. 90.

‡ *Annals, etc.*, January, 1895, p. 120. Professor Patten says, "The earlier organisms, living when the struggle for existence was not so fierce, could have prospered without any social bonds." It is but turning this into the language of every day when Mr. W. L. Sheldon says, "If we were all happy, and the world went easy with us, if we could have had our way and none of us ever had to endure pain or struggle, there would be little or no fellowship in the world."

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Thus again—and in a manner perhaps more readily intelligible than that above indicated—society appears as a device for individual ends. The further process of the same sort of evolution is also hinted at by Professor Patten. The weaker members of a species who unite and form a society in the manner described become thereby so strong that they may in time succeed in displacing the superior individuals who had laid hold of the better portions of the environment. "However powerful," says Professor Patten, "an isolated being may be, he cannot withstand the encroachments of a group of weaker but united beings."* Hence the isolated individuals of superior gifts are compelled themselves to become social, and the process of forming societies, once started, goes on. To quote Professor Patten's pregnant summary, "When, therefore, social feelings appear in any group, they force the growth of social feelings in all the groups with which they come in contact. The power of surviving lies with the more compactly united social groups."†

Social relationships are thus only somewhat accidental to man, according to Professor Patten. Under readily conceivable circumstances they would not arise at all. Such a view requires a pretty radical revision of the Aristotelian dictum that "man is, by nature, a political animal" (*Politics*, i. 2). I had myself been led to minimize such a claim to the extent of substituting "social" for "political" (government turning out to be an expedient rather

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Again, "It is the awful struggle for existence which makes fellow-feeling and fellowship. Far back in history, when it was one terrific struggle for the human race to keep alive, then it was that the feeling of brotherhood began. Shoulder to shoulder man had to move on in trial, pain, and difficulty, in order to preserve existence. It was in such struggle that fellow-feeling or altruism had its origin." —*Ethical Addresses*, May, 1895, p. 96.

Professor Patten elsewhere observes, however, that "a period of plenty destroys the opposition between individuals and tends to develop social relations" (*Annals, etc.*, May, 1895, p. 120), and I notice that the Italian criminologist, Professor Enrico Ferri, in his recent work, "Socialismus und Moderne Wissenschaft" (translated from the Italian by Dr. Hans Kurella, Leipzig, 1895), remarks to the same effect. ("Das Leben einzelner Individuen, Gruppen von Individuen und ganzen Gemeinschaften lässt stets erkennen, dass wenn die Nahrung, die Materielle Grundlage des Daseins, gesichert ist, das Gesetz der Interessengemeinschaft über das der Konkurrenz und des Kampfes dominiert, und umgekehrt."—S. 37.) Just how to reconcile the varying points of view I do not for the moment see.

* *Annals, etc.*, January, 1895, p. 122. † Ibid.

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than an organic necessity to man); but if Professor Patten is correct, we cannot even say that *society* is organic to man's nature, —it is a shift no less than the state.*

All this is very different from Professor Giddings's contention, that "the germs, at least, of fellow-feeling, of social instinct, and of association are as old and evolutionally as primitive as the individual, and that from the first they have contributed to the psychic development of the individual." And yet, practically, I cannot make out that Professor Giddings differs widely from Professor Patten. He says, for instance:

> "The struggle for food discloses the fact that creatures of the same kind or species are usually too nearly equal in strength and skill for any large number of them to depend habitually on conquests over their fellows for subsistence. They are forced to tolerate each other and to convert their struggle against one another into a war on lesser creatures."†

After all, then, social relations would seem to be a fruit of experience rather than the result of original instincts. The passage suggests, I may say by the way, a third manner of accounting for the rise of social phenomena, but my motive in quoting it is to show that Professor Giddings himself apparently supposes that a more or less individualistic struggle preceded social co-operation. So he seems, following the course of further evolution, to regard negative co-operation as coming first and as being "succeeded" by alliance, or positive co-operation.‡ It may, of course, be that Professor Giddings is representing a logical rather than an historical order of development, but his language does not make this clear. Moreover, he says (with a comparatively late stage of social progress in mind), "Conscious that their social relations are their most important means of defence, succor, pleasure, and development, individuals endeavor to conserve and perfect them."§ But if from utilitarian motives individuals may endeavor to conserve and per-

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* Professor Huxley observes that progress in general in the living world is more or less accidental. "At the same time it has been shown that certain forms persist with very little change from the oldest to the newest fossiliferous formations; and thus show that progressive development is a contingent, and not a necessary, result of the nature of living matter."—"Collected Essays," Vol. i, p. 126.

† "The Theory of Sociology," p. 29.

‡ Ibid., p. 30.

§ Ibid., p. 35.

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fect a thing, why may they not from the same motives have substantially originated it?*

As to the contrasted views of the origin of social phenomena (views which, it must be admitted, are more or less speculative in character),† I am only concerned now to state them, and do not venture to give an opinion of my own.

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

PHILADELPHIA.

FREE-WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY.

MY reply to Dr. Hyslop's criticisms (in the October number of this JOURNAL) can only be a very short one; for otherwise I should simply have to repeat all that I endeavored to make clear in my article in the July number. And I will ask any readers of Dr. Hyslop's criticisms, who care to know my position, to look again at what I said in that article. Dr. Hyslop complains that I "naïvely assume an antithesis between the free-will doctrine and the necessitarian doctrine." If by this is meant that I think there is ultimately an inevitable antinomy, I am somewhat astonished at the remark; for the main purpose of my article was to show that there is no contradiction between the element of truth which, in my view, is contained in the traditional free-will doctrine and a carefully-stated doctrine of psychological necessitarianism. That there is an antithesis between the free-will doctrine as usually asserted and the necessitarian doctrine as usually asserted, no student of philosophy can seriously deny; and I do not see any *naïveté* in assuming the existence of an old and famous controversy.

When Dr. Hyslop goes on to speak of "capacity of choice between equal motives," the expression seems to me extremely ambig-

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* It may, of course, be said that at least the social *impulse* (or rather germ of social feeling) must have pre-existed. But Professor Patten admits as much (by implication) when he speaks of social impulses as being "mere *adumbrations*" under circumstances that make societies unnecessary, but not as non-existent.

† A somewhat amusing instance of how the very same facts may be variously interpreted by ingenious minds is given in Professor Giddings's supposing that an amœba does not devour a fellow amœba, because, having learned the "feel" of its own substance, it has a similar "feel" when touching one of its fellows, and "recognizes the creature as an object like itself, and therefore as not food" (*Annals, etc.*, March, 1895, p. 101), while Professor Patten urges that the amœba mistakes the other creature *for a part of itself*—in other words, that we have here "a case of mistaken identity due to a lack of development" (*Annals, etc.*, May, 1895, p. 119).

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uous. Does he mean "between motives which *seem* equal to the agent," or "which *seem* equal to other persons"? If they are actually equal and are really "motives," they must neutralize one another and produce suspension of activity, until something occurs to make one outweigh the other, and then they are no longer equal. Further, is the "choice" between such motives a volition with or without a motive? If it is a volition with a motive, I do not see where Dr. Hyslop differs from psychological determinism; if it is a volition without a motive, Dr. Hyslop's new "freedomist" is but old indeterminist writ queerly. There is the less need for me to elaborate this point, because it has been very clearly put by Professor Royce in his review of Dr. Hyslop's work on Ethics (in October number of INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL). With Professor Royce I should agree in holding that psychological determinism is an inadequate philosophical theory in so far as it involves a merely mechanical conception of causation in mental processes, but that the fact of deliberation and of choice presents no difficulty whatever to any consistent determinist theory.

As to my reference to Robert Owen, I did not quote him as an authority on a philosophical question. I referred to the honored father of industrial co-operation as a conspicuous example of a *practical* reformer, who knew from experience the existence of certain bad social effects of the common free-will doctrine. I did not say that Robert Owen's knowledge of psychology or of philosophy or of the history of controversy was any better than that of the average "practical" man, who believes, or is taught to believe, that some acceptance of the free-will formula, in however crude or illogical a form, is an essential part of an ethical creed, and who is unaware that what he takes for the verdict of "common sense" is in great part the dregs of a Scholastic theory.

DAVID G. RITCHIE.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SOCIETY. By Albion W. Small, Ph. D., and George E. Vincent (University of Chicago). New York: American Book Company, 1894. Pp. 374.

This book modestly disclaims being a contribution to "sociological knowledge," and comes as a proffered help in the training of beginners. It proposes simply a "method of preliminary investigation adaptable to the use of college students." What is meant by sociological knowledge or sociology? The words are often used at the present time, and it is highly desirable to have clear ideas as to what is covered by them. What is it we are to investigate?

The authors start out by telling us that sociology is "the systematic knowledge of human beings," which is not exactly reassuring, as psychology or, at any rate, anthropology might be spoken of in much the same way. But they immediately pass on to say that "the facts of *associated** human life" are its proper territory, and a little later they identify it with "precise examination of social facts." It is true that they sometimes appear to put it on a par with "social theories" or "systems of social doctrine," and once roundly call it "the philosophy of human welfare," but this is because they have in mind a larger use of "sociology," according to which it is practically coincident with "social philosophy." Under the latter head are included three divisions: (1) the scientific exhibition of social facts, (2) the science of the ideals "which the facts implicitly contain," (3) the investigation of the means and available resources for changing the actual into the ideal. The first is called Descriptive Sociology, the second Statical Sociology, the third Dynamic Sociology. And plainly, if we know what society is, what it ought to be, and how it may become what it ought to be, we have what we may properly call social philosophy.

The authors limit themselves to the first division, referring only incidentally to the others. They do not even deal in full with Descriptive Sociology, but only with *contemporary* Descriptive Sociology,—*i.e.*, attempt an analysis of contemporary society not

* The italics throughout this notice are the reviewer's.

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in its origins, but as it is now found in the more advanced civilization of Europe and America. It must be admitted that it appears to be somewhat difficult for them to keep to the objective and analytical point of view. We are privileged to have their "views" on a variety of topics. They make use of the familiar bogy of the French Revolution, identifying its spirit with destructive dogmas and enjoining the teacher of sociology to make his influence felt "against every destructive tendency." They run a tilt against "those zealous prophets of righteousness who teach that the only reason why the kingdom of God cannot be established on earth to-morrow is that Christians will not put their knowledge of social principles into practice," though they appear to be themselves followers of him who came fervently prophesying, "The kingdom of heaven is *at hand.*" They venture to speak of idleness as a "pathological condition," and yet add, "In the case of all idleness, *especially that of the rich*, hasty judgments should be carefully avoided." They speak rather harshly of "hazards dignified in conventional phrases as commercial speculations," but hasten to reassure us by saying, "Wholesale denunciation of stock and produce exchanges will be avoided by the careful observer of society." They tell us that "from the sociological stand-point" the "demands of the laborer have been too exclusively in terms of wages and too little in terms of manhood," a contrast which sounds *imponirend*, though its force is somewhat abated by another statement that it is nothing less than "quackery to conceal the fundamental necessity and the universal utility of wealth." * We even hear that "in contrast with the eagerness of socialism, the policy of sociology is to make haste slowly," as if sociology were to be identified with a special sort of social programme.† But

* The authors finely say, "The world will not be right until every adult man's labor can command, for himself and for the family that should be a part of himself, access to everything essentially human." Again, "Civilization is a miserably crude experiment until it is possible for each member of society to command food and clothing and shelter and surplus and leisure enough to permit progressive and all-sided expansion of manhood." They add, "The struggle for this consummation is not a class contest, however. It is a common interest of all sections of society." This is true in an ideal sense, but the authors would probably admit equally that, because it is not an *actual* common interest of all sections of society, it remains for the time necessarily "a class contest."

† The same idea appears in another statement: "In the Hegelian idiom, conventionality is the thesis, socialism is the antithesis, sociology is the synthesis." But socialism is really one possible way of formulating the social ideal and one

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this is perhaps all explicable, partly in view of the fact that the authors, despite their somewhat severe reminder that the "primary task is not to reform society, but to understand society," cannot quite keep out of mind the larger aspects, the ultimately practical purport, of their science, and partly since in launching a new department, which is popularly supposed to have something to do with "social questions," in a university situated in the midst of the trying atmosphere of Chicago and supported by its sensitive wealth, they have encountered peculiar difficulties and have been somewhat exercised in their minds.

The description and analysis of social phenomena that make up the greater part of the book are not altogether satisfactory,—not from anything that is said, but from what we may call a lack of clearness in the point of view. "Society" may be taken as a synonym for the human race in general or some portion of it (*e.g.*, the Western peoples), or as an abstract word, the actual meaning of which is societ*ies*,—various particular kinds of human association. Sometimes the word appears to be used in the former sense, as when it is said "we are attempting an analysis of contemporary society, as it is found in the more advanced civilization of Europe and America;" and sometimes in the latter sense, though the only kind of society that is specially considered (aside from the vague *ensemble* just mentioned) is the family. We may possibly make our meaning clearer if we ask, Is the "contemporary society" of which the authors speak really a society? Can France and Germany properly be spoken of as a society? They belong to society in the vague sense, it is true, but can they be said to make, or compose, *a society?* Can those who are warring against one another (or are ready to) make up a real social whole?

Now, analysis of "contemporary society" in general is a task of bewildering complexity, and we cannot say that we have found any special enlightenment on this vast subject in the two hundred and seventy-five pages which our authors have given us. And as to study of societies in the concrete, of the various forms of association, of the principles underlying them, of the conditions and forces which call them into existence, we find very little of it.

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possible method of accomplishing it. Sociology, then, in its "statical" and "dynamic" phases, has to consider it; but sociology cannot by any possibility be contrasted with it any more than political economy can be contrasted with the theories of free trade or protection.

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What we find under the attractive title of "The Natural History of a Society" is a highly interesting narrative of the growth of a city in the western part of America from the time of the arrival of the first "prairie schooner." But this, as Professor H. H. Powers has already observed, is hardly more than a study in colonization, and simply shows how people fitted (and unfitted) for social life in one place found themselves similarly fitted (or unfitted) in another. It is excellent history, but strikes us as only in a very loose, or at least secondary, sense, sociology. Sociology should tell us what makes societies in the first place. We must do the authors the justice to say that they do not assume to more than describe the present (p. 183); but how can we perform the difficult task of *understanding* society, which they equally urge upon us (p. 19), if we do not know something of its antecedents and of the forces that have made it what it is?

Books III. to V., entitled "Social Anatomy," "Social Physiology and Pathology," and "Social Psychology," elaborate in a not extravagant way the analogy between society and an organism. The authors accept the principles of the system of Schaeffle, and state it as the aim of their manual "to place students in possession of the organic hypotheses of society, as a working-tool and a useful instrument." But surely to work out an analogy, however conscientiously, and to give us new designations for old facts, is not to lay the foundations of a new science.

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

PHILADELPHIA.

IDEALS AND INSTITUTIONS: THEIR PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT. A Thesis presented at the University of Minnesota for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. By John Ernest Merrill, B.A. Hartford, Conn.: Hartford Seminary Press, 1894. Pp. 175.

This thesis is divided into two parts,—the first of which is "metaphysical" or theoretical, and the second, historical. Though these parts are closely related to one another, the second giving the historical verification of the position established theoretically in the first, the first part alone falls within the proper province of this JOURNAL, and fairly within the knowledge of the present reviewer. The "thesis," completely stated, is that "History shows a parallel development of institutions and the moral ideal. In this development, the ideal has been prior to and causally connected with its

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corresponding institutions." While the second part seeks to prove by historical evidence that this is the actual relation between ideals and institutions, the first part attempts to demonstrate that, by the very nature of the case, this relation must exist. Brief as this metaphysical discussion is, it raises, and deals effectively with, the fundamental questions involved. The interpretation of the moral ideal accepted by the author is that of T. H. Green, whose conception of moral development he also adopts. Institutions are defined, first, "concretely," as "organisms, centres of force deposited by society, and conserving particular forms of social order," and then "abstractly," as "habits of social living." The form of institutional progress is "a series of institutions, or, more properly, a series of variations in single institutions. Apparently, from time to time, new institutions arise; but they are seen to be, in fact, only specializations of existing main divisions, the complexity which always accompanies higher forms of life." "A part of the development of institutions seems to be their decay, just as in animal bodies that is a feature of life and change. Yet, as there, not the whole dies, but a part which is sloughed off." Institutions have no intrinsic value or significance; their importance is merely instrumental. "They serve humanity only as they are forms under and through which there is manifested the ideal. The facts of life are purposes and actions; ideals direct the first, and institutions are the general forms for the second." Institutions and ideals are, therefore, inseparable elements in a single whole. The institution, severed from the ideal, becomes an inert form; the ideal, without the institution, dies because it finds no medium of self-expression. Yet the correspondence between the two is never perfect. For, in the first place, "institutions are primarily and only social," whereas "the ideal, while having regard to persons as in social relations, is first individual," and, secondly, even from the stand-point of society, "entire correspondence would mean that the ideal was fully realized, or, to put it in more startling form, that the existing condition of things was ideal." All that we can say is that "institutions and ideals in a broad way answer to each other," or that "the institutions of society correspond with the general moral ideal." It follows that the development of institutions is parallel with the development of ideals. The notes of development are the same in each, viz.: broadening of range and deepening of content. "In another way of putting it, the centre of all development is personality. As broadening in range, it includes more and more

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individuals as complete persons; as deepening in content, it reveals new depths and resources of self-conscious individuality." Finally, it is insisted that, in this parallel development, "the ideal has been prior to, and causally connected with, its corresponding institutions." Since an ideal is an "active idea," or an idea which dominates activity, institutions, being "habits of social living," must be posterior, at least logically, to "the ideals which dominate the social life;" the ideal is cause, the institution effect.

The entire discussion is excellent and highly suggestive: its only fault is its brevity. It is to be hoped that Mr. Merrill will develop in greater detail the very promising investigation of the present thesis. His emphatic assertion of the ethical element in institutional progress, of the causation of ideals in the development of institutions, is well-timed. The author suggests an important practical corollary of his own principle. The secret of progress lies in the man himself, not in his environment, however important in a secondary sense the environment may be. "There are those who do not accept this view of the Causality of Ideals. To this number belong, for instance, many socialists and communists, if we may judge from their programmes. They expect to elevate men by improving their surroundings and the conditions of their lives. The same is true of many philanthropists. On the other hand, the secret of such enterprises as Hull House, Chicago, and Andover House, Boston, of the social work of General Booth 'In Darkest England,' and of all sorts of missionary endeavor, is the changing of men's moral and social conditions by the prior elevation of their ideals. Not upon doing for men, but upon the possibility of persuading them to do for themselves, rests the assurance of ultimate success in the endeavor to elevate mankind."

JAMES SETH.

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OUTLINES OF SOCIAL THEOLOGY. By William DeWitt Hyde, D.D., President of Bowdoin College. New York: Macmillan & Co., and London, 1895.

It is most interesting to watch the "social movement" which marks our time penetrating, step by step, into all departments of the higher literature. A dozen years ago this rising tide of social interest was to be seen just rippling into periodical publications and filling the magazines and reviews with its new influence. Soon the same sweep of thought flowed up on the flats of Political

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Economy and enlarged the channel of Ethics, and at last within the last two years it has been approaching the point of philosophical statement. President Hyde now boldly takes this tide at its flood and opens the gate for the new way of thinking to enter into the sphere of Theology. Here, for most believers as well as for most theologians, has been the highest and driest region of individualism. The God who is my keeper, the Christ who is my Saviour, the redemption which is for my personal soul,—these have been the familiar ideals of traditional religion. "Father of *me*," says the hymn, with pleasant subordination of every one else:

> "Father of *me*, and all mankind,
> And all the hosts above."

This whole region of self-centred faith waits to be refreshed in its turn by the wholesome tide of the "social movement;" and this new step in Sociology is what this very suggestive little book sets itself to take.

What is religion? "Religion is the universal form of our social relationships" (p. 107). What is the test of our religion? "Our serviceableness to our fellow-men is the exact and infallible measure of our acceptableness to God" (p. 107). What is the Holy Spirit? "The spirit of social service is the Holy Spirit" (p. 80). "To be without the Spirit and to be without the life of unselfish social service is the same thing" (p. 150). What is sin? "All self-assertion of the individual against the social order . . . is sin" (p. 90). "From this social point of view sin is deadly because it is selfish and anti-social" (p. 146). What is the Church? "The Church is the inspirer and director of social service" (p. 180). What is the redemption of the neglected classes? "Social settlements and the industrial school, which carries the substance of civilization, rather than the mission which carries the form of evangelization is the effectual agency for the redemption of these classes" (p. 219). And what is regeneration? "Without regeneration there can be no true and worthy social life. Take the family, business, science and art, social intercourse, and the state. In each of these spheres regeneration is an absolute necessity to the realization of its ideal. . . . First, the family. No man can be rightly married who is not therein born anew. This is simply another way of saying that no man can be rightly married without love" (pp. 152, 153). In short, this little book is a restatement of Christian Theology in terms of the modern social ideal. Its

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author would, no doubt, deny that this broadening of definition involved any inconsistency with earlier historic statements. The personal applications of Christian doctrine lie, no doubt, within his conception of social redemption. Yet the shifting of emphasis is, in itself, not far from a theological revolution. It carries with a practically new ideal of life and duty, a new way of Christian preaching, and a new thought of missionary duty. The issue of this translation of Christian doctrine into the language of social ethics gives theology a new right to be the queen of the sciences, and it is sure to be invigorating in practical religion. President Hyde's book will seem to some readers too compact in form and abrupt in expression, as if persuasiveness had been in some degree sacrificed to brevity. But the significance of the book in modern theology is much beyond its size or its pretensions. It means that many thoughtful men within the Christian Church are being led to a complete reconstruction of doctrine, and a more generous view of the purpose of the Christian religion. Among the first contributions to this conception of religious life was Canon Fremantle's "The World as the Subject of Redemption." President Hyde's book is of the same type, claiming for the Christian life identity with all moral progress and summoning the believer from self-interested salvation to self-sacrificing service.

FRANCIS G. PEABODY.

HARVARD DIVINITY SCHOOL.

SOME BOOKS ON SOCIALISM AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. By J. J. Rousseau. Translated, with Introduction and Notes, by Henry J. Tozer, M.A. Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. iv., 247.

ANNALS OF THE BRITISH PEASANTRY. By Russell M. Garnier. Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. vi., 460.

ECONOMICS AND SOCIALISM. By F. A. Laycock, LL.B. Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. ix., 390.

THE BETTER ADMINISTRATION OF THE POOR LAW. By W. Chance. Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. xii., 260.

THE LOCAL CONTROL OF THE LIQUOR TRAFFIC. By Arthur H. Boyden. Warburton Prize Essay. Manchester: J. E. Cornish.

THE SOCIALIST STATE. By Professor E. C. K. Gonner. London: Walter Scott & Co.

Mr. Tozer deserves well of students and of the general reader by this edition of the Contrat Social. The "Historical and

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Critical Introduction" cannot be said to contribute anything of itself to the study of its subject, and is lacking in distinction; but it is a conscientious setting out of what others have written. Mr. B. Bosanquet contributes a short but felicitous preface. The edition supplies a want, and it is to be hoped that it may be widely used.

Mr. Garnier's "Annals of the British Peasantry" was probably more interesting to the author to write than it will be to the reader to read. He writes from the stand-point of the Christian Social Union, but his account of that position as an "effort to subordinate political action to religious dogma" does not seem particularly happy or inviting. The book is conscientious and, wherever Mr. Garnier cites from personal experience of peasant life, instructive; but, in spite of the author's enthusiasm, the history is that of an ambitious amateur, the generalizations exceedingly loose, and the information often incomplete and misleading.

The point of view of Mr. Laycock's economics is that unrestricted competition, or the full and free play of supply and demand, is the one means—the only perfect means—of supplying the needs of the race. He claims that this "natural system" has only to be tried in its entirety to be justified. His argument, therefore, is directed just as much against every form of trade combination, or of protection, as against socialism. On the other hand, "competition by persons who are not free cannot be called free competition,"—a point which seems to require development. Mr. Laycock's own programme may be summarized as a charge for coinage and a single-tax on ground values; for the rest, complete *laissez faire*. He writes with a naïve and buoyant dogmatism that is almost contagious; and he is satisfied that he has arrived at a demonstration of the cause and cure of trade depressions and national poverty. A curious book, certainly not "dismal," but mainly, perhaps, because it is not "science." His remark that "the community of goods which passes by the name of Socialism finds its chief economist in Marx" is typical of his *apparatus criticus*.

Mr. Chance advocates restriction of out-door relief, with a view to its virtual abolition,—a position which he supports with a good deal of expert evidence. His book should be most useful to Guardians, and contains matter of interest and instruction to all good citizens.

Mr. Boyden advocates concurrent experiments initiated and carried out by the various local authorities, but under the general

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supervision of some central body which would collate and publish results. There is so much useful and sensible matter in Mr. Boyden's essay, that it is a pity it was not submitted to some kind of orthographical revision.

The general reader who wishes to understand modern socialism "as in itself it really is," will derive considerable help from Mr. Gonner's modest but workmanlike essay. His discussion of the socialistic outlook, although necessarily sketchy, is eminently reasonable and impartial. But his assumption that socialism logically involves the guarantee of employment certainly requires justification, and I doubt if he has fairly faced the difficulties of "distribution" in a socialist state. Mr. Gonner's book shows, perhaps, as much as anything else that there are many departments of socialism in which thinking has hardly begun. But he has certainly helped to clear the ground for fruitful and practical discussion, and his book may be heartily recommended as an unusually trustworthy, if somewhat elementary, introduction to the subject. It should be noticed that Mr. Gonner (in accord with the modern conception) treats socialism throughout as a method of business or system of production; his point of view, therefore, is exclusively, perhaps too exclusively, economic. But the effectiveness of Mr. Gonner's treatment gains more than it loses by this limitation.

SIDNEY BALL.

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IPPOLITO TAINE. By Professor Giacomo Barzellotti. Rome: Loescher & Co., 1895. 8vo. Pp. xxi., 405.

This book belongs to the sphere of literature and æsthetics rather than to that of ethics, and therefore can hardly claim a lengthy review in this JOURNAL. As a presentation of the activity of a *littérateur* and critic who exerted a profound, if not a lasting, influence on the thought of Europe, it deserves hearty commendation, being throughout marked by judicial fairness and an absence of hero-worship. All the works of Taine, witnesses to his many-sided interest and study, are passed in review, their principles presented, and their merits and defects placed side by side, with impartial hand. This is done so well that the result is not altogether what the writer seems to think he has produced. Taine does not come before us as a great or as an original man. Rather he is an able, even brilliant, *doctrinaire*, combining the mathematical mind of the Frenchman with the evolutional idealism of the German,

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and the deterministic naturalism of the Englishman. The result is a syncretism, the discordance of whose elements is concealed only by his pungent, epigrammatic style. In morals, Taine was a determinist of the school of Mill; in æsthetics, a naturalistic theorist, who explained everything about art except art itself; in philosophy a Condillachian sensist with Hegelian categories; in history a reactionary, who saw in the French Revolution only the cause of the defeat of France in the war of 1870. He had a certain cosmopolitanism of the limited sort which alone seems possible for a Frenchman; but it remained a matter of the intellect and never penetrated to the roots of his nature, which remained to the last French, that is, sensuous, positivistic, mathematical. All this Professor Barzellotti has brought out with great skill and vigor, and, though he himself seems to incline to a somewhat exaggerated estimate of Taine, he supplies the reader with the means of correcting that estimate.

The literary style of the book is excellent,—rather French than Italian.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

SELECTED ESSAYS OF JAMES DARMESTETER. Translated by Helen B. Jastrow. With Memoir by Morris Jastrow, Jr. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1895.

The volume of Mr. Jastrow, which was to introduce James Darmesteter to a larger public in America, appears now as a memorial. On the 14th of October, 1894, while the essays were still in the hands of the translator, Darmesteter died at the early age of forty-five. It is with a sympathetic hand that Mr. Jastrow sketches the short life-history and gives us specimens of the life-work of a man who, as he tells us, "becomes our master even though we do not follow him in every particular." Born March 28, 1849, at Château-Salins, in Lorraine, the son of a poor Jewish bookbinder, Darmesteter's earliest training was Jewish as well as his surroundings and association, and it was no doubt largely to this influence and his early studies of Hebrew and the Talmud that his bias for the language and literature of the East may be traced; but it was at the suggestion of Michel Bréal, the distinguished philologist, that he took up the study of Zoroastrianism. His rapid mastery of language and of philological method gave him at once high rank among Persian scholars, and before he died

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he was universally acknowledged to be the greatest authority on his special subject. His most important work, and the most enduring monument of his great learning, is the French translation of the Zend Avesta, completed over a year ago,—three large quarto volumes, with a commentary, and enriched by a series of essays summing up his own views and giving a new point of departure for other scholars. To this great work was awarded the prize of twenty thousand francs from the French Academy, granted biennially for the most noteworthy achievement of French scholarship. Nor was it only in the studies of the past and of dead languages that Darmesteter excelled and interested himself. He was in quick touch and sympathy with the present, with all the living issues of the day; an ardent patriot, and a critic and exponent of modern life and literature, publishing a volume of essays on English literature and also of original poems, editing many of the English classics, and finally, a few years before his death, accepting the editorship of the *Revue de Paris*. All this, while at the same time he was professor of Persian at the College de France and at the École des Hautes Études, as well as secretary of the Société Asiatique, publishing yearly a masterly review of all contributions made to Oriental science by French and in part by other scholars. The volume before us consists of seven essays, chosen by Mr. Jastrow "with a view of illustrating the many-sidedness of Darmesteter's activity and the man himself." The essay on Afghan life, as illustrated by Afghan songs, was regarded by Darmesteter as one of his most satisfactory productions. But it is his essays on Jewish subjects that will have more general interest, especially as giving more insight into the life and character of the man. And what perhaps is most striking is his intensely Jewish conception and philosophy of life. Although, as Mr. Jastrow says, "in the course of years Darmesteter moved far away from the lines of orthodox tradition," his Judaism remained a deep-seated force, the motive power of his thought and action. When legal Judaism had ceased to appeal to him, it was the Judaism of the prophets that took hold of him, in whose moral ideals, divested of all dogma or theology, he found inspiration and strength, the soul of his own faith, and thence of all faith. The keynote of his belief seems to have been struck by Rénan, whose "History of the People of Israel," he says, "will form an epoch in religious evolution. The novelty and originality of this great work consist in having made prophecy the centre of interest of

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the history of Israel. Its power of attraction lies in the unlooked-for kinship existing between the heart of the prophets and the heart of the twentieth century." Here was the vital point, the touch that struck fire to the heart and brain of Darmesteter, who says, "Other nations have had their prophets,—men who spoke in the name of God or of supernatural powers. . . . What is unique in Jewish prophecy is that it became the all-powerful weapon, not of charlatans and fools, but of those inspired ones in whom the mind and conscience of modern humanity found their first successful and lasting expression. . . . The dawn of prophecy is the dawn of a new idea; the birth of a new phenomenon for mankind, —a god, become the instrument of morality, whose command is to do justice and to love mercy, who delights not in sacrifice and burnt offering, but in the pure heart and the clean hands. . . . 'Cease to do evil; learn to do well,' He says, through the mouth of these His servants, His holy ones, who have learned to know and do His will. . . . Practical morality, a code of ethics and of politics, the realization of justice on earth without the support of a reward beyond the tomb; this then is all the law and all the prophets, all that we need of divine and human guidance; and now, after twenty-seven centuries, we, the disciples of the modern, of science and of progress, can do no better than to hark back to that cry, the eternal voice of reason and of conscience in the soul of man. . . ." "What matters it," says Darmesteter, "that they spoke in the name of a God,—Jehovah,—and that the modern age speaks in the name of human thought? For their Jehovah was only the apotheosis of the human soul, their own conscience projected heavenward. . . . Hence their religion is the one best fitted to survive, because it is the religion most in keeping with the ideals and spirit of the age,—not the Judaism of myth and ritual, which cannot endure if it renounces its ritual nor spread if it retains it, but the Judaism than can dispense with these; prophetic Judaism, that holds the two great dogmas of the divine unity and Messianism,—unity of law throughout the world and the terrestrial triumph of justice in humanity. These are the two dogmas which at the present time illuminate humanity in its progress both in the scientific and social order of things, and which are termed in modern parlance *unity of forces* and *belief in progress*." To be rid of supernaturalism and mysticism, of mythical religion in every form, to confine our ideals and aspirations to the world in which we live, to the bettering of ourselves and those

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around us, is the goal to be attained, and for this, in some way not quite clear to understand, science and prophecy open out the path and furnish the watch-word.

Such the simple and austere code which Darmesteter practised as well as preached, and one hesitates to criticise, knowing with what high and steady courage he lived up to his ideals and to the creed which thus sufficed him to live by and to die by. But we know very well that this is not enough for most men. "The divine word is not in Ibsen, nor yet in Tolstoï," as he says, neither is it in Darmesteter. His is not the message which shall feed the hunger of the world, the famine not of bread nor water that has fallen upon the souls of men, "but of hearing the word of the Lord." Whether or not we agree with Darmesteter that the Hebrew prophets have spoken the last word of holiness, of justice, and of peace on earth, it seems to us that to draw no distinction between men who spoke as they did, in the name of a personal God in direct and personal communication with themselves, and through them to others, and the men of a modern age that speak in the name of human thought, human conscience and moral sense, is curiously to miss or to set aside the whole weight and power of their words, that which above all carried conviction and authority to the hearts of those who heard and followed them. Whatever belief we of modern times may hold in regard to a supernatural or superhuman principle and basis of life and conduct, in the case of the Hebrew prophets we cannot ignore this without ignoring the very source of their inspiration; we cannot separate their morality from its background of religion without divorcing the body from the soul, the life from its own cause and vital principle. We cannot thus misread the past, and hope to read the future aright, or even solve the riddle of to-day. But the problem of our age is a difficult and complex one, and who can say how it shall be unravelled? Darmesteter may not be a seer, but he is a scholar in the large and true sense, not alone in the world of letters, but of life, where his patient and faithful endeavor, his moral and mental honesty, and his devotion to ideals will secure him an honored place among those who have done service for mankind.

JOSEPHINE LAZARUS.

NEW YORK.

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PERSONALITY, HUMAN AND DIVINE. Being the Bampton Lectures for the year 1894. By J. R. Illingworth, M.A. London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. 274. Price, $1.75.

These lectures are an attempt to show that belief in a personal God is an instinctive judgment, and that that judgment is justified by reason. The old lines of distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion are ignored, and doctrines like that of the Trinity are treated as necessarily involved in the conception of personality. Because man is triune, he must conceive of God as triune also. The chapters in which this argument is elaborated will be found, by most readers, to be more ingenious than convincing. They do not prove enough for the orthodox theologian. The lecturer says that human personality is essentially triune "because it consists of a subject, an object, and their relation." But we are, after admitting this, as far from the doctrine of the Trinity, as formulated in the creeds, as ever. On the other hand, the freethinker, having attained to trinity, is not satisfied that he cannot carry his analysis further into multiplicity. Indeed, the speculations as to why the human mind loves the number three, and why the threefold divisions are so convenient, are of the same order as the speculations of Emerson's forest seer on—

> "Why nature loves the number five,
> And why the star form she repeats."

The chapter on "Moral affinity needful for the knowledge of a person" is full of suggestive sentences. "Self-communication is of the essence of personality." To know any person there must "exist the kind and degree of affinity between us which can alone make self-revelation on his part possible." "The same limitations which qualify our power of knowing a person, qualify also the possibility of his making himself known to us."

The treatment of pre-Christian religion is of scholarly breadth. The old form of apology which endeavored to prove the truth of Christianity in contrast to the falsehood of other creeds is given up. Christianity is treated as the culmination of an historic process as old as humanity itself.

The book is of value for its indications of ethical and spiritual insight rather than for the cogency of its formal argument.

SAMUEL M. CROTHERS.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

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VIA, VERITAS, VITA: Lectures on "Christianity in Its Most Simple and Intelligible Form." Delivered in Oxford and London in April and May, 1894. By James Drummond, M.A. (Oxon.), LL.D., Hon. Litt.D. (Dublin); Principal of Manchester College, Oxford. Williams & Norgate, 1894. Pp. xiv., 331.

This volume brings to a close, for the present at least, the series of Hibbert Lectures, the trustees believing that, "in providing for a lectureship of ecclesiastical history at Oxford which shall give special attention to those churches that have kept themselves free from the fetters of dogma, they are continuing the same work under another name." As the terms of the original trust provided that the funds should be applied in the manner deemed "most conducive to the spread of Christianity in its most simple and intelligible form," Dr. Drummond has set it before him as his special task to deduce "from the New Testament, under the illumination of the various previous studies, the fundamental and essential teachings of the Gospel." He has purposely put aside all doctrinal and critical questions, and confined himself to a general exposition of the religious and ethical ideas embodied in the New Testament. And his treatment of these is naturally of a popular rather than a scientific character.

In the view of the writer, it is the special work of our time "to recover the fundamental spiritual facts which alone can justify any system of doctrine," and the fundamental and permanent fact in Christianity is not a law of duty or of ritual, not even a doctrine, but "an inward experience of life with God of a peculiar and vivid kind, the consciousness of a spirit breathed over the disordered passions and desires, and reducing them to the peace and harmony of love." The earlier lectures deal with the Christian Church, the Bible, the Kingdom of God, and the Doctrine of God. In these there are many remarks that are true and just, though the thought often suffers in expression from a rhetorical richness of phrase, and principles are made use of which are rather assumed than proved.

The sixth and seventh lectures are devoted to an exposition of the ethical teaching of Christianity. Not pleasure or happiness or utility, but spiritual perfection is its end and aim. Conduct indeed has a large place, but mainly as a "sign of the inward condition." This subjective aspect of the moral life is made prominent in the war against impure thoughts, covetousness, worldliness, envy, hatred,

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anger; in the necessity for conversion, which is a change in the inward principle of life; in the law of self-denial, and in that power of faith "to which all things are possible." The virtues which are presented as characteristic of Christianity are (1), in relation to God, faithfulness, vigilance, sincerity, humility, prayer; (2) love to man, universal in its extent, expressing itself in forgiveness of injuries, almsgiving and mutual kindness; (3) duties towards self, such as openness to truth, purity, and the right use of wealth. These various points are passed rapidly in review without much attempt at elaborate or distinctive treatment, but with an earnestness and simplicity of exposition which will commend them to many. In the last lecture there are some interesting remarks on the doctrine of the "Logos."

ROBERT A. DUFF.

UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

THE ETHICS OF GAMBLING. By W. D. Mackenzie, M.A. London: The Sunday-School Union, 1895.

Mr. Mackenzie shows by clear analysis and effective illustration that "gambling," great or small, through its appeal to "chance" in the apportionment of "property," tends to "derationalize" man, substituting for the healthy normal play of human motives a distinctively non-human principle. Mr. Mackenzie admits rightly that in a bet even the loser may get something for his money,—viz., a pleasurable excitement; but he shows that the terms by which this pleasure is purchased are such as to injure "manhood." He deals, on the whole, effectively with the Headmaster of Harrow's defence of "three-penny points;" though it is just possible that Dr. Welldon might defend the retention of a slight and occasional appeal to hazard on the ground that human nature is not to be treated as wholly rational, and that the irrational element can only be gradually eliminated from life. The economic basis of "gambling" described by Mr. Mackenzie does not really differ from the "utilitarian" basis of Mr. Spencer,—viz., that "benefit received does not imply effort put forth." Indeed, had Mr. Mackenzie followed more closely Spencer's clue, I think he would have strengthened his account of the origin of the modern craze for gambling. The disturbance of the right adjustments between "effort" and "benefit" determines the transfer of property more and more by "chance" or by "coercion." Mr. Mackenzie, deeming a full treatment of the theory of property

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beyond his scope, ignores this latter disturbance. But the growth of "gambling," both among classes and masses, is due to an irrationality in transfer of property of which "chance" is only one important element. Commercial gambling in particular is closely linked with powers of monopoly or theft which are also irrational modes of transfer of property. An ordinary business "contract," unless the two contracting parties are equally free, *i.e*, have equal economic resources at their back, is not a "rational" mode of transfer. Mr. Mackenzie does not see that "gambling" is only one important "species" of irrational transfer. At the same time, his book is both acute in its reasoning and highly serviceable as an exposition of the degrading and dehumanizing influence of gambling.

JOHN A. HOBSON.

THE SEXES COMPARED, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Edward Von Hartmann, Author of "The Philosophy of the Unconscious," etc. Selected and translated by A. Kenner, M.A. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895. 8vo. Pp. xi., 164.

In the first essay, whose saleable title is given to the book, Dr. Hartmann exposes the fundamental fallacy of "the faddists who clamor for the equalization of the sexes." They forget that woman is female! But he himself leaves us with the impression that a woman is a sort of sublime cow,—a good creature, no doubt, and masterful in her way,—but inhibited by being always more or less in calf. Otherwise, too, Von Hartmann is naïvely old-fashioned, speaking as if all the peculiarities of woman were permanent characters, whereas many of them are obviously acquired and artificial —the results of her being treated now as a child and again as a domestic animal. He says that one of the results of her emancipation would be "the gradual triumph of papacy over the whole earth," which should cheer the hearts of the Ultramontanes. And, although the illustrious philosopher has said that justice requires the equality of all sensating subjects, he does not write up to this, for a woman who is mortally offended at her lover's former amours is "ridiculous," "it is only old maids who consider innocence an estimable quality in young men," "the experienced and well-tried man is much more fit for a chaste woman than a novice in the field of love," but if the woman has been so much as engaged before her ultimate lord and master appears, "the fragrance has departed

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from the rose." In short, woman must take what she can get and be thankful, but it is man's prerogative to be a sexual epicure.

The second essay is on "The Vital Question of the Family." Hartmann maintains that among the cultured classes there is an increasing proportion of bachelors, the mean age of marriage is later, the average number of children in a household is falling, and the standard of vitality is being lowered; *inter alia*, he also says, that the German people are indebted to the mothers of illegitimate offspring for the increase through which alone they are enabled to maintain themselves victorious against France. Among the evil conditions, he notices excess of work and pleasure, the strain of living above position, the enervating effects of luxury, the inducements to an unconstrained bachelor life, the miseducation and selfishness of modern women, the currency of a false prejudice against large families. In part, too, he makes a scapegoat of the past, believing, for instance, that, owing to the senseless blood-letting of the last century, we have become an anæmic and chlorotic race. Hartmann looks for improvement in life and ideals, but suggests, meantime, a special tax on bachelors, and giving married heirs the larger share of the patrimony of an intestate.

It is impossible to criticise in a few lines the author's opinions on this important question, but, assuming for the moment that the facts are right, we venture to suggest: (1) that the ideal of "eugenics" or good-breeding is qualitative as much as quantitative, that there are other ideals for the German maiden than that of keeping up the fighting strength of the nation (whose population, according to a recent German writer, is increasing over half a million per annum), and that there are great compensating advantages in small families, *e.g.*, greater intensity of education; (2) that if the cultured become increasingly of a selfishly non-mammalian, undomesticated type, they must (and should) disappear, however rich "in the capitalized possession of the work of past generations," even by that process of Natural Selection whose principle, Hartmann says, they are subverting; (3) that the relative infertility of the capables is probably in great part not selfish, but organic—a tax on their individuation. Eagles do not spawn, nor do they fear those who do.

In the essay on "Our Relation to Animals," Dr. Hartmann maintains that our "natural cousins of an older generation" have, as percipient beings, moral rights. They should be treated upon a basis of moral justice, for sentimental soft-heartedness is a highly dangerous quality, as is illustrated by "the forty-nine cats with which

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the good-natured young poet found himself blessed a year after he had interdicted the destruction of the first brood." It is a duty we owe to humanity to exterminate the superfluous brutes, for the rights of the creature must not interfere with ours. But granting that we are of more value than many sparrows, we wonder whether we might not spare a few men, and keep, let us say, the giraffe. The trouble is that man is a somewhat short-sighted judge as to what is superfluous. "The significant question as to whether the ultimate use of certain experiments is sufficiently weighty to justify the pain suffered by the animal lies, of course, quite beyond the pale of legal or judicial interference, and can only be answered by a competent authority. Public opinion should, by its voice, sharpen the knowledge of inquirers, and refine their tact."

The other essays in this interesting and well-translated volume discuss, "The Comforts of Pessimism," which consist in being thoroughly disillusionized in this life, and in contemplating the painlessness of the no-life to come; "The Need of Books;" "The Modern Lust for Fame," and the great differences between Hartmann's philosophy and Schopenhauer's.

J. Arthur Thomson.

University Hall, Edinburgh.

The Female Offender. By Prof. Cæsar Lombroso and William Ferrero. With an Introduction by W. Douglas Morrison, Her Majesty's Prison, Wandsworth. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1895. 8vo. Pp. xxvi., 313, 26 plates.

The point of this learned and ghastly book is explained in Mr. Douglas Morrison's excellent introduction. We have an elaborate organization for dealing with crime; the official expenditure in Great Britain is at least ten millions sterling per annum, and yet crime increases "like a tide that has no ebb." To what is the impotence of criminal legislation due? In part, according to Mr. Morrison, to the fact that the laws are framed and administered on the hypothesis that the criminal exists under the same set of conditions as an ordinary man,—an hypothesis fundamentally false. In part, furthermore, to the fallacy that each offender must be dealt with on exactly the same footing if he has committed the same offence, whereas judicial sentences and disciplinary treatment should be determined by the social and biological conditions of the offender quite as much as by the offence he has committed. Finally, the criminal is largely the product of anomalous biological and

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social conditions; while these remain the criminal must be always with us.

The present volume is a translation of that portion of Lombroso's "La Donna Delinquente" which deals with the female criminal. It is a laborious induction showing that the criminal, particularly, of course, the habitual criminal, has a high percentage of abnormalities, and represents a type midway between the lunatic and the savage. Whether the existence of a specific type be admitted or not, and we confess ourselves unconvinced; whether all Lombroso's interpretations be sound or not, and we venture to think that some are fanciful, there is no denying the cumulative evidence showing that abnormality and criminality are correlated. In the light of this fact the female offender is to be judged and treated.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

NEW BOOKS.

HEDONISTIC THEORIES: From Aristippus to Spencer. By Professor John Watson, LL.D. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons; London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

A SHORT STUDY OF ETHICS. By Charles F. D'Arcy, B.D. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

BUCKLE AND HIS CRITICS: A Study in Sociology. By John Mackinnon Robertson. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1895.

THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF PLATO'S ETHICS. By Arthur Bernard Cook, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Cambridge: Deighton, Bell & Co.; London: George Bell & Son, 1895.

VIVISECTION: Can it advance Mankind? By Charles Selby Oakley, M.A., Formerly scholar of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. London: Dryden Press, J. Davy & Sons, 1895.

STUDIES IN ECONOMICS. By William Smart, M.A., LL.D. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

THE BROTHERHOOD OF MANKIND: A Study towards a Christian Philosophy of History. By the Rev. John Howard Crawford, M.A. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1895.

PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS. By Professor Alfred Marshall, LL.D. Volume I. Third Edition (greatly improved). London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS. By Paton J. Gloag, D.D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1895.

HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By R. Falckenberg. Translated by A. C. Armstrong. London: George Bell & Sons, 1895.

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CATHOLIC SOCIALISM. By Professor Francesco S. Nitti. Translated from the Second Italian Edition by Mary Mackintosh. With an Introduction by Professor D. G. Ritchie. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

SOCIALISM AND MODERN THOUGHT. By the Rev. M. Kaufmann, M.A. London: Methuen & Co., 1895.

ESSAYS AND NOTICES: Philosophical and Psychological. By Thomas Whitaker, B. A., Oxon. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1895.

STUDIES IN THE EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY OF FEELING. By Hiram M. Stanley. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

MORAL PATHOLOGY. By Arthur E. Giles, M.D., B.Sc. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895.

JULIAN, PHILOSOPHER AND EMPEROR, and the Last Struggle of Paganism against Christianity. By Alice Gardner. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1895.

LIVES OF TWELVE BAD MEN: Original Studies of Eminent Scoundrels, by various Hands. Edited by Thomas Seccombe. Second Edition. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1894.

PLEA FOR A SIMPLER LIFE. By George S. Keith, M.D., F.R.C.P.E. London: A. and C. Black, 1895.

VIERTEHALB MONATE FABRIKARBEITERIN. (A Companion to Göhre's "Three Months in a Workshop.") Eine Praktische Studie. Von Minna Wettstein-Adelt. Berlin: Deutsche Schriftsteller-Genossenschaft, 1894.

IPPOLITO TAINE. By Giacomo Barzellotti. Rome: Ermanno Loescher & Co., 1895.

THE SPIRIT OF JUDAISM. By Josephine Lazarus. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1895.

ETHNOLOGISCHES NOTIZBLATT. Berlin: Druck und Verlag von A. Haack, 1895.

A CATECHISM OF LIBERAL FAITH. By Charles F. Dole. Boston: Unitarian Sunday-School Society, 1895.

CHRISTIANITY REINTERPRETED AND OTHER SERMONS. By Charles Strong, D.D. Melbourne: George Robertson & Co., 1894.

ADVANTAGES OF CHASTITY. By Dr. M. L. Holbrook. New York: M. L. Holbrook & Co. London: L. N. Fowler & Co., 1894.

ANARCHY OR GOVERNMENT? By William Mackintire Salter. New York and Boston: T. Y. Crowell & Co, 1895.

LIST OF BOOKS FOR GIRLS AND WOMEN AND THEIR CLUBS. By Augusta H. Leypoldt and George Iles. Boston: American Library Association, 1895.

Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:
Prof. E. Boirac, 27 Rue de Berlin, Paris, France.
Prof. Fr. Jodl, Gerstengasse 43, Prague, Austria.
J. S. Mackenzie, M.A., 58 Claude Road, Cardiff, Wales.
Prof. Josiah Royce, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

APRIL, 1896.

THE ETHICS OF RELIGIOUS CONFORMITY.*

I HAVE taken as the subject of my address, to-day, the "Ethics of Religious Conformity." What I wish to discuss is the duty which the persons who form the progressive—or, to use a neutral term, the deviating—element in a religious community owe to the rest of that community; the extent to which they ought to give expression and effect to their opinions within the community; and the point at which the higher interests of truth force them to the disruption of old ties and cherished associations. There can, I think, be little doubt that this is an ethical question of much importance. But it may reasonably be doubted whether it is one with which we are here called upon to concern ourselves. I will begin by trying to remove this doubt.

(1) The aim of our Society is to be a moralizing agency; to assist "individual and social efforts after right living." Now, actually, in the world we live in, the great moralizing agencies are the Christian churches; and the most advanced thinker can hardly suppose that this will not continue to be the case for an indefinite time to come. If so, surely none can be more seriously concerned than members of an Ethical Society

* A lecture delivered to the West London Ethical Society, November 24, 1895.

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that the vast influence exercised by the churches on social morality should be as pure and elevating as possible.

It is true that our work proceeds on a different basis: our principles are that "the good life has a claim on us in virtue of its supreme worth to humanity" and "rests for its justification" simply "on the nature of man as a rational and social being." But, in the view of the wiser and more thoughtful teachers in the Christian churches, this is not a basis to be rejected, though it needs to be supplemented. I will mention one or two great names. The philosophy of Thomas Aquinas has been for centuries the dominant philosophy in the Church of Rome. In the Anglican Church, and beyond its limits in England, there is no representative of orthodox Christian morality who has gained more esteem than Joseph Butler. Yet no one can doubt that in the view of Aquinas and of Butler equally it was a matter of the highest importance to show how—putting aside the Christian revelation—a life of virtue (not saintly virtue, but ordinary human virtue) might be justified on a consideration of the nature of man as a rational and social being.

Accordingly, in our Cambridge Ethical Society—though this is not, any more than yours, founded on the basis of acceptance of traditional Christian dogma—we have always invited, and, I am glad to say, obtained the co-operation of orthodox persons. It may seem, however, that this unexclusive attitude is incompatible with your express principle that the good life "rests for its justification on no external authority, and no system of supernatural rewards and punishments;" but I venture to interpret this principle as opposed not to Christian doctrine, but to a superficial and unphilosophic form of such doctrine. For in a more profound and philosophical view Divine authority is not conceived as external; it is the authority of that Universal Reason through community with which all knowledge, all truth, comes to human minds; the rewards of virtue and the penalties of vice to which Christianity looks forward in the future lives of individuals are not "supernatural;" since the conditions under which, if at all, those lives will be lived are conditions forming part of one system

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of nature—a system deriving its unity from the One Mind which is its ground. I am far from imposing this as an authoritative interpretation of your formula, but I trust I am right in regarding it as an admissible interpretation: since it is in this view of the scope of your principles that I accepted the honor of being your President, and of addressing you here to-day.

For while I have always sympathized with the movement that has led to the formation of Ethical Societies here and in America, I have always held that they ought to maintain, and I hope that they always will maintain, towards the churches an attitude of fraternal sympathy, without either conflict or competition. The work that the churches are doing, with their vast resources and traditional influence over men's minds, is work in the efficacy of which we must always be keenly interested; while any work that we may accomplish in our little measure, towards the realization of our avowed aims, is work which the thoughtful among them will equally desire to be well done—though, of course, in *their* view it cannot be by itself adequate for the guidance of life.

It is, then, in this spirit that I address myself to the subject that I have announced.

The student of history sees that hypocrisy and insincere conformity have always been a besetting vice of religions, and a grave drawback to their moralizing influence, after the first period of ardent struggle is over and they have attained a stable position of power and influence over men's minds. Indeed, we may say that in the popular classification of professional failings, just as lying is the recognized vice of diplomatists, chicanery of lawyers, solemn quackery of physicians, so hypocrisy is noted as the temptation of priests and of laymen who make a profession of piety. And in most of these cases, on the margin of the vice, there is a region of doubt and difficulty for persons desiring to do what is right: it is not easy to say exactly how far a diplomatist may legitimately go in concealing state secrets, or a lawyer in using his professional skill to defeat justice. It is on this margin of doubt and difficulty, in the case of religious conformity, that I wish now to concen-

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trate attention. With the vice of hypocrisy, so far as it is conscious and unmistakable, I am not concerned. The thorough-paced hypocrite—

> "Who never naming God except for gain
> So never took that useful name in vain"—

we may leave to popular censure,—which is, perhaps, at the present time, sufficiently active in reprobating him. It is the excusable hypocrisy, the well-meant pretence of belief—the region not of vice, but of error in judgment, if error there be —that I wish now to examine.

And here I may pause to note another aspect in which the question I am raising interests us as an Ethical Society. For I conceive that it is largely a sense of the value of the churches as moralizing agencies—as supplying both in their regular common worship and their weekly discourses, an assistance to individual and social efforts after right living—which leads men who do not really believe all the doctrines formally adopted by their church to cling to it in spite of intellectual divergence; and even, perhaps, in some cases to hold office in it and preach in its pulpits. They feel that the teaching received by them in childhood from their church or under its guidance has made them better men than they would have been without it; and they wish their children to be brought up under similar beneficent influences. Without denying that there are good men and women outside the churches, they think that—taking a broad and general comparison of the religious and the irreligious—the conditions and habits of life of the latter are, on the average, manifestly less favorable to morality than those of the former. They think, therefore, that separation from the church would be—from an ethical point of view—a greater evil than a more or less suppressed intellectual disagreement with some of the doctrines in the creeds that they allow themselves to appear to believe.

The question then is, Are they right, and if so why? I need hardly explain, after what I have already said, that I propose to treat this question merely from an ethical point

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of view, and not at all as a theological question. Doubtless, in an age like the period immediately following the Reformation,—when Christians still believed almost universally that there was some one ecclesiastical organization and some one system of doctrines to which the Divine favor was exclusively attached, but were profoundly disagreed as to which organization or system enjoyed this privilege,—any but a theological treatment of these topics would naturally seem idle. The inquiry then, could only be, what degree of variation from the true standard involved deadly error. Even now, it may be held by some, that if a man has the misfortune to hold erroneous opinions, he ought to keep them to himself, and outwardly appear to believe what he does not believe, rather than aggravate his guilt by the open rejection of saving truth. Or, they may hold that such a heretic must do wrong, whatever he does; he is in the miserable dilemma of being either a hypocrite or a schismatic, and it is an unedifying exercise in casuistry to discuss which is worst. On the other hand, men may still believe vaguely that the favor of heaven rests in some mysterious and supernatural way on a particular religious community, even though they may be unable to accept its distinctive theological opinions; or, rather, though they may have renounced most of its dogmas, but not the one dogma that asserts the peculiar salvatory efficacy of its discipline. To minds in any of these attitudes I do not attempt to appeal. Indeed, the mere statement of these views—though I believe them to be actually and perhaps even widely held—suffices to show how opposed they are to the general movement of thought in the present age—among Protestants, at least—both within and without the churches. On the whole, the recognition of the necessity of free inquiry and the respect for conscientious difference of opinion is now so general among thoughtful persons that I believe such persons—whether orthodox or not—are prepared to regard my question as one to be determined on ethical principles common to all sects and schools.

It is necessary, however, to separate this question from another one, that in many minds blends with it and predominates

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over it. It is very difficult for men in any political or social discussion to keep the ideal quite distinct from the actual, and not sometimes to prescribe present conduct on grounds which would only be valid if a distant and dubious change of circumstances were really certain and imminent. It is peculiarly difficult in discussing the conditions of religious union for in theology an ardent believer, especially if his beliefs be self-chosen and not inherited, is peculiarly prone to think that the whole world is on the point of coming round to his opinions. And hence the religious persons who, by the divergence of their opinions from the orthodox standard of their church, have been practically led to consider the subject of this lecture, have often been firmly convinced that the limits of their church must necessarily be enlarged at least sufficiently to include themselves; and have rather considered the method of bringing about this enlargement, than what ought to be done until it is effected. But when we survey, impartially, the development of religious thought from the Reformation to the present time; when we observe how the varieties of beliefs throughout the civilized world have continually increased, the interval between the extremes widening, and the intermediate opinions, or shades of opinion, becoming more numerous; when we see how little the outward organization, symbols, and formulas of the different religious communities have been affected by the discoveries of science or the changes of philosophy, or the successive predominance of novel ideas, novel hopes and aspirations, in the political and social spheres —we shall feel it presumptuous to prophesy that any revolution is now impending in the nature, extension, and mutual relations of the recognized creeds of Christendom so great as to render a discussion like the present unnecessary.

Here, however, it may perhaps be said, "granting the question to be still one of practical importance, it is not one of fresh interest; it is surely an old question which must have been raised and settled—so far as ethical discussion can settle it—long ago." My answer is that the change of thought to which I just now referred—the movement in the direction of wide toleration,—materially alters the conditions of the ques-

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tion; for this movement at once introduces a new danger and imposes a new duty. On the one hand, there is a danger that the disposition to tolerate and respect even widely divergent opinions, when held with consistency, clearness, and sincerity, may degenerate into a disposition to think lightly of conscious inconsistency and insincerity, and so to tolerate the attitude of sitting loose to creeds. On the other hand, every step society takes towards complete civil and social equality of creeds really diminishes the old excuse for lax and insincere conformity. Further, though the toleration of which I have spoken has, like other drifts of current opinion and sentiment, baser and nobler elements, its best element consists of the growing predominance of the love of truth over mere partisanship in theological controversy, which leads to a comprehensive effort after mutual understanding among persons who hold conflicting opinions. As a result of this we find, among the best representatives of orthodoxy, a temperate dogmatism which holds opinions firmly and earnestly, and yet is able to see how they look when viewed from the outside, and to divine by analogy how the opinions of others look when viewed from the inside; and this attitude carries with it a legitimate demand for respectful frankness on the part of their opponents.

And this demand is continually strengthened by the growing influence of positive science as an element of our highest intellectual culture. I do not refer to any effect which the progress of science may have had in modifying theological opinions; but rather to the necessity, which this progress lays with ever increasing force on theologians, of accepting unreservedly the conditions of independent thought which in other departments are clearly seen to be essential to the very life of knowledge. This is a necessity of which the recognition is quite independent of any particular view of theological method or conclusions. It is sometimes said that we live in an age that rejects authority. The statement, thus unqualified, seems misleading; probably there never was a time when the number of beliefs held by each individual, undemonstrated and unverified by himself, was greater. But

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it is true that we are more and more disposed to accept only authority of a particular sort; the authority, namely, that is formed and maintained by the unconstrained agreement of individual thinkers, each of whom we believe to be seeking truth with single-mindedness and sincerity, and declaring what he has found with scrupulous veracity, and the greatest attainable exactness and precision. In respect of theologians of an earlier generation, it was difficult to feel such security, owing to the one-sided stress which they were accustomed to lay on the imbecility of the inquisitive intellect, the inadequacy of language to express profound mysteries, and the unedifying effect of truth upon an unprepared audience. It is because a change is taking place in this respect; because among the most orthodox theologians there are men imbued with the best qualities of the scientific spirit; because the tide of opinion is moving in this direction, and the conviction is daily growing among earnestly religious Protestants of all shades that the exceptional protection that has been claimed for theological truth is a fatal privilege; that the time seems to me opportune for a fresh discussion of this subject. If English Protestants accept as a fact, which they cannot rapidly alter, that the divergence of religious beliefs, conscientiously entertained by educated persons, is great, is increasing, and shows no symptom of diminution; if they admit the principles of complete toleration and complete freedom of inquiry; if they also admit the growing demand of educated laymen, that when they are instructed on matters of the highest moment they should feel the same security which they feel on less important subjects that their teacher is declaring to them truth precisely as it appears to him—then surely the old question as to the nature and limits of the duty of religious conformity may reasonably be examined afresh in the light of these considerations.

Now I find two views—opposed to each other but both somewhat widely spread—which stand in the way of a full and frank discussion of this question. It is said that the question is so simple that it is not worth while discussing it at any length; an honest man can easily settle it on the principles of

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ordinary morality. Again, it is said that the question is so difficult and complex, and the right solution of it dependent on so many varying conditions, that it had better be left entirely to the conscience of the individual, which can take account of his special nature and circumstances. The truth seems to me to lie between these two extremes. On the one hand, I do not myself think it very difficult to find the right general answer to the question: at the same time I do not think it—for the persons whom it practically most concerns—quite a simple answer: I think it requires both impartial sympathy and careful distinctions to conceive and state it accurately. On the other hand, I think that the best general answer that we can obtain is not one that by itself gives decisive guidance to any individual: it leaves, and must leave, much to be determined by the varying views and sentiments and varying circumstances of different individuals: at the same time I think that we ought to confine these variations—in determining the conduct to which moral approval is to be given—within somewhat narrower limits than those within which the practice of well-meaning persons actually ranges.

The argument of those who treat the question as a simple one may be briefly given thus. A church is an association of persons holding certain distinctive doctrines; not necessarily theological doctrines, since the essential differences between one church and another may relate to questions of ritual or of ecclesiastical organization rather than to questions strictly theological, but in any case doctrines or beliefs of some kind. An individual belongs to a church because he holds these distinctive doctrines; or at any rate because he once held them, and his intellect has not yet decisively rejected any important part of them, though it may be in a state of doubt and suspense of judgment on some points. It would be generally granted that, so long as he remains merely doubtful and wavering, he is right in maintaining his old position. But—according to this view—as soon as he has made up his mind against any important doctrine explicitly adopted by his church, it is proper for him to withdraw. Or at any rate—

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for I do not wish to state the view in the most extreme form —this withdrawal is a clear duty in the case of any church which exacts, as a condition of admission to the privileges of membership, an express declaration of adhesion to certain doctrines selected as fundamental in the teaching of the church.

This view of the basis of religious association cannot, I think, be rejected as an inadmissible view: we cannot say that an individual does wrong in holding and acting on it. I should go further and say that it is the most natural and obvious view to take. But it would, I think, be a grave mistake to impose it as the only view ethically admissible.

First, the view clearly does not correspond to the actual facts—the actual basis of common understanding on which a church, in modern society, holds together. It is not only that the members of such a body do not always withdraw when they have ceased to hold any of its fundamental doctrines; but it is not expected that they should withdraw: they violate no common understanding in not withdrawing.

And this is because feelings that every one must respect make it impossible for a man voluntarily to abandon a church as easily as he would withdraw from a scientific or philanthropic association. The ties that bind him to it are so much more intimate and sacred, that their severance is proportionally more painful. The close relations of kinship and friendship in which he may stand to individual members of the congregation, present obstacles to severance which all, in practice, recognize, if not in theory; but even to the community itself, and its worship, he is still bound by the strong bands of hereditary affection, ancient habit, and, possibly, religious sympathies outliving doctrinal agreement. Let us grant that these considerations ought not to weigh against disagreement on essential points. The question remains, Who is to be the judge of essentiality? For a common case—probably the commonest at the present day—is when the point at issue, though selected as fundamental by the church, is not so regarded by the divergent individual: it may very likely appear to him to possess no religious importance whatsoever, and

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therefore to give him no personal motive for secession. A man who feels no impulse to leave a community, and sees no religious or moral gain in joining any other, can hardly be expected to excommunicate himself; others, sympathizing with his motives, shrink from excommunicating him; and thus "multitudinism"—as it has been called—creeps tacitly into churches whose bond of union is *primâ facie* doctrinal. And the principle thus admitted receives a continually widening application: until from the mere fact that a man is a member of a religious body we can draw no inference whatever as to his beliefs, even in the case of a generally upright and conscientious man, and even though the body to which he professedly belongs has a perfectly definite and express basis of theological doctrine.

Are we then to admit this result as legitimate, or are we to regard it as a concession to human weakness, inevitable in fact so long as men are weak, but to be firmly rejected in determining the moral ideal? The reason, in my opinion, for adopting the former alternative is that the service which religion undeniably renders to society lies primarily in its influence on the moral and social feelings, and that Multitudinism tends to keep this influence alive in many cases in which a strict Doctrinalism would tend to destroy it. If a man severs himself from the worship of his parents and the religious habits in which he has grown up, he will, in many cases, form no new religious ties, or none of equal stability and force: and in consequence the influence of religion on his life will be liable to be impaired, and with it the influence of that higher morality which Christianity, in all our churches, powerfully supports and inspires; so that his life will in consequence be liable to become more selfish, frivolous, and worldly, even if he does not lapse into recognized immorality. I need hardly say that I do not regard this as an inevitable result of breaking away from an inherited creed and worship. I do not even say that it is to be expected in a majority of cases. Many are saved from it by devotion to a non-religious ideal—to science or social progress; others by the bracing effect of onerous duties faithfully discharged; others by intense and

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elevating personal affections. But—though I have no means of estimating the proportion with any exactness—I am disposed to think that this moral decline is to be feared in a number of cases sufficient to constitute it a grave danger.

Here I would note, because it is apt to be overlooked, one moral advantage of membership of a church for ordinary men,—which remains even when the authoritative creed of the church no longer seriously affects their belief as to the moral order of the world,—namely, that it constrains them, gently but effectively, to a regular and solemn profession of a morality higher than their ordinary practice. This may sound a paradox; since the gap between Christian professions and Christian practice is one of the tritest themes of modern satire. And I quite admit that for men deliberately and contentedly false to their avowed standard of duty, the express acceptance of this standard is no gain but a loss: they merely add the evil of hypocrisy to the evil of vice or selfish worldliness. But the case is otherwise with the average well-meaning persons who are numerically most important: however much their practice may fall below their professions, it is higher than it would have been if they had not, by professions not consciously insincere, given their fellow-men the right to try them by the exacting standard of Christian duty.

I need not labor this point here: since surely a leading motive for the formation of ethical societies is the desire to gain, for oneself and for others, the moral support to be derived from sharing in the social expression of lofty ethical aims and interests.

For these reasons I think that in defining the moral obligation of church-membership it is right and wise to admit what I have called Multitudinism, and concede to it as much as can be conceded without violating the principles of Veracity and Fidelity to promises.

Now probably you would allow me, if I wished, to assume that the rules of Veracity and Fidelity to promises are rules to be obeyed at all costs: that the evils of violating them at all are graver than all the trouble and disturbance and pain that may be caused by strict adhesion to them. But this is

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not exactly my own view, and I wish here to explain my position with perfect frankness and precision. I am on ethical questions an utilitarian; I think that these and other virtues are only valuable as means to the end of human happiness; and when I examine the matters discussed for ages by casuists, I find exceptional cases in which I have to approve of unveracity. For instance, I should not hesitate to lie to a murderer in pursuit of his victim; nor—if I thought it prudent—to deceive a burglar as to the whereabouts of the family-plate. And there have been ages of violent and inquisitorial religious persecution, when it was excusable, though not admirable, in a heretic to keep his view of truth a secret doctrine, and simulate acceptance of the creed imposed by fire and sword. But in an age like the present, when even aggressive atheism has in England been found no bar to a political career and parliamentary success, the last shadow of this excuse for unveracity has vanished.

But again, I admit cases in which deception may legitimately be practised for the good of the person deceived. Under a physician's orders, I should not hesitate to speak falsely to save an invalid from a dangerous shock. And I can imagine a high-minded thinker persuading himself that the mass of mankind are normally in a position somewhat analogous to that of such an invalid: that they require for their individual and social well-being to be comforted by hopes and spurred and curbed by terrors that have no rational foundation. Well, in a community like that of Paraguay under the Jesuits, with an enlightened few monopolizing intellectual culture and a docile multitude giving implicit credence to their instruction, it might be possible—and for a man with such convictions it might conceivably be right—to support a fictitious theology for the good of the community by systematic falsehood. But in a society like our own, where every one reads and no one can be prevented from printing, where doubts and denials of the most sacred and time-honored beliefs are proclaimed daily from house-tops and from hill-tops, the method of pious fraud is surely inapplicable. The secret must leak out; the net of philanthropic unveracity must be spread in the sight of the

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bird; the benevolent deceiver will find that he has demoralized his fellow-men, and contributed to shake the invaluable habits of truth-speaking and mutual confidence among them, without gaining the end for which he has made this great sacrifice. The better the man who sought to benefit his fellow-men in this strange way, the worse, on the whole, would be the result; indeed, one can hardly imagine a severer blow to the moral well-being of a community than that that element of it which was most earnestly seeking to promote morality should be chargeable with systematic unveracity and habitual violation of solemn pledges, and be unable to repel the charge.

I conclude, then, that while we should yield full sympathy and respect to the motives that prompt a man to cling to a religious community whose influence on himself and others he values, even though he has ceased to hold beliefs which the community has formally declared to be essential; and while we should concede broadly the legitimacy of such adhesion; still all such concessions must be strictly limited by the obligations of Veracity and Good Faith.

This conclusion, however, is somewhat vague and general. I will try to make it rather more definite,—but much must always be left to the varying sentiments and judgments of individuals, and it is an important gain to get the principle clear. In illustrating its application, I will consider first the case of pledges expressly taken on admission to membership. Here I should understand my principle to mean that the obligation to believe what a man has pledged himself to believe should be held as sacred as any other promise, but that as broad an interpretation as is fairly admissible should be put on the terms of the pledge. In determining this I hold it reasonable to be largely guided by common understanding. This is not always easy to ascertain, but if an individual is in doubt, any serious danger of bad faith may usually be avoided by making his position clear to others who do not hold his views. The important point is that he should neither betray the confidence reposed in him by others, nor give them fair reason for believing that he holds opinions which he does not hold.

I may make this clearer by taking a particular example: and

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I will select the case of the Church of England, both because it is practically for us the most important case, and because in an established church with a prescribed form of worship and an elaborate official creed more than three centuries old, the difficulties of the present question reach their maximum. Now there can be no doubt that a member of the Church of England is formally pledged to believe the Apostles' Creed. But it is clearly impossible to take this pledge literally. If it comes into conflict with the obligation to believe what appears to a man true, it can be no more binding than any other promise that conflicts with a definite prior duty. Can we say, then, that in the case of such conflict there is an implied pledge to withdraw? This is, I think, the most natural view to take, and, for a long time, I thought it difficult or impossible to justify morally any other view. But as the pledge to withdraw is at any rate only implied, and as the common understanding, of orthodox and unorthodox alike, gives the implication no support, I now think it legitimate to regard the obvious though indirect import of the verbal pledge as relaxed by the common understanding. At the same time, considering how necessarily vague and uncertain this appeal to a tacit common understanding must be, and how explicit and solemn the pledge taken is, I do not think any one who is a candidate for any educational or other post of trust, in which membership of the English Church is required as a condition, ought to take advantage of this relaxation without making his position clear to those who appoint to the post; so as to make sure that they, at any rate, are willing to admit his interpretation of it. I do not mean that such a person is bound to state his theological opinions,—I think no one should be forced to do that,—but I think he ought to state clearly how he interprets his pledge to believe the Apostles' Creed.

I might pursue this question into much more detail; but this kind of casuistry is apt to weary, unless it is pursued for the practical end of personal choice or friendly counsel; and I am anxious not to seem to dogmatize on points on which I should readily acquiesce in minor differences of judgment. I pass on, therefore, to examine the obligation implied in taking

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part in a form of worship,—especially one which, like that of the Church of England, includes the recital of one or more creeds. Here, however, I think that the only practical question admitting of a precise general answer relates not to the duty of a private member of the church, but to the duty of its appointed teachers. For the mere presence at a religious service—by a clear common understanding—does not imply more than a general sympathy with its drift and aims: it does not necessarily imply a belief in any particular statement made in the course of it, as an ordinary member of the congregation is not obliged to join in any such statement unless he likes. And how far it is desirable that an individual should take any part in a social act of religious worship, while conscious of a certain amount of intellectual dissent from the beliefs implied in the utterances of the worship, is a question which may properly be left to be decided by the varying sentiments of individuals: the effect of public worship on the worshipper is so complex and so various, that it would be inexpedient to attempt to lay down a definite general rule. The minds of some are so constituted, that it would be a mockery to them to take part in a service not framed in exact accordance with their theological convictions; to others, again, quite as genuinely religious, but more influenced by sympathies and associations, the element of intellectual agreement appears less important.

The case of the teacher, the officiating minister, is different; for on him the imperative duty falls—in the Church of England—of solemnly declaring his personal belief in the fundamental doctrines of the church, as stated in the creeds. And here, I think, we come to a point at which the efforts made for more than a generation in England to liberalize the teaching of the English Church, and to open its ministry to men of modern ideas, must find an inexorable moral barrier in the obligations of veracity and good faith. For the minister who recites any one of the precise and weighty statements of the creeds, while conscious of not really believing it, can hardly be acquitted of breaking both these rules of duty at once; since he states solemnly that he believes a theological proposition which he has given an express pledge to believe and

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to teach, and stating this falsely, breaks his pledge,—a pledge which in his case no common understanding can, I think, be held to have relaxed. I believe that there are men who do this, and do it with the best intentions, and with aims and purposes with which we shall all here sympathize; but the more we sympathize with them, the more it becomes our duty to urge—from the purely ethical point of view which we here take—that no gain in enlightenment and intelligence which the Anglican ministry may receive from the presence of such men can compensate for the damage done to moral habits and the offence given to moral sentiments by their example. Let me not be misunderstood. I should desire and think right that in determining the scope of the obligation imposed by the creeds, the utmost breadth of interpretation should be granted, the utmost variety of meanings allowed which the usage of language, especially the vagueness of many fundamental notions, will fairly admit. Christianity, in the course of its history, has adapted itself to many philosophies; and I do not doubt that there is much essentially modern thought about the Universe, its End and Ground and Moral Order, which will bear to be thrown into the mould of these time-honored creeds. But there is one line of thought which is not compatible with them, and that is the line of thought which, taught by modern science and modern historical criticism, concludes against the miraculous element of the gospel history, and in particular rejects the story of the miraculous birth of Jesus. I would give all sympathy to those who are trying to separate the ethical and religious element in their inherited creed from the doubts and difficulties that hang about the "thaumatological" element, and so to cherish the vital ties that connect the best and highest of our modern sentiments and beliefs, religious and moral, with the sacred books and venerable traditions of Christianity. It is not a work in which I am personally able to take part for more than one reason; but I think it a good work and profitable for these times. But it is work that cannot properly be done within the pale of the Anglican ministry. Let them build their edifice of ideas, old and new, and make it as habitable

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as they can for the modern mind; but, for the sake of the ethical aims which we and they have in common, let them not daub it with the untempered mortar of falsehood and evasion of solemn obligations.

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THE MORAL ASPECTS OF SOCIALISM.

THE following considerations upon modern Socialism are suggested by the book entitled "Some Aspects of the Social Problem." * Justice has already been done to its remarkable merits in the pages of this JOURNAL: it is certainly a noteworthy and impressive contribution to the philosophy of Social Reform, and, from the authority of the writers, commands the greatest respect. But I cannot help thinking that, in spite of explicit declarations to the contrary, its tendency is one-sided, and to a certain extent misleading,—more particularly, it seems to me to misrepresent both the aims and methods of modern Socialism or Collectivism. It does recognize a theoretical distinction between a higher and lower conception of Socialism, but the idea of Socialism it habitually uses is generalized from the lower. It may be granted that a philosophical interpretation of Socialism was not within the scope of the essayists, and that they were within their rights in taking Socialism "as it is spoke," and sometimes written: that the "idolon" rather than the "idea" of Socialism was sufficient for their purposes. Still, the power of discrimination has generally been held to be a note of philosophy; and it surely could not have been the bias of philosophy which has led Mr. Bosanquet and Miss Dendy to group together under a common denomination such heterogeneous tendencies as "the organization of industry" and the extension of out-

* "Aspects of the Social Problem." Edited by Bernard Bosanquet. Macmillan & Co., 1895. (Noticed in October number, 1895.)

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door relief. It is true that Mr. Bosanquet guards himself against the position that the charity organization point of view is final or complete; but he is content with "saving clauses;" and the total impression of the book is that the social reformer who will not enter in by the narrow gate of the Charity Organization Society is destined to perish by the way. That Socialism should begin at home, that social reform can only proceed by action on character, that philanthropists should look at least a day ahead, these, and many other "moments" of truth, are at all times seasonable, and they may often have much more than a merely corrective value. But "forgotten truths" cannot be permitted to pass for exclusive truths without further examination. Certainly, some of the essayists regard their aspects of the social problem as the whole of it; and the book as a whole tends to a want of proportion and perspective, an excess of emphasis which is at the same time an excess of indifference, or antagonism, to "other" aspects. In some of the contributions the "twist" is unmistakable, and results in a doctrine which is not only "hard" (in itself, not a bad thing), but self-defeating. Without committing myself to the position either that "the Fabian Society" contains the whole of the truth, or that the Charity Organization Society contains none of it, I shall endeavor to show that the essayists have ignored not only what is most significant in modern Socialism, but what is the most significant defect in the philosophy of the charitable movement; and that of the two "truths" the Socialist truth is the more inclusive, and even the more seasonable: that, in short, it has superior claims as a "regulative idea" of social reform.

The principle which these "studies" illustrate in observation, in criticism, and theory is stated to be "that in social reform character is the condition of conditions." As interpreted and qualified by Mr. Bosanquet, this position can hardly be gainsaid: though it may be remarked in passing that the form of the principle which Mr. Bosanquet rules out (in the Preface), namely, that some undefined miracle of moral agency is loftier and better than any intelligible causation, is the one that is more obviously suggested by some of the reasonings which

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are intended to apply it. It is nowhere suggested, except in the Preface (which is in order of time and of thought the last thing in a book), "that it should be definitely recognized as the extreme of folly to despise the material conditions of life." Certainly, they are reduced, in the course of the book, to a minimum, if not to a negligeable quantity. And even Mr. Bosanquet's powers of explanation, baffling as they are to the critic, can hardly avail against the substantive argument which follows. What, however, I am immediately concerned with is the undertone of hostility towards the Socialist propaganda that runs through the essays, and the constant suggestion that modern Socialism, or Collectivism, is a typical expression of the neglect, or even the denial, of the principle that social reform must be regarded from the stand-point of character. At first sight, it seems true that character has not been put in the foreground of Socialist discussion: its emphasis appears to be laid almost exclusively on machinery, on a reconstruction of the material conditions and organization of life. But machinery is a means to an end, as much to a Socialist as to any one else; and the end, at any rate as conceived by the Socialist, is the development of human nature in scope and power and happiness,—in a word, of character, including powers of life and enjoyment. The quarrel with Socialists cannot be, then, that they mistake the means for the end, but either that they take a low or narrow view of human character, or that the means they suggest will lower rather than raise the scale of life.

Now it seems to me of the utmost importance to realize the nature of the evolution which has been going on in the conception of Socialism. Mr. Sidgwick, among others, seems to think that Socialism repeats itself, and deteriorates in the process. Bacon has said much the same about speculative philosophy. But if either impulse has anything in it at all, represents an inherent tendency of human thinking, it will always repeat itself with a difference, and that difference represents the amount of experience that society has gone through in the interval. The "Critique of Pure Reason" advances upon the "Posterior Analytics" just by the amount of experience it embodies. The same is true of Socialism: if we

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fairly compare the Socialism of the earlier with that of the latter part of the century, we shall find that, however much they have in common, the interval of time in which the human race has had new experience—in the widest of sense —is fairly represented in the latter; the context is different, and the ideas have taken on the complexion of their surroundings; and even when the language is the same, the meaning is changed. The claim of modern Socialism to be "scientific" may be just or not, but it means by "scientific" such an economy as shall be on a line with the modern scientific treatment and conception of life. Its dominating idea is that of conscious "selection" in social life, or of the expression of practical economics in terms of quality of life. From the point of view of its alleged indifference to character, the aims of modern Socialism may be described as an endeavor to readjust the machinery of industry in such a way that it can at once depend upon and issue in a higher kind of character and social type than is encouraged by the conditions of ordinary competitive enterprise. If it does, in a sense, want to make things easier, it is only for the worker, and not for the idler; and the problem with which it is concerned is not primarily a more or less of enjoyment, but a more or less of opportunity for development of character. Its criterion of economic machinery is simply, Does it or does it not make for a greater amount and quality of character?

The older Socialism rested upon such ideas as "the right to live," "the right to work," "payment according to needs," the denial of "the rent of ability," "expropriation without compensation," "minimizing" or "materializing" of wants,— all ideas of retrogressive rather than of progressive "selection." But it would not be too much to say that all these ideas are either silently ignored or expressly repudiated by the "scientific" Socialism, of which "Fabianism," now that it has for the most part sown its wild oats, is the most thoughtful expression. The "ideology" of the older socialists has given way to a deliberately, and in some ways rigidly, scientific treatment of life. Modern Socialism recognizes the laws

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of social growth and development in setting itself against "catastrophic impossibilism" and the manufacture of mechanical Utopias; it recognizes the moral continuity of society in its consideration for "vested interests;" it does not base industrial organization on "the right to work" so much as on the right of the worker, not on "payment according to needs" so much as "payment according to services;" it recognizes the remuneration of ability, provided that the ability does not merely represent a monopoly of privileged and non-competitive advantage; it is aware of the utility of capital, without making the individualist's confusion between the employment of capital and the ownership of it, between the productive and proprietary classes; it is not concerned about the inequality of property, except so far as it conflicts with "equality of opportunity" or "equality of consideration" for all social workers; it does not desire so much to minimize as to rationalize wants, and attaches the utmost importance to the qualitative development of consumption; and, finally, not to enumerate more distinctly economic developments, it recognizes "the abiding necessity for contest, competition, and selection," as means of development, when it presses for such an organization of industry as shall make selection according to ability and character the determining factor in the remuneration of labor. So far from attempting to eliminate "competition" from life, it endeavors to raise its plane, to make it a competition of character and positive social quality. The competition which takes the form not of "doing one's own work" as well as possible, but of preventing any one else from doing it,—the form of competition, that is, in which the gain of one man is the loss of another,—is of no social value. The only competition that can advance individual or social life is simply a corollary of co-operation; it implies the recognition of a common good and a common interest which gives to our own particular work its meaning, its quality, and its value. The competition to get as much as possible for one's self is incompatible with the competition to be as much or do as well as possible, and it is this kind of socially selective rivalry that Socialism is concerned to main-

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tain; and the two kinds of competition belong, as Plato might have said, to two distinct "arts." This is the meaning, for instance, of a "standard" as opposed to a "market" wage. The "Collectivist" policy of a minimum wage for unskilled labor is a deliberate preference of a form of competition which promotes efficiency over a form of competition which aims at (apparent) cheapness.

Which is the most desirable method of selection? The Individualist policy results in the degradation of labor and the increase of burdens upon the State; the Socialist policy, so far from favoring the weak, favors the strong, if weakness and strength are interpreted as relevant to social value; it is a process of conscious social selection by which the industrial residuum is naturally sifted and made manageable for some kind of restorative, disciplinary, or, it may be, surgical treatment. The organization of dock laborers and the extension of factory inspection to sweated industries follow the same lines. Any such form of collective interference, as the freeing of education or the weakening of protected and non-competitive privilege, is in favor of the competition which is not simply a struggle for (unqualified) individual existence, but for existence in a society which rests upon the distribution of "rights" according to character and capacity. In this way it not only favors the growth of the fittest within the group, but also of the fittest group in the world-competition of societies. The whole point of Collectivism is the recognition by society of its interest as a society in a certain type of character and quality of existence. "Can there be anything better for the interests of a state," as Plato puts it, "than that its men and women should be as good as possible?" It is just this social reference that explains the demand which Socialists make upon the organization of industry. Their whole quarrel with private competitive enterprise is that it does not give a qualitative form to the "struggle for existence," and does not—or rather cannot—concern itself with the maintenance of a standard of life.

To speak, therefore, of "the principle of Collectivism" as "lying at the root of a compulsory poor rate" (*Charity Organ*

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Rev., p. 386) reveals an astonishing incapacity for grasping the distinction between the organization of industry (upon selective lines) and the distribution of relief,—a *rôle* which Socialists would contend the individualistic system and method of industry has forced upon "the state." The Poor Law system, so far from being a concession to Socialism, is a device of Individualism, which, indeed, could not "work," unless its logical consequences were intercepted by the workhouse and the infirmary. The Poor Law ministers to a system which Socialists consider makes for deterioration,—a system which lends itself with fatal facility to partial and discontinuous employment, starvation wages, cheap and nasty production, wasteful, useless, and characterless competition. Collectivism is nothing if not constructive, and constructive on lines of social selection; the Poor Law, as it now exists, serves the purpose of a waste-receiver of private enterprise. Collectivism would not, indeed, dispense with the necessity of a poor law; only it would be a branch of its criminal department. It is no doubt true that this kind of selection is forcing itself upon the system of private commercial enterprise in the interests of economic production, and Professor Loria has based upon this fact his view of the gradual evolution of capitalistic industry into some form of associated labor. But "the economy of high wages," of regular and organized labor, and of genuine production is discounted by the "active competition" of low wages, casual labor, cheap and adulterated product. And we find, in fact, that the competition of "quality" is only made possible by the cessation of "the competition" of the market. This is the significance of the "trust," or the "combine," or "syndicate," conceived not as a temporary speculation, but as a permanent organization of a certain industry, based upon the extinction of wasteful rivalry between competitive firms. Whatever may be the abuse of the trust, it is clearly a higher type of industrial organization, and its abuse is just the occasion of Collectivism, towards which it is (in form) a distinct step. It certainly makes a standard of work and a standard of industrial conditions possible; and also it renders the particular industry much more

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amenable to public opinion and, if need be, public control. And the interest of the "Trust" organization is that it is not an artificial creation, but a normal development of modern business. It has become, in fact, no longer a question between "competition" and Collectivism, but between public and private monopoly, between monopolies controlled by private capitalists and monopolies controlled by the community. Monopolies of local service, again, are still higher in the industrial scale, so far as they represent the organization of production by the consumers (that is, on the basis of rational and persistent wants), and are under direct public control. And the policy of "practical Collectivism" lies in exacting from such monopolies the full measure of their capacity, and making them object-lessons in co-operative industry.

It is, after all, only by selection that the collective organization of industry can itself prevail, and this is one argument, if any were needed, against any "catastrophic" closure of the present system. This is the significance of the demand that government and public bodies should proceed upon a more scientific method than is possible to private competitive enterprise in the direction of better organization of employment, standard wages for standard work, shorter hours, and other "model" conditions of industry. In Glasgow, at the present moment, there is actually a competition between municipal tramways and private means of transit, and the whole history of the municipalization of tramways is full of interest and instruction. It is in every way a higher type of industry, and represents a competition of quality. It might be objected that this argument points to a mixed system of public and private industry, and does not meet the difficulty that a monopoly once established is liable to deterioration. It does point to the means by which public will supersedes private administration of certain industries; that is, by proved superiority of type. But it also assumes that the inferior type must give way. Still, the standard remains; it has been to a certain extent set, and to a greater extent recognized and approved, by the community. It could only fall back with a falling back in the community itself in its standard of satisfac-

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tion, material and moral. The higher type at once makes and depends upon its "environment." It may, indeed, have become an object of local pride and civic self-consciousness; a competition may be set up between one municipality and another, and that again would be a competition of quality. Readers of "Unto This Last" will remember a suggestion of the same kind; and it has always seemed to me not the least fruitful idea of the economist who has best understood the real significance of the pre-established harmony between ethics and economics. In the same way it may be said that the real evil of the "drink traffic" is that it is a private, instead of a public, enterprise.

Collectivism will, in fact, proceed by selective experiments of the kind I have indicated, granting the moral and intellectual conditions required by a higher type of administration; and where it does not take the form of social ownership, the principle may be just as effective in the form of social control, —control, that is, in the direction of a higher type of industrial character. Mining, railway, and factory legislation is, from this point of view, simply the application of "standard" ideas to competitive industry.

If, then, this general account of the drift of Collectivism and of its real "inwardness" be at all true, what becomes of the underground polemic against "Collectivist ideals" that runs through the writings of Miss Dendy and Mr. Bosanquet? All the tendencies they attack Collectivists attack, but while they are content with ascribing them generally to (abstract) moral and intellectual causes, Collectivists, rightly or wrongly, find that they are moral and intellectual causes which are logically connected with the whole principle and practice of "individualistic" or private competitive industry. I propose to deal in detail with the references of these writers to Collectivism, mainly with a view to exhibiting in a clearer light the logical idea and consequences of that position. For I will readily admit that this task is necessary, in view of the language that has been, and to a certain extent still is, used by responsible Socialists. I admit that there is some excuse for the perversion, or rather the construction, of Collectivist

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teaching as to "the unemployed," the family, and property that I seem to find in this book. For in some cases the teaching is ambiguous, in others it is evasive, and in certain cases it is demonstrably illogical. The philosophy of Collectivism is still in the making, and reasonable Collectivists themselves are perfectly aware of the hiatuses in their social doctrine. But if we can once disengage the root idea, we can, at any rate, say what are logical consequences and what are not; and I hope to show that neither "free meals," nor "relief works," nor "pensions without services," nor "the breaking up of the family idea," nor "the abolition of private property" are logical deductions from the Collectivist principle; they are, in fact, the denial of it, and could not be part of a strictly "Socialist" economy.

What, then, is the "idea" of modern Socialism, or Collectivism? I take it, Socialism implies, first and foremost, the improvement of society by society. Mr. Bosanquet says that this is going on every day; yes, but not with any clear consciousness of what it is about, or of an ideal. Moreover, empirical social reform does not go beyond improvements within the existing system, or consider the effects of that system as a whole. As a rule, it means the modification of the system by an idea which does not belong to it, with the result that it is either ineffective or that it hampers the working of the system itself. When a prominent statesman can say that "We are all socialists now," he has reduced the idea of "socializing" individualistic commerce to its logical absurdity; it only means that we are endeavoring to rearrange the handicap between "laborer," "capitalist," "employer," and "landlord," according as either becomes the "predominating partner" in legislation. It is impossible to get out of the confused aims of social reformers anything like a point of view, or an idea of social progress; it is a question of evils rather than ideals. Collectivism, as I have said, implies the consciousness by society of a social ideal, of a better form of itself, and its distinction lies in its clearer consciousness of the end to be attained and its conception of the means of attaining it. The means, as we know, are the collective control or collective

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administration of certain branches of industry.* (The ordinary formula of the "nationalization of the means of production" is unnecessarily prophetic, and is rather a hindrance than a help to the understanding of the ideal; by itself, it does not give the point of Socialism, and belongs to the picture-book method of social philosophy.) But, clearly, "control," "organization," "administration," are merely forms, the body without the soul; we want to know—organization in what direction, control to what end? And the answer in quite general and formal terms is (as already suggested) a certain kind of existence and a certain standard of life to be maintained in and through the industrial organization of social needs. Mere nationalization, or mere "municipalization," of any industry is not Socialism or Collectivism; it may be only the substitution of corporate for private administration; the social idea and purpose with which Collectivism is concerned may be completely absent. The presence of the idea is recognized by the extent to which the public machinery is made the conscious and visible embodiment of an ideal type of industry, taking form in certain standard conditions of production as also certain standard requirements of consumption. It is agreed that there are certain things which society is so concerned in getting done in a certain way and after a certain type, that it cannot leave them to private enterprise. We may recall Aristotle's arguments in favor of public as against private education; the important consideration being that education involves principles affecting the kind of social type and character which a particular society is interested in maintaining. The modern industrial state is beginning to realize that it is as deeply concerned in the conditions of industry that determine for better or worse the type and character of its citizens and the standard of its social life. This recognition implies the action of the general or collective will and purpose (which is, of course, also the will and purpose of individuals), represented by the social regulation of

* I am not now concerned with any further specification of these expressions, as this belongs to a more strictly economic inquiry. Mr. Hobson's "Evolution of Modern Capitalism" deals with some of the aspects.

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industry on behalf of a standard of industrial character and production—a standard of life—which society as society is concerned in maintaining. The Collectivist calls upon society to face the logical requirements of the situation; rightly or wrongly, he conceives that a requirement of this kind is incompatible with the existence, and the *raison d'être* of private competitive enterprise. He is trying to familiarize the community with the incompatibility by "example and practice," and at the same time to show that it is not with business, but with modern competitive business that the requirement is incompatible. What is good in ethics cannot be bad in economics, and *vice versa*, is an axiom of Socialism. A standard wage, for instance, is from the point of view of modern commerce a "non-competitive" wage, for it is not regulated by the supply and demand of the market; but from the point of view of good business and also good ethics, it is "competitive;" men are selected for their efficiency, and not for their "cheapness." The attempt to enforce this method of remuneration upon government and public bodies, as also to abolish the contractor, is described and resented by the rate-payer as "Collectivist;" he is right in his description, not in his resentment. The school-board, again, adapts its scale of salaries not to the supply of the market, but to the service required. It is only an individualist who can talk of "high" wages and "high" salaries in this connection; a high wage is simply a wage that is adequate to a certain kind of work done at its best; the wage is high according as the conception of the conditions required for the highest performance of the work is high. The "Socialism" of the school-board is, in the last resort, nothing else than a high standard of education, and therefore of the educator and his conditions of life. It is well to put it in this way, because it is often supposed that "Collectivism" or "Socialism" is simply a policy of securing better conditions of life for the worker, which gives the impression that it is a "class" and not a "social" point of view. The starting-point of social economics is, after all, consumption, and again its qualitative, not merely its quantitative development, rather than the conditions of work and worker as such; they are, of

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course, really aspects of the same thing, as readers of Ruskin are in no danger of forgetting. Accordingly, we find that the economic problem is not approached by the modern Socialist primarily from the side of "distribution," except so far as it affects the character of "production" or "consumption." Anyhow, the great thing is that the point of view is qualitative; or, the regulative idea of Socialism is the maintenance of a certain standard of life, whether it is looked at from the point of view of the condition of the producer or his product. The whole point of factory legislation, again, lies in its attempt to exercise such social control over the conditions of industry as will prevent them from lowering the standard of life which society as society is interested in maintaining; it is becoming less sentimental, and more scientific in its scope; and, again, it is now called "Collectivist."

From the stand-point of such an interpretation of the "idea" and the "phenomena" of Collectivism (which is, I think, justified by the language of its opponents), the suggestion that it is theoretically careless of the type, indifferent to any standard of life, or to the claims of character, is somewhat wide of the mark. So long as Socialism remains true to its scientific conception and treatment of life, it is not likely to commit itself to means of improvement at the cost of the type. Its animating idea is neither pity nor benevolence,—at least, not as usually understood,—but the freest and fullest development of human quality and power. It is characteristic of modern Socialism or Collectivism that its typical representatives are men who have been profoundly influenced by the positive and scientific conception of social life; while its popular propagandists have derived their inspiration from Ruskin, who is, in economics at least, a profound humanist: he is, at any rate, much nearer to "scientific" than to "Christian" Socialism. What is common to Ruskin, Morris, Wagner, "Merrie England," "Fabian Tracts," the writings of Mr. Karl Pearson, and others in their indictment of the individualistic organization of industry is their sense of the frightful and quite incalculable waste and loss of "quality" (in producer and product) that it seems to involve. Whether this criticism is just or not, Socialism is a

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principle which stands or falls by a qualitative conception of progress. It is bound up with ideas of qualitative selection and competition, and with the endeavor to raise in the scale the whole machinery, the whole conception and purpose, of industrial activity, so as to give the fullest scope to the needs and means of human development. Increase of human power over circumstance, increase of humanizing wants, increase of powers of social enjoyment,—these are the ends of state or municipal activity, whether it take the form of model conditions of employment and model standards of consumption, or the provision of parks and libraries and all such things as are means not of mere but of high existence. And, in all these directions, it would be true to say that the State or municipality operates through character and through ideas, and that, as the organized power of community, it helps the individual not to be less but more of an individual, and because more of an individual, therefore more of a definite social person.

State activity, as thus conceived, is not the substitution of machinery for the mainspring of character, but a process of training and adaptation, or it may be of restriction and elimination,—the human analogues of "natural selection" in the physical world. In this way the State, while it endeavors to give the personal struggle for existence a distinctively human and qualitative form, gains a clearer consciousness of the meaning of its own struggle for existence in the social world as a whole. And, just as it raises the plane of competition within its own social group, so it raises it in relation to other groups in the wider social organism. Even now, when we study great social experiments in Germany, it is suggested that there may be a more valuable kind of rivalry between nations than that of mere power, mere trade, or mere territory, —a rivalry of social type and efficiency, within the limits of the specific part each is most fitted to discharge in the whole. The law of national self-preservation, upon such a view, assumes a moral form, for it is not a mere exclusive, but a specific and inclusive "self." Anyhow, one effect of Collectivism would be to increase the self-consciousness of a State as organized for the attainment of a common good and a certain kind

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of social existence; and this consciousness is, from the Socialist's point of view, an increasingly determinate factor in social evolution, just as it is the worst effect of competitive industry that the idea of the State and the conception of a social ideal either disappears or becomes vulgarized and materialized. To depreciate the stress which Collectivists lay upon "organization" is really to depreciate the value of the moral atmosphere any particular manifestation of Collectivism may generate in familiarizing the members of the community with the idea of the social reference and destiny of industry, and of the State as the expression of the nation's conscience. Whatever else, then, Socialism may be, it certainly implies organized action for a social purpose, and this purpose may always be reduced to the conception of a certain standard of life other than mere animal existence.

I am aware that this representation of Socialism, as concerned with the maintenance of "natural selection" under rational human conditions, does not cover all the visible "phenomena" of Socialism. But the philosophic student is justified in limiting his view to the conception of Socialism as a reasoned idea of social progress; and it is its shortcomings in this respect that these essays, by implication at any rate, criticise and condemn. Their criticisms may, perhaps, be roughly indicated as follows: Socialism, it is suggested, aims at the substitution of machinery for character, in the sense that it fails to recognize that the individual is above all things a character and a will, and that society, as a whole, is a structure in which will and character "are the blocks with which we build;" it attaches, therefore, undue, if not exclusive, importance to material conditions and organization; and, further, it is fatal to the conditions of the formation of character, these conditions being private property, the family and "competition" (of character). In all these points they seem to me to compound the *Erscheinung* of Socialism with the *Begriff*.

Socialism and Machinery.—No doubt, at first sight, it seems to be the common idea of all Socialists that, by some reconstruction of the machinery, the actual material organization of life, certain evils incidental to human life, of which that

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organization is regarded as the stronghold, can be greatly mitigated, if not wholly removed. The theory of modern Socialism gives no countenance to this conception of the matter. It suggests neither utopias nor "revolutions" in human nature or modern business: it does suggest a method of business which makes rather larger demands upon human nature, but which, at the same time and for the same reason, is "better" business. Even if that were not so, it is clear that Collectivism is, as I have said, not machinery, but machinery with a purpose; what it is concerned with is the machinery appropriate to a certain spirit and conception of industry. It implies therefore emphatically ideas, and can only operate through "will and character." If, for instance, the machinery of public industry is not directed to keeping this idea before its employés from the highest to the lowest, then they stand in just as much a material and mechanical relation to their work as the employé of a private person or company; and, on the other hand, in proportion as the employé, through want of will or character or intelligence, fails to enter into that social purpose, his work would be as inferior in itself and in its relation to his character as it might be under any individualistic administration. As a practical corollary, the machinery of public industry must be organized in such a way that the workman can feel its interest and purpose as his interest and purpose. The mere substitution of public for private administration is the shadow and not the substance. The forces required to work collectivist machinery are nothing if not moral; and so we also hear the complaint that Socialists are too ideal, that they make too great a demand upon human nature and upon the social will and imagination. Of the two complaints, this is certainly the most pertinent. A conception, however, which is liable to be dismissed, now as mere mechanism, now as mere morality, may possibly be working towards a higher synthesis. May it not be the truth that Socialism is emphatically a moral idea which must have the machinery fitted to maintain and exercise such an idea—for a moral idea which is not a working idea is not moral at all—and this machinery is, formally speaking, the public control

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and administration of industry. Every advance in ethics must be secured by a step taken in politics or economics. Socialism implies both a superior moral idea and a superior method of business, and neither could work without the other. The superiority of the moral idea can only show itself by its works, by its business capacity, so to speak; and the superiority of a method of business lies in what it can do with and for human nature. It follows, therefore, that, just as Democracy is the most difficult form of government, Socialism is the most difficult form of industry, because, like Democracy, it requires the operation of ideas; and the test of the perfection of Socialist machinery is just its capacity to give to the routine industries of the community that spirit and temper which are the note of the freest and highest work. Apart from this atmosphere of interest and purpose, the State and municipality are distinctly inferior as employers of labor, and the history of the co-operative movement itself provides a series of object-lessons in the divorce of machinery from ideas. In its complete form as the organization of production by the consumers, Socialism presupposes a responsiveness in producer and consumer, and Trades-Unions of producers would be as much a part of Socialist as of individualistic organization, as witness the rational union of elementary teachers. On the other hand, if it has sufficient ground-work in moral and intellectual conditions, then the material organization itself helps to create the character it presupposes, and it will be educative in proportion as the employé of the community feels his social recognition, in a raised standard of life all round—shorter hours, dignity and continuity of status, direct responsibility. It cannot be said that Socialists are insensible to the amount of education—in ideas and character—that is required before any sensible advance can be made in the direction of co-operative industry. On the other hand, they do not believe that grapes can grow upon thorns: they believe that things make their own morality. The idea of industry is what institutions make it: it is impossible to put the social idea into institutions which make for the artificial preservation and encouragement of an antagonistic idea,—the

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plutocratic ideal; and it is impossible to get it out of them. It is not enough to modify the bias of the individualistic organization of society: that organization itself makes the whole idea of the organization of society on the basis of service or labor "the baseless fabric of a vision." Mr. Bosanquet demands, and rightly (in theory) demands, that the workingman should realize that he exists only on the terms of recognizing and discharging a definite social function. But what is there in the economic arrangements under which he finds himself to suggest such an idea—the idea on which Socialism rests—either to the propertied or the propertyless man? How is a man who depends for his employment upon a mechanism he can in no wise control or count upon, and upon the ability of a particular employer to maintain himself against rivals, enabled to realize a definite position in the social structure? What he does feel, for the most part, is that he is dependent on a system in which the element of chance is incalculable, and it is just this feeling that makes for a materialistic and hand-to-mouth conception of life. Or what is there in the economic structure of society which suggests to the employer or the capitalist, that their *raison d'être* is not so much to make a fortune as to fulfil a function? In what way, in a word, does the individualistic organization of industry make for the extension of the sense of duty which a man owes to society at large? Moral ideas must at least have a basis in the concrete relations of life. In the same way, we are told, and rightly told, that the value of property lies in its relation to the needs of personality. But how can a man who cannot count on more than ten shillings a week, or at any rate the man who depends upon casual employment or fluctuating trades, regard property as "the unity of his material life"? "A man must know what he can count on and judge what to do with,"—this is stated to be a requirement of morality (as it is certainly of Socialism). But how is this condition realized under a system which not only lends itself to the most violent contrasts between careless ease and care-worn want, between lavish indulgence and narrow penury, but makes it the (apparent) interest of the employing classes

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that the employed should not have property,—a situation which Trades-Unions were meant to meet. Moral ideas are, after all, relevant to a particular working organization of life. Mr. Bosanquet seems to require a Socialist ethics of property and employment from an economic system which is worked upon an individualistic ethics of property and employment. He disclaims, indeed, a policy of quietism; but he certainly gives the impression that a social reformer should not permit himself to dwell very much upon schemes of industrial organization. But the moralist who insists on the fulfilment by society of ideas for which its actual institutions and every-day life give no warrant seems to suggest that ethics are not relative, that (to use his own language in another connection) moral conceptions are not ideas *of* life, but ideas *about* life. To this abstract moral idealism and transcendentalism, of which "the Sermon on the Mount" is the most remarkable expression, Socialism, at any rate, furnishes a needful corrective. Is there anything, the Socialist asks, in men's ordinary industrial life which suggests the ideas they are to have about it? And I conceive that the Socialist who criticises the economic arrangements of society from the standpoint of these ideas is the more helpful moralist of the two. He has done well, if he has simply called attention to the antinomy; and, in a sense, that is the only remedy, for, unless it is felt and recognized, there is nothing from which anything better can grow up. If institutions depend on character, character depends on institutions: it is upon their necessary interaction that the Socialist insists. The greatness of Ruskin as a moralist lies in his relevance, and in his recognition of the inseparability of the moral and the material, of ethics and economics. But the practical man calls him a moral rhetorician and an insane economist.

But apart from the general value of economic organization or of the consideration of it, the writers certainly tend (in theory) to minimize, if not to discount, the influence of material conditions on the betterment of life. Mr. Bosanquet finds that "even in sanitary work and in the work of trained nurses among the poor, the great gain is the individual educa-

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tion to the importance of sanitary matters, and not the mere momentary unstopping of a drain or cleaning out of a room." Nothing could be more characteristic of what I may call the idealist bias. For what is the value of the education in the idea of a thing, if the thing itself has not a greater value? The importance of sanitary education is the best proof of the importance of sanitary conditions; and when one reflects that the presence or absence of sanitary conditions may depend upon the education of other people than the sufferers, the remark seems curiously exacting, especially if it is taken in connection with the following observations by Miss Dendy:

"For the worst cases of neglect of sanitary arrangements, and the consequent effect upon the workers, we refer readers to the chapter on the Cotton Industry in Cheshire and Lancashire,—they will not bear quoting. As an example of the way in which employers accept their responsibilities, we may, however, cite Mill No. 289," etc.

But what does Miss Dendy go on to say?

"Of course, the only radical cure for these evils is a wider interpretation of their duty by the employers, upon whom the well-being of so many depends."

Why is it, one may ask, that a system which Miss Dendy considers it superficial, or indeed immoral, to criticise * lends itself to this divorce between the conscience of the employer and his conception of his economic interest? The Socialist suggests a system of industry in which self-interest does not require to be "checked," and is it quite reasonable for Miss Dendy to complain, on the one hand, that Socialism does not provide the economic motive of private profit, and, on the other hand, to look for the improvement of the conditions of the laborer to the moralization or socialization of the motives of the employer? The evils which Miss Dendy describes are just those for which a "radical cure" can only be found in the popular control of industry. In another study, Miss Dendy, perhaps inadvertently, recognizes the dependence of character upon circumstances. Speaking of an aged spinster, she writes:

* Article on Socialist Propaganda, *Nat. Rev.*, August, 1895.

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"At one time, when far advanced in years, she had temporarily given way to drink, because she used to come home at night too worn out with work to be able to light the fire and make a cup of tea. A kindly neighbor saved her from the fatal habit by the simple expedient of boiling her kettle for her, and since then her faltering steps have kept the strait path."

I can imagine Mr. Bosanquet's comment upon this: "Characters or dispositions react altogether differently to conditions which are quantitatively and materially the same, according to the means by which they come," and so the fact that neighborly kindliness went to the making of the circumstances made all the difference to its effect. Only the exigencies of theory could go so far as this; and, anyhow, the "circumstance" itself was made necessary by the other "circumstance" of the long walk and the long hours, which "an adequate wage," a little "inspectorship," and cheap means of transit might have considerably modified. The intimate connection between circumstances of this kind and drinking, the degrading effect of material uncertainty (which the writers seem to regard as an unmixed moral benefit), are, at any rate, as normal phenomena as the powerlessness of a "degenerate" to cope with such conditions at all. A good deal more investigation is surely needed of the condition under which "character and ideas" operate before we can so easily assume their spontaneous generation and their indefinite possibilities.

"It should be definitely recognized as extreme folly to despise the material conditions of life. The point is simply that all conditions practically mean human action, and all human action comes from the *whole* disposition of human minds. Therefore the disposition of the mind as a whole is the determining condition of conditions, and, though men may suffer through the character of others, they can gain and retain no permanent advantage excepting through their own."

If, then, this is, after all, what the writers mean, namely, that there is action and reaction, it is more evident than the application. It should be at least consistently held, and then it might be found that "uncertainty of employment" may be the making of a rich man's son and the marring of a poor man's.

"I desiderate for every one" (Mr. Bosanquet says, in his rigorous way) "for their own sake, some possibility of falling

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into distress by lack of wisdom and exertion." One might think Mr. Bosanquet is for a moment among the Socialists; but in the next essay he seems to defend "the transference of property to those who have not earned it." There seems to be just a tendency on the part of the Charity Organization Society to treat the working-classes as if they had peculiar opportunities for independent life, just because their circumstances are so difficult; the eye of the moral disciplinarian should surely also be turned upon the many people who are as much pensioners of society as if they were maintained in a work-house. The poor man's poverty (it would seem) is his moral opportunity. But this kind of beatitude for the poor would have more point, if it was always their own lack of wisdom and exertion which occasions their "falling into distress." It must be admitted that the existence of an unemployed rich is as great a source of danger and deterioration to society as that of an unemployed poor, and to a great extent the one is an aggravating cause of the other. Much of the casual employment of the employed classes directly ministers to the unproductive and exclusive consumption of the rich; and one great difficulty in the way of the organization of production on the basis of rational and persistent wants, and the provision of a true industrial basis to the life of the worker, lies in the irregular, capricious, and characterless expenditure of superfluous incomes.

All that the writers have to say about the policy of "relief works," "shelters," and relaxation of the Poor Law is undeniable; but the corollary that "in refraining from action" we are helping on a better time seems hardly adequate, however graphically it can be illustrated from the history of unwise philanthropy. So long as the Charity Organization Society contents itself with the demonstration that devices of this kind only drive the evil further in, it is really helpful; but in refusing to look for any source of the evils except foolish benevolence on the one side and reckless improvidence on the other, it seems to be unduly simplifying the conditions of the problem. It is, at any rate, scarcely justified in deprecating the inquiry as to whether the absence of any rational organization

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of industry may not be a part of the situation. The writers are so much concerned for the moral independence of the worker that his actual economic dependence hardly enters into their consideration. The circumstances beyond the control of great masses of workers engaged in machine industries are much larger than those that their own action goes to make up, and here again Collectivism endeavors to bring these circumstances much more within their control. Lack of employment means to some of these writers lack of character; but where, after all, does character come from? The contention of Socialists is that the absence of any permanent organization of industry, by setting a premium upon partial and discontinuous employment, is itself a contributory cause of shiftless character; and where the character is hopeless, the best way of dealing with it is such an organization as would really sift out and eliminate the industrial residuum.

"The net result of organization at the Docks was in the direction of confining to about six thousand people the work which had previously been partial employment for between twelve thousand and twenty thousand; . . . all permanent organization seems to mean the withdrawal of partial and inadequate employment from a certain class."

Surely in this case system and character act and react: discourage intermittent employment, and you save the "marginal" cases from social wreckage, as Mr. Bosanquet himself points out: while it becomes possible to deal with the industrial residuum in some restorative or restrictive way. But is not this the point of Collectivism? The Fabian Society has repudiated the false economics of "relief works" with quite as much energy as the Charity Organization Society. But the real objection to relief works, as also to "Old Age Pensions," is that they have no logical connection with the system they are designed to palliate. "Continuity of employment" and "superannuation pensions" would be a logical part of a Socialist state; but the idea of "the State" as a relief society to the employés of private industry can only be satisfactory to the employer, whose irresponsibility it would effectually sanction. Under a system of individualistic industry, "State relief" and "State pensions" can only mean an allowance in aid of reckless spec-

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ulation and low wages; and these devices only serve to distract reform from the true line of deliverance,—the best possible organization of industry and the improvement of the conditions of labor. It is not the Socialist who contemplates the "ransom" of the capitalistic system by relief works and old age pensions. I do not think that even the most impatient Socialist has ever suggested that "out-door relief" in any shape was Socialism; while the more scientific Socialist has never regarded these so-called "Socialistic" proposals as other than the herring across the track. Socialism means the organization not of charity, nor of relief, but of industry, and in such a way that the problem of finding work which is not apparently wanted, and of devising pensions for no apparent service, would not be "normal."

The real danger of Collectivism, indeed, is not that it would take the form of the charity that fosters a degraded class, but that it would be as ruthless as Plato in the direction of "social surgery." It may take a hard and narrow view of the "industrial organism" and the conditions of its efficiency. For the progress of civilization gives a social value to other qualities, other kinds of efficiency, than merely industrial or economic capacity. "Invalidism" may be said to develop valuable states of mind, and to strengthen the conception of human sympathy and solidarity. It is possible to apply the conception of an industrial organism in two ways: the State is an organism, and therefore it should get rid of its weak; the State is an organism, and therefore it should carry its weak with it. Perhaps, it might be said that the modern problem is not so much to get the weak out of the way, as to help them to be useful. As Mr. Alexander pointed out in his essay upon "Natural Selection in Morals," "there is no reason in the process of natural selection, as such, why every member of society, provided he be not criminal, should not be preserved and helped to live as effectively as possible." But this would depend upon the possibility of such a readjustment of the economic system that would enable all members to maintain an efficient existence under it, and, conversely, upon the condition that each person should do the work for which he

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is best fitted. "Weakness" and "unfitness" are, after all, relative, and in any more systematic organization of society what is now a man's weakness might become his strength. One advantage of the organization of industry would be the increased possibility of "grading" work, as also of estimating desert. "The problem is no other than that of finding a distribution of work which would allow the weak to render a service proportioned to their ability in the same ratio as the service is required of the strong." The present system makes too little use of the weak and too much of the strong; instead of helping the growth of all after their kind, it fosters an overgrowth of an exclusive and imperfect kind. And, lastly, if it be said that any form of Socialism would be immoral if it denied the necessity for individual responsibility, it may also be urged that the compulsory elevation by municipal and State activity of the most degraded classes is a necessary preliminary to their further elevation by individual effort and voluntary association. But none of these considerations seem germane to private competitive enterprise, which can hardly afford to "treat life as a whole." From all these points of view, therefore, I venture to think that the question of morality is largely a question of machinery, and that the consideration of morality apart from machinery reduces ethics to the level of a merely "formal" science.

Socialism and Property.—Socialism recognizes the value of property by demanding its wider distribution. The social situation is, upon its showing (rightly or wrongly), largely created by the divorce of the worker from property, which means that the arrangement and disposition of his life is outside his own control. Mr. Bosanquet, who seems to be contrasting the principle of private property (as a need of moral realization) with "Collectivist ideals," allows that wages and salaries on which society is largely, and under Collectivism would be wholly based, fulfil the principle of private property so far as they are in some degree permanent and calculable; otherwise, there is a discontinuity in the life of the individual; he cannot look before and after, cannot organize his life as a whole. Here, again, Socialists not only

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accept the idea, but demand some opportunity for its realization. One point of the organization of industry is that it should admit of more permanency, stability, and continuity in the life of the worker than is provided by the precariousness of modern competition. His life, it is contended, is much more exposed than it need be to the worst of material evils—uncertainty. The "Trust" organization of industry, as also the organization of dock labor, are so far upon the line of Socialist advance; and it is well known that this constitutes the attraction of the civil service, which not only provides an industrial basis to the employed,—enables him to look beyond the satisfaction of the momentary or daily want,—but "leaves a margin for the private duties on the one hand, and the public or semi-public on the other, which lie round its margin," allows for the organization of interests as well as duties. Or, again, we are told that the social need is to make the possession of property very responsive to the character and capacity of the owner. Could the endeavor of Socialism be better expressed? Socialism does not, like Communism (with which it is here confounded), rest upon the idea that no man should have anything of his own; it is concerned with such an organization of industry as shall enable a man to acquire property in proportion to his character and capacity, but will make the mere accumulation of property less and less a motive force of industry. Just to the extent that property serves the needs of individuality, Socialism would encourage its acquisition: the idea of hand to mouth existence, the ideal of the slave or the child, is probably much more encouraged by the fluctuations of competitive industry than by the routine but regular and calculable vocation of the public servant.

It may be further considered that it is the object of Collectivism not merely to give a true industrial and calculable basis to the life of the worker, but to give to the possession of property character and propriety. There is a justifiable pleasure in surrounding one's self with things which really express and respond to one's own character and choice of interest, and in the feeling that they are one's own is a

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peculiar and intimate sense. But the number of books, pictures, and the like, which one "desires for one's own," is comparatively small, and would be much smaller, if one had within reach a museum, a library, and a picture-gallery. The property that is revolting is that which is expressive not of character, but of money; the house, for instance, of a successful man made beautiful "by contract." Emerson's exhortation to put our private pictures into public galleries is perhaps extreme, and not altogether practical or reasonable. But the public provision of libraries and galleries, and of things that can be best enjoyed in common, not only enlarges the background of the citizen's life and adds to his possessions, but suggests a reasonable limit to the accumulation of property; as it would most certainly give a social direction to art, when it could minister to the needs of a nation rather than the ostentation of the few. And the same may be said of public parks, means of transit, and the like,—all in the direction of levelling those inequalities of property which serve no social purpose. Whether, then, property be regarded as a "means of self-expression," or as "materials for enjoyment," the Collectivist ideal may be said to lie in the direction not of denying but of affirming and satisfying the need; and the Socialists criticise the distribution of property under individualistic institutions just from the point of view of its failure to satisfy a need of man's nature. Mr. Bosanquet, therefore, really expresses the Socialist's position when he says:

"The real cause of complaint to-day, I take it, is not the presence but the absence of property, together with the suggestion that its presence may be the cause of its absence."

He admits that this raises a practical problem, but seems to suggest that "Collectivism" solves the problem by ignoring the need of property. But when he adds:

"All our work towards permanent organization and improvement of conditions is to the good, as assisting the treatment of life as a whole, so long as we do not artificially introduce the ideal of the child or slave,—of a life forbidden to organize its future, and restricted to receiving what is deemed necessary from day to day,"

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he is really expressing the distinction between Collectivism and Communism. He points out, indeed, that the principle of unearned private property and the principle of Communism really meet in the common rejection of the idea of *earning*, of some quasi-competitive relation of salary to value or energy of service,—in fact, of the organization of society upon a basis of labor, which *is* the ideal of Socialism. Similarly, he puts himself at the point of view of the Socialist when he says:

"The true principle of State interference with acquisition—an alienation—would refer to their tendency, if any, to prevent acquisition of property on the part of other members of society,"

a principle which omits nothing in Collectivist requirements.

Mr. Bosanquet, however, finds a difficulty in the idea of "apportionment to services," which seems to reconcile him to "the transference of unearned property."

"The same sort of chance which transfers property to persons who have not earned it asserts itself now strongly in salaried work, and would probably do so much more intensely if all work were salaried."

He cites the case of Burns as exciseman, and suggests that in a completely salaried scheme of society places would have to be found for good men, and would not always represent their true services to society. This is a somewhat nice point, but it would seem to be an incident of any salaried position, and is a point of distinction between "salaries" and wages by "time" or "piece." Mr. Bosanquet suggests that in the case of men of letters who are also civil servants a man receives a salary he has not earned, with the possibility of his justifying it by some other work, and that in such a case a salary takes on the character of private property obtained by chance: "He is paid not for what he does, but because he has the good luck to be there." This is surely a little straining of facts as well as of theory. Presumably, in any case, and in a complete system still more so, a man would have to justify his salary by the minimum of service and efficiency required.

Socialism and the Family.—Just as Socialism does not logically involve any denial of the principle of property (and

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if anything presupposes it), in the same way it does not necessarily conflict with the idea of the family. In both cases, however, the responsibilities and social utilities that arise out of these institutions would be the measure of their rights. If Socialism would restrict some kinds of property, it would only help to emphasize the moral and social idea of property as such. The conversion of land into deer forests might, for instance, be said to conflict with the idea of property as an element of social and individual well-being. In the same way the very fact that the family is the most formative of moral agencies renders the conditions of its "rights" more exacting; and it has been clear to all consistent Socialists that the family in an individualistic society has an anti-social bias. At the same time, the Socialist, if he builds on human nature at all, must recognize that the institutions of the family and property have their roots deep in human nature, and they are facts which have to be utilized, not suppressed. It is just their close relation to human nature that accounts for their use and abuse. The inherent selfishness of human nature expresses itself more in relation to family and property than to anything else: as they are the most intimate and distinctive institutions of man, human nature finds its intensest expression in them But it is equally true that the unselfishness of mankind also finds its intensest expression in these institutions. If they make selfishness possible, they also make unselfishness, and by removing the occasions of vice, we should also remove the occasions of virtue. This is obvious, but the practical consequence is that, as we cannot develop unselfishness out of selfishness, we must endeavor to give both to property and the family the shape which is appropriate to them as moral and social institutions. This implies some interference with the exercise of the "right" of property, as also with the "right" of bringing children into the world. It is this right which the Poor Law seems to countenance by guaranteeing the right to relief, though it is true that it does not guarantee the right to a full or complete existence; and as things are, there is no way by which the responsibilities of this right can be brought home to the individual. The suggestion that

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Socialism may mean "the collective guarantee of support to all children, and still worse, to all adults," cannot be derived from its logical idea, though it may be suggested by the *obiter dicta* of Socialist writers. A theory of the organization of society on the basis of labor is hardly compatible with the recognition of a right to be supported at the public expense. It is a main cause of the Socialist's dissatisfaction with an individualistic organization of society that such a right is countenanced at all. The danger is that Collectivism would be inclined to let the idea of State policy override the idea of individual responsibility, and to trust to State regulation rather than to an increased sense of social responsibility, as also of social liability. That "the free maintenance of necessitous children" (without further qualification) should appear as an item in an attempt at a "joint Socialist manifesto" is an incident in the Socialist propaganda to which a Socialist is not inclined to attach too much importance; but Mr. Bosanquet is certainly justified in making the most of it as an indication that there is a kind of Socialism which would suppress the personal struggle for social existence. "Free maintenance" would certainly destroy the moral idea of the family: the same cannot be said of free education (and possibly not of maintenance in connection with education), which tends to heighten the idea of responsibility involved in adding children to a community which sets before itself the maintenance of a conscious standard of life: as also it "breaks up" the family life far less than the public school or college system, while it keeps it in touch with the idea of citizenship and social standards. "Free maintenance of necessitous children" is by itself an individualist, not a socialist, point of view. If for "free maintenance" we were to read "compulsory standard maintenance," and for "necessitous" read "impoverished," the proposition would fall within the lines of "scientific" Socialism, and the criticisms of Mr. Bosanquet would have to take a new direction. However, I must confess that Socialists sound an "uncertain"—in some cases, too certain—note on the position of the family in a Socialist state. They are certainly not ideal enough when they regard the family as an incident of "a

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capitalistic *régime*:" the economic arrangements of society certainly give a bias to its individualistic perversion: but its particular mode of action under a particular set of conditions suggests not the abolition of the family, but of the conditions. "We begin our particular affections in our families," and the anti-family Socialist would pull up our social life by the root, thinking in this way to preserve the branches: it is really a question of soil and atmosphere.

Socialism and Competition.—I have already endeavored to show that Socialism is a method of social selection according to social worth (in the widest sense); that it desires to extend the possibilities of usefulness to as many as possible, and would measure reward by the efficiency of socially valuable work. The differences in reward would, however, be of less account in proportion as social consideration and recognition, in the form of various social privileges and opportunities, are extended to any kind of worker, and as the motives to personal accumulation are reduced within social limits. Socialism, therefore, aims at the development of human nature along the line of its highest bent.

It is not to be denied that competitive private enterprise does develop character and performs social services; but the character and the services are of a partial and inferior type. It is partial because a few grow out of proportion to the rest, and therefore in a narrow and anti-social direction; it is inferior, because the character of the economically strong is not of the highest type; if it is of a type fittest to survive in a commercial and non-social world, it is not the fittest to survive in a moral and social order. And what can one say about the quality of products and standard of consumption? Is it as such directed to evolve and elevate life? Matthew Arnold's description of an upper class materialized, a middle class vulgarized, and a lower class brutalized, is a fairly accurate description of modern commercial types.

But not only is commercial competition inferior in form, but it is directly responsible for an increase in quantity over quality of population. The idea that unchecked competition makes for the natural selection of the fittest population

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is singularly optimistic. It is just that part of the population which has nothing to lose that is most reckless in propagating itself. The fear of falling below the standard of comfort at one end of the social scale, and the hopelessness of ever reaching it at the other, combine to increase the quantity of population at the cost of its quality. And what is a loss to society is a gain to the "sweater;" he is directly interested in the lowering of the standard of life, and in the competition of "cheap" labor; and the "sweater" is a normal product of commercial competition. Collectivism deliberately aims at the maintenance and elevation of the standard of life, and at such an organization of industry which would not enable one class of the community to be interested in the over-production of another. To Socialism, "the population," as other "questions," becomes a problem of quality.

There are, of course, many other aspects of Socialism than its adequacy to the requirements of a moral and social idea; that is, of the principle of a progressive social life. It may be thought that Socialism is essentially a movement from below, a class movement; but it is characteristic of modern Socialism that its protagonists, in this country at any rate, approach the problem from the scientific rather than the popular view; they are "middle class" theorists. And the future of the movement will depend upon the extent to which it will be recognized that Socialism is not simply a workingman's, or an unemployed, or a poor man's question. There are, indeed, signs of a distinct rupture between the Socialism of the street and the Socialism of the chair; the last can afford to be patient, and to deprecate hasty and unscientific remedies. It may be that the two sides may drift farther and farther apart, and that scientific Socialism may come to enjoy the unpopularity of the Charity Organization Society. All that I am, however, concerned to maintain is that there is a scientific Socialism which does attempt to "treat life as a whole," and has no less care for character than the most rigorous idealist; and I believe I am also right in thinking that this is the characteristic and dominant type of Socialism at the present day. It may not be its dominant idea in the future, but it is

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the idea that is wanted for the time, the idea that is relevant, and it is with relevant ideas that the social moralist is concerned.

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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OLD AND THE NEW: A RETROSPECT AND A PROSPECT.*

HOMER calls a man a being who looks forward and backward. These two ways of looking cannot well be separated. The thoughts and feelings with which we look to the future are necessarily—though perhaps unconsciously to ourselves—determined by the manner in which we regard the past.

The closing of a century is a fitting time for a retrospect. The marking off of time by centuries is, it is true, a purely arbitrary, civil arrangement, to which neither the events of the inner nor those of the outer life can be made to correspond. I shall undertake to show that the present century began before the year 1800. Perhaps the same may be said of the next. We do not realize that a new century may already have begun, because we are living in the midst of the process, and hence cannot see the gradual rise of the new from the old out of which it springs. Nevertheless, taking advantage of the closing of a century of civil history, let us look back at the process of mental evolution during this period. Such a retrospect suggested itself to me in concluding a work on the history of philosophy of the last century. The views I shall present in this paper are based on the results of that work. Before attempting to show what history has to say with reference to some of the chief problems of thought, let us consider the point of view and standard of mental evolution.

I.

If it is acknowledged that there has been a mental evolution, not only in the individual but also in the race, the ques-

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tion arises, whether the evolution has been a progressive one whether the changes that have gone on are to be looked upon as a gain or a loss. The conception of evolution does not necessarily imply that something is realized more valuable than existed before, or even that present values are conserved. An evolution—in the sense of a regular series of alterations —is conceivable, which means not only retrogression in value but diminution of energy.

In the domain of external nature the law of the persistence of energy has been established within the past fifty years. Natural philosophers are convinced that no energy is produced or annihilated in the material world, but that—where change and evolution are going on—energy is simply transferred to new forms. But persistence of energy does not mean persistence of value. It has been held that such a distribution of heat might possibly take place that all motion and life would disappear from the earth, and the earth consequently be deprived of that which, from our point of view (and any other point of view we cannot conceive), gives it its whole value,—namely, its being the home of life and mind.

But is there persistence of energy and value in the domain of thought? I shall not here treat of the much-disputed question of the relation of mental life to physical energy. Quite independent of this problem the question naturally arises whether energy and value persist in the course of mental evolution. Inasmuch as the science of mental life is not an exact science, like the science of material phenomena, we cannot expect to reach a sure conclusion. If we attempt to point out the persistence of the energy that manifests itself in functions of mental life, we are in an awkward situation. We cannot prove that the possibilities of mental life in the world are always the same. Even if we limit ourselves to any given period, we have no means of proving that energy does not disappear in the process of evolution. Whether in the course of one or more centuries there has been a diminution, a conservation, or an increase of energy cannot be answered positively. But, if we had good grounds to believe that no diminution of energy in mental life has taken place, the question

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would still arise whether the energy exerted is as valuable as before. Morbid evolution may require as much energy as healthy evolution, a process of dissolution may use up as much energy as a process of growth. Since the value of life depends on its force, the persistence of energy is important. But the fulness and richness of the mental life are also to be taken into account. The more and the richer the forms of mental life the more differences and contrasts it embraces, the greater value we assign it. Yet only when richness and differentiation are the expression of centralized force is life healthy. The ratio between force and richness, however, may easily be inverted. We do not restrict our observations to the single individual. Mental life is healthy only when the individual stands in close relation—in both giving and receiving—to society and to the race. The mental life of a period is valued for the force and independence which single personalities possess, as well as the community as a whole. A time is unhappy not only when there is a lack of individual force but also when fellowship, understanding, and harmonious reciprocity between individuals are wanting. If the thoughts and feelings which sustain the life of different individuals are totally unlike, indifference or contempt takes the place of sympathy; there is no pleasure in giving, no pleasure in receiving. The most eminent persons—those whose mental life is of vast importance to large circles—suffer most from such conditions; they feel more keenly because they have greater power to give and receive than others. Many problems and many wants disappear when the mental horizon is narrowed.

The psychology of modern times has shown in different ways the possibility of the persistence under new forms of that energy which was manifested in the earlier stages of mental life. We mention first the phenomenon of transference of feeling as described by Spinoza and Hartley. That which at first is interesting and exciting only as means to an end, may, later on, become the object of independent interest, and by and by stands as an end itself. A belief which we at first accept through obedience to authority may,

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later on, be established through its own force and upon its own foundation, independent of reliance on authority. Institutions which have been established to fulfil certain ends persist until those ends are accomplished and then disappear, unless they are able to serve new ends which were not thought of when they were founded. Both in the individual and in society such changes are constantly going on, without which there would be a break in the continuity of human development. In so-called mental chemistry we have another illustration of the preservation of continuity. Mental phenomena may so combine as to lose their separate peculiarities and present an entirely new phenomenon made up of many distinct parts, just as water is the common product of oxygen and hydrogen. If joy and grief are frequently caused by the same event, the idea of this event may at last give rise to a feeling which is neither joy nor grief, but a combination of both. An adjustment takes place by which the earlier experiences are preserved in a new form. Transference and adjustment are the prime ways in which mental energy persists. But there is no certainty that the value of the new form is equal to that of the old. And it is not the healthy mental life only that shows change and adjustment; the science of mental maladies also recognizes psychical equivalents, as, for instance, when the tendency to epileptic fits takes the form of sudden fury or of some surprising alteration of mood. The question of conservation of value ought here, too (as in the case of the physical), to be distinguished from the question of persistence of energy.

One period in the course of mental evolution is of special importance,—namely, that in which instinct and mere authority become a thing of the past. The horizon is now widened. A great multitude of possibilities and tendencies, both in belief and in action, make their appearance. Hitherto the world was limited and only a single view of life and its workings was known. Now the doors are open to an infinite world in which there are many points of view and many ways of looking at life. With this tremendous growth of the contents of life, may there not be a sacrifice of force, depth, and

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security? Can mental fellowship exist where so many different tendencies and theories and practices have their free development? These questions were broached for the first time during the century of the renaissance, and later during the century of enlightenment and revolution. This fundamental problem runs in various forms through all thinking from the time of the renaissance down to our own day. The renaissance was so occupied with the many and great things which it discovered, it did not feel the full force of the problem. The period of enlightenment was so occupied with criticism and philosophizing, with pushing aside the old and enjoying the exercise of critical and searching reason, it did not ask the question whether the break with instinct and authority had not been a loss which the new forms of mental life could not make good. Even if continuity of development could be shown in every renaissance and revolution (as geology shows continuity of evolution, despite all geologic catastrophes), and even if it could be proved that the energy which formerly appeared in the forms of instinct and reliance upon authority now appears in more widely distributed and more differentiated forms, even then it does not necessarily follow that the new forms are equal in value to the old; and they may have far less possibility of unified action. There is danger lest in the course of evolution life should become more inactive, not because its energy is annihilated, but because it is distributed and differentiated,—just as some natural philosophers believe that our solar system will at last become cold and lifeless, because its energy having been dissipated the great rhythmic movements of the world's process will no longer be possible.

Here, then, is the problem. And, returning to a consideration of the times, I find it characteristic of our century that this problem has been recognized. The period when it was first seen must be regarded as the beginning of our century. But here we must leave the almanac, for the problem was first raised by Rousseau, Lessing, and Kant. Having felt the great importance of modern criticism and the enlargement of the mental horizon, they were the first to see that it was a

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great question how, with the many alterations in its conditions, the force and depth of mental life could be preserved. They belonged to the age of enlightenment, but they saw its limits and felt the necessity of preserving the innermost kernel of the old faith and the old social order, though the husks had to be thrown away. These three men gave the nineteenth century its problem.

II.

A history of the philosophical thought of our century shows that this problem has been felt by many eminent minds, so that it may rightly be called the problem of our time.

Philosophy—especially from an historical point of view—can be considered in two different ways. Philosophical ideas may be viewed as *symptoms* of what is taking place in any period. That which in most men is only a dim feeling or a spontaneous want develops itself into an idea in the mind of a philosopher, and forms itself into an image in the mind of a poet. Philosophical natures have a peculiar tendency to formulate their internal motives into clear thought. Often in the history of philosophy, thoughts arise which the thinker himself is not able to prove or account for. They push their way for the first time into the world, having arisen out of a chaos of experience and the obscure realm of spontaneous tendencies into the full daylight of thought. Their first formulation, therefore, is often imperfect and without a firm basis. It is only at a later period that it becomes clearly understood how they were evolved out of the conditions of the time.

Philosophy, viewed from another stand-point, is the *scientific discussion* of unavoidable, consciously proposed problems; and from this point of view it has often a very different value than from the one just mentioned. But every important philosophical contribution contains both features. Obviously, too, there is an inner connection between *philosophy as a symptom* and *philosophy as a science;* they have in common the desire of the human mind for conscious clearness concerning its own nature and the conditions of its own life. Philosophy is *scientific self-cognition.*

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In this paper I am chiefly concerned with the first point of view. I regard it as a remarkable sign of the times that the problem which was raised by Rousseau, Lessing, and Kant, has been agitated under many different forms throughout the whole of our century. Again and again this idea appears: We have left the safe and firm ground of instinct and authority; criticism and analysis have done their work,—a work which cannot be undone. But we cannot live on criticism and analysis, because life ever demands positive content and firm ground under our feet. We must then find a new standpoint which unites positive force on the one hand with critical universality and mobility on the other. If that is not possible, then life is in a process of dissolution. No doubt we can still live for a time on the habits and tendencies acquired during our childhood of instinct and faith; but these supports will at last be undermined unless new forms are developed. To use an illustration of Renan's (in his "Souvenirs de l'enfance et de la jeunesse"): a legend of Brittany relates that a church bell once sank into the sea at the overturning of a boat. In calm weather, it is said, one can still hear it tolling from the bottom of the sea. So we still hear echoes from the time when people were united in a common and powerful faith and a childlike trust in life. But will not those sounds one day or another disappear? Shall we not become so far removed from them that they can no longer be heard?

Rousseau propounded our problem, not only in his well-known paradoxes, but in all his writings. His mind was agitated by it, and he became its victim. It made him a homeless man, because he neither partook of the joy of the conservatives in the traditional order of things, nor of the Encyclopedists in the new enlightenment. In Germany, Lessing held a similar place between the orthodox and the rationalists, and Kant a similar place between dogmatism and scepticism. They were both, especially Kant, influenced by Rousseau. None of these three men would go back to the old idea, though they were not content with the new. They expected, each in his own way, a "third kingdom." Kant, the greatest thinker of the three, stated more distinctly than the others

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his relation to the two tendencies from which he felt himself at variance. With the sceptics he rejected the dogmatic systems, but not in a mere negative way. He endeavored to understand how these systems arose, to discover the mental needs and powers that had found expression in them, and how they had persisted in different forms. In thus tracing back the finished systems to their first motives, and in investigating the possibility of the persistence of those motives in new relations and under new forms, was, I think, Kant's greatest work. He has shown how to preserve continuity with the past and at the same time keep an open outlook on the future. Kant laid down as the programme of all mental science this: we learn to know the human mind through its work; but the finished work, the elaborated confession of faith or system of thought, easily becomes a dead treasure without any connection with our life, and therefore utterly useless. We ought then to penetrate to the *ultimate forces which produced the work* to see whether they are still at our disposal and under what conditions they may do their work to-day.

In the century following the time of Rousseau, Lessing, and Kant, two chief tendencies in philosophical thinking may be pointed out. One I would call *romanticism*, the other *positivism*. One adopts the method of speculation and contemplation in the solution of problems, the other that of experience and reason based on experience. Starting from the opposite poles of knowledge they stand in sharp contrast to each other; one begins at the top, the other at the bottom. Perhaps, then, they meet. And, in fact, a profounder inquiry shows that both schools are following the Kantian programme. They both have a deep sympathy with the Middle Age and on the whole with the mental life of earlier times. They are discontented with, and have even an aversion to, the mere negative criticism and intellectual pride of the eighteenth century, and look forward to a time when affirmative belief and critical reflection, common faith and individual liberty, shall no longer stand as enemies to each other. They look upon the present age as an age of transition and confusion, as an age of imperfect beginnings. Curiously enough,

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the romanticists are more disposed than the positivists to accept the existing order of things.

In Fichte's "Grundzuge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters" (1806) the theory of the three stages found, perhaps, its clearest and most powerful expression. After the period of instinct and authority there comes, says Fichte, a time which may be called a period of barren liberty—the *Auf- und Aufklärung* period. Rejoicing in enlightenment and criticism it proudly turns from the darkness of the past. Negation and egoism rule. But the thinker looks for a new time when a deeper science and a higher art shall lead to a new view of life that will give all mental needs—feeling as well as thought—their full satisfaction.

Contemporary with Fichte, Saint-Simon, in France designated the eighteenth century as a critical, revolutionary period, which would be followed by a constructive period. His disciples generalized his observation and found constructive and critical periods reappearing at various epochs in the historical development of mankind. A constructive period is characterized by firmness and concentration of thought and faith, and spiritual fellowship. In the critical epochs, on the other hand, doubt and antagonism hold sway at the cost of faith and fellowship. Fichte was influenced by Kant and through him by Rousseau; but Saint-Simon appears to have reached his conclusions through reflection on the development of industry and science. Lessing's paper on "The Education of the Human Race" had no little influence on the further development of the ideas of Saint-Simon through his disciples.

It would carry us too far to point out all the distinct forms in which the same great idea appears in the different romantic and positive philosophers. Only a few traits will be given. The threefold division made by Hegel and his whole dialectical method are, in truth, based upon a schematizing of the law of the three stages. As we know from papers produced in Hegel's youth his philosophical system was based on a study of the history of culture and religion. Happy are those times, says Hegel, in which there is faith in the source and centre of existence, and in which all men are united by a com-

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mon conception of life. The individual is then not isolated from his fellow-men by subjective criticism, nor is there discordance in his soul. But it was Hegel's conviction that the substance of the old faith and of the old order of things could be conserved by means of criticism, and he thought he had proved this in his own philosophy. Schleiermacher was more critical than Hegel. Yet he believed he was able to show the same internal experiences as those from which the essentials of the old faith had been evolved. Neither of these two thinkers would concede that they had altered the old modes of thought in accordance with their own needs. Hence, they may be called romanticists: they believed that they were living over again the life of the past.

As to positivism we have only to mention the theory of Auguste Comte, which makes human development take place in three stages: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. The metaphysical stage is wholly negative and critical; it is a period of dissolution, corresponding to Fichte's "period of liberty," to Saint-Simon's "critical period," and to Hegel's "unhappy times," or period of isolated subjectivism. According to Comte, the positive and the theological stages are kindred; they both have a conception of totality, and in both the individual and the totality are connected in a vital and organic way. John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Schelling, and Eugene Dühring have expressed similar ideas. Carlyle is impressed with the thought that we live in one of the most unhappy periods of history, the period of criticism and mechanism. But he is none the less convinced that the old eternal powers still live, although he regards the romantic, speculative, attempt to revive the old forms as an attempt to hide one's head like an ostrich, to avoid seeing things as they are. He is convinced, moreover, that the Phœnix does not die on the funeral pile but still lives, although we do not hear the stroke of its wings. He has faith in the law of the three stages; he believes in the third kingdom.

The romanticists, as we have already said, are more disposed to believe in the identity of the old and new forms. The positivists are disposed to conceive the relation of the old

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to the new as a relation of equivalents. The romanticists are therefore more conservative than the positivists; but both believe in continuous evolution. The age of enlightenment and revolution depicted the Middle Age as mere darkness and barbarity. The romanticists and positivists, on the other hand, acknowledge its great importance as an organic period. The era of reaction in the nineteenth century depicted the era of enlightenment and revolution as dominated by intellectual pride, bewilderment, and negation; yet the necessity of such critical periods is acknowledged by both romanticists and positivists.

III.

Now, this agreement of the two schools, one may say, is of no great importance, if they disagree about the nature of the third stage, the "third kingdom." As to this there is a decided contrast. But is the doctrine of the three stages acknowledged by all? Are there not those who on this point side neither with the romanticists nor with the positivists, but believe rather that no third stage is wanted, and that, even if wanted, it cannot possibly come?

I shall endeavor to answer these objections, beginning with the second.

While a comparative consideration of the two chief tendencies of thought of the last century has shown a greater agreement than could be expected with respect to a problem of such importance as the one we have contemplated, yet there is another feature which presses itself upon us when we look at the mental development of our own century. I refer to the sharpening of the contrast between creeds. Not content with the acknowledgment and sympathy which both positivism and romanticism display for the old faith and the old order of things, the system that rests on authority develops with ever greater consistency and absoluteness into even more extreme forms. Intermediate stages are crushed out. In the Catholic Church Gallicanism has disappeared, Papal infallibility is proclaimed, and every kind of philosophizing that does not follow in the footsteps of Thomas Aquinas is re-

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jected. And as Catholic theology goes back to the thirteenth century so Protestant theology turns back to the seventeenth. Surely, the adherents of such a theology feel no need of a third kingdom. To them only one thing is needed—that which entered history once for all, and the non-acceptance of which, they think, causes all the distress and disturbance of the time! From that stand-point they look down with compassion upon the poor philosophers who torment themselves with speculation about the possibility of the persistence of mental life, just as those who stand on the shore look with pity at the shipwrecked sailors struggling with the waves. On the other hand there are some who believe that the renaissance and the revolution started a process of dissolution that cannot be checked. They perhaps rejoice at this dissolution, looking upon it as a higher and healthier process than that of evolution. Criticism and negation often destroy the power and the desire for positive life; they kill enthusiasm and mental fellowship. Thus, some do not care for a third kingdom, or if they care for it they do not regard its coming as within the range of possibility. Weary of mind, instead of striving forward, they are much more disposed to throw themselves into the arms of the old faith.

Though these sharp contrasts in the mental world are undeniable, we must not forget the law of transmutation and metamorphosis. Although old forms and traditions are reestablished, does not a closer examination show that essential changes have taken place in the attitude of men toward their creeds? It is very doubtful whether the Christianity of our time, even in its most absolute form, is the same as original Christianity. Thinkers of such different types, as Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, and Kierkegaard, deny that modern Christendom has the same practical conception of life as primitive Christianity. One must be quite blind to what is essential in every practical view of life who does not concede that here at any rate rises a great problem,—the same problem, or a special form of it, which we are considering in this paper.

The sceptical and cultivated are too apt to confound the old system with the forces that worked to produce it. Their

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criticisms hit only the finished system, not the great underlying forces which established it. Experience alone can show whether these forces would still live and work if the forms and methods of their application were essentially altered. The sceptic himself becomes a dogmatist if he denies *a priori* the new possibilities. Some forces are only known when we make use of them. As the dogmatist does not see the metamorphosis which has taken place during recent centuries, so the sceptic fails to see the metamorphosis which is still going on, a metamorphosis which makes each new period of criticism assume a different character than formerly. There is an essential and characteristic difference between Feuerbach and Voltaire in their relation to religion. Transmutation and coalescence of motives is the great household remedy of history in the domain of religious and social evolution.

As to the special nature of the third kingdom, or the new organic period, it is no wonder that there is a very great difference of ideas. A formulation of the creed or social order of the future is impossible. Its general features which we may indicate,—namely, the union of concentrated force and wide diversity, of firm faith and free criticism, of social organization and individual liberty,—even these are not sufficient to construct it. Indeed, constant metamorphoses exclude the possibility of forming beforehand an idea of the structure of the life of the future.

It is a misunderstanding of the province of philosophy to believe that it is a part of its task to undertake such a formulation. Philosophy is scientific self-knowledge, and as such its task is to make clear how we stand in relation to our own mental life, whether the forms of life harmonize with the stage we have reached, and what forces have produced these forms and this particular stage. If the philosopher can contribute to the solution of this problem, he ought to be content. He sympathizes with the disquiet of the sceptic in so far as it comes from real research, and with the conservatism of the dogmatist, in so far as he is really preserving something valuable.

My purpose in this paper has only been to point out a prob-

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lem, not to give a definite solution. But after setting forth a problem there is to be considered the spirit in which and the method by which we must work, and I shall attempt to state the points which seem to me most essential in this respect.

If we acknowledge the problem, we must admit also what may be called the principle of equivalents,—namely, that whatever has filled an essential place in mental life cannot drop out without compensation. Mere criticism cannot be the last word if life is to go on. It is the task of philosophy to inquire whether new forms are ready to take the place of those whose efficiency is decreasing and to discover that which at any given time gives to mental life its force and value. This task, as we have seen, is much more difficult than the corresponding one in the physical domain. But it is a task which cannot be set aside if we wish to understand our life and to help its further progress. We understand a personality only when we see from whence it draws its nourishment and how it uses it, just as we understand an organism only when we follow the process of metabasis or the taking in of elements from without to their manifold uses in the organism. We are still dwelling in psychology on the theory of personality, the conditions of its existence, its growth, and its healthful condition. Romanticism has often contented itself with conceiving personality in the abstract and setting it up as its object of contemplation, as Plato did his "idea." Positivism, on the other hand, endeavors to discover the laws and conditions of personality. By means of experiment and self-observation, by availing itself of physiological and sociological science, it seeks that which holds together the conscious life of the individual and that which connects the life of the individual with the life of the race. Positivist research, instead of undermining the idea of personality, on the contrary strengthens its value and application in showing its fixed laws, conditions, and limits. The fear or contempt of the romanticists for a mechanical order as the frame or foundation of all that persists and has efficiency in the real world, is one of the greatest hinderances to mental progress. It is in itself un-

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belief to suppose that the value of mental life is disparaged by being subject to law and order. A confident faith in the idea of personality creates a belief that its value is not dependent on the existence of old forms, and also an eagerness to examine the orderly process by which it passes from one form to another. This belongs to psychological and ethical research. To this goal the positivist turns his attention when he wishes to escape from the confusion brought about by the difficulties of his special researches. It is an ideal, and every ideal is unattainable in a mathematical sense. By real efforts we may reach an approximation, but it is always only a few more decimals that can be determined.

In our effort to lay the foundation of a philosophy of personality, which shall draw a clear distinction between what is real and what is false in affirmations and negations, and which shall discover the true forms of the "organic" and the "critical" and separate them from false substitutes and misleading features, one thing should be remembered: there is such a vast difference between men that they require very different kinds of nourishment and value different things very differently. Only that which agrees with the individual personality gives real nutrition. If truth is to be personal truth to every individual, one common external expression of it is impossible. The mark of truth for any one is, as a Danish thinker * has said, that it is produced anew by the individual himself: "No manifestation of life is true, unless the individual is exerting his own powers." No excuse is necessary for the individual differences that cause each to shape truth his own way. As energy of life in the individual is shown by the richness of thought and motive which concentrates about his leading aims, so the energy of the life of the race is manifested by the number of persons born with strongly marked individualities, each one taking life and the world as his nature requires. "Critical" periods in history occur when a preceding "organic" order of things becomes too fixed or narrow—when the horizon ought to be widened and new

* Paul Möller.

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experiences and new points of view attained. The future of the race can only be saved then through individual variations. Each variation means a possibility of new experiences, new views, and new discoveries by which the existing life may be benefited. A few years after the middle of this century, two books appeared by two of the greatest English thinkers of the century, each of which—from its own point of view—championed the cause of individuality. These books were "On Liberty," by John Stuart Mill, and "The Origin of Species," by Charles Darwin. Mill plead the cause of individual liberty because it was desirable to have as many original centres of mental development as possible; and Darwin pointed out individual variation in animals and plants as the condition of the evolution of new forms. If we in our day often see individuality assert itself in too forced a manner; if, for instance, in literature strange characters and strange situations are presented from choice,—this is a sign of a new awakening sense, which, while it may have some unsound views, can only be properly developed and disciplined in the school of life and experience. Not by external moralizing, but by confidence in the power of each personality to discover its own laws and to work itself out of each crisis of negation and doubt into a new organic stage,—and by keeping our eyes fixed on the great ideals,—shall we succeed, through the ordeal of criticism and apparent dissolution, in preserving the real values of life.

Our age presents in the world of thought a picture of motley confusion. Some will at any price conserve the old order of things; others, with a light heart, give it up without feeling the want of a new order. Others, again, are mourning because the old times are gone, hoping nothing from the new; and still others have a new complete programme to offer, and are demanding with impatience that the old shall make way for it. The task of the philosopher is to examine the force and value of both the old and the new, and then, perhaps, through his elucidations, and through the faith in the possibilities of life which he can strengthen, he may make a contribution to the work of the times. With Dr. Faust, he is en-

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couraged by the thought: "*Die Geisterwelt ist nicht verschlossen!*" Neither the old dogmas nor the new doubts are able to bar it against us.

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THE MORALITY THAT IS.

THERE was published some time since (on the principle that half an article is better than a whole one) a paper with the title, "The Morality that Ought to Be." * It was a little criticism on the Rationalist endeavor to find a sufficient basis for morals in right reason—a little effort to see "as in itself it really is" the system of morality sought for by those who do not regard possession of the field as a sufficient title in an ethical code to one's obedience, but propose to inquire, not what is the ideal of conduct tacitly implied in the "moral injunctions" in force about one in Society, but what is *the* ideal of conduct—the beau ideal—of all the beautiful impossible ideals the *best.* And the argument went on to show that there are at least as many such ideals, and as many such systems, each in the eye of reason the equal of any of the rest, as there are persons capable of giving in allegiance to them, and that the obligation one is under in respect to such ideals and systems is precisely on a par with the obligation one is under in respect to Logic or Hygiene, or any other practical science—a conditional obligation namely—the obligation, *if* one choose the end, to choose the means, the obligation not to fumble, simply—the obligation, when one has chosen what one wants to do, to do it intelligently, to use one's common sense.

But side by side with these "systems of morality," so-called by the extreme Rationalists, with their beautiful impossible ideals of which one may or may not feel the seductive charm,

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* Philosophical Review, vol. iii., No. 4.

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there subsists also the ethical code in force about one, the ethical code of the Society in which one lives, the inevitable, actual morality, the Morality that Is, with *its* ideal; and though this ideal be not perhaps in any eminent degree either beautiful or impossible, it is still a matter of intelligent interest, (the contrary is by extreme Rationalists too often implied), to know what this ideal really is, and what is really the nature of one's obligation to obey the "system of morality" subsidiary to it. And here also ("without prejudice" to any alternative hypothesis) it is proposed to assume a Rationalist theory of the Morality that Is—the theory, at least, that the Morality that Is is of naturalistic origin.

When one lives with other people, (it is really necessary to make up to the point in question from a respectful distance —the position is not one that can be carried incontinently by assault), one's conduct helps and hinders them in various ways in the attainment of their ends. They take means—it would be strange if they did not!—to make one practise the acts which help them and to refrain from the acts which do the opposite. These means are, of course, nothing else than their power to forward or to hinder one in the pursuit of one's own aims—their power, speaking broadly, to reward or punish one. If one does not lend oneself to their purposes, if one sacrifices their aims to one's own, they show their disappointment by wreaking vengeance on one. Whether the punishment will in the long run attain its object, whether it will in any given community prove effective in pretty generally deterring one from the kind of act at which it is aimed, will depend in a great measure on what kind of act it is. If, (as has always been the case in every cluster of men yet known), some ends are commonly pursued in that community with more energy or desperation than others, and if the act is of a kind that ministers to the most cherished ends of those who perform it and interferes at most with some of the merely minor ends of other people—if it is a "life and death matter," so to speak, with the agents, and an annoyance of no great moment to the other people, then the efforts of the latter to suppress it will in most cases be met with such vigorous

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and prolonged resistance that coercion will be felt to "be more trouble than it is worth;" in especial, if the number of those interested in suppressing the line of conduct in question does not greatly preponderate over that of those who are interested in practising it. If, however, one party does greatly outnumber the other, and has at stake interests not much (if at all) less cherished, it will generally have its own way, so far as that way can be accomplished by the quantity and quality of reward and punishment which it feels it "worth while" to set in operation. These are the two constant factors upon which it depends whether a certain kind of act will in the long run be generally put down in a given community: the greatness of the interest that the agents (and those who benefit with them) feel themselves to have in its performance as compared with the greatness of the interest that "other people" feel themselves to have in its suppression; and the number of the agents (and those who benefit with them) as compared with the number of the "other people."

To deal with these two factors in an exact way is not possible. One cannot say precisely how many people animated by some certain end will on the average be a match for a given number of people animated by another certain end. What one can say is that, other things equal, those who are "dead in earnest," or who are greater in number, will win. A number of men dead in earnest are, other things equal, more than a match for a somewhat greater number of men who are less in earnest, but are not a match for an indefinitely greater number. In the majority of cases a line of conduct will be suppressed which does to a community more harm than good, in the sense that it gratifies aims which are in that place less pertinaciously pursued, or pursued by fewer people than those aims which it thwarts. This is the only measure of benefit or damage that Society recognizes—I don't mean, of course, in words, in public speeches, in the public prints, but in effect: the good that a thing does one is measured by the force one is prepared to bring to its accomplishment; the harm that a thing does to other people is measured by the force that they will put forth to suppress it. This being

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the case, a man will in the majority of cases be compelled to refrain from those acts which do him less "good" than they do other people "harm," and be compelled to practise those acts which do him less harm than they do other people good; the interest of those who benefit or suffer with the agent being reckoned in with his interest.

Now, people are susceptible of education (*Tout s'apprend*, says the French sage, *même la vertu*); people learn in the course of time not to try to make each other do what they cannot succeed in making them do, and not to try themselves to do what will not be permitted; a man learns to do what he has been punished, or has seen others punished, for not doing, and learns not to do what he has been punished, or has seen others punished, for doing. He comes to do with a sense of uprightness and of social good-standing what he feels he will be approved for doing, and to shrink back from, or to do in guilt and secrecy, what he feels will be met by punishment. If he has himself suffered from a certain line of conduct on the part of other people, or has observed others suffer from it, and if on either account he fears in the future himself to suffer from it, he will (independently of friendship for those he helps, or of enmity to those he is damaging) be predisposed to give aid and comfort to any movement of his fellows aiming to make an example of one who has offended in that way. With the lapse of time, that is to say, and the accumulation of experience, the members of a community become in a measure obedient to the general will; the community itself learns to act within bounds and to act in a measure as a unit. It becomes, generally speaking, the custom for the individual member of a community to refrain from lines of conduct which harm "other people"—the "community"—more than they benefit the agent and those whose interests are bound up with his; it becomes, generally speaking, the custom for the individual member to force himself to practise lines of conduct which benefit "other people" more than they harm the agent and those whose interests are bound up with his. It becomes also the custom for the community as a whole to unite in condemning, and if need be in punish-

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ing, whoever does not conform to these customs. The individual learns to anticipate the community's judgment in his own case, and to judge himself according to the same standards by which *it* has long since judged both himself and others—he learns to judge himself according to the same standards by which he has himself long since judged others; for as James Mill remarked, (in the "Fragment on Mackintosh" —a book in manner at the farthest remove from urbanity, from "sweetness," but filled to overflowing with "light"), the judgment that somebody else's conduct is right or wrong is psychologically prior to the judgment that one's own conduct is so.

It is, in effect, in the nature of things, that if people live together at all, certain kinds of conduct will come to be marked for repression, and certain other kinds for encouragement, by social disapprobation and, perhaps, by still severer kinds of punishment. The ground of this distinction lies in the incompatibility of the aims of different people. Certain acts which it is to the advantage of other people that one should practise or forbear, one practises or forbears already in the pursuit of one's own aims. To mark such acts for artificial regulation by Society would be a bit of elaborate folly; they are perfectly "regulated" already. It is only when a certain line of conduct is repugnant to one, that one needs be forced to take up with it. It is only when it is more to the advantage of the community as a whole than it is to the disadvantage of the agent—it is only when it does the community more "good" than it does the agent "harm" (in the sense explained in the second preceding paragraph), that he *can* be forced to take up with it. And one can be forced, too, only in respect to one's voluntary conduct, and in that only to the extent that its consequences are deliberately incurred—are intended. It would be fruitless to punish one for a congenital squint, or for a sallow complexion, or for anything else that one cannot help, or for the results of conduct in itself indifferent that did not turn out as one intended. The utmost that can be done with people is to make them *mean* to do thus and so.

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Society, that is to say, (it is the merest commonplace), is an organism just as truly as a human being is. When people live together, each strives to gain his own ends, but he is not permitted to do so uninfluenced. His conduct is modified in a thousand ways by the proximity of his fellows. His own desires constitute but one factor in shaping his activity; the other factor is constituted by the desires of those about him. Individual conduct ceases in a sense to exist except as an abstraction; all conduct becomes in a sense social; and the ideal of activity on the part of Society is to fulfil all the desires of *all* the associates. In practice, however, something less than this has of necessity to be put up with, the desires of different associates being incompatible; when, therefore, some one has to be sacrificed, Society sacrifices the weak to the strong. Other things equal, (I said it a moment since), the many prevail over the few and the vitally interested over the feebly interested, and the many prevail not because they are many, but because they are strong, and the vitally interested prevail not because they are vitally interested, but because they are invincible. Society, when all is said, is but a "state of nature," in which individuals have learned to act together. The right of the strong arm is disguised simply, not abolished. When a man has to sacrifice all but one of a number of objects of desire, he retains the one which he values most: if these terms may be employed with reference to Society, we may say, that Society also recognizes the "satisfaction of desire" as the ultimate good, but that the measure of goodness is not the quantity or quality of the given satisfaction, but the powers which that satisfaction has at its command. Every object exerts a certain sway over the person who desires it: so long as the influence is held in check by other desires belonging to the same individual, so long as the object in question is not pursued, it is from the stand-point of Society but theoretically "good"; Society has found itself under no practical necessity of providing a means of estimating the relative worth of merely contemplated objects of desire, and has not done so. But the instant that one pursues an object, then Society measures its worth by the relation

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which the power put into its service bears to the power likely to be exerted against it. The desires of a man are, in the estimation of Society, (judging always not by what Society says, but by what it does), of more importance than those of a woman; the desires of a strong man are of more importance than those of a weak man; those of an energetic man of more importance than those of a dawdler; those of a rich man or a noble of more importance than those of a poor man or a commoner. If a man gains in power, all his objects are, from the stand-point of Society, increased in value; more objects of other people will have to be sacrificed before his objects are. Two objects are better than one, whether they belong to the same person or to different persons; it is harder for Society to make one person sacrifice two objects than either of them alone, and harder to make two persons sacrifice an object apiece than to make either of them separately do so. The principle of selection that Society inevitably goes upon is that might makes right, and the Morality that Is, consists simply in the formulation of Society's practice in this particular.

Wrong conduct is that by which the agent intends to "profit himself," and those with whom he identifies himself, at the expense of Society; right conduct is that by which the agent intends to sacrifice himself, and those with whom he identifies himself, for the sake of Society; meaning by Society ("God," said Napoleon, "is always on the side of the biggest battalions") the biggest, or at least the most effective, battalions—the "majority" that "rules," or the indomitable incensed minority who will not be ruled. Social interference and adjustment apart, a man tends naturally to profit by the wrong he does and to suffer by the right—tends naturally to profit by the right that other people do and to suffer by the wrong. The moral code at any given time and place in force (speaking always as a Rationalist)—the Morality that Is—is the sacrifice of the weak to the strong reduced to a system. This is its beautiful, impossible ideal.*

* We have seen that the individual is an organism, and that Society is an organism, and that these two facts cut a figure in Ethics. Modern science has shown (let us at least assume that it has shown) that the universe, too, is an or-

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In strictness and the punctilious observance of the etiquette of proof, one ought here to show forth the comfort given the above account of the Morality that Is (in especial when due allowance is made for differences of tradition, information, and intelligence), by the more or less explicitly recognized assumptions in the casuistry of various peoples and times. But the present undertaking is rather expository than demonstrative—it binds one to making one's best bow to the logical points of the case one after the other as they arise rather than to treating them to a more extended hospitality. Assuming in the present instance, then, that this much has been done—assuming that the essential points of a Rationalist account of the Morality that Is have been passed in review, and that we have ascertained according to that account its beautiful impos-

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ganism, a unit; and it might appear that this fact also cuts a figure in Ethics. If the universe, like the Society, were a mass of intelligent striving units, each pursuing its own ends, so that the actual state of things at any time would be the expression of the activities of all the individuals, then plainly it would cut a figure. Each of the features of one's environment might be regarded as so many dumb commands to adapt one's self to it on penalty of extinction. And what, after all, the Rationalist may ask, is the universe but this? Wherein is it marked off from the Society? In that its units are not intelligent, nor "end-pursuing," nor conscious? What difference does that make—on the hypothesis (which is, perhaps, the dominant hypothesis) of determinism? If the reactions of a conscious being are predetermined, are as purely a matter of cause and effect as those of an unconscious being, I cannot see that it makes any difference. If consciousness is not a wheel in the machine, is a "musical accompaniment simply," its presence or absence is not essential. One receives the law from blindly driven puppets, equally in the case of Society and of the universe at large. Inanimate nature may be said to propound and enforce a code of conduct quite as justly as Society may be said to do so. But a distinction must be marked. Society directs itself to intentions; "Nature" does not. "Nature" makes no allowance for "good intentions;" her business is with acts simply. On this depends the difference in the limits of the two codes. Nothing which is not capable of an intention can commit a social wrong. Many things not capable of an intention may commit a natural wrong. The point of limitation in the latter case depends not on *intention* but on *educability*. So long as a thing is educable, whether it is conscious or not, so long as under given circumstances it will repeat an action which turned out one way, and will not repeat if it turned out the opposite way, so long some analogy exists to the relations an individual bears to the moral code of his Society. Beyond that point the analogy ceases. It had already come to be extremely tenuous.

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sible ideal—what then is the nature of the injunctions of that morality?—and what the nature of one's obligation to obey them?

To answer these questions, it will be convenient to fall back on the familiar distinction between sciences whose controlling object is knowledge—theoretical sciences—and sciences such as Hygiene and Logic, and "practical" sciences generally, whose controlling object is the application of knowledge to some branch of affairs. Ethics clearly, viewed as the theory of the Morality that Is, may be ranked among practical sciences. But the injunctions of morality do not hold the same place in Ethics so conceived, that the precepts of health do in Hygiene, and that the precepts of morality hold in the Morality that Ought to Be—the Morality of Conscience. The difference will appear upon one's asking: "Why not? Why not breathe impure air? Why not disregard the scruples of one's conscience?" The reply is that if one is not going in for health or for conscientiousness, there is no reason why not. But that if one is going in for either of these things, then the reason why not is plain: one is sacrificing one's own object; one has chosen the end, and these are the means—not to take the means is to sacrifice the end. The appeal is to one of the ultimate aims of the individual addressed. At first sight it might seem that there is nothing more than this in a moral injunction issued by Society; and for the man who has had the current morality drilled into him, so that it sits upon him easily, doubtless this is true. The injunctions of that morality have become his second nature; he would not be comfortable in violating them; he would not violate them if he were permitted to do so. It is no sacrifice for him to follow current morals; they have become his conscience, and he is conscientious from habit. But if all men were of this stripe, the Morality that Is would never have arisen. If all men were willing to do right and refrain from doing wrong, in the sense of those words given above, the distinction of acts into those which must be encouraged and those which must be repressed by punishment, would (on any Rationalist hypothesis) never have arisen. The very soil in which alone a moral code, such

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as we are now considering, can grow is an *im*moral community. It is the very essence of a moral injunction of social origin that a number of those to whom it is addressed will find it irksome. Why not disobey it then? Doubtless, in an already articulate Society, because disobedience will be visited by punishment, and obedience gifted with the fruits of fair fame. The appeal is still to some ultimate end of the agent. But there is more in the injunctions laid on us by Society than this. The gist of this moral code is not, "Be virtuous and you will be happy," but "Be virtuous in any case." Its injunction to be honest does not amount to "Honesty is the best policy." The limits of the rule are not "Be honest only so far as is necessary to escape punishment and maintain a good name," but "Be honest at no matter what sacrifice to yourself." The rule against stealing does not bear the same relation to the agent that the rule against breathing impure air does; it is not addressed to the realization of his aims, but to the realization of the aims of Society. The Society and not the individual is the ethical unit—that has been the implication throughout, from the beginning of the exposition. A Society has ends in essentially the same sense that the individual members of it have—things towards which it strives as ultimates, using means to attain them. In any community that *is* a community and not a crowd simply, there are the individuals and their several activities, that of each individual directed to the realization of his own especial ends; and there is the Society and *its* activities, directed to the realization of its especial ends—which are quite different from the ends of any individual, being the ends of the many as against the few and of the energetic as against the lethargic. The means which Society employs are social institutions, of which social "morals" (the Morality that Is) constitute one. Ethics, as the theory of social morals, defines their function, ascertains the source and limit of their power and the principle of their operation. Well, the function of social morals—the purpose of this particular device for helping Society in the attainment of its ends—is to force the individual members of Society to forgo their personal aims to such extent as may be necessary

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for the more complete realization of Society's aims,—to enforce what is "right" and suppress what is "wrong." Just as from the truth, then, that to breathe impure air is not conducive to health, there issues for the individual desirous of health the precept, not to breathe impure air, so from the truth that something—stealing, we will suppose—is contrary to the supposed interests of Society—of the biggest or at least the most effective "battalions"—there issues *for Society* the precept: "Suppress stealing and enforce honesty." Just as, if the individual ask why he should not breathe impure air, the reply is that he will sacrifice his own ultimate ends if he does, so if it be asked on the part of Society why Society should not allow stealing, the reply is that it will sacrifice some of its ultimate ends if it does. Practical sciences of the stamp of Hygiene address their precepts to the individual. But there are practical sciences of the stamp of Social Ethics and Politics which address their precepts to the Society. And here the confusion comes in: when a truth about the individual has been discovered, it results in a precept addressed to the individual, and there's the end of it. But with Society the precept, "Suppress stealing and enforce honesty," is only the beginning. A second precept resulting from the first, or rather a command, a categorical imperative, resulting from it, must be issued from the Society to the individual—the command namely: "Thou shalt not steal." Or, more truly, the action of Society based on the precept to suppress stealing would, if formulated, take the style of a categorical imperative: "Thou shalt not steal." All the rules of the Morality that Is, the items in its code, are of this kind. Social morals are not advisory as Hygiene is; they are coercive. Well, then, when one demands, "Why not steal?" and when to your answer, that stealing is wrong, one rejoins, "What is that to me?" the reply is that primarily it is nothing to him, or rather, that primarily it is to his interest to do wrong, and that he will sacrifice his own ultimate ends by doing right; but that the Society in which he lives is primarily interested in putting stealing down, and that therefore he has indirectly a double interest in not stealing; one as a member of that Society, and

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one as an individual within the scope of social seizure and punishment. In effect the true scientific analogue of "Breathe fresh air" is not the command, "Thou shalt not steal," addressed to the individual, but the precept, "Suppress stealing and enforce honesty," addressed to the Society. And just as the whole authority of the personal precept lies in the hold that the ultimate aim, to the realization of which it is directed, may have over the given individual, so the whole authority of the social precept to suppress stealing and enforce honesty lies in the hold that the ultimate social end in question (the security of property) has over the given Society—a hold which, in a great commercial country like Great Britain, is very strong, and in some others very weak.

If this reasoning is correct, it follows (speaking always as a Rationalist) that there are as many independent "Moralities that Are," with their respective beautiful impossible ideals, as there are Societies. There is no more reason for confounding the moral institutions of one Society with those of another, than the political institutions. And the word *Society* must not be taken as a synonym for nations. There was nothing in the argument to imply that its conclusions do not hold good of any but such great and permanent organizations. They hold good of any organization. No matter what the Society is, whether it is a whist-party, or a camping-party that is to last a week, or a band of robbers, or one of the great national associations that we call, *par excellence*, Societies, the individual always takes part for some end of his own; he is always to gain this by doing something by which the rest benefit as directly as he does himself; there is always more or less opportunity to shirk this task, or to gain the end he has in view more easily, or to gain some other end that he holds preferable, by sacrificing the other members; and against every form of this shirking or this sacrifice there is always a more or less explicit prohibition running from the Society to the individual and sanctioned by the power of the Society (of the biggest, or at least the most effective, battalions) for good and evil over that individual's aims. These prohibitions, from whatever Society they come, constitute its current moral code,

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its "Morality that Is," no matter whether its membership be three, or thirty, or thirty million; no matter whether its object be amusement, or robbery, or murder, or the costermonger joys of trade. To restrict this name to the prohibitions of merely one kind of Society is entirely arbitrary; properly speaking, there are as many moral codes of the social sort—as many "Moralities that Are"—as there are ethical units—as there are Societies.

The logical outcome of all this (and surely from an outcome that is logical the Rationalist may not shrink) is not obscure: there is almost nothing, from the stand-point of the Morality that Is, or rather from the stand-point of the Moralities that Are, that is not at once both right and wrong. Was it right to assist Robin Hood and Little John in highway robbery? to conceal their exploits if they came to one's knowledge? to help the outlaws escape pursuit and capture, or baffle prosecution? Yes and no: it was right from the point of view of Robin and his merry men, it was wrong from the point of view of England. And between these parties there can, in logic, be no decision. There is no call for a decision, the two propositions do not conflict; one may with flawless logic assent to both of them. The one assertion is that highway robbery and helping highway robbers tended to affect the English commonwealth in such and such ways; and so it did. The other assertion is that highway robbery and helping highway robbers tended to affect the robber band in such and such contrasted ways; and so it did. The same act may work one effect on one Society and an opposite effect on another. One may show by appeals to certain systems of the Morality that Ought to Be—of the Morality of Beau-Ideals and Individual Proclivities—that highway robbery is wrong, and that Society has a paramount right to suppress it; but so long as one confines one's self to the Moralities that Are, one can show that highway robbery is right in just as high a sense as one can show that it is wrong. Society's claim to put it down is based not on superior right, but on superior power. Society may convict the robbers judicially, but not logically. She may say, "I will apprehend and punish you if you do not do precisely

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as I wish," but she cannot justify so doing, except by begging the question. She can show that robbery is wrong in the sense that it damages her; the robbers can show that it is right in the sense that it benefits them. As these two propositions are not contradictory, one cannot disprove one of them by proving the other. It may be said that the people damaged by robbery are many, and the people benefited by it few; and if both sets of people belonged to the same Society this would be to the point. But as they belong to different Societies, this is not to the point. The right of a big Society, merely by virtue of its bigness, to force a little one to do its bidding, is not one that the Moralities that Are can be made to justify. England is bigger than Portugal, but cannot on that account be shown to possess the right of coercing Portugal. The robber-band is still smaller than Portugal, that is all. England has not a right by virtue of her size to coerce a strange Society that is only one-tenth as large as she; does she acquire the right if discrepancy becomes still greater? If so, at what point in the division does her right appear? She does not have it at a tenth. Does she gain it at a hundredth? or a thousandth? or a millionth? Or is it felt that there is a distinction between Portugal and the robber-band? Is it felt that Portugal is doing nothing to offend England and the robber-band is? and that it is on that account, and not because of her bigness, that England has the right of coercion? Then England has the right of coercing whom she pleases, for she would please to coerce no one who is doing already as she wishes. Or is it said that Portugal is a different Society from England, and that the robber-band is not? Is it said that the robbers are a part of England's own citizens, and that, therefore, she has the right of controlling them? The reply is that they are not her citizens; they are no part of the social organism; they are not co-operating with her citizens for the associate ends. Their whole attitude towards England and their whole power over England is that of an outsider who is meeting force with force, and not of an insider. The robbers are not citizens, they are parasites. If the comparison is not beneath the dignity of philosophy, one might as well

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call a flea part of the dog he lives upon, as to call a band of robbers part of England. It was remarked, in speaking of the "Morality that Ought to Be," that each of the conflicting ideals was better than any of the others and worse than any of the others, and, therefore, to all practical intents the simple equal of any of the others. We find the same in the ideals looked to by different Societies.*

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* I have spoken of the "Morality that Ought to Be" as distinct from the "Morality that Is," and even as set over opposite to it. In point of history this is not accurate. Writers have seldom made it plain whether they had a mind to ascertain the actual ideal shadowed forth in current morals, or whether giving over that ideal as a low one, or as questionable, they purposed finding a new one. They have sometimes made it plain that to their minds current morals are susceptible of improvement, but they have seldom said whether the improvement would consist in being brought closer to their present ideal, or whether they were fundamentally at fault, ideal and all. Generally, I think, the tacit assumption is that present moral maxims in the writer's age and country are about right—point, at least, in the right direction. So much is this true, that one might almost be excused for regarding theories of the Morality that Ought to Be as insufficient explanations of the Morality that Is. In the Morality that Is there are two striking phenomena. One of them is, that the categorical imperatives do not look to the good of the agent; they look to the general good. The other is, that to the bulk of well-nurtured people any failure to live up to the moral standards of their time is followed by an oppressive sense of guilt, no matter whether they escape detection and punishment or not. Moral people *par excellence* are those who are so on account of this feeling, and not out of regard for the pleasure or displeasure exhibited by their fellows. One division of the class of theories of the Morality that Ought to Be would seem to be the elaboration of the first of these striking phenomena, the other would seem to be an elaboration of the second; each under the impression that the phenomenon chosen is the central fact of the Morality that Is. It is hardly necessary to say that both impressions are mistaken, if the foregoing exposition is at all correct. The central fact of the Morality that Is, is not that it looks to the general good, but that it sacrifices the agent. It was expressly shown that acts of the kind that the agent would perform on his own account were outside of the sphere of morals, no matter how much Society might benefit by them. If all the acts that Society would benefit by were so much to the agent's advantage that he would practise them spontaneously, Society would not invent and put in motion a moral code to force him to practise them. The other fact, that of conscience, is even less significant. To the Morality that Is, it is an accident, simply, that people come in time to judge themselves by the same standard that their fellows use in judging them, and to do with a sense of shame what they have always condemned and seen condemned in others. If no one possessed a conscience, the moral code would still flourish—would flourish even

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And now a word in the interests of lucidity: perhaps it is a digression, but there are digressions that are more pertinent than the text. Ethics, strictly speaking, I suppose, is the rationale of morality; but there is another inquiry associated with this term, and not commonly distinguished from the rationale of morality. I mean the investigation into the content of ultimate aims, or, as it is technically styled, into the *summum bonum*. It is a pity that two such distinct fields of investigation should not be marked off by separate names. Discussion on both subjects is in a somewhat hopeless tangle because this is not done. One can hardly tell half the time whether one is reading about what is good or what is right. As often as not, one finds that one is reading simply of good conduct, which is neither. The investigation into the *summum bonum* starts with the fact that some ends are pursued only as a leading up to other ends, which are pursued for themselves. There are things which are merely good for something, and things which are goodness itself; there are intermediate ends and ultimate ends. And the pith of the inquiry is, what is the content of these ultimate ends? What quality is it that makes a thing to be valued for its own sake? Is it pleasurability? or painfulness? or the having-been-desired-and-the-being-at-last-attained? Or are objects of pursuit so heterogeneous that they can be catalogued simply, and not classified? This is the fundamental question in relation to the *summum bonum*, and its solution is in nowise necessary to a rationale of morality. That its solution is in nowise necessary to a theory of the Morality that Is, should be evident at once. The Morality that Is has nothing to do with the content of one's aims. It deals only with the relation which they bear to the aims of the dominant party in Society. The theory of the Morality that Is requires only that the individual have aims of some kind, no matter

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more luxuriantly than at present. But though, historically, expositions of the Morality that Ought to Be may be regarded as mistaken efforts to interpret the Morality that Is, it must be confessed that they have started a distinct problem, and elaborated a separate Ethics—which is sometimes even regarded as the only Ethics.

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what, which are out of joint with the aims of Society—the Society of which he is a member. This condition fulfilled, there might be two Societies diametrically opposed in the content of the aims their respective members have in view, and the theory of their respective moral codes would be the same. One moral code would sanction in any given case precisely what the other would repudiate, but they would together constitute an application simply of the same theory to different circumstances. Ethics (as the theory of social morals) ends at a point this side of where the investigation into the *summum bonum* begins. The same is true of one class of theories of the Morality that Ought to Be. To ascertain that the satisfaction of all my desires is for me the moral ideal, one needs to premise only that what I value in and for itself is good, and that what I value more is for me better. It is not necessary to show what quality in things it is which makes me value them. The fact that I do value them is for this system of morals enough. And as for the other class of theories of the Morality that Ought to Be, it repudiates at the outset all commerce with the content of one's ultimate aims. It announces at once that some aims are low—that some aims ought not to be gratified; so that whatever it is which makes objects of desire in general to be valued, it must be something quite foreign to what would on this theory make them to be moral. The very key-note of this theory is that good in the ordinary sense of the word and good in morals are two quite distinct things. The investigation into the *summum bonum* belongs rather to Politics than to Ethics, and rather to Metaphysics than to either of them.

But to return from this digression (if it is a digression), the Rationalist finds in the Morality that Is as in the Morality that Ought to Be an utter conflict of obligations and ideals and no rational ground (the accent throughout is of course on rational ground) of decision between them. For their conflict is practical, not speculative. There is no hinderance or let in logic to one's assenting simultaneously to all of the systems of the Morality that Is and to all of the systems of the Morality that Ought to Be. They all use the same words,

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but define them in different senses; and it is quite permissible to believe that the same thing is right in one sense and wrong in another, or right in half-a-dozen senses and wrong in others. The need for choice arises only when one comes to act. One may in all consistency believe that—what you will—is right in one sense and that the precise opposite is right in another, but which must one do? It is for the Rationalist (*Il ne faut pas regarder le devoir en face, mais l'écouter et lui obéir les yeux baissés!*) an affair of taste. No matter what one does, one will equally on Rationalist principles do wrong, and equally do right; one may do as one likes, one may take one's choice—*must* take one's choice. The craving for an authoritative rule—an outer prop and stay—is one that Rationalism cannot fill; the instinctive wish to ease the burden of one's life, to shift somehow the responsibility of choice, to escape the mortal isolation of facing the world alone with nothing but one's inclination for a guide, must go ungratified. One object, no matter how abominable or what, is in the eye of logic as good as any other to the man who values it as highly; there is, speaking always as a Rationalist, no central, superior, over-reaching standard of conduct or morality at all, there is only greater inclination—and superior force. The only title that Society or anybody can have to interfere with anybody else is superior might—men and Societies must in the last resort stand frankly to arms and give as their reason for coercing one another their simple determination to have things the way they want them. This is Society's position at once in relation to its own members, and to aliens, and to other Societies, and the position of individuals in relation to the world and to one another; and for any one of any masculine vigor, (even Rationalism is not wholly seamy-side), one would suppose that that should after all be enough—a certain not unwelcome simplification even of the problem—an abridgment of the sphere of casuistry and futilities and preliminaries. Such a person is not likely to find himself appalled at the discovery that he is standing on his own feet, nor to feel an inner sinking and need of some imperative external curb to keep him from doing anything especially abominable. It

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is something (he must feel) for robustness that no such curb, no "outer prop and stay," exists—that he is free to do as he likes because he likes it—and to take the consequences. He will naturally deprecate as morbid any effort to make him look upon the situation as tragic; but if he *must* regard it so,

> (νῦν δ'—ἐμπης γὰρ Κῆρες ἐφεστᾶσιν θανάτοιο
> μυρίαι, ἃς οὐκ ἔστι φυγεῖν βροτὸν οὐδ' ὑπαλύξαι),

he may well take refuge in the not unmanly stoicism of Sarpedon, and reply simply—*ἰομεν*.

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SELF-REALIZATION.—A CRITICISM.

WHEN we ask ourselves, impelled by the curiosity to know what is to be known which is the beginning of philosophy, whether we can find one common expression which shall tell us the inmost nature and meaning of all we can desire and all we pronounce "good," we find ourselves in the position indicated by Aristotle in the first book of the "Ethics." Answers are readily given to our question, but most of them unfortunately stamped with the character of intellectual cheapness. Such coarse and vulgar cheats as pleasure, popular approbation, the rewards of a world to come, and many another shameless aspirant to the position of ethical end of ends cannot impose on us for any length of time. Another solution of the problem has, however, been put forward which demands more serious consideration. It is not these low and imperfect ends, say the "cultured," in which we could possibly find final satisfaction; what we desire, and that in which our true happiness is to be found, is something which includes them all and is yet beyond and more than them all. To realize yourself, say these "Sicilian and Ionian Muses," is the secret of all content and aim of all endeavor. It is your only and all-embracing duty to realize yourself in action, and that because, when you come to think of it, in no action can you seek anything else even if you would. And if we raise the

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old difficulty about self-sacrifice, we are met by the severer Muses with the suggestion that sacrifice is only disguised attainment. That the doctrine has no difficulty in disposing of the shallow and unspeculative rivals that contested it on its first appearance among us is certainly true; that it has done excellent service in leading us towards a more intelligent insight into the mechanism of action no one, I think, will deny; that the theory is connected with some of the greatest names in the philosophy and literature of our century is equally incontestable. But all views of ultimate truth are bound in the end to be imperfect and one-sided, and this particular view has by now been so much overdone that I think we may without irreverence towards "our fathers that begat us" ask whether it is not at last time to examine its pretensions without prejudice; the more so that the most illustrious of its champions among living English moralists has in his last and greatest work made something very much like a formal recantation of at least part of the doctrine.

Confining ourselves, then, within the limits of morality, properly so called, let us ask whether it is in any way an adequate account of the end to call it realization of self. I pass by the question whether a complete conception of the good as the sum total of the desirable may not include elements which come to us unasked for and unaimed at, and which are, strictly speaking, not the realization of anything. Such goods, if indeed they exist, at least fall outside the sphere of ethics, where we have to do throughout with goods which are attained by intelligent and purposive movement. Keeping entirely within this narrow sphere, I would ask, Is it a satisfactory definition of the moral end to say that it is self-realization? If I would know what it is to be moral, does it help me much to be told,—It is to realize yourself. And we may say at once that in one sense no action *need* be self-realization, while in another all acts good and bad alike are or are not self-realization, just as we please.

(1) If it were meant that what is consciously before the mind of the moral agent as the final cause of his action is the conception of the desired end as a realization of himself, then

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I should say the idealistic morality was guilty of the very confusion it is never weary of charging on the Hedonist; it takes what the philosophic spectator finds in the completed action, and reads it quite unwarrantably into the mind of the agent. (That the relation thus surreptitiously introduced differs in the two cases does not affect the identity of the psychological blunder.) No act is ever done with the deliberate intention of realizing one's self on the whole, just as no act is ever done with the conscious purpose of getting pleasure in general; and though it is true that a *particular* act *may be* done with the intention of realizing your own personality in a particular way, the act may be, and, I should say, where it is a morally good act, usually *is* done without any such conscious determination by a relation to the self of the agent. In most ordinary cases of the discharge of duty what is before the agent's mind as his motive is rather "this act is good" than "this act is good for *me*," and in what is popularly called "self-sacrifice" the conception of my *self* as the subject of satisfaction to accrue from the act in question can be absolutely excluded, though that is no doubt a limiting case.

(2) But I do not suppose—in spite of certain suspicious utterances of Professor Green—that this is what is really meant. The meaning is rather that the philosopher, on analyzing the agent's conduct, finds that the moral act is, as a matter of fact, a realization of the agent himself, whether he knew this when he resolved on his course of action or not. If we distinguish what is "in" the mind from what is "before" it at any given moment, we may say the relation of the act willed to the willing self as its own realization was "in" the mind as determining the desire, but not necessarily "before" it as the desired end. In that case, however, we have only escaped one contradiction by falling into a worse; every act, good and bad alike, will now be equally an assertion, and therefore a realization, of the acting self. You cannot, we must be careful to remember, ever have self-realization except at the cost of self-negation; no act can be mere or pure realization, just as no act can be bare negation. Alike in sacrifice and in selfishness, in

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patriotism and in treason, in virtue and in vice, you assert and make real some one element in the self at the cost of all the rest. So that in one sense all acts, in another no acts, are realizations of self. If the commandment says, "Do not steal," and my inclination says "Steal," whatever the resultant act may be, it cannot, in either case, be entire self-realization or unqualified self-negation. The only choice ever open to me is between realizing this or that element in myself, or, if you like to speak more philosophically, between identifying this or that element with the whole self for the time-being. Even the self-suppression of inactivity is, in a round-about way, assertion of self. Thus, it is not enough to answer the question, When am I truly moral? by saying, When you are yourself. Self may be anything or nothing, and the fundamental distinction between the good and the bad act or life will be a distinction, within the sphere of self-realization, between the objects in which self-satisfaction is found, or, to put it in another way, between the aspects in the self which are marked out from whatever else is found there as the self to be realized. And this is a consideration which is admitted by the patrons of self-realization themselves, though they do not always seem aware of its results. Green will tell us that self-realization is as much the end of the enlightened pleasure-seeker as of the patriot or the saint. Bradley rightly admits that the recognition of self as the end to be realized in morality is no more than the discovery of a mere universal form; the content which is to give it definite meaning is still wanting, though it can, he holds, be developed from the form itself, and has not to be empirically assumed from a foreign source, like the moral code of Kant or the Aristotelian table of virtues. What, then, is the content as distinct from the mere form of moral action? Or, as I prefer to put the question for convenience' sake, which among the many conflicting aspects which from time to time assert themselves as my self am I to seek to make real in morality? Several answers can be and have been given which it is worth while to look into one by one.

The most obvious distinction—the one that is most commonly made by excellent persons who have practical progress

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more at heart than speculative exactness—is one between a higher self which is to be realized and a lower self which is to be negated. But when we ask after the standard by which the relative position of the ends for which I act may be estimated, either we are met by a circular reference to the very good of which we are in search, or some new and more definite conception of the good self has to be introduced. Thus I may be told, to take three answers which philosophy has given to our question, that the self to be realized is, (*a*) my permanent self as distinguished from the momentary self that is identical with the felt desire, or (*b*) my self as a harmonious and widely-extended whole, or (*c*) the social self. I think it will not be hard to show that not one of these three answers will bear serious investigation. Let us begin with (*a*), which seems to be Green's meaning in his Introduction to Hume, and in certain of the earlier chapters, at least, of his Prolegomena. What I am to realize, if I would be moral, will now be my permanent, lasting self, my self taken as something that is not exhausted in the gratification of any one desire, nor of a series of desires, but demands some abiding and solid satisfaction. What secures this permanent satisfaction is morality, though moral and immoral men alike aim in all their intelligent actions at it, not at the mere relief of passing passion.

Now, considered as a negative or purely formal aspect of the ultimate good, permanency has no doubt its value. The good must at least be capable of yielding lasting happiness and abiding content; what fails to do this is at best an imperfect good. And the good man again will be the man who is permanently satisfied by the good; to whom it is the love of a life, not the mere darling of an impassioned minute. But it still remains that the bad man and the partially good man are capable of finding a permanent satisfaction in what is far from good. Whether or not what satisfies you is what morality pronounces good will depend entirely on who you are. It is by no means always the case that those elements of self which are as a fact the most settled are the best; the impulse that comes as a rare visitant from a far country may be a prompting to better things, and the preference of it the first

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step towards improvement. And many a man has found his permanent happiness in what we cannot but call bad, while there have been others whom morality would probably call better men in whom the division of the self against itself has been so strong that even when most moral they have doubted in themselves whether this too be not vanity. Altogether in permanency of satisfaction you have one mark among others of the moral good, not the good itself; and you cannot plausibly maintain that your mark, such as it is, is restricted to the good and distinctive of it unless you are prepared to go the whole length of saying that the first law of morality is "Know what you want," and the second, like unto it, "And see that you get it." And how is this better than Hedonism? The belief that all selves are so much alike that no man will permanently find his good in the ethically bad would seem to be no more than a deduction from a psychological monstrosity —the timeless or eternal self identical in all the individuals. But just because this illusory phantom is identical in all the individuals it can have no specific desires to satisfy, and just because it is timeless could get no satisfaction for them if it felt them. In no man is the real self, with its empirical likes and dislikes, identical with the mere formal condition of self-sameness in different mental states, which an unpsychological metaphysic confuses first with man, and then, by a further stroke of humorous audacity, with God. And it is the curse of morality that our real empirical self is by no means too ready to acquiesce in any one content as its lasting good. Perhaps ultimately no source of satisfaction can be quite perennial. Our attitude towards the objects in which we seek content is too much like that of the Flying Dutchman with his wives. The thing awakens desire, and with it the hope that this time fruition will be unchanging. We embrace the new interest with enthusiasm, and for a while we dream that there at last is something that will prove permanently true, but it is generally not very long before we find it is only the same old tale of deception and mistake and trust betrayed, and the restless search for a really final spring of happiness has to begin over again. Or, if we do lastingly acquiesce in

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certain aims and ends, it is only because we have ceased to look upon them as pre-eminently sources of satisfaction and realization for ourselves. We have come to think more of the thing to be done as good in itself than of its formal relation to our own personality as a good for us. And from this point of view it is no longer appropriate to find the one satisfactory account of the good in self-realization.

(*b*) Can we say then, by a slight modification of our doctrine, that it is not so much in its permanency as in its inclusiveness and harmony that we shall find the special character of the self-realization which is morality? Is it enough to be told to realize myself as a whole, *i.e.*, as a developed and concordant system of fixed habits and relations which may, for convenience' sake, be taken as roughly equivalent to the relations imposed on me in virtue of my particular position in the social order? The practical value of the advice no one of course will dispute. It is true that, to a large extent, what I am is determined for me by these relations, and that by fulfilling the obligations they bring along with them I am in a true sense making myself real. It is true that neglect of these duties is, as we can all see, hardly compatible with morality, nor, in the long run, with happiness. But the theory, as a theory, seems open to objections from more sides than one. To begin with—though this is to forestall our verdict on the third of the formulas we undertook to examine—the social institutions contemplated would seem to be those of a past age rather than of the present. As we listen to Mr. Bradley's stirring panegyric on the duties of "my station," we think irresistibly of the Athens of Pericles rather than of the England of Gladstone. Whatever may have been the case in a city-state, the increasing complexity of modern life has made it practically impossible for moral duty to coincide with the duties of one's station throughout its whole extent. Take a concrete example: I am a clerk, let us say, in a City office, with a widowed mother to support. Can it be said that in keeping a home for my mother, serving my employers honestly and diligently, and paying my rates and taxes I have fulfilled the *whole* law? Perhaps, however, the duties of my

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station extend rather further; I should become a volunteer and, possibly, a County Councillor. But, even so, it would seem that the most exhaustive catalogue of the obligations arising from my social station will hardly complete the sum of the demands of morality, and that the former can never amount to the whole of the latter, unless, indeed, you give some very new and widely extended meaning to the conception of my "station," the apparent simplicity of which was, however, its chief recommendation. We will turn to a more important consideration. Dropping the particular identification of myself as a whole with myself as occupying a particular place in society, let us look for a moment at the general injunction, "Realize yourself as a complete and harmonious whole." Is the thing enjoined really possible? To begin with, it is very doubtful whether my self ever is or ever can be, strictly speaking, a whole. What I at least find when I "look into my breast" is a conflicting set of likes and dislikes which neither are nor can be made a single whole except by the forcible suppression of some of them. And it might be urged that the formation of a settled character may as justly be called a process of definition and elimination as one of extending the boundaries of the self. Character, if it is to be of any permanent kind, can never include more than a part of what was originally given in disposition, and it would seem, at least for the majority of men, that the most we can expect is to enter halt or with one eye into life. Two illustrations of this view may be added. Whatever moral education may be in after life, it certainly begins with the very reverse of self-realization. An infant might be said, in one sense, to be the very type of self-realization. With him, almost from the first, there is a standing impulse to make real in the outer world any and every suggested content which may present itself. To desire an object means at once to grab at it, to feel an uneasiness is to set about relieving it. Thus, of course, disposition is at first everything, character is nothing. Now, the process of education by which order and habit are brought into this primitive chaos is by no means one of advance in capacity for self-realization. The first lesson a

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child has to learn is, to his cost, the lesson of self-suppression. It is not by teaching the child to know what he wants and, above all things, to see that he gets it, that a wise parent lays the first foundations of moral character; but by impressing severely the sense that there are many, very many, elements in the self which are to be made *unreal*, desires to be left ungratified, tensions and unpleasantnesses to be borne without attempt at escape. It is by eliminating and negating original elements of disposition that decency and morality alike are first called into being. And it cannot be maintained that the process of self-suppression comes to an end with the transition from childhood or youth to self-reliant manhood. No doubt the realization is more prominent in adult years as the negation was in the period of preliminary training. But the two processes go on forever side by side. We never reach a point at which there is no longer anything left to suppress, but only elements to realize. The influence of the ἐρωτικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι is in itself enough to prevent most men's lives from being quite an undisturbed whole of harmony.

It may be said, however, that the maxim is not "Realize your whole self *as such*," but only "Realize yourself as *a* whole of some sort or other," and that it is not intended to exclude the constitution of the whole by the removal of outlying and excrescent elements. Our criticism on this has been in great part anticipated by the remarks we have just made on moral education. First, I would once more ask, Is the complete excision or suppression ever actual, or even possible? Is there, in heaven or in earth, such a thing as a self in which there is no longer a conflict of one habit with another or of settled habit with wandering and unformed elements of disposition? And on this point I must be content to appeal from the disciples of the Bradley of "Ethical Studies" to the Bradley of "Appearance and Reality." The mere unattainableness of the moral ideal would, however, be no final argument against it. All moral ideals owe their value to the impossibility of reaching them, and all that the self-realizer asks of us is the admission that it is by their comparative nearness to the ideal of complete harmony and wholeness that the

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moral worth of acts and of lives is judged. A graver objection remains to be raised. The admission is one which we cannot make unless we are prepared to break with the ordinary unphilosophic moral consciousness instead of explaining it. It is not in any and every systematizing of disposition into character that moral advance is to be found. The discordant elements which the self has rejected may be of greater value than those it has retained. The system of habits may be comparatively consistent and of the nature of a concordant whole, and yet be bad. The first result of moral progress in the individual may be, and not infrequently is, the introduction of new elements and new habits which obstinately refuse to shape themselves into a harmonious system with the old, as may be seen in almost any case of what is popularly known as "conversion." And this disorganization is not necessarily for the individual what it is logically for outside reflection, a mere transition to a wider and completer (not to use the question-begging adjective "higher") wholeness. The converted individual may perfectly well remain in a divided state, and thus fall short of the harmoniousness which characterized his unregenerate self. More, the new elements will often not merely refuse to unite with the old, but even demand, and in part secure, their abolition, thus disposing of the extensiveness as well as of the wholeness of the old life. Morality may thus find itself in the position of having to prefer a relatively discordant and narrowed existence to a wider and more concordant one, and we are forced to admit that, while harmony and wide extent are undoubtedly included in the moral ideal, it is not the fact that one life can be called more moral than another merely as being wider in its interests and more in harmony with itself in its desires. It is not enough to say that the moral life is a whole; we are still forced to ask, What kind of whole?

(*c*) Of the third theory, which identifies the self to be realized straight away with the "social' self, I do not intend to say much. It is quite inconsistent ultimately with even the relative truth, which we have admitted, of the two theories we have just discussed, and it has difficulties of its own which

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must by this time be familiar to us all. Perhaps I need not do more than just recall the futility of the attempt to reduce all so-called "self-regarding" duties to duties to others, and ask a few questions which it is easier, on this theory, to ask than to answer. Of the extreme form of the doctrine which is practically altruism it should be enough to ask: Assuming that all our duty is duty to humanity at large, what is the good which we should seek to promote for mankind? This must apparently come to consist in something more than a general tendency to be altruistic if we wish to avoid the absurd picture of a world in which everybody's sole duty and good is to promote in somebody else a disposition to promote the same disposition in somebody else still.* And if the ultimately valuable thing be a state of, or stand in a direct relation to, *any* self, we have refuted altruism. Of any less radical doctrine of the "social self," we may say,—

(1) That it utterly fails to explain the morality, not only of personal culture and refinement sought for its own sake, but —which is more important—of a life spent in devotion to art or science as such, regarded not as an instrument of self-culture, but as an end in itself. And this is probably, after all, the attitude of the scientist and the artist. Their desire is neither that they personally nor yet that society at large should know or enjoy, but that phenomena should be reduced to system, that things of beauty should exist.

(2) That it is unintelligible apart from a theory of what is desirable as the good for the single self, and that is just what self-realization seems unable to tell us. Meanwhile we shall recognize that social activity is at least an element in the moral ideal, and as such is directly desired. Leaving it to metaphysic to decide, if it can, the question whether this element can ever be ultimately reconciled with the others, we shall insist on the importance of the social side of the moral ideal as making it clear that there are some ends which we actually desire which are not in any intelligible sense states of, or elements in, our own personality. We desire them, to

* Cf. Plato, "Euthydemus," 292 E.

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repeat what I have said more than once already, because *they* are good, not because of any near or remote good they will bring to *us*.

We are thus reduced to a slightly paradoxical position. The good—because to be achieved by *our* action—must be, at least formally, a self-realization; yet there are goods which are not, for us as agents, realizations of ourselves, and every moral act is a self-negation. The good is a realization of your permanent self,—now and then, and if you are already a good man; of yourself as a whole,—and can never be got except by suppressing some part of yourself. It cannot exist apart from society, and there are elements in it which cannot be conceived as social. Happiness, knowledge, beneficence, are all essential factors in it, and it is not exhausted by any combination of them that we can conceive. Thus, whether you call it self-realization or self-sacrifice, you say something which is necessarily true of it, and at the same time only half true, and therefore necessarily false. With self-sacrifice I am not now concerned; in self-realization the truth seems to me to be as much as this: (1) There is nothing ultimately capable of being the end in ethics except some state or states of a self. (2) When you desire a thing, it is *you* that desire it, and the obtaining your end is thus, at any rate formally, a realization of *yourself*. The false implications are more various; in different authors they appear in different forms, but they may perhaps be reduced to the following:

(1) The self the states of which are the ethical end is always *my* self.

(2) The states to be promoted are always states of felt *satisfaction*.

(3) The self to be realized is the formal identity of subject and object in self-consciousness.

It has of late years been more fashionable to talk of self-realization than of self-sacrifice, but, if there is anything in what I have advanced, the name is misleading, and it is time the fashion changed. It is true that any other name would be equally defective, but it is at least better to pass from one partial view of the reality to another than, remaining in the

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same one-sided aspect, to mistake it for the whole. This particular one-sidedness would seem to owe its popularity to a metaphysic which is innocent of psychology and careless about it. It cannot for a moment stand before a serious examination of the contents of the self as it exists and its formation by means of the psychological mechanism, and, as the future of philosophy is obviously with psychology, and no metaphysic can ultimately dispense with it, it might be as well for us, after so many years of neglect, before we send a new ethical theory of the self into the world, to see whether psychology has not something to say on the question, What is the self?

In the mean time, what are we to say for ourselves? Are we to take refuge in the general assertion that reality is a paradoxical and unaccountable thing, or shall we rather look for some new formulation of ultimate good, seeing that the old one seems to have broken down in our hands? For purposes of practice it is fortunately unnecessary to have a theory, as we have all learned long ago from Aristotle; still, as long as we are not prepared to abandon all attempts at constructing a philosophy of conduct, we cannot help raising the question as a mere matter of speculation. I will not do more now than just hint at what I think a possible, if a very vague and modest, answer. If we would know what is of the essence of morality, perhaps our best course is to consider rather the nature of the moral judgment we pass on the acts of others than our own psychological state at the moment of action. No doubt the passing of moral judgments on the acts of another implies a sense of morality as something which we ourselves are bound to do; and the evolution of the one necessitates a corresponding growth of the other. But it will, I think, be found that as a matter of fact the moral judgment on outsiders becomes articulate earlier than the sense of our own moral shortcomings: we learn to expect certain performances from those around us, and to be displeased if they are not forthcoming before we have an equally acute perception of the corresponding obligations on ourselves. Hence, if we would find what morality, in its simplest form, involves as an

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irreducible minimum, we must, I think, betake ourselves to the analysis of the moral judgment. Now, the moral judgment in its simplest form is, I take it, an expression of approbation or disapprobation. It is at least this: so long as you have only an expression of pleasure and displeasure your judgment is as yet not moral: it is no more than this; the conception of it as a categorical law is a much more developed product. It is, that is, a judgment of relative *value*. It implies that there are things which for their own sake are worth doing, a life which is in itself worth living, even if it does not turn out to be the pleasantest or the best accommodated to my particular likes and dislikes. To find a first principle for morals would mean to point out the standard which is implied in this judgment of worth. If I venture to suggest, with much diffidence and without inquiry, where I think our standard of worth may be sought and how far it is knowable, I hope I may be forgiven. I would say, then, that any judgment of relative worth seems ultimately to resolve itself into a statement of the relative reality of its subject. In the last resort only that which is absolutely and entirely real is felt to have absolute worth, and relative worth means comparative nearness in the scheme of things to the absolutely real. And we cannot conceive of the entirely real except as the entirely rational. (Both these points would, I think, become clearer on an examination into our judgments of worth generally. As a rule, except by a conscious transference by analogy, we do not make judgments about the relative worth of various forms of existence in physical nature; there it is an axiom that no one thing and no one fact is of more worth or importance than any other. We predicate worth only in the sphere of human action and production, *i.e.*, where we can trace rationality in some form or other. At the same time, we can certainly raise the question of the relative worth of nature and man in the scheme of things, even if we finally refuse to decide it; and here the judgment of worth seems to imply the assumption that the more highly rational is of more worth because more nearly allied to the absolutely real.*

* Plato, "Philebus," 65 D.

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Whether there is ultimately any meaning in speaking of the ultimately real as having absolute worth or whether all worth is purely relative does not concern us here. For the moral consciousness at least the entirely valuable is the completely real.) Hence the judgment that a certain kind of life is the good seems to me to mean that in this life reality and rationality, so far as they can appear in the realm of action, are mostly fully present. The higher or better life as opposed to the lower, the fully as opposed to the partly good, means the old opposition of the real to the illusory, the true to the false. And the supreme law of ethics is that it is our duty, just because our life is bound to be to some extent a rational content, to make it as pregnant and surcharged with reality as we can. And the ultimately desirable or chief good would be a kind of life soaked and permeated through and through with reality. So far, I suppose, I am at one with the school of self-realization. What I should deny is that the life which it is most rational for me to lead is necessarily the life which ends in the completest actualization of myself,—or, in other words, that the self, whether individual or social, is an ultimate end. What the rational life is we can only learn from experience, and experience is, I think, decidedly against the view that nothing but my own or society's happiness forms part of it. And experience should be taken whole and as it stands, not truncated in the interests of a theory.

A final difficulty remains. If the conception of the ultimately rational life cannot be fully realized, either in the lives of individuals or in the life of society as a whole, is it finally realizable as a life at all? Can there be anywhere, in the earth or out of it, a life of pure rationality unalloyed? That is, however, only to ask if what is ultimate for ethics may not turn out from the point of view of a higher science to be a merely partial and illusory apprehension of absolute reality. And the question is for metaphysics, not for morals. It may be that no life could ever be made actually one with the ideal, but, for morality at least, the reality is such an ideal, and the most real life is the life which most nearly approximates to it, while it need not surprise us

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if we should one day discover that our moral ideals are not ultimately true, any more than it disconcerts us to know that all our physical science rests on a necessary basis of fiction. For "the truth is the whole," and the life of purposive action but a part, and it cannot hold good in the end for speculation, though it very well may in practice—

πλέον ἥμισυ παντός.

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DISCUSSIONS.

THE ETHICAL THEORY OF VALUE.

THE economic theory of value has been submitted in these last years, especially by Austrian philosophers, to remarkable researches. An Austrian philosopher, Alexius Meinong, Professor of the University of Graz, has elaborated and presented the problem of value in general on its ethical side,* and his theory, though quite independent and individual, shows so many relations with the theory of economists that they might be united without much difficulty into one all-inclusive system. The work is not, as its title would lead one to expect, simply a series of scientific contributions to the subject which it treats. It develops the outlines of a general psychological theory of value, and a system of ethics based upon it. It thus pursues the same aim as my "Werth Theorie und Ethik,"† a work to which the author in his preface expressly alludes, and to which in his text he frequently and, indeed, almost exclusively refers. In reviewing it, I may be permitted, therefore, to refer to my own investigations, and to give particular attention to such points as suggest comparisons.

Should one attempt to describe the fundamental character of the two works in a few words, one might designate Meinong's investi-

* "Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werth Theorie." Von Alexius Meinong (Festschrift der k. k. Karl-Franzens Universität zur Jahresfeier am 15 November, 1894). Graz: Leuschner u. Lubensky.

† "Viertjahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie," edited by Avenarius, 1893, 1 bis 4 Heft and 1894, 1 Heft.

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gation as the statics, and mine as the dynamics, of the theory of value and ethics. While I paid attention chiefly to the transformation and development of values, and considered definitions and conceptions only so far as seemed indispensable for my purpose, Meinong furnishes us a comprehensive view of fundamental conceptions in the theory of value and ethics, and endeavors to establish and bring within fixed rules whatever is permanent in the constant transformation of the phenomena of general values, and especially of moral values. The two investigations supplement rather than contradict each other, and if, as I intend, I should undertake a systematic presentation of the subject in the near future, I should have to reproduce many portions of Meinong's work almost unchanged.

I have already emphasized in the last paper of my investigations that this agreement is not mere accident. The accidental circumstance that Meinong has published the results of his labors two years after my publication appeared induces me to repeat my previous avowal. In Meinong's theory of value and ethics much has indeed changed since, as a hearer at the University of Graz, in the winter semester 1884–1885, I first became acquainted with it. Many portions have since been elaborated or co-ordinated by each of us independently, though upon a common basis. Nevertheless, I am fully conscious that my fundamental convictions and tendencies in the treatment of problems of the theory of value and ethics were formed and strengthened under Meinong's influence in the years when intellect was pliant and in a state of evolution. To avoid any misunderstanding as to the relation of the two publications, I feel it my duty to give here again a definite expression to this consciousness.

The opening paragraphs of Meinong's work are apparently in direct opposition to my introduction, since his starting-point is a conception of value which differs widely from my own. My definition is, "Value is the relation, erroneously made objective by language, of a thing to a human desire." Meinong aptly contends against this that by it objects of whose existence we are convinced can have no value for us, since desire is only directed to things which for the present we consider as not in existence. For him the psychological substratum for the elucidation of the concept of value is feeling and not desire, and thus he arrives at a definition of the concept which departs widely from my own. The difference is not, however, so great as might appear at a first glance, for in my

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treatment desire is shown to be so entirely dependent on feeling that the definition of value above given is, after all, reduced to feeling. I personally discussed with Meinong, after the appearance of his "Untersuchungen," the differences which still exist, and the result was at least a considerable *rapprochement* of our views on the basis of mutual concessions, if not a complete agreement. Meinong has published his theory of value in its modified form in a short monograph on "Werthaltung und Wert," * which I shall accordingly take as a basis in the following discussion whenever it deviates from the opinions of his principal work which was published earlier.

According to Meinong's latest explanations, one might understand value as the capacity of an object to maintain itself as an object of desire in the struggle of motives, or, if the phrase is preferred, in the "struggle for existence." This differs from my definition only by introducing in the first place the idea of capacity between the subject of value and desire, and by adopting in the second place a relative determination of the magnitude of value.

The first of these additions appears to meet the objection to my definition. The capacity of being desired can, with a somewhat free use of language, be imputed to things of whose existence we are rightly or erroneously convinced, and in so far as our conviction as to the existence of the thing is capable of being annulled. In this respect Meinong corrects my definition, and thus indicates the concession to which, in consequence of his explanations, I see myself forced. By introducing the notion of capacity, a further thought, which I equally accept, is properly introduced,—namely, the circumstance that we impute value to an object not only in so far as we desire it, or might desire it in case it did not exist, but also in so far as we assume in us the mere disposition to do so.

The second addition to the definition of value leads directly to the question, by what means may the capacity of an object, to maintain itself in the conflict of impelling motives be psychologically measured? Meinong answers the question as follows: If an object is worth something (has value for us), the affirmative judgment which affirms its existence awakens in us a feeling of pleasure, the negative judgment, which denies its existence, a feeling of pain. Converse conditions prevail when the thing has for us negative value. The sum of the intensities of these

* "Archiv für systematische Philosophie," Bd. 1, Heft 3.

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opposite feelings equals the magnitude of the value or non-value, $W = C.\ I + C'.\ I'$, in which I = the intensity of the feeling produced by an affirmative and I′ the feeling coincident with a negative judgment. C and C′, however, are definite constant quantities which are probably equal, and as the unity of the magnitude of value can be arbitrarily assumed, C and C′ can also be considered equal to one (1), so that we have the result, value W (and consequently non-value U) = I + I′. The essential core of my own explanation agrees with this, though clothed in another garb. The measure of the magnitude of value is for me not the sum, but the difference of two conditions of feeling, of which one is produced in the prospect of the realization, the other in that of the non-realization of the object concerned. In the formation of the difference the feelings of pain are introduced with negative signs. If, for instance, G and G′ are the two feelings, G a feeling of pleasure with the intensity I, and G′ a feeling of pain with the intensity I′, we obtain $W = G - G' = I - (-I') = I + I'$. With G′ as pleasure and G as pain, it results that $W = G - G' = -I - (+I') = -(I + I')$. My definition seems to differ from Meinong's only in so far as it confers upon non-value—*i.e.*, negative value—a negative algebraic expression. The difference is, however, still deeper. In his measurement, Meinong proceeds on the supposition that the feelings of G and G′ must show an opposite quality, and hence his formula is constructed for such cases only. Experience does not confirm his supposition without exception. Consider, for instance, the following case: A sick man is about to take a bitter medicine. The opposite judgments "I will take the medicine" (otherwise expressed, the taking of the medicine will occur) and "I will not take the medicine" (the taking of it will not occur) both awaken in him a feeling of pain, the first because of its bitter taste, the second because of the interrupted treatment. If he decides to take the medicine, it shows that his has a value for him, which certainly is not equal to the sum of the intensities of the two feelings of pain. We obtain rather $W = G - G' = -I - (-I') = -I + I' = I' - I$, equal to the difference of the intensities, a positive quantity, since I′ must be greater than I in case the decision should be in the sense indicated. For this case Meinong's method of determination has no expression, and hence I hold my own method, with the notion of the relative promotion of happiness which lies at the basis of my method—against which Meinong in his work repeatedly argues—to be the most suitable because universally valid.

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Meinong in his monograph gives the above-cited definition without withdrawing the one given in his principal work. We are, therefore, forced to correct that definition (p. 25) with the changes which he has made. Accordingly,we are empowered to impute value to an object, in so far as it has the capacity to awaken feelings of value among those sufficiently well informed and of normal endowments. As feelings of value must be understood the feelings G and G′, which occur in the judgments as to the existence and non-existence of the object concerned.

With these critical observations on the fundamental conception, we shall now proceed to an orderly account of the contents of Meinong's work.

The book, in accordance with its subject, is composed of two strictly separate parts. One treats of values in general, the other of moral values. The fundamental notions of the first part have been indicated in the main in the foregoing discussion—so far as this is possible in a brief presentation. It appears from this that Meinong fully appreciates the relativity of the conception of value, since every fact of value presupposes not only an object, but also a subject. We have the question not only what object, but also for what person the object concerned has value. Thus there is derived a determination of the quality, whether positive or negative, of value or non-value, and the magnitude of value.

Particular mention must be made of the doctrine of the direct and indirect estimation of value, inherent and effect value, in which Meinong accepts my position of the theory of value, not, however, without enriching it in detail by many noteworthy contributions. Meinong seeks especially to explain psychologically the fact of the indirect estimation of value by postulating as a requisite the addition of secondary judgments to the principal judgment, or the essential judgment with which the feeling of value occurs. The indirect estimation of value of money, for instance, is rendered psychologically possible by the fact that to the principal judgment "I possess such and such a quantity of money," are added all the secondary judgments which tell me what I am able to accomplish by the use of this money. These determinations render possible a still more precise limitation of the scope of theoretical considerations in the discussion of value. The scope reaches here just as far as the possible errors in value, and these reach as far as the participation of indirect judgment in the production of the fact of value. Just as little as reason alone can produce in any individual

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the disposition of feeling necessary for the estimation of a definite value, just as little can reason take away from the individual such a disposition when it is already psychologically given. It would, however, be erroneous if one could desire to transfer from the feelings of taste to the feelings of value the principal "*de gustibus non est disputandum.*" It is possible even to contest the justification of inherent value from the stand-point of reason,—namely, when inherent value has arisen from an erroneously estimated effect value, as, for instance, when an individual has acquired a direct affection for a stick of wood because he has used it for a long time erroneously as a wishing-rod.

Here, also, Meinong's presentation is in accord with my theory of value, with the exception that he does not mention some cases of self-deception concerning inherent value which I cite (p. 101 of the first paper), although, on the other hand, he gives some cases where value arises by indirect estimation, and includes, therefore, possible errors in value which had escaped me.

Besides these fundamental considerations, the reader will discover in the first and general part of Meinong's investigation an abundance of valuable psychological determinations and distinctions in regard to details: notably the distinction between feelings of value and a second class of feelings of judgment,—namely, the feelings of knowledge (§ 12), the observations concerning the special estimation of value of the psychical phenomena and dispositions of ourselves and of other persons (§§ 13–16), the determination of the conception of hope and fear (§ 20). The fact that the theory of final utility, which has been developed by the political economists, but is also important for the comprehension of ethical facts of value, finds so little consideration, does not arise from any disparagement of its significance, but rather from the idea that scientific research in this field is already closed. It must, on the other hand, be traceable to a misunderstanding that Meinong raises the objection against the economists in general, and against C. Menger and F. Wieser in particular, that in their treatment of the conception of value they were unconscious of the fact that economic values constitute only a portion of the entire field of value.

The second general division of Meinong's work is devoted, as already mentioned, to the consideration of moral values. He begins with an introduction (§ 28) which defines the field of investigation. In the wide ethical field, with its limits impossible to settle, Meinong looks for a central point whose ethical quali-

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ties are beyond question, and from whose investigations a general knowledge of the essence of the ethical can be obtained. He finds what he seeks in the contrast expressed in the familiar conceptions of good and evil. Without any more precise definition, Meinong separates in a preliminary way the field of application of these familiar conceptions of good and evil from the general ethical field, and, in distinction from the general field, designates this special field with the name moral. Accordingly, the ethical field is composed of a special moral and an extra moral division. The investigations which follow are devoted solely to the central moral field (§ 28).

In the first place (§ 29), there are established four classes of moral values,—the classes of the correct and meritorious in the field of moral super-values (that is, in the field estimated morally with approbation) and the classes of the permissible and the objectionable in the field of moral sub-values (those estimated with disapprobation). Two by two these four classes are reciprocal. The omission of the correct appears to be objectionable, the omission of the objectionable to be correct; the omission of the meritorious appears to be permissible, the omission of the permissible to be meritorious.

After these preliminary distinctions, the problem of the following investigations is more precisely formulated (§ 30). These have to answer the question as to the nature of that which is held to be valuable (or non-valuable) under the name of good and evil. The discussion which leads to the solution of this problem (§§ 31–53) constitutes the most extensive, the most difficult, and the most detailed portion of Meinong's work; yet it furnishes a final result which departs little further from the familiar conceptions than the notions of good and evil which have been borrowed from it. "The object of the estimation of moral value is the impersonal participation with the woe and weal of mankind which is confirmed or disclosed by the position concerned (the act or the omission of volition). . . . One can hardly boast of this principle that it is new, but in the moral field, in the face of facts with which even the most naïve reflection must have come in contact, novelty or strangeness of the formulation must appear at the most a reason for distrust, but surely not an advantage" (§ 53, p. 159). This is Meinong's judgment upon the result of his investigation. One can, however, properly raise the question whether it is scientifically justifiable to place such a long established principle in doubt, in order, by means

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of a tiresome and circumstantial heuristic process, to bring it forward again as something new. I would not hesitate to reply in the negative to such a question, if Meinong's investigations were not exceedingly stimulating, and did not offer countless evidences of insight and perception of ethical questions, whose scientific value is quite independent of the final result. To these belong an excellent elucidation and definition, which in its pregnancy must be called truly classical, of the conception of egoism (§§ 32–35), which is morally so significant, but which in general is so dubiously and uncritically applied. To the same class belongs the entirely novel attempt to represent the dispositions of feeling, especially of altruism and egoism, as mathematical functions of the measure of the aim in conjunction with that of the accompanying facts of value of certain acts of volition which proceed from such dispositions, or at least have some connection with it (§§ 39 and 52). As Meinong himself expressly recognizes, the formulas which he here establishes have necessarily an approximate validity only, and suffer from defects which the author himself points out. The method, however, which is here pursued has a high theoretical interest as a psychical method of measurement in a wholly uncultivated field. On account of the novelty of the undertaking, it is not practicable to give a clear notion of it in a brief space; we must content ourselves therefore, after this allusion, with the final results of the investigations which we have already mentioned. As "participation in the woe and weal of mankind" we are to understand the endowments of an individual caused by the disposition of his feelings, by virtue of which objects which represent value or non-value for another man, are, on account of this circumstance and in so far as he is able to perceive it, valuable or non-valuable to him. If this participation rises above the measure of the endowment of an average man, the individual concerned is to be highly esteemed morally. If it falls below this measure (culpable egoism), or is turned into its converse (wickedness), the individual concerned is morally condemned. This participation is impersonal in so far as it is independent of any personal connection between the individual concerned and his fellow-men, such as relationship, friendship, nationality, etc.

This last position points to the division of the ethical field which stands closest to the moral. It is evident that our particular participation in the woe and weal of our fellow-men to whom we have some particular personal relation, is not in an ethical sense indiffer-

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ent. The estimation of these values concerns the field of the quasi-moral (§ 54).

The next chapter treats of the subject of moral values, that is, of the individual from whom the estimation of moral values normally proceeds, or by whom it is normally concerned. This is neither the subject nor object of the act of volition, but a third person who does not participate in it. Since the neutral third person is to be found not only in the singular but generally in the plural, it follows that the *subject* of moral value is the surrounding community. For this surrounding community dispositions of moral feeling possess effect value as well as inherent value. I will content myself here with this reference, since I have given to this subject elsewhere a much more detailed consideration (in "Werth Theorie und Ethik," third and fourth chapters).

One position only, which is assumed by Meinong at the conclusion of this chapter, demands a closer investigation because it furnishes the foundation of the subsequent reflections. Meinong distinguishes between the resultant value, the subsequently so-called "actuality value" of a moral action, and the value of the intention or disposition of feelings which prompted it, and discusses the relation of these two values, which are by no means always proportional to one another, as the following illustration will sufficiently demonstrate: (1) A falls into the water and is about to drown; B saves him by handing him a pole which is lying on the bank. (2) A falls into the water and is about to drown; B saves him by springing into the water and pushing him to the bank, but in so doing finds death in the flood. Evidently, the value of the intention is far greater in the second case than in the first, not, however, the resultant or "actuality value." For in the first case a human life is saved without the slightest injury to another; in the second case one human life is exchanged for another. In the latter case the life which was sacrificed was possibly more valuable for the surrounding community (from whose point of view the estimation takes place) than the one which was saved, so that the actuality value of the action can be a negative one. If one should construct a series of cases in which the life of A is saved at a continually increasing "sacrifice" of B, the result is obtained that the actuality value of the actions in question diminishes quite regularly as the moral value of the motives which prompt it increases. Such considerations may have led Meinong to raise the relationship here noted to a law, and to maintain that actuality value and the value of the intention

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are strictly proportional to one another in the converse sense, though experience furnishes just as many examples against this supposed law as it does illustrations in which the law is apparently confirmed. Let us take into consideration, for instance, the following cases: A physician good-naturedly binds up the insignificant wounds of a pedestrian who has been accidentally injured by a third person. Second, the captain and owner of a merchant ship sacrifices in a storm his entire property, in order to receive and bring to land the numerous passengers of another ship in distress. Evidently, the actuality value of the second action exceeds that of the first just as much as the value of the intention. Similar illustrations could be taken freely from the practice of morality. Meinong appears to have been led astray by the fact that he considers here, and also earlier in the establishment of his formulas (§ 25), those cases only in which a single person is affected by the moral action, although even with this limitation the converse proportionality of which he speaks is by no means corroborated without exception.

The error which is here demonstrated is disastrous for the results of the next chapter which treats of moral obligation. The preliminary formulation of the conception (§§ 60 and 61) is unimpeachable: obligation exists where the will or the wish of A is directed to the will or the action of B. A can also, in exceptional cases, be identical with B. In moral obligation B is any individual capable of moral intentions, and that which is demanded of him is volition morally qualified. The consideration of obligation brings with it the consideration of prohibition. While, however, the prohibition increases uniformly with the moral non-value of the prohibited volition in question, there is, without exception, between obligation and the moral value of the act of volition demanded a converse proportionality. The more meritorious an action would be if I should wish it, the less it can be demanded of me in the sense of moral obligation. Up to this point Meinong's positions furnish indisputable and commendable contributions to the elucidation of the problem. As Meinong fancies that he can construct analogous functional relationships between obligation and moral super-value on the one hand, and between prohibition and moral sub-value on the other hand, and also between the actuality value and the moral super-value on the one hand and the actuality value and the moral sub-value on the other hand, he believes that he has found in the actuality value of actions qualified as moral the element which, in the last instance, determines moral obligation. His theory stands

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and falls, therefore, with the supposed law of the converse proportionality between actuality value and the value of intention, and must, like this, be held to be disproved by experience. Nevertheless, we believe that the problem of obligation can readily be solved upon a basis of Meinong's own positions. The relation of converse proportionality between obligation and moral super-value calls to mind the reciprocity pointed out by Meinong between the four classes of moral value. The lower the moral sub-value of an act of volition stands below zero, the nearer the moral super-value of the contrary omission lies to the zero-point, and conversely. This relationship dissolves itself in that which is given in obligation when we suppose that in the contrast of the obligation and prohibition the latter is really primary, and is directed to the omission of that which has moral sub-value. If we recall the four classes of moral value,—the meritorious, the correct, the permissible, and the objectionable,—obligation and prohibition appear simply as the notification of moral condemnation for the case of the omission of the correct, or the commission of the objectionable. That this notification proceeds from the "surrounding community," which cherishes the desire that the correct shall take place and the objectionable shall not occur, is a consequence which results, as it were, spontaneously from Meinong's earlier explanations.

The definitions of moral duty and of moral right which are based upon the conception of obligation (§ 64) are free from objection.

The explanations of the last chapter on attribution and freedom, constitute unquestionably one of the most valuable portions of the entire work. The conceptions are established for further use with pregnant acuteness. He distinguishes imputation from attribution, and notes in both of these processes an intellectual as well as an emotional element. The intellectual element of the imputation is found in the answer to the question as to the moral quality, or the disposition of the originator of definite action, that of attribution in answer to the question as to the measure in which a definite action can be considered to proceed from the moral character of its originator. According to the reply to the question there follows with imputation as well as with attribution a transfer of feeling from the success of the action to the originator, a process which is by no means peculiar to the moral field. This transfer, especially where the attribution appears to be diminished, encounters hinderances measured by the degree in which we consider the doer of

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an action as the originator of it, or by the extent to which it has actually proceeded from the character (disposition of feeling) of the latter. This relation between the deed and the doer can be loosened by intellectual or emotional irregularities of the latter. Accordingly, as one eventuality or the other has been placed in question and denied, attribution can in fact take place, and we can distinguish between intellectual and emotional attribution.

Equally lucid is the determination of the conception of freedom (§ 68). Freedom in general is the absence of non-value, freedom of action and volition the absence of force or constraint to act or to wish otherwise than in accordance with a previously-formed wish. If this previous wish is a moral one directed to some future act of volition, the freedom is moral freedom. Conceived in this manner, the moral freedom of the will is limited, since our volition is caused not only by the preceding wish, but also by other concurrent circumstances which are able to neutralize the first. One must himself have had to struggle with the prevalent confusion of ideas respecting the moral freedom of the will, in order to fully appreciate the relief which is given with this simple deduction and position.

Meinong's enumeration of the hinderances and constraints which oppose the freedom of the will seems less felicitious. He cites, in the first instance, the perception of the unattainability of the object desired. There can be no doubt that such a perception makes the exercise of volition quite impossible; but no one will recognize in this a limitation of his moral freedom. For the latter it is sufficient if one can remain conscious of the disposition, which, should the possibility of the object desired be recognized, would then lead to the realization of the act of volition. In this sense the demand of the "moral freedom of volition" appears as a demand for "moral freedom of intention." Meinong mentions as further hinderances to volition the perception of accompanying circumstances of negative value and also suggestive influences. In all this it seems to me that the hinderance, which is more prominent when one speaks as does Meinong himself of the moral freedom of volition being limited by the law of causation, is passed over in silence or cited only under a misleading title. This hinderance is the existence of dispositions of feeling which are stronger than, and contrary to, the tendency of moral intentions. The most important and most frequent limitation of my moral freedom consists in definite inclinations or passions which prevent me from willing that

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which from the stand-point of morality I would desire. This limitation might, it is true, be included under the phrase perception of accompanying circumstances of negative value, but only in a very artificial way; and it appears that Meinong does not so include it, otherwise he could not have identified freedom with spontaneity (p. 213). One acts spontaneously who succumbs to the force of passion; yet, according to the definition, he assuredly does not act freely as soon as he has formed subsequently the honest wish to withstand temptation.

The conclusion of the chapter forms a polemic against me and against my assertion ("Werth Theorie und Ethik," fifth chapter), that the indeterministic conviction, "I can under all circumstances withstand all temptation," even were it erroneous, is able to give to the moral volition a basis which is necessarily lost with the triumph of deterministic insight. Meinong replies, "If one has only the good faith that, if he is man enough, no power on earth can lead him astray, and that he is man enough and can remain so if he will only seriously desire it, it is not necessary for him to seek a basis in so dubious a theory as that of indeterminism." But his characteristic honesty forces him to add this clause to his criticism: "Whether he has indeed any right to this good faith is a question of itself." It is indeed a question of itself which with every logical determinist would demand a consideration by itself, and frequently would be answered in the negative. And in these cases the auto-suggestive moral basis, from that conviction which the indeterminist will never be forced to relinquish by any illogical mental process, disappears. This admission cannot be avoided by the deterministic doctrine. If it seeks to evade it, it only appears that it does not trust itself to think out the conclusions of its own convictions to their end; and whoever is unable to be satisfied with this admission will continually have to struggle against indeterministic sympathies.

The concluding observations of the book give a general survey of the ethical field, and the problems of an ethics based on the theory of value. If moral value, which is exclusively treated by Meinong, appears to have very narrow limits,—narrower than correspond to the usual use of the term as the author concedes,—the field of the ethical is extended as far as possible. Ethics investigates what man in his relations to other men is worth to mankind. The estimations of value which are here concerned are to be regarded as falling within the ethical field so much the more surely

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as they approach the ideal of universality (expressed in the definition by the threefold use of the word man). I will speak in another place of the deviations from my formulation of the idea, which Meinong casually mentions. The normative character of ethics, as the capacity to give rules from one's own powers to human action and volition, is a misunderstanding. On the contrary, it possesses, like every practical discipline, this capacity in the name of the interests which it serves. While, however, with most practical subjects this interest needs no further elucidation, in ethics the determination of the existing state of value forms an essential part of the problem of investigation which must be solved in the first instance. Hence the correction of the vague ethical estimation of value in practical life constitutes the immediate practical task of theoretical ethics.

In closing herewith a discussion of Meinong's investigations, I am fully conscious of having given to the reader an idea merely of the outlines of the whole, leaving numerous and valuable details unconsidered. Any one who undertakes to reproduce in narrow limits the contents of extensive scientific treatises, finds himself in the dilemma of sacrificing completeness to comprehensibility or comprehensibility to completeness. Now, I believe it wise to choose the first of these alternatives, and hope that I have awakened a desire for a direct acquaintance with the work among those who are interested in the subject. They will find in it the results of an investigation correctly planned in its method, intensive and logical in its execution, and hence in its principal parts convincing in its conclusions. It is, moreover, a labor in a field which within a relatively recent time only (since the spread of the psychological tendency) has received adequate attention, and which thus offers a wide latitude for scientific research.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

HEDONISTIC THEORIES FROM ARISTIPPUS TO SPENCER. By John Watson, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Queen's College, Kingston, Canada. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons, 1895. Pp. xiii., 243.

"In the following pages," says Professor Watson, "an attempt is made to give in familiar and untechnical language a critical account of Hedonistic Theories in their historical succession. I hope that even those who cannot accept my criticisms may find my exposition fairly satisfactory. For my own part, I am convinced, as the result of this and other investigations, that no hedonistic theory can plausibly explain morality without assuming ideas inconsistent with its asserted principle." In successive chapters on the Sophists, Aristippus, Epicurus, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Herbert Spencer, Professor Watson has given a clear and vigorous account of leading hedonistic moralists. The style deserves high praise, and many good points are aptly stated. Thus, with reference to the opposition of selfish and unselfish activities, he says, "these two tendencies are strictly correlative. Where the capacity for the one is strong, so also is the capacity for the other. 'Great criminals,' as Plato says, 'are perverted heroes.' Gigantic selfishness is possible only to men of vast ability." And, again: "Man is not a mere individual, and he has therefore no purely individualistic tendencies. The desire of self-preservation is not selfish, because life is the primary condition of action, and therefore of moral action."

On the whole, I find myself so much in sympathy with Professor Watson's point of view, that I am inclined to agree with his criticisms as well as with his exposition. But when I try to put myself at the hedonistic point of view, it seems to me that the last word has not always been said. "Hedonism," it is said, "rests on the assumption that the mind may be resolved into a number of individual feelings" (p. 38). This is certainly a common assumption in hedonistic writers, and may at first sight seem natural or even inevitable. But its apparent inevitableness is largely due to the ambiguity of the term "feeling." When "feeling" is said to be the ultimate constituent of mind or even of reality, the reference is to the sensations which enter into our knowledge of the world; when,

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on the other hand, "feeling" is said to be the ultimate ground of preference and so of morality, it is the subjective feeling of pleasure which is meant. It may be said, of course, that philosophical sensationalism is the assumption which lies at the root of ethical hedonism; and for this view, again, the opinions of almost any hedonist from Aristippus to Spencer may be quoted. But this logical connection between the two doctrines is not made clear. And, since pleasure and pain are not restricted to impressions of sense, it may be possible to take pleasure for our ultimate test of value in conscious life without making any assumption as to the elements which go to form conscious life. It would have been interesting had this view received some attention from Professor Watson, especially as it is the view of the most consistent—perhaps the only consistent—hedonistic moralist of the present day. A book on Hedonistic Theories which takes no account of Sidgwick's Ethics neglects that part of its problem which is of chief importance and difficulty.

"In speaking of the greatest pleasure on the whole," says Professor Watson, "there is introduced a conception that, when carried out, destroys the whole hedonistic basis of the theory, and converts it into its opposite" (p. 66). By this, Professor Watson seems to mean that the conception "greatest pleasure" changes the conception of the end into "permanent satisfaction," which he himself uses as an expression for the end of life. Now, "satisfaction" seems to me a somewhat vague term, but as Professor Watson, following Green, uses it, I take it not to be of the nature of feeling, but rather something nearer the literal sense of the word—the completion or realization of one's nature. This is certainly a very different conception from "pleasure." It can be properly spoken of as permanent, whereas pleasure cannot; but "greatest amount of pleasure" is not therefore without an intelligible meaning. We may fully recognize that each pleasure is transient, and yet hold it desirable that life should provide as frequent a succession as possible of transient feelings of this nature. The tendency of a course of life to produce such feelings may be used as a test of its moral value, and to use this test is hedonism. Professor Watson may hold this to be an imperfect account of the moral ideal, and therein I should agree with him; but I do not think he has given any good argument for regarding it as an impossible account. It does not seem to me that in this matter "the confusion between pleasure and pain as feelings and as objects of thought" (p. 151) always

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lies at the door of the hedonist. When Professor Watson contends that "if he [Epicurus] had seriously meant that pleasure is the end, he would have seen that the end cannot be attained unless the intensest pleasure conceivable is secured at every moment of existence" (p. 68), he seems to me to repeat an argument sufficiently disposed of in J. S. Mill's "Utilitarianism."

In a work like the present, intended for the general reader, it must have been difficult to preserve strict accuracy in the account of philosophical doctrines. And some points might still bear revision. The description of Hobbes as combining pure universalism with pure individualism (pp. 74, 88), is not, I think, a happy use of the term "universalism." It is hardly correct to say that, according to the same thinker, "society is based upon the voluntary surrender of the individual will for the common good" (p. 73). It is for his own good (or preservation) that the individual surrenders his will,—a surrender that leads to the common good as well as to his own. The originality of Hobbes's view of the "natural" state of man is, perhaps, over-rated (p. 77), and his classification with the hedonists seems to me to need some further explanation and justification than is given. Again, it is a little too sweeping to say that "Locke is in all things the reverse" of Hobbes (p. 94); it is incorrect to say that "he [Locke] makes all knowledge consist in the passive reception of ideas" (p. 98); and it is no refutation of Locke to say that "the constitution of the state is the work of reason" (p. 97), because the compact or agreement by which, according to Locke, states are formed, is not arbitrary in the sense of irrational, but deliberate, purposeful, and rational. Locke, no doubt, had an imperfect doctrine of the relation of reason both to the data of sense-experience and to the social order, but he did not deny its function in either. Professor Watson also identifies Locke's view, that "the most pressing uneasiness" determines the will with the view that "what a man wills is always what appears to him at the time to be fitted to bring pleasure" (p. 102), although Locke himself takes pains to distinguish the two views on the ground that what appears good or pleasant does not move the will until the want of it raises a felt uneasiness ("Essay," I., xxi. 35). On the whole, however, Professor Watson's exposition seems to me excellent.

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SHORT STUDY OF ETHICS. By Charles F. D'Arcy, B.D. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

If a book is known by the abundance of its fruits, Green's "Prolegomena to Ethics" must take a high place in the philosophical literature of our own generation. Here is another group of ethical studies which owns the same stalk as Dewey's "Outlines," Mackenzie's "Manual," and others. Their author is thoroughly at home in recent English contributions to idealistic philosophy, and brings much critical ability and a fresh and interesting style to the task he has set before himself.

His treatment differs from that of his predecessors chiefly in the prominent place assigned to the discussion of the metaphysical questions, which he rightly holds are involved in any thorough investigation of ethical problems and the comparatively subordinate place assigned to the criticism of rival schemes. He announces at the outset that philosophy, whether successful or not, is inevitable, reminding one of Mr. Bradley's epigram that "metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct." Accordingly, he takes the risk of repelling the beginner by devoting the first seventy pages to a statement of the philosophical basis of ethics. Nor does he spare the student who consents to follow him in this swift analysis. Within these limits he condenses a discussion of the relation of the subject to the Cosmos, of Will to Nature and of the Divine to the Individual Mind, ending with twelve pages on the proofs of the Being of God and the "Idea of Organic Unity as applied to Society." It need hardly be said that a treatment of this kind gives his conclusions a dogmatic colouring, which they might have lost if the writer had felt himself at leisure to tone them into harmony with his fundamental assumptions as to the nature of human life and mind. No reviewer, however, is likely to quarrel seriously with a writer for condensing his argument. It is a more serious matter when the doctrine, whether stated dogmatically or not, is itself open to exception. This seems to me to be the case in respect to one important contention which is here put forward and pervades more or less the whole succeeding argument. The author is perfectly clear in his view that the Cosmos is penetrated with mind, and therefore presupposes the subject. But, withheld apparently by the fear of Pantheism on the one hand and of the doctrine that the self is a mere correlative of nature on the other, he here stops

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short and denies that the subject in the same way presupposes the Cosmos. But there are different kinds of Pantheism, and it is not necessary to reduce the self to a mere correlative of the object in maintaining that a subject implies a Cosmos just as truly as a Cosmos a subject. The author takes refuge in the Kantian doctrine of a transcendental ego, which "can abstract from the concrete and remain still the same self-identical subject as before" (p. 14). What is the writer's conception of such a self-identical subject? Has it thoughts and feelings? If it has, these are its Cosmos; if it has not, what is it?

If this dualism stood alone it would be of less importance, but Mr. D'Arcy is too much penetrated by his own speculative ideas to leave it here. It reappears when we come to the question of the Cosmos of wills. He admits that there cannot be a society of wills any more than a world of objects, except to an individual mind, but there may apparently be an individual mind and will into which the minds and wills of others do not enter as constituent elements. We represent other subjects to ourselves "symbolically" (it is not very clear what the symbol is), but their existence and unity are guaranteed to us, not by the constitution of our own nature as social beings, but by the Divine Mind. The objection here is the same as before. What is the individual will apart from the wills of others? The *diversity* of wills is symbolized by the externality of our bodies to one another; their *unity* is given in every moral or, for the matter of that, immoral act. Does Mr. D'Arcy deny this? does he really believe that because there is no material sensorium in the body politic corresponding to the brain in the animal organism there is no civic spirit, no general purpose, no *community* of wills? His whole doctrine of a common good contradicts any such assumption. And if we grant the existence of the general will, what is the relation of the individual will to it? What would the individual will be without it? Would it not be the same abstract self-identity—the same nonentity—as the subject without the Cosmos? It is this fundamental identity to which the idealist means to call attention by emphasizing the "organic view" of Society. It is not a question of finding interesting parallels between the animal organism and political society, but of realizing this essential unity of wills. Mr. D'Arcy, of course, does so elsewhere, as, for instance, in his excellent chapter upon the "Determination of the Principle." But had he done so more explicitly at the outset he would have saved himself from appearing to accept (p. 58)

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the most vicious element in Mr. Kidd's clever book, the assumption that reason is essentially unsocial. One cannot avoid a suspicion that, as it is his fear of Pantheism that is at the root of his speculative dualism, so here it is his justifiable jealousy of a purely naturalistic Ethics which is the obstacle in the way of his acceptance of a thorough-going idealism. The danger to the religious view of morality is, of course, all the other way. If the individual will is shut up within itself and can only enter into communion with other wills symbolically, how are we to conceive of its relation to the Divine? Can the individual soul partake of this also only through symbols, and if so, what meaning can we attach to a symbol of that of which we have no real knowledge? Mr. D'Arcy quotes Scripture. The root of the present matter is contained in the scriptural question "If a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" Mr. D'Arcy has shown himself an appreciative student of Green's "Prolegomena." To the present writer much, both of the metaphysics and the psychology of that great work, seems to possess little more than an historical interest, but the Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation are as fresh and vital to-day as when they were delivered in 1879. A book like the present shows how important it is, in the attempt to carry on and develop idealistic philosophy in England, to supplement the more individualistic view of the Prolegomena with the doctrine of the general will as developed in the Lectures.

I regret that my limits do not permit me to do justice to the admirable style and still more admirable spirit of this hand-book by quotations, and that this review has been mainly critical. The book itself is chiefly constructive, and has suggestions for the student of ethics at whatever stage of advancement.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

LONDON.

INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. By J. S. Mackenzie, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Professor of Logic and Philosophy in the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895. Pp. 454.

The doctrine that Mr. D'Arcy rejects is made the head of the corner by Professor Mackenzie in his able work on Social Philosophy. Throughout two brilliant chapters (III. and IV.) he exerts

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himself to prove that society is organic in the sense that the individual can only be understood as a member of a system of wills whose mutual relations constitute the essence of each. Society is necessary to the individual not only τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκα, but also τοῦ εὖ ζῆν ἕνεκα, and in this latter connection again, not only in the sense that "the realization of any one individual's highest life is impossible without the co-operation of others, but even that the realization of other lives is an essential element, indeed, *the* essential element in the realization of our own."

The success of his method in working out this doctrine is sufficiently indicated in the review of the first edition which appeared in this JOURNAL in April, 1892. It will be sufficient, here, to note the changes the author has made in his second edition. Besides one or two notes and a running reference to important works on sociology which have appeared since the date of publication, the chief addition consists in a short appendix to Chapter IV. upon the Theory of Value. Professor Mackenzie here emphasizes the distinction he elsewhere draws between objects which have value for a conscious being and which may be anything and the subjective appreciation of their value in what we call pleasure. While agreeing in the main with his view on this subject, I confess that there are some points in it which are still left obscure. The distinction above stated between that to which we assign value (in other words, the object of desire), and the subjective sign of that value (in other words, the pleasure we feel in obtaining it), would probably be accepted by most non-hedonistic readers. But when Professor Mackenzie substitutes as a synonym for the usual "sign of value" the phrase, "sense of value," and proceeds on the basis of this definition to the further contention that feeling is implicit judgment (see p. 242), many readers will probably feel that they are on more dangerous ground. They may be willing to admit that feeling, in the sense of the "indifferentiated continuum" of primitive experience, is implicit judgment, but this does not, of course, commit them to the view that feeling as such, and it is of that we are here speaking, is merely an elementary form of intellection.

It might have been better if Mr. Mackenzie had recast this whole section of his book instead of simply adding a note to it as the result of further reflection. The whole point, however, is of great importance, perhaps, also in spite of so much that has recently been written upon it of great obscurity, and we are grateful even for the

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few hints that are here thrown out as an addition to an otherwise trenchant and valuable criticism of the various forms of Hedonism. Externally, the new edition is all that could be desired as a handy text-book for the student of political philosophy.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

LONDON.

DIE GESELLSCHAFTS-ORDNUNG UND IHRE NATÜRLICHEN GRUNDLAGEN. Entwurf einer Social-Anthropologie zum Gebrauch für alle Gebildeten, die sich mit socialen Fragen befassen. Von Otto Ammon, Mit 5 Abbildungen im Text. Jena: Gustav Fischer. Pp. viii., 408.

The fundamental theoretic thoughts of this book can be given in a few words. The true object of the social order is the selection of the best, the most capable. On this depends every possibility of progress, every possibility of solving the increasing problems of civilization, of even preventing the fall of existing civilization. Perhaps the thought in its universality will nowhere arouse opposition. The extremest socialism would scarcely be inclined to believe that every man was capable of *any* performance, provided only that it was imposed upon him for the sake of society and with a corresponding livelihood assured to him. Socialism also is not inclined to relinquish the intelligent control of production, the continuation of inventive activity, and creative intellectual work; on the contrary, its advocates promise that the powers of mankind will have an entirely new development when the burden is lifted that the capitalistic *régime* of to-day has laid upon the masses, when talent no longer starves on the hard crust of misery, when freedom from the humiliating and hindering struggle with want gives each one room for his individual development.

The principal object of the work before us is to prove that this view of the existing order of society and this form of hope for the future is a dangerous delusion not in harmony with the natural laws of social life. The author attempts to show that the existing social order of civilized peoples possesses, as the product of a development of several thousand years and of a slow selection of forces, mechanical instrumentalities for selection, which work with at least comparative perfection, and that it would be an attempt of hopeless folly to change fundamentally the order of society, and to create artificially new instrumentalities for selection, with the idea of winning by means of them better results. Ammon considers

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the view erroneous that the number is considerable of those who, despite high gifts, are obliged to languish in straitened circumstances. He thinks that there are either no, or but few, unrecognized talents in the lower class; that in consequence the lower class, considering its average endowment, must remain upon a tolerably low plane, since it represents only sediment of which the most valuable constituents have been distilled.

The deductive proof for the position that the proportion of higher endowed individuals to the mass of population can be in general only a small one, Ammon furnishes, in accordance with Francis Galton's method, by applying the combination theory to the grouping of mental characteristics among men. I regard this proof absolutely conclusive. Equally incontrovertible seems to me what Ammon says about the value of class organization for the social end of natural selection. The organization of classes continues the work of natural selection among men, for it militates against the chance of panmixia,—that is, the sexual blending of men of contrasted types of endowment. If one should do away with classes, or if men should cease to marry principally within their own rank, the consequence would be a strong decrease in the number of highly endowed individuals. Here one is compelled to make a choice between fundamental principles, so far as such a thing is possible in questions of national development. The decrease of highly endowed individuals in consequence of a panmixia, thoroughly carried out, would also have for a consequence the decrease of the weaker endowed, as Ammon shows by means of the population- and endowment-curves established by Galton.

The question is, Should we strive for a slight raising of the average mental level at the risk of making less frequent higher orders of endowment? It repeats itself when we think of attempting to do away with existing inequalities of income, and, in this way, place the great mass of those who have little more than the minimum necessities of existence on a more favorable footing. Here, too, one would buy a relatively slight elevation of the standard of life among the masses at a heavy loss; one would have given up the advantage which society gains from the existence of a number of highly educated and better-fed individuals, and from the excitement of competition; and this deficiency would soon let the whole average sink considerably. The inequality of men, the division of labor, and the organization of classes resting upon it are natural laws of human society which can be set aside by no

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reform. If one should attempt to set them aside, one would, to the extent he succeeded, have done away with nature's means of breeding selected individuals. But so little is a caste-like exclusiveness of social classes towards each other meant by this that the author asserts in the most emphatic way that a continuous influx of new elements from the lower ranks to the upper strata of society is an indispensable condition of the health of a social body. The dying out of the upper classes constantly going on must be offset by the fruitfulness of the lower. The social question as it is ordinarily taken is thereby made unsolvable; but the social question in its higher signification is first truly solved by this strong production, —*i.e.*, the renewal of the higher classes in society by bringing to them fresh blood and by strict selection.

According to the general principles thus gained, Ammon considers in his second part most of the projects for social reform under discussion to-day. The need of reform in social arrangements Ammon thoroughly recognizes; he sees therein simply a consequence of the rapid change which the last half century has brought about in the outward conditions of life for the race. Only against political radicalism, especially so far as it has a socialistic coloring, does Ammon carry on (on above mentioned grounds) a relentless war. Chapter XXXV., in which he develops a number of general points of view for the judging of social reforms, gives the broad outlines of his social ethics and contains really the quintessence of the practical proposals which follow from his social anthropology. I say intentionally "social ethics," although the application of such a conception to views like Ammon's may seem to many to-day almost paradoxical. For the leading practical thought of the book is the well-being of the whole,—the furthering of welfare and progress,—for the sake of which we have to put up with many hard things which grow out of arrangements fixed by Nature's laws. We can and must try to soften these hardships, so far as is possible, without endangering higher ends,—in many places in the book there is manifest a noble ethical fervor, which should suffice to protect the author against the charge of making himself the advocate of a class-state, and of the fleecing and oppression of the working-people. But with inexorable distinctness the leading thought stands out that a one-sided heeding of the principle of welfare is inevitably at the cost of progressive development; that the establishment of complete equality of conditions must lead to doing away with all competition, all selection, to a perfect stand-

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still, to the paralysis of forces, to the death of culture. The criticism of the social-reform activity of our time is in its details exclusively fitted to the conditions of the German empire, and therefore need not be further explained here. Still there are also in this part a number of chapters which are either of more general bearing or else contain thoughts that can be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, without difficulty to conditions outside of Germany.

One will not agree with the author in all his opinions. Along with the proper accentuation—for which we may be grateful at a time when the socialistic current is running as rapidly as at present—of the beneficial results of competition and natural selection, many of the evils connected with the present forms of the competitive struggle deserved to be made prominent. Not in all cases do the instrumentalities for natural selection allow the actually valuable to come to the front; not in all cases is work best performed under the pressure of competition. Often the conditions of the competitive struggle are such that only the worse sort of men, the worse wares, predominate. Often a small advantage in one direction is bought with excessive sacrifice in another. It looks as if the author had not sufficiently weighed the possibility, that the preservation of the instrumentalities for selection, now existing in the social order, may be compatible with a certain socializing of many fields of labor. But giving the grounds in detail for this idea would lead beyond the limits set to this notice. Let it suffice to emphasize that Ammon's book, although, like everything that is human, not perfect, yet by the clearness of its fundamental thought, by the fulness of its well-sifted, positive material, and by the sureness of his method, rises far and away above the average of the many well-meaning but poorly thought-out works about social problems, with which literature swarms and which for the most part only appear to forthwith vanish again from the horizon of men. The book will share in the life of the truths which it contains.

FR. JODL.

UNIVERSITY OF PRAGUE.

ANARCHY OR GOVERNMENT? AN INQUIRY IN FUNDAMENTAL POLITICS. By William Mackintire Salter. New York and Boston: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1895. Pp. 176.

This is a very fresh and stimulating little book; a book that the thoughtful man of affairs, with his natural objection to being intel-

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lectually bullied by the mere theorist, might take pleasure in reading. It is, in substance, a quiet appeal to the Individualist,—Mr. Salter, indeed, tries to avoid the use of the terms Individualist and Socialist; but they save the trouble of periphrasis, and they are not likely to be misunderstood in this connection by the readers of this JOURNAL,—it is, I say, an appeal to the Individualist to "consider it again;" to reflect that many of the arguments against governmental action are such as, "if carried to their appropriate conclusion, would result in undoing government altogether," and so logically justify "anarchy," or complete absence of government; to allow that as some amount of government is generally recognized as justifiable, since it results in a balance of advantage, the question of more or less government can only be a question of expediency and not of principle. The argument comes with the more force on account of the spirit in which it is presented and the personal standpoint of the writer. I know of no book which, while presenting the case for "government," does it with so vivid a perception of the ingrained Individualism of the average American citizen, and with so much sympathy for it. Again and again (*e.g.*, pp. 29, 37) Mr. Salter takes occasion to say, even with a certain unction, that "the abstract presumption is always against government" (in the sense of coercive power). "That liberty or complete absence of government would mark an ideal state of society seems hardly to admit of doubt," he declares (p. 11) with a fervor that reminds one of J. S. Mill. The explanation evidently is that, while with one side of his nature our author feels the need of social control, on the other he is an Individualist of the Individualists. The whole Ethical movement, of which he is so distinguished a representative, is surely not misjudged when it is regarded as one of the last manifestations of the individualizing tendency set going by the Reformation. And so Mr. Salter has the best of all qualifications for a missionary, and that is that he can enter into the state of mind of the heathen.

This being so, I cannot but regret that on p. 50 Mr. Salter should begin to leave the more easily tenable grounds of historical experience and practical expediency, and pass over on to the ground of "the social organism;" and that from this point onward, *a priori* arguments deduced from "the very notion of a society" (p. 99), and "the social point of view" (pp. 77, 103) should be put by the side of "the simple logic of events" (p. 149). Not that the idea of "the social organism" is not a true and valuable one; but simply because, so far as my experience goes, it does not appeal to the

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individualist masses one would wish to reach. One can readily anticipate what a heathen pontiff—let us say Professor W. G. Sumner, or an editor of that excellent pagan periodical, *The Nation*—would say to the "real social body" (pp. 53, 64). They would say that what we call "society" *is* "simply an aggregate of individuals" (p. 55); that as Professor Sumner has said of the "state," it is simply "All of us;" and that arguments based on "social consciousness" and "members" rest on misleading analogies. The whole of Chapter V. sounds, to the thorough-going Individualist, like reasoning in a circle: since the nation is a social organism, and an organism has such and such characteristics, therefore a national government has a "right" to do so and so. The argument beats the air in vain if the listener refuses to grant the major premise. To me it seems, that in a missionary tract it were better to bring "the social organism" in at the very end; to endeavor to convert up to it, and not by means of it. Even the most hardened worshipper of Herbert Spencer can be made to feel that if it is wrong to interfere with the individual "struggle for existence," it is hard to find a justification even for the protection by the state of life and property, and that certainly his master has not found it. As for Individualists *à l'outrance*, like the amusing Mr. Donisthorpe, it will be sufficient to whisper to the sober citizen where Mr. Donisthorpe's "anarchy" leads *him*. Such a procedure may not be scientific; but it is a good deal more likely to produce conviction of sin in the unregenerate breast.

Yet, if only public opinion can be led to agree to a strengthening of government in the directions which a wise judgment may suggest, it matters comparatively little what the social creed of the public may be. An Individualism which goes on allowing more and more exceptions, like that of the disciples of John Stuart Mill, will practically serve the purpose as well as a cautious and opportunist Socialism. And hence it seems rather a mistake to say that "there is no possible reconciliation between those who take the individualistic and those who take the social point of view" (p. 97). In theory, perhaps not; but a reconciliation in the field of practice does not seem so hopeless. Moreover, even from the point of view of theory, it may be doubted whether what we want is a *complete* abandonment of the "individualistic" for the "social" point of view. If Individualism, "sternly logical," runs to anarchy, Socialism, it might with equal fairness be argued, leads, when "logically" carried out, to excessive government; an established church, such

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as Mr. Salter disapproves of (p. 86), being the least of its enormities. It will be enough if people can only be made to realize that, for some time to come, it is more government that is needed. It is easily conceivable that a few centuries hence Individualism will once more call for its prophets.

As Mr. Salter says in his chapter on "The Industrial Realm," "the question (of governmental action) is a practical one, not one of abstract theory" (p. 120). Then why quite so much theory in that particular chapter? The operation of the "law" of supply and demand causes evils enough in all conscience to destroy any belief we might have in its adequacy for human needs; it is hardly necessary to open a set assault upon it as "unjust." May I say that the argument here strikes me as not untainted with individualism. That the shrewd or lucky *entrepreneur* (like Mr. Salter's ice-merchant) should benefit by the fluctuations of supply and demand may, in a sense, be regarded as unjust, since he has not incurred any greater cost of production: and here Mr. Salter is at one with mediæval theologians. But that supply and demand should lead to fluctuations in price is the way by which it is brought about that the wants of the community are better supplied. These fluctuations, therefore, provisionally serve a social purpose, and the conduct of the individual in causing them has, provisionally, a social justification—*i.e.*, under the present system of private property. Of course, we trust the world will get to something better some day: meanwhile, to talk of injustice only creates unnecessary irritation.

The last chapter on "The Pullman-Chicago Strike" is added as an illustration; and it is timely. That strike ought, indeed, to have opened many eyes to the ease with which the "peaceful" anarchy of present industrial conditions may give birth at any moment to the anarchy of the streets. It has brought the American judiciary and the American thinking public face to face with the fundamental question of the relation of the state to the joint action of combinations of laborers. And it is difficult to see how we can dissent from Mr. Salter's conclusion that either strikes must be allowed with all they involve (short of actual violence or breach of contract), or the state must assume a responsibility in the industrial sphere from which it now holds back. And this whole argument would remain perfectly valid—since it is based not on theory but on "the logic of events"—even if a few adjectives applied to the action of the Pullman Company (p. 154) were omitted. Unfortunately, the industrial world is so constituted now, that even if employers

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and men lived up to the highest standard we have a right to ask from them, the evils of anarchy would still remain.

W. J. ASHLEY.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

CATHOLIC SOCIALISM. By Francesco S. Nitti. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

This volume, published in Italy in 1890, forms the first part of a critical study of all the important types of modern Socialism, to which Professor Nitti has devoted himself. Its object is to place before the public a clear and orderly statement of historical facts which shall enable them to understand the origin, growth, and present condition of Christian Socialism within the pale of what we term the Roman Catholic Church. The first three chapters are occupied with the Social Problem as it presented itself in the ancient societies of Greece, Rome, and Judæa, and with the mental attitude of ancient philosophers and Christian theologians towards those questions of labor, capital, and industrial organization which took shape in their times. But though it was inevitable, in showing the relation of the Church and Socialism, that Professor Nitti should trace from the earliest era of Christianity the persistence of certain social ideas which found expression in the communist practices of the early Church and of later monasticism, in the condemnation of irresponsible wealth and the rejection of "usury," the author rightly distinguishes Socialism in its modern and tolerably definite shapes as a product of the conscious life of the last century and a half. After sketching in briefly but sufficiently the influence of the Utopists of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Professor Nitti takes up his close and serious study from the middle of this century, to which he dates the first endeavors of churchmen to face the problems of modern industry and poverty in a sympathetic spirit. His account of the social teaching of Archbishop Von Ketteler, of Mainz, the father of Christian Socialism in Germany, and of Abbe Hitze, whose economic analysis and constructive policy are far abler and closer knit, is particularly instructive. It is hardly necessary to say that in the chapter devoted to the Economic Doctrines of German Catholic Socialists, the critical thought is much more clear and convincing than the constructive. Though Professor Nitti gives a careful condensation of the teaching of the leaders, no one save Hitze seems to have seriously endeavored to grasp the complexity of the modern situation. The theological

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bias constantly asserts itself in a tendency to revert to mediæval methods for a solution, in particular to a revival of the old guilds either as independent trade units or as subject to some general supervision of the Church or the State. Moreover, both in Germany and in Austria, whither the brilliant Rudolph Meyer had carried the new teaching, the difficulty of determining whether Church or State is to have the upper hand in the new industrial order evidently divides and confuses the minds of many of the leaders of Catholic Socialism. The most interesting chapter deals with the movement in Austria, the head-quarters of the financial Jew, where the strong anti-semitic feeling has drawn into the ranks of Catholic Socialism a number of aristocratic leaders, such as Prince von Lichtenstein and Baron von Vogelsang. Both in Germany and Austria it is the constantly growing control of money-capital over the land and labor of the nation, and the fact that race and religion mark off the new money-lords from the rest of the nation, that are the dominant influences in the new movement. The slight hold which economic "liberalism" or Manchesterism obtained in Germany and Austria as compared with England, the retention until recent years of guilds and other trade restrictions, the wide limits assigned in practice or in theory to government, are conditions predisposing Teutonic nations towards a repudiation of what not unnaturally seemed to them the industrial and moral anarchy of *laissez-faire*. In France, Professor Nitti shows, Catholic Socialism has made slower progress, owing to the powerful development of "free-trade" teaching by the Le Play School, and has not drawn to itself many of the higher ecclesiastics, as in Germany and Austria. Indeed, though Professor Nitti considers that the teaching of the Count de-Mun and his followers tends ever more strongly towards State Socialism, his account of the movement in France leaves it very doubtful whether the term Socialism in any distinct form can be rightly applied to it. Belgian Socialism, whether Catholic or others, for the most part resolves itself into a demand for co-operative societies.

There are certain defects in the book which inhere to its subject-matter, a vagueness and elusiveness in the presentation of the constructive ideas of Catholic Socialism which contrasts pretty sharply with the mechanical preciseness which hitherto has marked the treatment of the Social Democratic adherents of Marx. The frequent reiteration of the same criticism in almost the same phraseology is perhaps necessary to mark the agreement of the different leaders

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of the movement in different countries, but it rather palls upon the reader. In the constructive proposals, two tendencies deserve notice. One is the tendency to revert to antiquated measures of guild organization and local protection, showing an imperfect grasp of the present and the inevitable future of great industry and world markets. The other is a fondness for the idea of peasant-proprietorship and a rejection of "nationalization of land." Instead of State ownership or control of land figuring first in their "Socialist" programme, it is money-power or pure capital which is the centre of attack.

The volume is of great value and importance, containing a large quantity of matter nowhere else to be obtained; and if at times it assumes the shape of a quarry rather than an edifice of learning, it is, perhaps, none the worse for that. Professor Nitti has preserved strict impartiality, rarely thrusting his own views upon the reader. In the few cases where this rule of abstinence is broken the reader does not gain. There is no object in interpolating ejaculatory criticism, such as "This theory is not very practical, and is also, economically speaking, rather inexact" (p. 354). The translator's notes, which are always trivial and generally foolish, might also have been omitted with advantage. In a final chapter, however, the author gives an able summary and interpretation of the forces of Catholic Socialism, showing reasons why the Church is likely to go further than it has yet gone. "Nevertheless, the Church feels more and more the urgency of accepting whatever there is of good and sound in the doctrines of Socialism, and of winning the love and attachment of the popular classes by taking up their defence and protecting their interests. The more the sceptical and unbelieving bourgoisie, infected by liberal doctrines, falls away from the principles of the Church, the more imperious for the latter becomes the necessity of strengthening its influence over the masses."

J. A. HOBSON.

LONDON.

STUDIES IN ECONOMICS. By William Smart, M.A., LL.D. London: Macmillan & Co., 1895.

Dr. Smart has collected together in this volume a series of *Studies* on various economic subjects, which have, as he states in his preface, "particularly interested" him "in the course of" his "teaching." They are distinguished under three heads—"Studies in Wages," "Studies in Currency," and "Studies in Consump-

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tion." Some have appeared separately in their first draft in various periodicals, including the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. But they have been carefully revised, and additions made in the present volume; and the reader will find certain common lines of thought running through all. He will discover, as indeed he might expect, unmistakable traces of loyal adherence to the characteristic doctrines of that Austrian school, which Dr. Smart has done so much to render familiar to English students. To one who, like the present reviewer, finds the doctrines of that school inadequate, and regards the exclusive emphasis laid by them on one side of the central theory of economics,—the theory of value,—as erring by an excess as extravagant as the older English economists perhaps erred by defect, some of Dr. Smart's theoretic positions must inevitably appear to be doubtful. Nor does he think that that "fallacy of the particular instance," to which Dr. Smart, with characteristic candor, alludes in his preface, is without its prejudicial influence on the reasoning of parts of the book. The readers of this JOURNAL will be more especially interested in the "Studies in Consumption," where distinctly ethical considerations are raised; but it may be noticed that throughout the whole book an ethical strain is apparent. This does not always, we think, conduce to perfect clearness of thought; but it may attract readers, who would be repelled by mere economics, and it may be attributed with some plausibility to that special influence of Mr. Ruskin to whom Dr. Smart pays a tribute of genuine gratitude. This ethical tendency is perhaps not entirely consistent with the strict tenets of the Austrian school. In discussing women's wages, for example, and seeking adequate reasons for their comparative lowness, Dr. Smart places apparently as parallel in their validity the criterion of explanation and that of justification; but, while the first of these may be economic, the second is surely more properly ethical. Yet Dr. Smart evidently inclines here to attach as much importance to the latter as to the former standard, while on page 9, on the other hand, he says that "in vain does" a man protest that he has worked hard and worked well, and that a fair day's work deserves a fair day's wages. Society answers inexorably, We have nothing to do with your work; let us see your product; if it pleases us, we shall pay you for it; if not—." There can be little doubt that the Austrian school, with its exclusive insistence on the demand side of the problem of value, would emphasize this rigid economic view; but we doubt whether Dr. Smart himself has quite reconciled this conception with those more ethi-

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cal considerations to which he often appeals. Perhaps in his case, as in that of many another writer, the hardness of his head has not been able to resist the warmth of his heart, and he is betrayed into an inconsistency, which is dangerous to sound reasoning, though it is creditable to sympathetic feeling; and this apparent inconsistency may, we think, also be detected in other passages of the book.

L. L. PRICE.

ORIEL COLLEGE, OXFORD.

JULIAN, PHILOSOPHER AND EMPEROR, AND THE LAST STRUGGLE OF PAGANISM AGAINST CHRISTIANITY. By Alice Gardner, Lecturer and Associate of Newnham College, Cambridge; author of "Synesius of Cyrenet." Vol. xiii., "Heroes of the Nations." Edited by Evelyn Abbott. London and New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1895.

Miss Gardner's able and scholarly little book deals with an important passage in the history of the great conflict, supremely interesting to all students of ethics, between the young Christianity and the dying Paganism. The new spirit, in its strenuous fight for existence, was inevitably forced into an attitude of defiance, denial, absolute opposition, war to the death against the old systems of which it was in reality the complement. The root-principle of Christianity, its identification of the nobler nature of man with the divine spirit of the universe, manifesting itself in a burning enthusiasm for truth, for a spiritual morality, and a deep-hearted love, gave rise also to a contemptuous hatred and rejection alike of the easy-going eclecticism of the times, the fleshly standard of pleasure, the cold and lifeless self-righteousness of the moralists, and the art and philosophy and culture that seemed to block the way. A deeper consideration of that very principle was one day to show that those rejected elements were vitally necessary to its own development. But that day was not yet.

Miss Gardner's account of the varying struggle, though clear and instructive as far as it goes, does not bring out this all-important point, nor does she treat the great Arian controversy with the care and precision it deserves. Her estimate of the work and character of Julian, not as an apostate, but as what he was, a reactionary, is thoughtful, temperate, and judicious. Yet it may be questioned whether the author's sympathy with her hero and her laudable desire to do justice to his undoubted merits have not caused her to over-

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look the deepest reasons for his antipathy to the Christian faith. No doubt the factor on which Miss Gardner lays most stress, Julian's reverence for past philosophy and culture, especially for the Hellenic, was of the highest importance in the formation of his views, but he was also profoundly influenced by his unfortunate bias, as a thinker, against the identification of the human and the divine, and the self-righteous conceit, the academic pride of the conscious philosopher and follower of tradition, must have effectually closed his mind to the new light which changed the lives of the Pharisee Paul and the student Augustine. Nor had Julian in compensation the statesman's insight, the firm grip on the real needs of his time, which induced Constantine to change the religion of the empire as he changed its seat of government.

Miss Gardner's book closes with a suggestive sentence. "The two streams," she says, referring to Hellenism and Christianity, "have blended;" and she adds, "We cannot feel that the triumphal cry of Julian's enemies has been fully justified at the bar of history. It is the Christ, not the Galilean, that has conquered." Julian assuredly had no such dream of a conception that could unite the Christian and the Hellenic ideal of life. It is still, we may say, the task before the world, the theoretic task for those who would formulate our ideals, the practical task for those who would realize them.

No mention has been made of the other historical portions of the book, as not falling within the scope of this review. The volume, as a whole, forms a valuable addition to the series.

MELIAN STAWELL.

HISTORY OF RELIGION. By Allan Menzies, D.D., Professor in the University of St. Andrews. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895. (University Series.) Pp. xiv., 438.

The history of religion, like the history of social ethics, may be written entirely from the stand-point of ethnology, so that it will have no direct interest for the student of philosophy; it has often been written as the historical statement of purely philosophical conceptions. The present volume distinctly turns aside from the description of religious beliefs and religious practices, nor does it aim to set forth any philosophy of religion. Dr. Menzies has thought it possible to write a history of *religion*, noting the different forms which it assumed among different races, and seeking to

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define the place of each of these forms of religion in the development of human culture. In spite of the popular interest in comparative religion and in "parliaments" of religion, the task which the author undertakes is a new and untried one.

The title of the work is intended to mark the difference between it and the various compendiums of mythology and religious rites which have preceded it. These have stated the phenomena, and it remains to understand the historical meaning of these phenomena. As thus understood, the history of religion rests on two important assumptions, which receive due emphasis in the earlier chapters of the present volume. It assumes, *first*, that different religions—false religions as they are commonly called—are in truth religions. A religion is not a set of cunningly devised fables nor a set of rites devised with equal cunning. It is a religion because it contains truth revealed from God, and because man, having grasped this truth, seeks to live in communion with God. And religions differ because different phases of divine truth are grasped, and God is approached, in different ways; as well as because higher truth so easily degenerates in frail human hands. This first assumption is a bold one to make in the present state of our knowledge; still it is necessary if there is to be a real history of religion, and unless one is prepared to make it, why should he care to study curious rites and beliefs without meaning?

The *second* assumption is connected with the first: the history of religion assumes that the different religions are really phases of one organic development, and that they can only be understood when studied as parts of one great process. This idea, which has been so fruitful in other branches of science, is destined, I believe, to make the history of religion a study of real importance; and the real value of the present volume is that it squarely faces this new, great task.

The difficulties which a pioneer in any new field must encounter are much increased by the limitations imposed on the author. In order to accomplish his purpose at all, he is obliged to give some account of religious beliefs and practice; yet this account is so meagre as to lose most of the interest it should properly have. The detailed discussion of the religious meaning of particular beliefs and rites is manifestly impossible. Still, the reader will be surprised that so little is said of religious practice, for it would seem most natural to trace the development of religion in connection with the rites by which the religious life sought expression.

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The chapters on Semitic religion and on Christianity will undoubtedly have most interest to the general reader, and on this (to him) more familiar ground the author is very successful in giving a brief and comprehensive account of the important facts. The volume as a whole ought to do much to make the present interest in comparative religion deeper and more intelligent.

ARTHUR FAIRBANKS.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

NEW BOOKS.

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Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:
Prof. E. Boirac, 27 Rue de Berlin, Paris, France.
Prof. Fr. Jodl, Gerstengasse 43, Prague, Austria.
J. S. Mackenzie, M.A., 58 Claude Road, Cardiff, Wales.
Prof. Josiah Royce, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JULY, 1896.

IS PLEASURE THE SUMMUM BONUM?

ETHICS is the science of the Good. As distinguished from the natural sciences, or the sciences of the actual, it is a normative or regulative science, a science of the ideal. The question of ethical science is not, What is? but What ought to be? As the science of the Good, it is the science, *par excellence*, of the ideal and the ought. Its task is the interpretation and explanation of our judgments of ethical value, as the tasks of æsthetics and of logic are respectively the interpretation and explanation of our judgments of æsthetic and of logical or intellectual value. This task ethics seeks to accomplish by investigating the ultimate criterion or common measure of moral value, the true norm or standard of ethical appreciation. What, it asks, is the ultimate Good in human life? To what common denominator can the many so-called "goods" of life be reduced? Why, in the last analysis, is life worth living?

Or, since moral life is a series of choices, and character or virtue is, as Aristotle said, a certain habit or settled tendency of choice, the ethical question may be said to be, What is the true object of choice? What object approves itself to reflective thought as unconditionally worthy of our choice? What ought we to choose? For the objects of choice fall into two

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great classes,—ends and means, objects that we choose for their own sake, and objects that we choose for the sake of other objects. Some objects we judge to possess an absolute, primary, and intrinsic value; other objects we judge to possess only a relative, secondary, and extrinsic value. But, strictly, there can be only one End, one object or type of objects to which we attribute absolute and independent value, one *Bonum* that constitutes the several *Bona*. Ethical system and unity imply such an ultimate and unitary Good; and ethical thinkers, when they have understood their task, have always sought for this last term of moral value, this one End to which all other so-called ends are merely means, and which they have therefore called by the proud name of The Good (τὸ ἀγαθόν).*

The answer of Hedonism, in both ancient and modern times, is Pleasure. Pleasure, it is maintained, is the ultimate term and measure of ethical value, the one true object of human choice; the attainment of pleasure in life is what alone makes life worth living; pleasure is the absolute and sovereign good. Other things may seem to be worth living for, and may be chosen. But their value is secondary and derivative; they are chosen only as means to this end, only for the sake of the pleasure which they yield, in their pursuit and attainment, either to ourselves or to others; or, in Professor Sidgwick's phrase, for their "felicific" quality.

In general, this ethical Hedonism is based upon psychological Hedonism. The theory that pleasure is the true object of choice rests upon the theory that pleasure is the only thing we actually choose, or, by the nature of the case, *can* choose. The proof of ethical Hedonism is experiential,—the evidence of universal experience. In Mill's words, "the only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other

* The true significance of the alternative term *Summum Bonum* is sometimes missed. It means the *highest* or sovereign good; not merely the greatest good, or the sum of all the rest, but their regulative and constitutive principle, which assigns to each its place in the hierarchy of goods,—the one and only real Good, of which all so-called "goods" are but the several aspects or expressions.

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sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it." *

This experiential basis of the theory is essential to it. Ethics must not contradict psychology. The ideal must not be the absolutely impossible or unattainable, the contrary and opposite of the actual. As an interpretation of moral experience, ethics must not falsify or invalidate that experience. It is true that the complete demonstration that pleasure is the constant and inevitable object of choice would annihilate the distinction between the ideal and the actual, between the Ought and the Is. In this sense, Mr. Sidgwick's statement is indisputable, that "psychological Hedonism is incompatible with ethical Hedonism." Yet it is none the less true that the ideal must have a certain community and affinity with the actual. If the ideal is ever in any measure to be actualized in human experience, if it is the ideal form of that experience, it must already exist there, in germ and potentiality, if not in full-blown actuality. The preparation is laid for the moral ideal in the psychological constitution of our nature, in the native tendencies of our life. By "desirable," Mill probably meant "that which *can* be desired," rather than "that which *ought* to be desired;" † and certainly we may assume that we *can* choose what we *ought* to choose, and may properly look for the mark of the desirable object in the object of desire. If we cannot choose (or desire) anything but pleasure, then the statement that we ought to choose something else is "solemn trifling." As Kant insisted in another reference, "Thou shalt" implies "Thou canst." In this sense, psychological Hedonism *would* be the proof of ethical Hedonism, and the disproof of any non-hedonistic theory of the Good.

But is psychological Hedonism true? Is pleasure the only object of choice? Choice is the realization of an idea. Is the idea which we choose to realize, in all cases, the idea of

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* "Utilitarianism," ch. iv.

† Only in the former sense, of course, as Mill must himself have seen, is his "proof" deserving of the name.

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pleasure,—*i.e.*, the anticipation of the pleased feeling which will result from the proposed course of action? Is this the only possible content of the idea selected for realization? Is this, in the last analysis, the only possible object of thought, and, therefore, of choice? The obvious answer is that, so far from this being the case, the ideal object may be anything, objective or subjective. The mind may, in Butler's phrase, "terminate in the object," and not return to the consideratjon of its own pleasure in the attainment of the object. And, even if the content of the idea be subjective, that content need not be merely the represented state of feeling. I may choose to *do* something, or to *be* something, as well as to *feel* somehow. As Mr. Bradley says, "there never was any one who did not desire many things for their own sake; there never was a typical voluptuary." *

Whence, then, the illusion of psychological Hedonism? It arises, I am convinced, from a confusion between the content or constitution of the moving idea, on the one hand, and the emotional strength by virtue of which the idea moves me to its own realization, on the other hand; from the confusion between a *pleasant idea* and an *idea of pleasure*. † The idea must please or attract me; else it will remain unrealized. To *move* me, it must *please* me. Pleasure is the mechanism or dynamic of choice. The energy or moving power of an idea lies in the feeling which it arouses. The law of its operation is the law of attraction or fascination: it moves, "as one that is loved moves," by drawing us to itself. There is pleasure in every act of choice. Without this pleasure, the choice would be impossible; and the pleasure must, therefore, be accepted as part of the explanation of the choice. It is what Aristotle calls the "efficient cause," the *moving* power or agency. It is more than the concomitant of the act of choice, which Aristotle acknowledged it to be: it is the dynamic of choice. Even when the choice is a choice of pain (in preference to pleasure) or of

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* "Ethical Studies," 237.

† Cf. Bradley, op. cit., 235: "A pleasant thought" is "not the same thing with the thought of pleasure."

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something quite different from either pleasure or pain (as in the choice of the scholar or of the man of science), the choice itself is pleasant, or it would be impossible. The idea thrills us, fascinates us, claims us as its own; and it is in this appeal to our feeling that its power to move us lies. *Otherwise*, the idea (whatever it is an idea *of*) were impotent; *so*, it is omnipotent. And, to leave no doubt as to the importance of the function of pleasure in the process of choice, let us add that the law of that process is that the idea which is *most* attractive, or gives *most* pleasure, is always the victorious and moving idea. In this sense Mill's words are true, that "desiring a thing and finding it pleasant . . . are . . . in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact." * Mr. Sidgwick's statement is also true, that "if by 'pleasant' we mean that which influences choice, exercises a certain attractive force on the will, it is an assertion incontrovertible because tautological, to say that we desire what is pleasant, or even that we desire a thing in proportion as it appears pleasant." †

But there is another, and no less essential, element in the process of choice; and therefore another, and no less essential, factor in its explanation. In Mr. Bradley's words, "to choose what pleases me most . . . merely means *that* I choose, and says nothing whatever about *what* I choose." ‡ Pleasure is that which enables me to choose; but it is not therefore also that which I choose—the content or object of my choice. A *pleasant choice* is not necessarily a *choice of pleasure*. The idea which moves me to its realization does so because its content (that which it is an idea *of*) appeals to me more strongly, attracts, interests, or pleases me more than the content of the other competing ideas. The attractive power of the idea is the explanation of its realization in the act of choice. But the secret of this attractive power is found in the correspondence between the content of the idea and myself. That content raises or degrades me to itself, makes me its own: *it*, therefore, is the *object* of my choice—is *what*

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* "Utilitarianism," ch. iv. † "Methods of Ethics," Book I., ch. iv., § 2.
‡ "Ethical Studies," 234.

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I choose. *It* is what Aristotle would call the "final cause," that *for the sake of* which I act, the end which I choose as my good. We cannot too carefully distinguish this teleological explanation of choice from the mechanical or dynamical explanation already referred to,—the *ratio* from the *causa*, the ἐξ οὗ from the οὗ ἕνεκα. It does not follow that, because an action is pleasant, it is performed *for the sake of* the pleasure; that because the martyr's, and many another's, self-sacrificing devotion thrills him, and the thrill of strange delight carries him through an act which had otherwise been impossible, the act is therefore done *for the sake of* the thrill, or that *this* is the object of his devotion. That would be an explanation which does not explain, a distortion and negation of the essential fact in the case. On the contrary, it is the very perfection of his devotion to the object that accounts for the thrill: the thrill is the thrill *of devotion*, and is not felt save by the *devotee*.

This distinction between the dynamical and the teleological aspects of choice was well expressed by the older British writers in the two terms "motive" and "intention" (or "end"). The former term was used to designate the sentient "spring" or source of the action, the latter to designate its aim, object, or end. This is the usage of Bentham, who defines a "motive to the will" as "anything whatsoever, which, by influencing the will of a sensitive being, is supposed to serve as a means of determining him to act, or voluntarily to forbear to act, upon any occasion." * "A motive," he adds, "is substantially nothing more than pleasure or pain operating in a certain manner." † It is also the usage of J. S. Mill, who defines the intention as "what the agent wills to do," and the motive as "the feeling which makes him so will to do." ‡ In view of this distinction, these writers hold, quite consistently, that ethical quality belongs primarily and strictly to the intention alone, and only secondarily and indirectly to the motive. Bentham says explicitly that all motives are morally colorless,

* "Principles of Morals and Legislation," ch. x., § 3.
† Ibid., ch. x., § 9. ‡ "Utilitarianism," ch. ii.

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since they are all the same in kind,—all pleasure-seeking and pain-shunning. "There is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one. Let a man's motive be ill-will; call it even malice, envy, cruelty; it is still a kind of pleasure that is his motive: the pleasure he takes at the thought of the pain which he sees, or expects to see, his adversary undergo. Now even this wretched pleasure, taken by itself, is good; it may be faint; it may be short: it must at any rate be impure: yet, while it lasts, and before any bad consequences arrive, it is as good as any other that is not more intense." * Similarly J. S. Mill writes: "The morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention, that is, upon what the agent *wills to do.* But the motive, that is, the feeling which makes him will so to do, when it makes no difference in the act, makes none in the morality." † The distinction has, however, been obscured, if not ignored, by later and especially by contemporary writers. "Motive" is now generally used as the synonym of "end" or "intention;" and the inseparability of the dynamical from the teleological aspect of the act of choice affords good reason for the application of the same term to both. T. H. Green has, with especial persuasiveness, insisted upon the indissoluble unity of motive and end; and his influence is chiefly responsible for the change in terminology. But, though inseparable, these two aspects of choice are not indistinguishable; and it is as necessary as ever, for clear thinking, to distinguish them. ‡

Yet, as Professor Dewey remarks, § the very psychological confusion of "pleasure as object of desire with pleasure as motive testifies to a right psychological instinct: that which is an aim of action must also move to action. There must be an identification of the real concrete ideal with the impelling

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* "Principles of Morals and Legislation," ch. x., § 10, and note.

† "Utilitarianism," ch. ii.

‡ It might perhaps be questioned whether, while all ends are motives, we ought not to admit the existence of motives which are not ends. Cf. the discussion on the meaning of "Motive" in this JOURNAL, October, 1893, and January, 1894.

§ "The Study of Ethics," 50.

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spring to action. Unless the aim or ideal itself becomes a moving force, it is barren and helpless. Unless the moving force becomes itself idealized, unless it is permeated with the object aimed at, it remains *mere* impulse, blind and irrational." Perhaps the best term by which to express this concrete unity of the ideal content and the impulsive force which makes possible its realization in the act of choice is *Interest*. The word suggests both the objective and the subjective, both the ideational and the sentient, elements in choice. On the one hand, the object must *interest* me,—*i.e.*, must appeal not merely to thought, but to feeling. If it is to become the end or motive of my activity, the object of my choice, it must attract or please me. On the other hand, it is no less true that I must be interested in *it*, that my feeling must gather round the idea of the object as its centre. As Butler says, "the very idea of interest . . . consists in this, that an appetite or affection enjoys its object." Moreover, the object which interests me, while it *may* be my own subjective condition or state of feeling, may also be some thing or person or state of affairs—some "condition of things"—quite other than myself. The object in which I am interested, or in which I find my pleasure, may be pleasure itself—my own or another's; or it may be something quite different from pleasure. But an *object* there must be: if you cannot divorce *it* from *me*, neither can you divorce *me* from *it*. Choice is always the expression of interest. It is neither the expression of "self-interest," nor is it strictly "disinterested." It always has both an objective and a subjective side; and according as we lay the stress upon the objective or upon the subjective aspect of it, we shall call the choice "disinterested" (because I am interested in an *object*), or "interested" (because the object interests *me*). Within this omnipresent interest of choice, room is found for all the "disinterested" enthusiasms of life.

Such a determination of the place and function of pleasure in the act of choice, such an acknowledgment of its psychological inevitableness and importance, invalidates in advance certain interpretations of the moral ideal, or of the true object of choice. The question, for example, is constantly asked, in

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proof of ethical Hedonism, and in refutation of an objective theory of the Good: Would an object be desirable *if it did not yield pleasure?* "*Is* any object regarded, or *can* or *ought* it to be regarded, as good or valuable (however much desired) if it causes no happiness whatever—no pleasure and no freedom from pain—to any sentient creature? And the case may be put more strongly still by supposing an object which, so far from causing pleasure, causes pain,—pain severe, prolonged, extensive, and unrecompensed."* The question is unmeaning, since such an object could not be desired or chosen; since to *choose* an object *is* to find pleasure in it. Professor Bain similarly argues† that though "our desires do fasten upon the indifferent objective accompaniments of our pleasures, . . . they do not set up these indifferent accompaniments as ends of pursuit, even when divorced from the pleasures that brought them into notice," that, *e.g.*, "when a man loses his enjoyment in hunting, he does not continue to desire hunting." We have just seen the impossibility of such an elimination of pleasure from the process of choice. But the ethical question is not thereby settled,—the question, namely, as to the rightful *place* of pleasure in choice. Since, however, pleasure is an inexpugnable element of our moral experience, an ethical theory which refuses to take account of it, and which offers for our acceptance a Good in which no place is found for pleasure, is unpsychological, and, therefore, untenable.

Similarly, it has been pointed out that Kant's attempt to eliminate pleasure from the Good is the result of a false psychological analysis. Kant accepts the traditional psychology of the Hedonists, that pleasure is the constant and inevitable object of desire and choice; and his only way of escape from Hedonism in ethics is, therefore, by ascetically maintaining the rights of reason against those of feeling, and holding up before us, as the ideal life, the passionless choice of the practi-

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* Miss E. E. Constance Jones, in INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, V., 238.

† "The Emotions and the Will," ch. viii. (3d ed.).

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cal reason. This is necessarily a purely formal ideal, since, on Kant's view, pleasure is the only possible content of choice. Refuge is sought from the subjectivity of feeling in the abstract and formal objectivity of mere reason. But we have seen that it is not necessary to abolish pleasure in order to reach the objective side of choice. Pleasure is the inevitable subjective side; all choices are pleasant; to choose is to find our pleasure in that which we choose. A pleasureless or passionless choice is a contradiction in terms. But the question of the objective content or the *What* of choice remains open for discussion, unprejudiced by the fact of the pleasantness of the act of choice itself.

Professor Sidgwick, on the contrary, after denying that pleasure is the *object* of choice, affirms that it is the only reasonable *ground* of choice. His ethical Hedonism rests upon the denial of psychological Hedonism. We do not choose pleasure; our choice is of objects, and "terminates" in them. Yet the only rational vindication of such objective choices is to be found, he holds, in the pleasure which the pursuit or attainment of the object yields. The only criterion of ethical value is pleasure. Pleasure is the only thing desirable, though it is not the only object of desire; it is the only thing worth choosing, though it is not the only thing chosen.* While we must admire the candor of this abandonment of the psychological basis of Hedonism in ethics, we cannot help remarking the peculiarly difficult situation of the new Hedonism. We must watch with interest its further fortunes, and observe whether, after being uprooted from the old soil of feeling, the hardy plant of Hedonism will take root and grow in the new ground of reason. It does seem as if the last strain had been put upon the "paradox of Hedonism," when we are told that the only thing desirable and worthy of choice is the very thing that, in general, we neither desire nor choose. For, taking the case of knowledge, Mr. Sidgwick urges "that this specific enjoyment is strictly unattainable, so long as one desires knowledge *merely* as a means to it: until the desire of knowledge for its

* Cf. F. H. Bradley, "Ethical Studies," 116.

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own sake is somehow aroused in us, we cannot experience either the agreeable ardor of investigation or the true delight of discovery." *

But let us examine Mr. Sidgwick's argument for the "rationality" of Hedonism. We have seen that he is perfectly aware of the objective as well as of the subjective side of choice. His argument is that the objective side has no value in itself, but only in relation to the subjective; that the value of objects consists in their felicific possibilities. "Admitting that we have actual experience of such preferences as have just been described, of which the ultimate object is something that is not merely consciousness, it still seems to me that when . . . we 'sit down in a calm moment,' we can only justify to ourselves the importance that we attach to any of these objects by considering its conduciveness, in one way or another, to the happiness of conscious (or sentient) beings." † It is true that "several cultivated people do habitually judge that knowledge, art, etc., are ends independently of the pleasure derived from them." Yet, even "these elements of ideal good"—these objects of enthusiastic pursuit—derive their real value from the pleasure to which they minister. The pursuit of such ideal objects as Truth, Freedom, Beauty, etc., *for their own sakes*, "is indirectly and secondarily, though not primarily and absolutely, rational: on account not only of the happiness that will result from their attainment, but also of that which springs from their disinterested pursuit. While yet, if we ask for a final criterion of the comparative value of the different objects of men's enthusiastic pursuit, . . . we shall none the less conceive it to depend on the degree in which they respectively conduce to Happiness." ‡

Is this a fair and satisfactory interpretation of such appreciations? Is pleasure the only thing that we regard as having value in itself, as, in itself, worth attaining? Mr. Sidgwick finds the argument for Hedonism in "the results of a compre-

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* "Methods of Ethics," Book I., chap. iv., final note.

† Op. cit. Book III., chap. xiv., § 2.

‡ Loc. cit.

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hensive comparison of the ordinary judgments of mankind:" * his method always is the interrogation of the uncorrupted moral common sense. Moreover, he clearly states the idealistic alternative. Take the case of Culture. "If the Hedonistic view of Culture, as consisting in the development of susceptibilities for refined pleasure of various kinds, be rejected, it must be in favor of what I have called the Idealistic view: in which we regard the ideal objects on the realization of which our most refined pleasures depend,—Knowledge, or Beauty in its different forms, or a certain ideal of human relations (whether thought of as Freedom or otherwise)—as constituting in themselves ultimate Good, apart from the pleasures which depend upon their pursuit and attainment."† His decision between these alternative views is that our interest in Culture is ultimately an interest in pleasure; such "ideal goods" "seem to obtain the commendation of Common Sense, roughly speaking, in proportion to the degree" of their hedonistic productiveness. Is it not strange to find such a thinker as Mr. Sidgwick agreeing with the practical man's utilitarian and practical estimate of knowledge? It is not the practical man, but the student, who is the rightful judge of the value of knowledge. It is true that "the meed of honor commonly paid to Science seems to be graduated, though perhaps unconsciously, by a tolerably exact utilitarian scale," and that "the moment the legitimacy of any branch of scientific inquiry is seriously disputed, as in the recent case of vivisection, the controversy on both sides is generally conducted on an avowedly utilitarian basis."‡ But this popular and practical

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* *Mind*, II., 35. † Ibid., II., 34.

‡ "Methods of Ethics," Book III., chap. xiv., § 2. Professor Bain's estimate of knowledge is no less frankly utilitarian, and is even more surprising as the judgment of a student. The value of knowledge is, like the value of money, merely instrumental; but, by association of ideas, it comes to be mistaken for an end in itself. "Like money, knowledge is liable to become an end in itself. Principally valuable as guidance in the various operations of life, as removing the stumbling-blocks, and the terrors of ignorance, it contracts in some minds an independent charm, and gathers round it so many pleasing associations as to be a satisfying end of pursuit." ("Mental and Moral Science," Book IV., chap. iv., § 3.)

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estimate of knowledge is not to be confused with the theoretical estimate of it by the intellectual man, who has surely more right to be heard on the question than the practical man whose interest and business lie elsewhere. The "things of the mind" can be estimated aright only by men of mind, not by men of affairs; and the moral common-sense of the former class is no less entitled to a hearing than that of the latter. Similarly it is not the uncultured man and the Philistine who may rightfully adjudge the value of artistic products. As Plato would say, such men have not the experience which alone fits a man to judge of good: these forms of good are not *their* good,—they may even be their bad. One cannot help thinking that Mr. Sidgwick has fallen into the old fallacy which he has done so much to refute, namely, that because the good is *pleasant*, therefore it is *pleasure;* that because an object is not chosen, or regarded as good, unless it attracts or pleases, therefore it must be chosen *for the sake of* the pleasure, and its goodness must be identical with its pleasantness. But we have seen that the interests of life imply objects in which we are interested, as well as our interest or pleasure in such objects. The ethical question—the question of the criterion of good or value—has to do with the content of the ideas which move us to action, of the purposes and intentions of which our actions are the execution. The question of ethics is, What are the *true* interests? In what objects *ought* we to take pleasure? What is *the* Good?

Ethical value is essentially objective as well as subjective. The ethical universe is a scale of values, in which the possible interests are ranked as higher or lower, according to the objects in which they centre. The final aim of ethical reflection is the discovery of the true objective centre of interest, as the effort of the moral life itself is to make that centre our own. Morality is not the mere getting of pleasure,—to be pleased is easy, is inevitable. But to be pleased "to the right extent, and at the right time, and with the right objects, and in the right way, this is not what every one can do, and is by no means easy; and that is the reason why right doing is rare,

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and praiseworthy, and noble."* The objectivity of Good is no less essential than the objectivity of Truth. To make truth subjective, to resolve the object of knowledge into the experience or consciousness of the knowing subject, is to destroy truth and knowledge. Knowledge implies the reality of its object: the criterion of truth is found in the *It* which I know, not in *Me*, the knower. Intellectual subjectivity means intellectual scepticism, or the decentralization of knowledge. And to make the Good subjective, to resolve the ethical *It* into the experience or consciousness of its subject, is, no less inevitably, to destroy the Good. Morality implies the reality of its object; the criterion of Good must be found in some object not merely supremely interesting, but supremely worthy of interest. If we are to avoid moral scepticism, we must avoid ethical subjectivity, or the decentralization of the Good.

To make the ethical centre objective and absolute, rather than subjective and relative, is not, of course, to divorce the Good from consciousness, as Mr. Sidgwick seems to think. It does not follow that, because nothing is good (as nothing is true), out of relation to consciousness, therefore its goodness (or its truth) lies in the mere state of consciousness itself. Consciousness, whether intellectual or moral, is objective, as well as subjective, in its reference: it is essentially an attitude of the subject towards the object, of the Ego towards the Non-Ego, of man towards the universe. And to know the Truth, and to attain the Good,—what is either but the taking of the right attitude towards Reality, the attitude dictated by Reality itself?

Mr. Sidgwick, it is true, reaches a certain objectivity of view by invoking the aid of reason as the guide to sentient or subjective satisfaction. But the function of reason is still merely regulative: it provides the distributive principles of a Good which is wholly constituted by feeling. Reason is still, in Hume's phrase, "the slave of passion;" for it only discovers the path to the goal of sentient satisfaction, plans the execu-

* "Nicomachean Ethics," II., ix. 2.

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tion of an end which is determined by sensibility. To be truly objective, the Good must be rationally constituted, as well as rationally regulated: the content of the end must be the expression and exponent of reason. The essential inadequacy of "Rational Hedonism" is seen in the absence from its scheme of the distinction between "higher" and "lower" pleasures. After all, it provides merely a *Maximum* Bonum, "the greatest amount of pleasure on the whole;" not a *Summum* Bonum, a system or hierarchy of goods, ranged according to their several degrees, according to the order of their excellence. The ethical function of Reason is sovereign and legislative; and she refuses the office of a servant, however plausibly urged upon her. But Rational Hedonism still places pleasure in the seat of supreme honor and of solitary dignity, on the throne of the moral universe: pleasure is still the only End, the only thing absolutely worthy of choice, that *for the sake of which* everything is done. That seat of sovereign dignity and authority belongs to Reason, and she will take no lower. It is for her to determine the true content of choice,—to dictate the scale of ethical values, and to assign to the several pleasures of life their place in that scale.

Two grand difficulties must always beset the hedonistic theory of the Good, by reason of its subjectivity. In the first place, as I have just been arguing, it cannot interpret the qualitative, but only the quantitative, aspect of the Good. The only distinction it can establish is that between the "greater" and the "less;" it has no place for the "higher" and the "lower." It points to the *greatest*, but not to the *highest* Good. Even the Rational Hedonism of Professor Sidgwick exhibits this inherent deficiency. Its regulative principles are Prudence, Benevolence, and Justice,—all quantitative or economic principles. But the true ethical alternative is always, as Dr. Martineau insists, between the higher and the lower, not between the greater and the less. The ethical distinction is one of rank rather than of amount; of *quale* rather than of *quantum*. Mill, alone among Hedonists, acknowledged this essential

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distinction; and he obviously failed to establish it upon a hedonistic basis.*

In the second place, Hedonism fails to transcend egoism, and to establish the validity of a truly altruistic morality. Even Professor Sidgwick acknowledges an ultimate "Dualism of the Practical Reason." Unless the individual good is seen to be objective as well as subjective, the wider objectivity of social good cannot be reached. In Mr. Bradley's words: "A rational way of transcending the abstraction of the private self must . . . transcend also the abstraction of mere pleasure."† If my interest is only in pleasure, it is only, primarily at least, in *my* pleasure. Pleasure is, by its very nature, a subjective, private, and individual good.

The only way to establish the preferability both of the higher to the lower pleasures and of the general to the individual happiness, is to recognize the essential objectivity of the Good, the absoluteness of the criterion of ethical value. The measure of our life is found in the ideas of which it is the realization, in the content of these ideas. According to the measure of that content, in its height and in its breadth, is the measure of the life which has chosen it for its Good. As for feeling, it must be enlisted in the service of the idea, and educated to find its satisfaction in the highest and largest, or most completely rational, ideas. And "I cannot help feeling," with Sir Frederick Pollock,‡ "that, while fulness of life is pleasant, yet it is not so much the pleasure of it that is good as the fulness of life itself." The good life blooms in pleasure, as Aristotle said. But pleasure is rather the symptom and expression of moral health than itself the soundness of life. The moral task is the gradual formation and development of ever higher and larger interests; the learning to find our pleasure in the best objects, to draw from the deep wells of the absolute Good the pure waters of life.

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* Mr. Spencer's explanation of the qualitative distinction is entirely psychological in its interest, and resolves quality into quantity.

† INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, IV., 386. ‡ *Mind*, II., 271.

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RIGHTS AND DUTIES.*

MODERN biological science, at least as popularly understood,† has accustomed us to see all through the course of the development of organic being the signs of an incessant struggle, and has taught us to regard that struggle as being essentially a struggle for existence. And certainly, however we may doubt the adequacy of this theory as being a complete explanation of the facts of life, it can hardly be denied, at any rate, that those who adopt it have hit upon a *vera causa*, that the struggle for existence is actually an operative force. As regards the life of animals, the idea of "nature red in tooth and claw" is certainly more than a poetic figure; and even in the peaceful growth of the vegetable world we can easily find instances of one form of life overshadowing another and pressing it out of existence. And in human life, also, we do not require either the authority of Mr. Gladstone or the production of sensational details to convince us that for a large number of men and women within our present civilized societies life is little more than a struggle for existence, and a struggle in which many of them succumb.

Yet even in the case of the lower forms of life it may well be doubted whether this aspect of struggle for existence is the only element involved in the process of development, or even the most significant. I observe that some of our modern evolutionists, now that they have themselves ceased to struggle for existence in the republic of science, are inclined to attach somewhat less importance to this factor than they

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* A lecture to the London Ethical Society, November, 1894.

† Serious students are beginning to recognize "the element of co-operation in competition." On this point I may refer to Mr. J. Arthur Thomson's article on "The Endeavour after Well-being," *Natural Science*, January, 1896. Cf. also the remarks by the same writer in this JOURNAL, Vol. V., No. 4, p. 517. I am not, however, enough of a biologist to judge of the value of the views put forward by Mr. Thomson and others of similar tendencies. Some of them, such as Kropotkin, appear to exaggerate the side of "mutual aid."

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did at first. Certainly to the lay mind it seems difficult to believe that all the beauty of form and color which we find in the vegetation of our globe, and all the excellent adaptations that we find in animal life, are merely the results of the survival of chance variations which happened to have fitted themselves to their surroundings. It seems as if we must assume also in the organic, as in the inorganic world, a certain natural tendency to the production of regularity and grace of form, and a certain natural tendency of such forms to be preserved. Indeed, even the pure Darwinians seem to recognize in sexual selection a certain choice of the beautiful in form and color which appears to carry us beyond the mere idea of a struggle for existence between accidental varieties of a species. Of course, I do not mean to suggest that the lay mind has any right to an opinion on such a matter, but rather to indicate my belief that biologists themselves cannot be regarded as having made any final pronouncement on the subject. The conditions of variation, as distinguished from those of preservation, are still largely in the dark. Human life, at any rate, is not exhausted by the speculations of the biologist; and it is with human life that we are here concerned. Whether or not there is teleology in the lower forms of nature, man, at any rate (as even Professor Huxley emphatically recognized), is a teleological animal, guided continually by the idea of an end. And what I should wish to maintain on this point is, that while it is perfectly true, as Burns put it, that "man is a sodger and life is a faught," yet the struggle which is here most characteristic and significant is not a mere struggle for existence, but rather, according to the title of a famous German book,* a "Kampf ums Recht," a struggle for rights.

Some, indeed, might be inclined to suggest that these two things are at bottom the same. Are not all so-called rights, they might ask, founded simply on the interest of the stronger? Do not all the primitive races of mankind act consistently upon "the simple plan

* One of Ihering's.

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That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can?"

and is it not the case that even in civilized life the change which we have made consists, not so much in an alteration of the plan, as in a modification of its simplicity? Are not all our rights of property, liberty, and so forth, simply more or less cunningly complicated methods by which the powerful hedge about the possessions that they have wrested, or by which those who are habitually weak, having happened to become at some time strong by combination, have endeavored to barricade themselves against further extortion? In a sense I should be disposed to grant this Hobbistic position; but I should wish to inquire what it is that makes any set of people, taken collectively, strong or weak. No doubt there are many things that contribute to this; but I should like to ask whether the consciousness of justice is not one of them, and one of the most important. The boldest of conquerors would find it a poor way of animating his followers to tell them that he simply went to kill and plunder. Men with such aims could not long hold together. Accordingly, they at least try to persuade themselves that they have at bottom some right to what they take. Their reasons may be flimsy, but they could not get on without them. Kingdoms are not conquered under the skull and cross-bones, but under a certain idea of justice. And this is more and more the case as the world goes on. Persuade men in general that any social arrangement is fundamentally unjust, and you may be very certain that it is doomed. While, then, it is true that human life is a struggle, a struggle in which every kind of force has its weight, yet I would urge that it is more and more true that the determining force is a certain idea of justice; and that thus in the end the struggle of human life is not essentially a struggle for existence, but a "Kampf ums Recht,"—a struggle for justice, a struggle for rights,—rights which men are often ready to prefer to existence itself.

What, then, is justice? This is a question which we can hardly be expected to answer with any fulness in a paper such as this; but perhaps it may be instructive to look at

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it in the following way. It may be true to say of the lower animals that they simply struggle to live, and that their development comes in, as it were, by the way, as an unconscious outcome of their simple self-assertion. This is true also in part of the life of man; but it tends to be less and less true as he advances. We partly struggle to live, but much more to live well. Now what does this mean? It means, no doubt, a great deal, which it would be difficult to set forth with any completeness. A human being aims not chiefly to be, but to be human; and to be completely human means to develop an infinity of relations with the world. "I am a human being: I count nothing foreign to me;" that old saying, with the omission of an adjective, may be taken as the best expression of what it means to be completely human. It means a knowledge of external nature and an appreciation of its beauty; it means an understanding of how natural objects are to be turned to account for the satisfaction of our needs and the expression of our ideas; it means the establishment of relations of mutual help and intercommunion between ourselves and our fellow-men; it means an insight into the nature of the world as a whole, a view of it as a unity, an appreciation of it as a system, a reverence for it as our home and the sphere of our destiny. All this is implied in what some ethical writers like to describe as self-realization,* the development of our whole spiritual capabilities. It is a great and worthy object to struggle for, and on the whole it is what we struggle for, with a more or less clear consciousness: it is not for mere existence. Now I should say that what in the end we mean by justice is simply the best possible realization of the means of this development for all mankind. We feel it to be unjust that we should be balked in the effort towards the full development of our capabilities by any other cause than the

* I admit the force of most of what Mr. A. E. Taylor has urged in criticism of this conception in the April number of this JOURNAL. But I think it will be observed that the sense in which I am here using the term is not open to his objections. I believe that the ethical end is best described not as self-realization, but as the realization of a rational universe.

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limitations of nature or the claim of mankind in general to a similar development.* This is unjust, and fundamentally there is no other injustice. Whatever else we regard as just or unjust is either so regarded by an inadvertence, or it derives its justice or injustice from the relation in which it stands to the development of human capabilities. That is the view which I wish to maintain: to defend it, or even to explain with any fulness what it would amount to, would obviously require a larger treatment than is possible within our present limits.

Now, supposing we accept this view of the essential nature of justice, what we have most to note is that it involves two sides,—rights and duties, claims † and obligations; and it is this duplicity with which we are specially called upon to deal. Self-realization, or the attainment of a complete humanity, means the relating of ourselves to an infinity of objects, the relating of an infinity of objects to ourselves. These objects are necessary for our development, and it is necessary for our development that we should relate ourselves to them in particular ways. Thus we have claims upon them, and, in a sense, they have claims upon us. We claim to use them: they claim to be used in the proper way. When the objects to which we thus relate ourselves are other human beings, this duplicity of claim takes the form of definite rights on each side. We have a right to certain services or to the carrying out of certain relationships from them; they have a corresponding right to services or other forms of relationship from us. But when we look at these reciprocal rights exclusively from our own point of view, we describe the one as a right and the other as an obligation or duty. And when that to which we are thus related is not another person, but only some thing which we use in some way for the accomplishment of our purposes, this is the point of view which is necessarily adopted, since we can hardly speak of a mere

* The social aspect of the subject, *i.e.* the consideration of the adjustment of opposing claims within a group, is purposely omitted in the present treatment.

† I use this term here in an objective sense, *i.e.*, not simply for a claim that is put forward, but for one that is generally recognized as valid.

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thing* as having rights against us. The claim which things may be said to have with reference to us we can only describe as our duties or obligations with reference to these things. The idea of justice thus breaks up into the twofold relationship of claims and obligations, rights and duties.

Now with respect to this duplex relationship, the first point on which it is important to insist is the essential reciprocity of the two sides in the relationship. There is a saying that is often quoted to the effect that "Every right implies an obligation, and every obligation implies a right." It is chiefly in legal and political discussions that this saying is used; and what it is understood to mean in such cases is that, wherever any one enjoys a right, some one else (*i. e.*, either some individual or some corporate body or some set of individuals or of corporate bodies or some combination of these) must owe a corresponding obligation. This is a consideration of some value and importance in law and politics; but it does not specially concern us here. In law and politics we are concerned with the relations of individuals and bodies to one another, their mutual claims and obligations; and it is important to remember that wherever you have a claim on one side you have an obligation on another. The two sides here are like the debtor and creditor sides in a ledger. But this view cannot, without a good deal of straining, be extended to those general ethical considerations with which we are now concerned. We are not now dealing simply with the relations of one person or body to another, but with the relations of man to the world regarded as the means of his realization. Here we have to consider the general claims of mankind upon the world, and the claims of particular individuals upon those objects which are necessary for their welfare, as well as the claims of individuals upon each other. Now in some of these relationships it would be difficult to distinguish two parties to the transaction. Even in law it is sometimes only by a kind of legal fiction that such a distinc-

* Scarcely even of an animal, unless we imagine it to be endowed for the moment with a human self-consciousness.

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tion can be drawn. And when we come to speak of the rights of men in general, the only other party to the transaction is either mankind regarded in a different aspect or else the world as a whole treated as if it were a person. But it is not desirable to introduce legal fictions into such a discussion as this, and accordingly I prefer to set aside this purely legal and political view of the reciprocity of claims and obligations. But there is another view of this reciprocity which seems to me to carry us deeper and to have a more abiding interest. A claim which any individual possesses may be regarded as carrying with it an obligation upon that individual himself. It has been said that, in the full sense of the term, we can possess nothing but what we are. Completely to possess anything is to take it up as an element in the realization of our personality, and the right of possessing in this sense is at the same time the obligation of possessing. A right, from this point or view, is not something that can be simply held. It must be acquired;* it must be made our own; and this act of acquisition is the obligation which is involved in its possession. Our rights and our duties are, as it were, two aspects of our powers, of our concrete personal development. To realize a complete humanity, so far as that is at any moment possible, is our only ultimate right and duty. The means to this realization, so far as these are at any time accessible, are what we claim; and our obligation is to use the means in the most effective way. The two elements of right and duty are, from this point of view, absolutely reciprocal.

Perhaps I may illustrate what I mean at this point by referring to a famous saying of Carlyle, which has often been misunderstood,† the saying that "Right is Might." Of course, Carlyle did not intend the saying to be inverted. He did not mean to affirm the doctrine of Rob Roy, to which I have

* Hence the point of the familiar quotation:

> "Was du ererbt von deinen Vätern hast,
> Erwirb es um es zu besitzen."

† See, for instance, Mr. John M. Robertson's "Modern Humanists," p. 20.

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already referred. This doctrine he expressly repudiated. Yet I am convinced, also, that he did not mean anything so trite and edifying as that what we recognize as right is sure in the end to come out triumphant. What I take him to have meant, so far as he had a clearly defined meaning, is rather this,—that a right is not an abstract thing, but a concrete realization. A man has to acquire his rights, to struggle and fight for them by the development of his personality. Such an acquired right is a power or capacity, a thing that we have conquered for ourselves. The further conquest of a mere external attainment of the object to which we have a right is a comparatively secondary affair,—a thing that almost follows as a matter of course. The hard contest is to acquire the right at all. Being acquired, it is a might, which is almost bound to go on further to the attainment of the necessary object. The man who has a right to rule, for instance, is the man who has developed in himself a certain sovereignty of nature. That is the hard acquisition, and, being acquired, it is a power, a might. The gaining of a throne, or other sphere of exercise, is comparatively secondary and easy. It is of some importance, however, to remember—and this is a point which perhaps Carlyle did not always bear sufficiently in mind—that our rights depend not merely on our personal powers, but also on the nature of the things to which our powers are related. The possession of a power of ruling, for instance (one of Carlyle's favorite examples of "mights"), does not in itself give the right of ruling, if there is nothing that wants to be ruled over. This is a point that is sometimes forgotten by those who claim certain natural rights, *e. g.*, the right to labor. The abstract claim of this right has been well ridiculed by a French writer who represents a dentist as claiming a natural right to extract a lady's teeth, saying that he had the right to labor, and that his labor was that of a dentist. We have certainly no right to extract teeth unless they, so to speak, claim to be extracted. Our rights over things depend on the claims which they make on us, as well as on our power of dealing with them; *i. e.*, they depend on the whole nature of our relationship to them.

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Such a view of the nature of rights and duties leads us to regard them as progressive in their nature. We are not born to them, but grow into them. I should deny natural rights and natural duties, in the sense of rights and duties that belong to us from the first and all through, just as I should deny innate ideas.* It is true, indeed, that the ultimate right and duty of developing a complete humanity may be said to be always with us; but it is with us only as a far-off ideal, and the process of reaching it is a long and difficult one,—if, indeed, it is attainable at all within the conditions of the natural world. Our actually present right and duty at any particular moment is only that of taking the next step in the way upward, and this step varies at every stage in our development.

But at this point I fancy I hear some one raising objections. It may be said that the view of rights and duties which I have just been endeavoring to propound is altogether too aërial in its nature. It seems to belong to some such region as that which Mr. Herbert Spencer describes as that of Absolute Ethics, and to have little bearing on the affairs of every-day life. In our ordinary life, I may be told, we are largely concerned with legal and political rights; and these are not dependent on the stages of an individual's development, but on the positive enactments of the state. Nay, it may be urged further, that, even if we have regard to the ethical conception of rights and duties, as distinguished from merely legal and political claims and obligations, still, what is morally permitted or enjoined is largely a question of social convention, and does not depend on the stages of personal development. And it may be suggested that what I have been saying, if it has any significance at all, has significance only as a metaphysical conception, based on a general view of the relations of man to the world, and has little reference to the actual rights and duties of human beings in the midst of their actual social conditions. In order to meet

* It seems to be the increasing tendency to accept some such view as this that is mainly responsible for that change in the attitude of Socialists referred to by Mr. Ball in his admirable article in the April number of this JOURNAL, pp. 293, 294.

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this objection, I think it desirable to draw a careful distinction between the three different points of view to which I have just referred, from which it is possible to regard our rights and obligations. I shall distinguish these as (1) the point of view of positive law, (2) the point of view of positive morality, (3) the point of view of ideal ethics. In distinguishing these, I shall at the same time endeavor to show their relations to one another; and then I hope it will appear that metaphysical considerations are not so irrelevant to our actual present interests as they are apt at first to appear.

(1) In the case of legal and political rights it may be urged that there is no such reciprocity as that to which I have referred, and no such dependence on the stage of personal development that has been reached. Rights of this kind are in general rigidly defined by the body which grants them, and there is no respect of persons. The rights cannot be modified to suit the requirements of different individuals, except within the most narrow limits. They are thus not in any way the counterpart of a man's character. They do not imply any might on his part to appropriate them. Nor do they imply any duty. A man may do what he likes with his own. Within the borders of his rights he is absolute master and sovereign. The only reciprocity that is implied is that to which reference has already been made, viz., that his claims imply an obligation on the part of some person or body of persons to make good what he claims; and even this obligation may be only a kind of fiction.

This is the superficial aspect of legal and political rights; but if we accepted it as the final view, it would be just as superficial as the idea that words are made by the lexicographer and have no relation to the characters of those who use them. Laws and political institutions, like words, are a growth out of the general consciousness of a people. Like words, they have a certain rigidity. They do not adapt themselves, like a dress, to each new personality. Yet they are an expression of a people's life. They are the water-marks of its progress at a particular time and in particular directions. They do not express the character or the might of any par-

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ticular individual; but, taken together, they do express, with more or less adequacy, the realized powers of the mass of the people, or of that part of the people in which the nation's power is embodied. And, looking at them in this way, we see that they imply duties also. An individual may legally, within certain limits, do what he likes with his own; or, rather, it might be more correct to say that he can absolutely do what he likes with his own if only he can clearly ascertain what exactly is his own.* But there could not be any such legal right if there were not a certain presupposition that, on the average, the individual will use it well. If property were generally abused, the right of private property could hardly exist for a year. Similarly, the right of voting, the right of choosing an occupation,, the right of free contract, and other legal and political rights, would all be found unworkable if we could not, on the whole, assume that the average man will make a tolerably judicious use of them. In such cases the obligation corresponding to the claim is not enforced by law: otherwise, of course, the right itself would cease to exist, since it is a right to freedom. But the existence of the right at all depends on the presupposition that the moral obligation will, under normal conditions, be acknowledged and acted upon. How essential this is to the existence of legal and political rights becomes especially apparent whenever an attempt is made to extend such rights beyond the limits within which mights have been definitely realized; when an attempt is made, for instance, to transplant English institutions to the soil of India, or even, sometimes, when an attempt is made to transplant such institutions to Scotland, Ireland, or Wales. We cannot put new wine into old bottles, or old wine into new. Rights may, indeed, to some extent anticipate mights, and serve as the means of developing the latter. The extension of the franchise may create citizens. But this is only possible within narrow limits. Certain potentialities must at least have been developed before the right is conferred. If we get

* Böhm-Bawerk's treatise on "Rechte und Verhältnisse" is very suggestive on this point.

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rights before we have in any tolerable degree the might, *i. e.*, the moral faculty, to use them rightly, they soon sink into abeyance, or else they may become a curse to us. This is a difficulty which begins to be felt, for instance, in America, where political privileges have often to be granted to classes of the community who have never learned to appreciate the duties of citizenship; and it is a difficulty which is not altogether foreign to ourselves. Thus we see that even legal and political rights depend on the average standard of morality in a people, and in that way both involve the consideration of personal development, and imply a reciprocity of claims and obligations.

And this leads us to our second class.

(2) Here, again, when we pass to the sphere of positive morality,—*i. e.*, to a consideration of the moral standards that are definitely recognized at a given time and place,—it might seem at first that our view of the interrelation of rights and mights, and of rights and obligations, had but little bearing. Ordinary common sense morality seems to call on individuals for the performance of certain duties, even if we have good reason to believe that they have not developed the moral faculties requisite for their performance. And, again, common sense morality seems to recognize rights which do not carry any definite obligation with them. It is ordinarily supposed that we have a right to a certain part of our lives, to be used, so to speak, for private consumption, and not to be interfered with by any law of duty. This view has the sanction, for instance, of Dr. Johnson. When Boswell pressed him for the production of more literary work, and when even Goldsmith urged his "Ay, sir; we have a claim upon you," Dr. Johnson is reported to have answered: "No, sir; I am not obliged to do any more. No man is obliged to do as much as he can do. A man is to have part of his life to himself. If a soldier has fought a good many campaigns, he is not to be blamed if he retires to ease and tranquillity," and so on. Here a right seems to be claimed to the use of some part of life without obligation. Nay, in this sphere it seems as if even that reciprocity which exists in the case of legal

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and political rights did not hold. We may have moral rights which seem to imply no corresponding obligation even on the part of others. Here, again, Dr. Johnson might be quoted, and I suppose there could be no better authority on the judgment of common sense. We might refer to his famous utterance on the subject of liberty of conscience: "In short, sir, I have got no further than this: every man has a right to utter what he thinks truth, and every other man has a right to knock him down for it." Here the right of expressing a private opinion is not supposed to carry with it the duty of toleration on the part of others. The reason is that the two sides come before different tribunals—viz., the consciences of the individuals concerned. One man has a right before his own conscience, but his merely private conscience cannot impose the duty of respecting that right upon any one else. Thus it would seem as if, in ordinary morality, the reciprocity of claims and obligations broke down even more completely than in the case of legal and political rights.

But here, again, the answer is sufficiently obvious. The rights and duties recognized by ordinary morality are very much in the same position as those recognized in law and politics, except that they are somewhat more elastic in their nature, and are referred to a somewhat less definite tribunal. Just as in the case of legal and political rights and obligations, we see on reflection that they have a very distinct reference to the general level of social development that has been attained, and that a certain reciprocity is implied. The right of expressing one's opinions, for instance, is one that is recognized at all only when a certain level of reasonableness in the formation of opinion has been reached. Prior to that stage it is generally regarded as a penal offence to utter opinions contrary to those generally received. The stage at which it ceases to be a penal offence, and becomes merely an offence for which you may knock a man down, or for which a duel may be fought, is a little higher. Then there is the stage at which even this comes to be regarded as improper, and you are only at liberty to make sarcastic and offensive remarks. At a still higher level one is expected not merely

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to allow another to express his opinions frankly, but also to listen to them with a certain degree of courtesy and respect. But this is possible only in a society in which the majority of human beings take some care in the formation of opinion, and state them with some measure of caution and moderation. This duty is implied in the right of expressing them at all, and even common sense, when it begins to reflect, sees more or less clearly that this condition is implied. Otherwise the right would not work, the recognition of it would be a public nuisance. Similarly, when we reflect, we perceive, I think, that there is no such right as that which is apt to be claimed by common sense morality of doing less than our best. The reason why such a right seems to exist in such a case as that given by Dr. Johnson is that most of the duties recognized by ordinary morality are incomplete. They are binding upon us only within limits. They are not in the full sense duties at all. The duty, for instance, of literary production cannot be regarded as exhausting a man's obligations. There are other sides to his nature, and it may be important that these other sides should have their turn. That we should not on the whole do the best that we can under given conditions is scarcely a right that even common sense, when it begins to reflect, would be apt to claim. In short, if ordinary morality, like ordinary law and politics, does not exhibit a complete connection between our rights and our duties, and between both of these and our powers, it is only because ordinary morality, like law and politics, is limited in its view, and does not clearly recognize all that is implied in its own position. We are thus led to the point of view of ideal ethics as the underlying presupposition of both law and morals.

(3) By the point of view of ideal ethics, I mean the point of view that I have already indicated in the opening part of this paper. Here we place ourselves, in a sense, above the conventional rights and obligations recognized by ordinary law and morals. We test these rights and obligations by the standard of human welfare. We accept them in so far as they conform to this standard: we reject them in so far as they are inconsistent with it. The man who occupies this position says

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to himself, as it were, "I am a human being, and I demand to be a human being in the fullest sense of the term, and with all that it implies. I acknowledge no other duties; I claim no other rights." Like Milton's Satan—in some respects not a bad model—he aspires to the highest that he knows, and "rather than be less cares not to be at all."

Of course, I am far from meaning to imply that this position supersedes the other two. It is one of the many merits of Hegel, whom some of us regard as the last great philosopher, that he taught us to abandon the idea that in rising to a higher point of view we entirely abandon the lower. The lower is retained, but put in its right place of subordination. It is, in his excellent phrase, "aufgehoben," or "put past." In such a position of subordination, law and morals have their due significance. Legal rights are like the dikes in Holland. They mark our triumphs over the waves of human selfishness and passion. Morality is a more elastic barrier, a floating stage, as it were, drifted out farther into the waters. Ideal ethics carries us beyond them both. It is the eternal effort to extend our conquests, in virtue of which the other two are made possible. In this extension we must not ignore what has already been won. No man can leap to the goal of human perfection singly. In his advance he must take the world along with him; and the world moves slowly, marking the stages in its advance by the establishment of definite laws and customs. Such laws and customs may become a hinderance and a nuisance to us if we take them as final. But if we take them merely as representing the solid part of what has hitherto been done, the part that it has been found possible definitely to formulate and establish, then we may use it as a basis for further work.

The way, then, in which I would apply the ultimate conception of ideal ethics to the criticism of the rights and obligations recognized by ordinary law and morality is briefly this. I would take up these rights and duties one by one, and try to find out their real significance. I would ask how they help us forward, how they make a rich and perfect life more possible than it would be without them. I would ask,

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further, what are their implications, at what stages of human development it is possible to realize them, and at what stages they may be superseded. I would ask at what precise point they cease to help us, and when they may be expected to become a positive hinderance. I would also ask whether these rights and obligations are of such a nature that they may be conveniently enforced by legal regulations and sanctions, or whether it is best to leave them under the more elastic guidance of the moral consciousness. I should think it desirable to carry on this investigation with a good deal of care, taking account, as far as possible, of all the light that has been thrown on it by the past history of the race, of all that is being now thrown on it by current events and researches. Then, having completed the inquiry with reference to each right and duty singly, I would say, "I accept them in so far as they help life forward, and at the stage at which they help life forward; I reject them whenever they can be shown to be a hinderance or an impediment."

I do not say that this inquiry would be an easy one, any more than I say that it would be free from danger; but within certain limits I believe it to be both possible and profitable; and I should hope that more definite efforts may be made in the future, than I have yet seen attempted, to carry it out in dealing with such conceptions as the right of property, the right of the franchise, the right of public education, and various other aspects of the life of the modern citizen. For the present I must content myself by concluding with two statements, which may, I think, be taken as indicating the general spirit in which we should proceed in such an inquiry. In the first place, I think we should be cautious. We should take it as our first presupposition that the world is not altogether a fool; that, indeed, "this wise world of ours is mainly right." Much has been gained by violence, much has been established by passion and ignorance; but, on the whole, we may be confident that but little of what we find either in law or in morals that has stood the strain of centuries of human activity is without some firm foundation in the nature of man, either as a permanent requirement or as a temporary necessity.

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That is my first principle. But my second is, that I think we should be bold. We possess in ourselves the criterion of reason; or, with due effort, we may develop it within us; and it is a sacred privilege which we must never abdicate, that everything must submit to be tested by that criterion. In the end we cannot accept anything as a right or as a duty, however venerable may appear to be its authority, however august its sanction, if it cannot somehow be made clear to us that it is an essential element or a necessary stage in the development of a full and perfect humanity.*

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ETHICAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE.

THERE is a sense in which all science is ethical. Aside from the mere dogma, which is, however, sound, that truth is always in the long run beneficial, though usually based on the other dogma, which is not sound, that nature is always beneficent, it is susceptible of proof that every step in the process of revealing the secrets of the universe has resulted, or is likely to result, in some advantage to man. This is true even of political economy, which many besides Carlyle have supposed to have no other purpose than to teach the world how miserable it is, and a no less able expounder of that science than Mr. William Cunningham has remarked that "it

* In order to give more point to my statements, and to avoid endless complications, which would have been quite unmanageable in a single lecture, I have spoken throughout of a man's rights and obligations as if they belonged to him simply as an individual, without reference to his place in society. Of course, I do not mean in the slightest degree to imply (and I hope this may be sufficiently apparent to the careful reader) that a man's rights and obligations could possibly be determined apart from this social reference. How the individual and social aspects are related to one another is a problem that I have purposely sought to evade for the present.

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has no *raison d'être* except as directing conduct towards a given end."*

But this sense of the word "ethical" is a new one, and not the same that it has been the fashion to give it in times gone by. In common with all other persons who are now in or past middle life, I have always been kept familiar with the current meaning of the word *ethics* and with the leading doctrines of "moral philosophy." Although for a long time unable to analyze the subject or give a reason for the impressions that these teachings produced, nevertheless, I always felt that there was something fundamentally unsound in the general philosophy of conduct as inculcated in books, in the church, and in society at large. For this reason I never wrote an article or delivered a lecture on ethics. It early became clear to me that the moral progress of the world, which history shows to have taken place, though in a less phenomenal way than its material progress, has been due only to a very limited extent, if at all, to ethical teaching, and that true moral progress, thus far at least, stands in some such relation to material progress as an effect stands to its cause.

In fact, the old ethics is cold, austere, ascetic, and forbidding, and does not pretend to have human happiness as its aim. On the contrary, it openly condemns nearly all forms of conduct that tend to produce happiness. The reasons for this will be stated later, and I will only say here that I believe this school of ethics is passing away. There is springing up in these last years of the nineteenth century what, at the risk of using a form of expression now becoming too common, I may call the *new ethics*,—an ethics which, though now only in the bud, as it were, is destined not only to blossom but to bear abundant fruit in the century now so close upon us. In contrast with the old ethics this new ethics will be warm, generous, sympathetic, and attractive. It will have for its avowed

* "Politics and Economics: an Essay on the Nature of the Principles of Political Economy, together with a Survey of Recent Legislation." London, 1885, p. 12.

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aim the increase of human happiness, and it will approve and enjoin all forms of conduct that contribute to that end.

Let us look a little more closely into the true nature of the ethical idea. Broadly viewed, it may be said that the ethical is nearly the same as the practical. This was admitted by Immanuel Kant,* who clearly saw the distinction above pointed out between the old and the new ethics. The ethical is the useful, and this is what is meant by saying that all science has an ethical basis. But the analysis is still incomplete.

I do not propose in this paper to be profoundly philosophical, much less metaphysical, but there is one psychological principle that lies at the foundation of the subject and must be considered before further progress can be made with it. It would need only to be stated were it not that it has been so generally rejected, and were it not that it is the essence of the old ethics to deny its validity. It will therefore be necessary not only to state it but to furnish proof of its truth. That principle is that the basis of ethics is *feeling*,—that pleasure and pain furnish the only tests of moral quality.

In searching for a moral element in action let us consider three hypothetical cases. We will suppose first that, by reason of his power to do so, one man exploits another, extorts from him that to which he is not in justice entitled, compels him to serve him without rendering an equivalent, or, in fact, enslaves him and profits by his enforced labor. All will agree that a moral quality resides in such an act and that it is morally wrong.

Let us suppose, in the second place, that a man exploits an inferior creature, an animal, that he compels it to carry his burdens and to perform other labor useful to him. Under ordinary circumstances such action would not be considered wrong, but the reason is that in his treatment of the animal he is believed to confer as much benefit upon it as he requires of sacrifice. This is, in fact, the only ethical ground upon which human slavery has ever been defended. To show that this is the basis of popular judgment, let us suppose there to

* "Kritik der reinen Vernunft," ed. Hartenstein. Leipzig, 1868, p. 529.

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be no such reciprocity, and that the man abuses the animal. At once the moral quality enters into the action and it is condemned.

Finally, let us suppose that a man exploits the mineral kingdom, compels certain substances and material objects to minister to his wants, directs natural forces into channels that cause them to benefit him. In so doing he exercises the same qualities of mind as in the preceding cases. By reason of his intelligence he is able to gain an advantage over inorganic matter and physical forces and to derive from them benefits which they would not otherwise yield. The psychological principle is the same in all three cases.

Apply the same test here, and see if there is any way in which such action can be clothed with a moral quality. Can man in any way wrong the inorganic world? Obviously not. Where, then, lies the distinction between the first two and the third of these cases? It lies wholly in the fact that the man and the animal can feel, while the inorganic substance cannot. Sensibility to pain is all that makes a moral question possible. It would not be difficult to illustrate the same truth from the standpoint of pleasure. In fact, so frequently are pain and pleasure relative that most ethical questions, like the one respecting the animal, turn upon the relative amounts of each that are given or received in any course of conduct.

The practical and the useful are at bottom the agreeable, or at least a surplus of the agreeable over the disagreeable. Moral philosophers agree that the end of ethics is the *good*, as distinguished from that of science, which is the true, and from that of art, which is the beautiful. But what is the good but the useful, the practical, the agreeable? To cause happiness or relieve suffering is the real purpose of moral conduct: This is what is meant by "doing good," and many who deny that pleasure is the end of conduct work unceasingly to give pleasure to others.

This, too, is the true meaning of virtue,—conduct which in the long run is believed to yield a surplus of enjoyment,—while vice, although yielding a present pleasure of a low order and short duration, is believed to be followed by pains

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that more than counterbalance this, either to the agent himself or to others. There are all degrees in conduct from this point of view, and everybody knows that there are thousands of acts which lie so close to the line between good and bad that their true ethical position is a question of opinion. There is, therefore, in modern, as there was in mediæval times, a real *casuistry* being debated, inaudibly for the most part, by large numbers of well-minded people.

What, then, is the true field of ethics? It is that of human *conduct.* Conduct is not the same as *action.* It is only a species of action. Etymologically, the word connotes a sort of leading, vaguely implying difficulties in the way. The terms "right," "rectitude," etc., are ill-chosen, since they connote directness, which proper conduct never possesses. Conscience, the so-called ethical sense, always leads the agent through a sort of labyrinth. The least attempt to go straight, *i. e.*, to follow his impulses, which, being true natural forces, move on straight lines, brings him into conflict with the interests of others, which is to go wrong. Action, *i. e.*, the normal result of human motives, produces constant collisions in the interests of the agents, and it is this that ethics seeks to prevent. The ethical code is a digest for the guidance of men through this labyrinth. But the "path of rectitude" is a crooked and tortuous path, perpetually dodging in and out to avoid these collisions, which inflict pain. This, in so far, limits free activity. The windings and climbings required to keep in the ethical trail make a severe demand upon human energy and cost heavily.

The essence of the ethical idea, then, is *restraint.* It is a check upon human action. I have compared it to friction in machinery and called it "social friction."* In fact, so far as ethics can be called a science, it is simply the science of social friction. Mechanical progress has consisted largely in the successive steps taken in the direction of reducing friction. This might be illustrated in almost any department. That of transportation will serve my purpose.

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* "Psychic Factors of Civilization," chap. xvii.

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As the first step, representing the minimum economy in this direction, may be instanced the "stone-boat." Every New England farmer knows what a stone-boat is. It has the shape of a flat-bottomed boat or scow, is taken into the stony field and loaded with stones. Then it is dragged by strong horses or oxen to the wall or fence which is built of these stones. Its whole under surface is in contact with the ground and thus gives the maximum friction, its economy consisting entirely in the ease with which it is loaded, so that any boy can "haul stone." A step in reducing the friction is sometimes taken by transforming the stone-boat into a sort of sled or "bob" with two thick runners.

From this it is a long way to a vehicle with wheels, in which part of the friction is transferred to the axle; and, from rude carts having wide felloes without tire and rough wooden axles to the Studebaker wagon and the improved types of carriages, the reduction in the amount of friction is immense.

The improvement of roads forms another series of steps, but the next long stride is taken when two wooden stringers are laid down for the wheels to run on and flanges put on the wheels to prevent them from running off. This is the tram in its simplest form. The chief improvement consists in putting cross-ties under these stringers and iron rails upon them. For these last the T-rail, first of iron and then of steel, is ultimately substituted.

But even the modern railroad does not represent the absolute minimum of friction. Besides the friction of axles, the wheel still rests to a width of several inches on the track. This last element it has been sought to overcome by a beveled wheel or a convex rail, reducing the contact to a single point. A still bolder innovation has been made, applicable at least to certain kinds of transportation, which abolishes the axle and reduces the friction to the minimum conceivable. This is the sphere propelled by air through a tube. Many are aware that this device was once introduced, though unsuccessfully, in conveying public documents from the National Capitol to the Government Printing Office at Washington. Mr. Brisbane's principle was certainly unas-

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sailable, and I am informed that it has been successfully applied in Paris and other European cities.

Now the moral progress of the world has consisted, and must continue to consist, in a similar series of steps in reducing the friction of society. When we look back over the history of the world and realize how much better it is than it once was, especially in public life, it looks as if we had come a long way; but when day after day we scan the heads of the newspapers and note the ever-recurring horrors of our present state, we are compelled to admit that the moral world is still in the stone-boat stage of its history, dragging its heavy body over the rugged field of human life with the utmost friction and the smallest ethical economy. It is the painfulness of this feature of life that so arouses the quickened sympathies of mankind and lends such an intense interest to all ethical questions.

I am bound to say that in all this there is far more heat than light, that the problem itself is misunderstood, that ethical teaching is in the main misdirected and ineffective. The positive side of ethics is lost sight of in the prominence of its negative side. The object has been, not to increase happiness, but to mitigate suffering. This has always been the principal form of doing good. Even where it is sought to confer pleasure, it is only upon isolated individuals. In fact, the ethical method has been applied only to special cases, and not to underlying conditions. It is superficial and temporary, not fundamental and lasting. It is therapeutic, not prophylactic, and its effect is always static, never dynamic. This desultory beneficence has been erected into a creed and inculcated as the great duty. By many it is regarded as the supreme end of life, and philosophers have characterized it as the highest aim of science.*

In the face of all this it may seem presumptuous to raise a dissenting voice. But it is not without prolonged reflection

* The only two philosophical systems claiming to be universal, viz., those of Comte and Spencer, both make ethics the last, highest, and most important of the sciences.

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that I have been compelled to conclude that, except in so far as it means the discovery of ways to diminish social friction, ethics not only is not a science, but is only an expression for the imperfection of the social order, an imperfection which, theoretically at least, is removable. The phenomena to which ethics relates constitute a transitional stage in social development.

The fundamental assumption of the old ethics is that there is something essentially evil in human nature. Its whole purpose is to destroy this evil element. No other science is wholly destructive. Nothing that is such can be a science. Suppose, for a moment, that it shall have accomplished its mission and eradicated the last vestige of preventable evil. Its "occupation's gone." The great science—that to which all others are "subsidiary" *—has been eliminated, has eliminated itself! Or, imagine the condition of one of those excellent beings, familiar to everybody, whose only satisfaction in life consists in alleviating the sufferings of others, placed in a world in which there are no sufferings to alleviate! The intolerable boredom of such a state would have to be classed among the unpreventable evils. The avowed object of ethics is to contract and ultimately to remove the entire field of ethics. The highest moral state is one in which there shall be nothing that can be called moral.

We have seen that the so-called science of ethics is essentially negative, that it aims at restraint, that its tendency is to curb, repress, and ultimately destroy the alleged evil propensities of mankind. But all true science is essentially constructive. Where, then, is the fundamental fallacy which must lurk somewhere in the current moral philosophy? It lies in the very assumption of evil propensities. Such supposed propensities form an integral part of the natural forces that underlie the social world. They belong to the nature of man. They would never have been planted there if they had not been necessary to his development. They are evil only in so far as they conflict with individual or social interests.

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* Spencer, "Data of Ethics," Preface, p. v.

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They do not differ in this respect from any other element of power in the world. If man only knew fire as something that destroys, that would be classed as an evil agency. Man may have passed through such a stage in his history. Certainly, this was his attitude towards electricity until within less than a century. The attitude changes in proportion as the knowledge of the nature of the agent increases. Strange as it may seem, the natural forces about which man knows least are those that reside within him. The latest sciences to be developed are those of mind and society,—psychology and sociology. But when man shall attain to an acquaintance with the laws governing these fields at all proportional to that which he has now acquired in the fields of physics and mechanics, the practical value of this knowledge will probably be as much greater than the other, as it is more difficult to acquire.

This knowledge of the psychic and social forces constitutes the basis of the new ethics. But it seems folly to call it ethics. The real science to which all these ethical considerations belong is *social science*. This is a true science. It is constructive. Like every other true science, it aims to utilize the forces operating within its domain. These are the social forces, and included in them are all the supposed evil propensities of human nature. Instead of condemning these, it recognizes them, and, after the manner in which science deals with all natural powers, it seeks first to render them harmless and then to make them useful. This is always possible so soon as their nature is known. Such has been the history of science in every other field. Such will be its history in the social field.

The method of science is not that of checking the flow of natural forces. It aims not to diminish, but to increase their effect. It restrains only where they are doing harm. But this is done by directing them into new courses where they no longer do harm. It seeks to find useful directions, and thus brings good out of evil. More than this. It unites many currents into one, and multiplies the power which it is desirable to have applied to any useful purpose. It assists

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nature to store its energy that it may expend it economically. Thus it secures far greater results than nature would achieve unaided, and renders these results beneficial, instead of indifferent or injurious.

All this social science aims to accomplish in the domain of the social forces. Its field is not restricted to conduct, but extends to all action. Its object is not to limit activity, but to increase it. It uses restraint only in order to direct it into useful avenues. But this results in the greatest freedom and the maximum activity. Man has already learned that liberty is not secured through anarchy, but through government. What is true in the political world is true in the social world. The new ethics, which is social science, seeks the utmost individual liberty. But, like every science, it aims at results. Its true object, to use the forcible expression of Mr. Benjamin Kidd, is *social efficiency*. The social forces, once in their proper grooves, may all exert their utmost energy, as their friction is thus reduced to the minimum. Enthusiasm and zeal are beneficent powers when directed to useful ends. The emotions and even the passions of men are precious gifts to society, because they represent vast powers for the accomplishment of results. These results constitute social progress, which follows necessarily upon the liberation of the dynamic agencies of society.

It cannot, of course, be denied that there are catabolic elements in man's nature, elements productive of evil results. There are criminal impulses, often congenital, in dealing with which moral suasion is powerless, and which are therefore beyond the reach of the ethical code. Most of these are survivals from an antecedent state, savage or even animal. They were once useful, but are now mere vestiges, like the tonsils or the vermiform appendage—sources of social, as these are of physical disease. Where this is not the case, and the destructive elements are not atavistic but normal, such as anger, hate, jealousy, envy, and the rest, they are the products of a cramped social environment. They only appear when the free play of the healthy, harmless, anabolic sentiments is impeded or prevented. In the ancestral state these impulses passed into action and caused battles between rivals, the

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destruction of the weaker, and the ultimate restoration to the conquerors of liberty to pursue harmless pleasures. In society they result in immoral conduct or crime.

Now, it is precisely the function of social science to do away with this state of things, not by allowing free vent to catabolic impulses, but by removing the conditions under which they arise. As they are due to the constraint of the harmless impulses, the liberation of these latter prevents the former from manifesting themselves. This constitutes one of the best illustrations of the theory of the social forces and of social friction. Rage is the true homologue of the heat generated by friction. Remove the friction and the heat will not exist. It is only a "mode" of the general force employed. The social forces are identical with all other natural forces, even to the extent of conforming to the law of the transmutation of forces. The catabolic impulses are only modes of manifestation of the general psychic force; they are the forms which the natural or anabolic sentiments assume under frictional restraint.

The sociological point of view is thus seen to be precisely the opposite of the ethical point of view. It is that of the liberation instead of the restraint of human activity. In short, it is positive, not negative, and on this the whole distinction turns. It is not necessary to abandon the good as the end of action. Indeed, however insignificant the domain of feeling may be (and it is certainly an exceedingly restricted field relatively to the whole universe of matter, space, and time), we are so circumstanced that we are compelled to regard it as everything to us. Therefore a positive even more than a negative ethics will make the good its end. But there is this manifest difference. Negative ethics sets bounds to its own scope and tends to consume itself. When all preventable evil shall disappear its course is run. As this is only theoretical and cannot probably be actualized, it can only be regarded as a logically fatal objection, but the practical objection is that the method of negative ethics would repress the normal activities of society which form the condition of positive ethics.

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Is there, then, no limit to the extent to which the good may be increased? At first view it would seem that there must be such a limit. Reduced to its simplest expression, the good consists in the exercise of the faculties. To go into the physiology of this proposition would carry me too far, but I believe it can be sustained. Even an unexpected physical pleasure, such as that derived from a delicious morsel or a flagrant bouquet, presupposes a specialization of the nerves of taste or smell which has made the flavor or the odor agreeable, and the fact of experiencing such a pleasure is simply the exercise of a faculty which it has required untold ages to develop. The human body is a reservoir of a vast number of such capacities for enjoyment, and when we include the psychic faculties, æsthetic, intellectual, social, there is scarcely any limit even now to the wants which men possess to be satisfied. The good is nothing more nor less than the satisfaction of these wants.

But can we say of good as we may say of evil that its range is limited? Can all desires be conceived as gratified just as all pains may be conceived as removed? Not in the *élite* of the human race, certainly. In the animal, with only physical and a few social wants, this might be possible, but in man, with all his spiritual aspirations, it is inconceivable. Certain individuals with coarse organizations might perhaps be placed in the same class with animals in this respect, but the finer organizations cannot be so placed. It is not, however, with individuals that the question chiefly deals, but with the race as a whole. It is not a question of satisfying present as much as future wants. History furnishes plenty of examples of the creation of new wants.

In the domain of æsthetics this is very manifest. Music is a comparatively modern art. This is not altogether nor chiefly because musical notation, instruments, and methods were unknown to the ancients. It is principally because the love of music had not yet been created in the physical mechanism of the men of that time. There are still not only races, but individuals of our own race, in whom it does not exist.

The Greeks and Romans were far advanced in architecture

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and sculpture, and they had the art of painting men and animals, plants and buildings, all symmetrical objects. But there appears to be no evidence that they painted landscapes. They had not yet acquired the power of admiring the landscape. Cæsar marched his armies over the Alps and wrote much of his Commentaries on their summits, but he was utterly oblivious of their beauties. The love of nature as a whole, especially in its amorphous aspects,—mountains, waters, clouds, etc.,—is a recent acquirement, like the love of music.

In the domain of social life, the more refined sexual sentiments furnish a striking example of the power of man to acquire new wants. It is only in the European race that these have assumed any marked prominence, and even in this race they have been developed within comparatively recent times. Brilliant as were the intellectual achievements of the Greeks and Romans, and refined as were many of their moral and æsthetic perceptions, nothing in their literature conclusively proves that love with them meant more than the natural demands of the sexual instinct under the control of strong character and high intelligence. The romantic element of man's nature had not yet been developed. This constitutes a distinctly modern need. It is rooted in the lower passion and has grown out of it, but it is distinguished from it by the fact that the presence alone of the object is its satisfaction. This step is an exceedingly long one, and was gradually taken during the Middle Ages, assuming its developed proportions under the knights-errant and the troubadours from the eleventh to the thirteenth century. To-day it prevails throughout Europe, America, and other countries that have been settled by Europeans, and nowhere else. It has completely revolutionized the social life of these peoples and has purified their literature. This is why the older literature requires to be expurgated before it is fit for modern ears. It was too erotic. Modern literature, although it deals with love to a far greater extent than ancient, is chaste, because love means something entirely different from what it formerly meant. The needs of modern peoples growing out

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of it are much more numerous and imperative than before, but they are so pure and elevated that it is possible to treat them with the utmost freedom without causing the least shock to the finest sensibilities.

Again, true conjugal affection, as it exists to-day in enlightened communities, and which is a different thing from the spiritualized sexual sentiment last considered, although an outgrowth from it as that is an outgrowth from the sexual instinct, constitutes another and still more modern source of social enjoyment developed by civilization. Nor is it less important, for it has done more than all other influences combined to cement and solidify the most important of all social structures, the family. The monogamic sentiment is gaining strength and becoming more and more the bulwark of society. Those who see in the prevailing unrest relative to marriage only signs of degeneracy fail to interpret these signs correctly. It is in reality due to the very strengthening that I have mentioned of the true bonds of conjugal affection, coupled with a rational and altogether proper determination on the part of individuals to accept, in so important a matter, nothing less than the genuine article.

I might go on and enumerate the proofs that the race is constantly acquiring new powers of enjoyment in the æsthetic, moral, social, and intellectual world, but these examples must suffice. Nor is there to be found the slightest evidence that its capacity for such acquisition will ever be exhausted. This, then, is the basis for a positive ethics which cannot consume itself. It stands on the same footing with every other science and is in all essential respects a true science. These higher aspirations, which are the spiritual representatives of the lower wants, sublimated by intelligence and culture, are, like the bodily cravings out of which they have evolved, *faculties—i. e.*, powers, and contribute to the full extent of their intensity to the motor strength of society. The new ethics aims not only to liberate all these social forces, but to utilize them in propelling the machinery of society.

I have thus far only spoken of the dynamic agencies of society. These would, indeed, be unmanageable without the

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aid of a directive agency. This is the *intellect*, which serves as a guide to the social forces. And right here lies the explanation of the sterility of the old or negative ethics. It does not recognize the reason as a factor. It does not attempt to guide or direct the destructive elements of social activity. It treats them as only baneful, and wages a crusade against them. It invents such epithets as sin, vice, immorality, and seeks to stamp these out. It denounces, anathematizes, condemns, or else it pleads, expostulates, and exhorts. All this, if separated from the influence of example and personal magnetism, is without effect—mere *brutum fulmen.* As well might King Canute command the sea to retire, or Pope Calixtus III. drive Halley's comet from the skies.

The method of science under the guidance of intelligence is to attract the natural forces, not to drive them; to free them, not to fetter them. There is no more misleading expression than the one so commonly used to the effect that Franklin "chained the lightning." So far from his chaining it, he found for it an unobstructed path, albeit one in following which it not only could do no harm, but could do and has done incalculable good. And all subsequent dealings on the part of science with this wonderful agent have only served to increase its power. The most violent thunderbolt that ever rent the clouds was not equal to the great Baltimore dynamo that recently forced a train through the tunnel against the power of the strongest locomotive.

And so it will be with the social forces when once we learn how to control and utilize them. This is social science in its applied stage. Its purpose is to find unobstructed paths along which they may operate to their full extent. It will minimize the social friction and utilize the social energy. It will devise the requisite social apparatus to this end. Just as material progress under science consists in the development of the practical arts of which machinery is the highest expression, so social progress will consist in the development of the supreme social art of which social machinery will constitute the highest manifestation.

This is not, of course, the place, even if it were advisable,

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to offer any hints as to the character which this social machinery is likely to assume. As well might our ancestors have sought to predict the machinery of to-day. But on numerous previous occasions I have attempted to indicate some of the initial steps in social invention. My chief purpose, however, has been to emphasize the fact that sociology is a science, that it is a domain of natural forces of which man may take advantage precisely as he has taken advantage of the physical forces of nature. Until this truth can be perceived and vividly brought home, not only to philosophers, but especially to men of affairs, statesmen, and legislators, it is vain to speculate upon methods and details.

It is only within the scope of the present paper to deal with the ethical aspects of the question, and I must end as I began by repeating that all science is essentially ethical. Social science is more so than other sciences only because it deals more directly and exclusively with the collective welfare of mankind. It seeks not merely to reduce the social friction and thus accomplish all that the old ethics has so vainly striven to secure, viz., negative moral progress, but also and chiefly to put the manifold existing and prospective wants of mankind in the way of satisfaction, and thus to bring about a progressive and unlimited train of benefits and a truly scientific or positive moral progress.

I have called these ethical aspects. In this I may be mistaken, but it is only a question of the meaning of words. As I said at the outset, I have never entered the field of ethics, and if the universal betterment of man's estate does not belong to ethics, it is a field into which I do not care to enter.

LESTER F. WARD.

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THE JEWISH QUESTION IN ITS RECENT ASPECTS.

I.

WHAT is vaguely known as the "Jewish Question" has received considerable attention of late,*—more, perhaps, than it at present merits,—for though the question is a vital one to the Jews and only less vital to non-Jews, it is not a problem pressing for immediate solution. In some form or the other, there has been a Jewish Question ever since there has been a Christian Question. Simultaneous with the appearance of Christianity, as an offshoot of Judaism and yet distinct from it, the unique phenomenon was presented to the world of a people losing its national independence, its country, and, to all practical purposes, its language, and yet retaining its identity as distinctly as though it possessed all three of these factors. Add to this the circumstance that the Jews, following the general movements of culture, spread over all parts of the globe whither Christianity travelled, and you have the reasons for the permanent character of the "Jewish Question," so far as the relation of the Jews to the world around them is concerned. A problem whose roots are so deeply sunk in the past cannot be hastily disposed of; in fact, it may be doubted whether it is capable of solution. Like so many other questions that seem to form part and parcel of our civilization,—a legacy bequeathed by one generation to the other—it enters upon new phases from time to time, but never wholly disappears.

At its origin the question is much more of a political than a religious one. I have just said that the Jewish Question is as old as the Christian Question; but in some of its aspects the former even antedates the latter. The evidence

* "Israel Among the Nations: a Study of the Jews and of Antisemitism." By Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu. Translated by Frances Hellman. New York: Putnam's Sons, 1895. "The Spirit of Judaism." By Josephine Lazarus. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1895. "The Jewish Question and the Mission of the Jews." New York: Harper & Bros., 1894.

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for this has recently been collected in an admirable work by Theodore Reinach.*

The dispersion of the Jews creates a Jewish Question, and this dispersion begins with the so-called Babylonian exile at the beginning of the sixth century before our era. The restoration of the commonwealth at the close of that century is only partial. Large settlements of Jews remained in Mesopotamia, while, through the closer contact between Orient and Occident established by Alexander's conquests, the Jewish colonies in Egypt, settled there since the days of Nebuchadnezzar II., or earlier, constantly received fresh accessions. As a result of the teachings of the prophets and of the national experience, the Jews were led to differentiate two factors,—religion and national life—which for the rest of the ancient world seemed inseparable. Whether we turn to the Greeks in the West or to the Assyrians in the East, we find that religion was not so much a matter of soul as of soil. There could be no religion without a country, and citizenship was indissolubly bound up with loyalty to the god or gods presiding over a district. The Jews of Egypt, although granted considerable privileges by the Ptolemies, formed a state within a state, and the same was true, as Mommsen has shown,† of the Jews of Palestine when that country fell under the sway of imperial Rome. The complications ensuing from such a state of affairs were at the bottom of all the troubles which came over the Jews. Their religion was merely an element in the general contrast that they presented to the political conditions prevailing in antiquity. Religious toleration was a principle recognized as a corollary from the prevailing view, which accorded to each land and district its own religion. Cyrus recognizes Marduk as the god of Babylon and Yahwe as the god of Judæa. Alexander worships Ammon in Egypt, but a people without a country could have no religion. Their god or gods had ceased to exist, and hence to the Romans

* "Textes d'Auteurs Grecs et Romains relatifs au Judaisme, réunis, traduits et annotés." Paris, 1895.

† "History of Rome," vol. v., chapter xi.

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both the Jews and the early Christians appeared as "without god"—atheists.

It is not until the period when Christianity becomes established as the official religion of the Roman Empire that the Jewish Question becomes a religious one. In the Middle Ages, this aspect of the question is dominant. Religion, though still bound up with the state, is recognized as distinct from citizenship. The affront of the Jews consisted in their stubborn resistance to the alternating allurements and threats of the Church, which, claiming to be the sole repository of religious truth, was logically forced to assume an attitude of intolerance against such forms of belief as she regarded false or heretical. It seems strange that religious intolerance and hatred should make their appearance with religions of the most advanced type; yet the example of the Christianity of the Middle Ages and the example of Islam prove the correctness of the assertion, and had Judaism become the dominant religion of occidental civilization instead of Christianity, it is likely that the same spirit would have been manifested against Christians as was shown by Christianity against the Jews.

At present, the religious aspect of the Jewish Question has given way to one in which social considerations play a conspicuous part.

The political disabilities of the Jews have been removed in all civilized countries. Almost everywhere they are taking an active part—in some countries, a prominent part—in the commercial, political, and intellectual life of the century. As a result of the advance in religious thought, even the strict adherents of any particular form of religion have come to recognize that religious truth is many-sided. The numerous sects into which Christianity is split up furnish a guarantee that the era of intolerance and fanaticism is past, so far at least as Western civilization is concerned. The attempt on the part of Russia and Turkey to secure religious uniformity in their respective empires is sure to end in disastrous failure.

But there remains a strong social feeling against the Jews, which manifests itself in diverse ways and differently in the

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various countries where Jews are found. Just as in the pre-Christian days and in the early Christian period, the religious factor was merely an *incidental* one, so at present both the religious and political factors are introduced into the Jewish Question as a support—frequently unconscious—to a feeling which is at bottom a purely social one. The very name, "anti-Semitic," given to the present movement against the Jews, is significant. The German agitators recognize that their opposition is due to a prejudice against the Jews as representing what they term an "alien race;" but race feelings, whether justified or not, are admittedly social. Recognition must also be given to the consistency of the position maintained by such men as the late Professor von Treitschke. If the Aryan and the Semite are really two elements that can commingle as little as oil and water, then no alternative is offered but war to the knife, and war to the bitter end. The very success of the Jews in adapting themselves to a civilization which is claimed to be Aryan, constitutes at once a menace and a justification for the attempt to force the Jews back into the position of "innocuous desuetude" that characterized their life in the old ghettos. But it must not be overlooked that Christianity, as a religion which is in part a "Semitic" product, is involved in this "anti-Semitic" movement. As a matter of fact, many of those engaged in stirring up popular feelings against the Jews are only nominally Christians; and there are not wanting those who, like Goldwin Smith, advocate the casting aside of the Old Testament as a mill-stone that tends to crush the spiritual power of "Aryan" Christianity, though it seems strange that so eminent a scholar as Goldwin Smith should fail to see in the New Testament the product of the same "Semitic" thought which he finds in the Old.

The latest phase of the Jewish Question thus presents a curious parallel to its earliest phase. Precisely as Judaism and Christianity were equally involved in the struggle made by the ancient world against the differentiation of religion and national life, so in our age anti-Semitism, viewed from the religious side, is as much an attack upon Semitized Chris-

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tianity as upon Semitic Judaism. If there is such a thing as Semitic thought in contrast to Aryan thought, then Judaism and Christianity stand and fall together.

II.

Two works have recently appeared which deal with the recent aspects of the problem,—an anonymous work under the title "The Jewish Question and the Mission of the Jews," and a more elaborate work entitled "Israel chez Les Nations," by the well-known French economist Leroy-Beaulieu, which is now rendered more accessible by appearing in an English translation.* The former—a series of independent essays of unequal value—is more of a defence of the Jews, the latter more of an exposition of the question. Both authors recognize that, in order to understand the Jewish Question, it is necessary to know the history of the Jews and to understand the meaning of that history. Nothing is easier than to furnish an off-hand opinion about the Jews; nothing, it might be added, is commoner. Such opinions are generally based upon personal experience which varies, and is in all cases limited and insufficient. Renan once said that only few people have any right to speak disparagingly of the Catholic Church, because only few can understand the intricate system upon which its organization is based. The "Jewish Question" may not be an intricate one, but it certainly calls for careful study and considerable knowledge. Of the two volumes under consideration, that of Leroy-Beaulieu is by far the more profound, more thorough, more suggestive, more satisfactory, and, it may be added, the more interesting. It is marked by a strong historical spirit. His aim is not to write an apology of the Jews, nor to defend them against unjust charges, but, firstly, to account for the existing feeling against them, and, secondly, to interpret this feeling. The method adopted by Leroy-Beaulieu, who styles himself in the preface "a Christian and a French-

* Mrs. Hellman's translation is very well done. It reads easily, though there are some slight inaccuracies—chiefly in the spelling of foreign words—which ought to be corrected in a second edition.

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man," is better adapted than an apology for furnishing to such as are willing to consider the subject a correct view of the situation. He takes the Jews of to-day, submits them to a searching examination for the purpose of determining what traits—physiological and psychological—they possess that mark them off from others, and he compares his results with the conceptions current about the Jews. His readers may draw their own conclusions.

There are two features in this investigation that are particularly striking. In the first place, Leroy-Beaulieu shows how superficial the supposed contrast is implied by the terms "Semitic" and "Aryan"; and, secondly, he demonstrates the *recent* origin of so-called Jewish traits.

The late James Darmesteter (whom Leroy-Beaulieu frequently quotes) begins a notable essay on "Race and Tradition" * as follows: "The historical sciences in this century have subsisted on a single idea,—that of race. When one lives on a single idea, one is at last apt to die of it." It may be doubted whether any "single idea" has ever produced so much mischief as that of race. Supposed contrasts between races have been made the point of departure for justifying inveterate hatred and cruel hostility and inhuman offences committed by one nation against another. The doctrine of incessant warfare has been raised to the dignity of a scientific dogma, on the assumption that the mission of the races of mankind consists in engaging in bestial struggles with one another. The blood of one race cannot mix with the blood of another without detriment to both. Purity of race has been preached as at once the ideal and the condition of culture and happiness for a people.

It is high time to protest against doctrines so mischievous and so unfounded. The great mistake of historians and psychologists has consisted in confusing race with a factor which Darmesteter calls "tradition." The contrasts presented by two peoples are due not to physical features, but to surround-

* "Selected Essays." Translated by Helen Bachman Jastrow. Boston, 1895. Pp. 155–177.

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ings. It may safely be asserted, moreover, that there is no such thing as a *pure* race. Races differ from one another only in degrees of impurity, and, as a matter of fact, so far from culture depending upon purity of blood in a people, the stimulus to intellectual powers comes from the commingling of races. Civilization would never have developed in the Euphrates Valley had it not been for the presence in that region, from the remotest days, of a variety of races. The ancient Egyptians were so "mixed" that anthropologists find it difficult to determine whether they should be classed among the Hamitic or the Semitic branch of mankind; and yet it was this very mixture that produced the wonderful civilization of ancient Egypt. In our days, the Germans, who are the loudest in clamoring for "racial purity," are perhaps the most conspicuous examples of the excellent results obtained by the mixture of Slavonic with Teuton blood. The supposed anthropological unity of the Aryans is a scientific myth. One cannot properly speak of "an Aryan race." There are at least five races to be distinguished among the various groups of peoples that speak languages closely related to one another.* The term Aryan, in the strict sense, is applicable only to the languages spoken by the groups, and even here the term has its limitations. Language is to a great extent an accidental factor. Two branches of the same race may speak languages derived from different parents. Nations drop their language and adopt another with surprising ease, and it does not therefore follow that the races speaking Aryan languages have a common origin.

The bearing of all this on the Jewish Question is obvious. What is true of "Aryan" applies to the term "Semitic." It is a convenient term for grouping a certain number of related languages together. These languages being spread over a territory much more limited than that covered by the Aryan group, it is but natural that the racial components in the case of those speaking Semitic tongues should be fewer in number. Up to the present, traces of only two distinct races have been found among the Semites. There may be more, and, at all

* Isaac Taylor, "The Origin of the Aryans."

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events, in these two races there is considerable mixture of "Hamitic" elements. In Africa, more particularly, the dividing line between the Semites and Hamites becomes exceedingly faint. The Arabs of Arabia are perhaps the purest in blood of the Semites, but they are far from constituting a pure race. Mohammed himself married an Abyssinian. Mecca, the centre of Mohammedanism, is a gathering-place of all nations,* and the ethnic results may be imagined. The spread of Islam meant the substitution of a religious bond between groups which had hitherto been bound to one another by blood ties. The pilgrimage to Mecca, and other institutions of Islam, favored the mixture of races on a large scale throughout the Orient and in a considerable part of the Occident.

That the Jews are not a pure race is no longer questioned by any serious scholar. The researches of Isidor Loeb and Ernest Renan† have settled this point once for all. Leroy-Beaulieu furnishes additional evidence that clinches the argument. The strong injunctions of the Pentateuchal legislation against intermarriages between Hebrews and surrounding peoples‡—some of whom, like the Philistines, were not Semites, and none of whom were pure—is a proof that "mixed" marriages were common, if not indeed the rule. The protests of Ezra and Nehemiah, however effective, could not stamp out the results of what had gone before. The advent of the Greeks and Romans in Palestine constituted an additional menace to the purity of the Jewish race. The Rabbis found it necessary to draw the lines of demarcation between Jews and non-Jews even sharper than the Pentateuch did. Christianity threw down all barriers between races. A movement that assumed such gigantic proportions necessarily reacted on the Jews. The Talmud was Judaism's answer to Christianity, but even the great bulwark against "foreign" encroachments represented by the Talmudic regulations did

* See Snouck-Hurgronje's remarkable work, "Mekka," vol. i.

† Renan, "Le Judaisme comme Race et comme Religion." (Paris, 1883.) (Art. Juifs in St. Martin's "Dictionnaire de Geographie." The opinions of Renan and Loeb are meeting with increased favor, despite Joseph Jacob's objections. ("Jewish Statistics," xvii.-xxx. London, 1891.)

‡ Deut. vii. 3.

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not wholly check the tendency to make the Jews an "international race," if the term may be used. Late in the Middle Ages, despite the growing isolation of the Jews from the Christian communities in which they lived—notably in Spain and France—we learn of marriages between Jews and Christians, and the offsprings of such marriages were by no means all lost to Judaism. The Jews of Eastern Europe and Southern Russia exhibit several distinct anthropological types, all of them far removed from what is supposed to be the "original" Semitic type. Dr. Weissenburg, who has recently investigated the subject,* reaches the conclusion that the types are due to the commingling of Jews with other nations, which assumed large proportions during the period of the migrations of the Jews in the Caucasus and the Russian steppes. Renan, in summing up the question on its physical side, pertinently says that there is no such thing as a Jewish type; there are Jewish *types*. Weissenburg brands the idea of a Jewish type as a "popular myth." Whatever the proportion of "Aryan" and other blood in the Jewish race may be, it is certainly sufficient to demonstrate the absurdity of regarding the Jews as "pure" Semites.

But apart from this, if the historical and anthropological researches of the past decades count for anything, they certainly show that it is a totally unscientific procedure to throw Frenchmen, Germans, English, etc., into one group and label them "Aryans," and to throw all the Jews into another group and call them "Semites," and then proceed to pit the one against the other. Surely, the contrast between an intense Frenchman and a fanatic German is as great as anything can be imagined. The fact that both the Frenchman and the German can be labelled as "Aryans" does not diminish this contrast. The question of race, indeed, has little to do with these contrasts. In the same way the Jew of the United States has little in common with the Jew settled in one of the villages of Palestine and surrounded by comparatively undisturbed Oriental influences. His religion is an accidental fac-

* "Die Südrussischen Juden," etc. (Archiv für Anthropologie, vol. xxii.)

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tor, and he stands much closer to his neighbor in the village, who may be a Christian, than he does to a coreligionist separated by thousands of miles, and who is the product of totally different circumstances. Again, the fact that the Englishman stands ethnologically closer to the German than the Frenchman, does not make the Englishman more of a German. What makes a man an Englishman with all his virtues and faults, with his characteristic traits and peculiarities, is primarily the fact that he lives in England, and, secondly, that he identifies himself with English interests. There is a good deal of anthropological philosophy in the ditty so popular a few years ago of the man who

> "In spite of all temptations
> To belong to other nations"

remained an Englishman. The grandfather of this intense Englishman may have been a German. Two generations would suffice to practically remove all traces of foreign origin, and had this grandfather emigrated to France or America, the grandson might have become an intense Frenchman or as thorough an American as the member of a family settled in this country for a longer period.

What we regard as national traits are the result of *tradition*, impressed upon people by virtue of living together under the same influences, sharing their interests with one another, and passing through the same experiences. Admitting that there is such a thing as an English spirit as distinguished from a German spirit, an English manner of looking at things, an English way of expressing one's self, and of conducting one's self, the factors involved in producing this spirit are simple enough,—climate, associations, and common experiences. Time does the rest. Leroy-Beaulieu shows in a most convincing manner that in so far as there is a distinctively Jewish spirit manifesting itself in various ways, or, perhaps, it would be better to say in innumerable ways, it has been *solely* the result of the conditions under which the Jews lived during the Middle Ages and down to the disappearance of the ghettos. Race has nothing to do with this result, and the

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religion of the Jews only enters as a factor because it formed part of the conditions in question.

A recent writer in the *Quarterly Review* * commits the old blunder of supposing the peculiarities of the Jews to be due to "two thousand years of isolation." He is (so it is said) the "outcome of centuries fashioned by the Mishna and the Gemara,—" whatever that may mean. This writer, while characterizing the Jew, in phraseology more forcible than elegant, as the "money-dealer, doctor of medicine, astrologist, spy, huckster, and usurer in retail," declares that "the religion has formed the tribe."

As a matter of fact, the traits, both the favorable and unfavorable ones commonly associated with the Jews, are recent developments,—the result of the Middle Ages. The Bible has little to do with them; they are due to the social status, to which the Jews were condemned by the occidental world. In their own country the Hebrews were agriculturalists. The merchants and traders of antiquity were the Babylonians, and at a later period the Phœnicians. So weak was the commercial spirit among the Hebrews that they incorporated in their legislation a regulation which crippled all chances of commercial enterprise,—the prohibition against lending money on interest.† Commerce on any large scale is impossible without credit,—so the economists tell us and so experience shows. There can be no doubt that the stipulation of the "Code of Holiness" and of the "Deuteronomist" is directly aimed against the commercial methods of Babylonia. Thousands of clay tablets found in the ruins of Babylonian temples show that money-lending—the average interest was twenty per cent.—was the condition that insured the great commercial activity of the Euphrates Valley. The blow aimed against interest was fatal to commerce The anti-commercial sentiment of the Hebrew legislation finds an echo in a Psalm belonging to the late post-exilic period, which

* "The Modern Jew." (May, 1896, p. 31.) The article is characterized by a bias and a prejudicial spirit which is painful in the extreme.

† Lev. xxv. 36, 37; Deut. xxiii. 20. No distinction is made between "interest" and "usury." All "increase" on the capital is absolutely forbidden.

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declares that he who lends his money on interest has "no place in the Lord's tabernacle."*

The Pentateuch, taken as a whole, is applicable to an agricultural people only, and had the Hebrews been traders, they would have produced an entirely different code. Nor were the Hebrews "doctors of medicine," nor "astrologists." Astrology was the prerogative of the Babylonians among ancient nations. Medicine, in so far as it was differentiated from magic, was cultivated by Babylonians and Egyptians. The mind of the ancient Hebrew did not have a scientific bent. Philosophy does not arise among them until they come into contact with the Greeks. Even in the prophets—the highest exponents of ancient Hebrew thought—there is but little that merits to be called speculation. Ecclesiastes reflects Greek influence.

The totally changed conditions of life that began for the Jews with their dispersion over the face of the globe is the fundamental factor that produced a change in their traits. The second factor is the treatment they received at the hands of the masters and of the masses into whose territory they came. It is a serious mistake to suppose that the Jew everywhere turned out to be alike. He was moulded entirely by circumstances. The Jew of Europe is not the same as the Jew of Asia. If in Western Europe they become "money-dealers" and "doctors of medicine," it is simply because, under the restrictive laws imposed upon them by the rulers of Europe, they were prohibited from entering upon other pursuits. In his personal habits no less than in his pursuits, the Jew of Europe is the product of the Middle Ages. Take any body of people and shut them up in a quarter where but for necessary contact they lead an isolated life and continue this process for only a few generations, and the result will necessarily be a "peculiar" people, no matter to what race they belong and what religion they profess. The Romany of Europe and the Parsees of India are examples in point.†

* Psalm xv.

† See Brinton, "An Ethnologist's View of History," Philadelphia, 1896, p. 11; and Weissenburg's investigations above referred to *passim*.

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Living together, thinking alike, leading the same life engenders a body of traditions which stamp themselves upon all individuals alike. The Jew of Italy in the Middle Ages resembles the Jew of Germany simply because there were ghettos in both countries. Even the physical features can be accounted for on this ground. A distinctive dress, in part forced upon them and in part retained by them because of their non-participation in the changing fashions, had much to do with accentuating the traits engendered by ghetto life. As for the religion of the Jews, it naturally exerted a great influence upon them, because with the Jews Judaism, also, was confined within the ghetto walls. The Jews were not "fashioned by the Mishna and Gemara," but during the centuries that they lived a restricted life the religious spirit pervading the Talmud was the only spiritual influence to which they were subject. What was the result of this spirit? That it produced a certain one-sidedness cannot be questioned, any more than that the Puritans of New England, deliberately shutting themselves off against all but such influences as were congenial to them, developed a single side of their nature at the expense of others. We may not approve of the general spirit pervading the Talmud, though, considering the fact that the Talmud is a literary compilation covering six centuries, it is not easy to specify what this spirit was. But this at least may be said: the Talmud, like the Bible, is open to various interpretations. The Bible interpreted by the Puritans is certainly not the same as expounded by the historical student of the present day. Similarly, the Talmud would have been viewed by the Jews of the Middle Ages in an entirely different light had they read and studied it in the broad daylight and not in the dark, stuffy corners of the ghetto.

The great philosopher Maimonides found it possible to reconcile the Talmudic enactments with an advanced type of Aristotelian philosophy, of which he was an ardent disciple. His interpretation of the Talmud was subsequently rejected by the Jews, not because Maimonides was wrong, but because his view of it did not meet the conditions of life under which

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the Jews from about the fourteenth century on throughout Western Europe were forced to live. It may be said of every age that it produces its own Bible—suited to its needs. The Talmud became the Bible for the Jews of the ghetto. The Jews, so far from being fashioned by the Mishna and Gemara, themselves fashioned the Mishna and Gemara to their purposes. If, instead of taking the Talmud as their guide, they would have taken the Old Testament—as a Jewish sect that sprung up in the ninth century and known as the Karaites did—the result would have been the same. The Bible would have become their Talmud. The moral precepts and spiritual passages to be found in the Talmud are as fine as anything in the Old or the New Testament, but you can put a narrow, one-sided spirit into the Bible, or the Buddhist scriptures for that matter, quite as readily as into the Talmud. "The letter everywhere killeth." But, after all, it may be asked, What has this much abused and much misunderstood Talmud done? It undoubtedly made the Jews slaves to the letter of what to them was the Divine Law. It led them to surround themselves with minute regulations controlling all their actions. Their religion became a mass of ceremonies and customs. But all this was their own affair. If they were satisfied to burden their lives with a thousand and one prescriptions, what mattered it to others? The world did not care for them. It deliberately shut them off from other influences than such as the Jews could create for themselves. The Talmud was exactly the kind of religion adapted for their conception of life, or, as we ought to put it, the Jews adapted the Talmud to the needs called forth by a ghetto existence. They could not do anything else. The moment the walls of the ghetto disappeared, the Talmud of the ghetto vanished like a cloud driven by a fresh morning breeze. Even before they were readmitted to citizenship in the world, the Jews began the work of freeing themselves from the yoke of ceremonialism. That process has steadily gone on in direct proportion to the civil liberties granted to them, until to-day the Jews, who are natives of Western Europe and America, are as far removed from the Talmud as their Christian neighbors. The

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vast majority of them are as ignorant of the great legal compilation as the "anti-Semitic" agitators are who write about it without being able to read a single line of it in the original. Just here the importance of Leroy-Beaulieu's warning that we must not judge Jews by a single standard is strikingly illustrated. In Russia, where the condition of the Jews resembles the ghetto life of the Middle Ages, and in parts of Eastern Europe, "Half-Asia"—as the Austrian novelist Franzos calls it—where their treatment is only a small improvement upon that meted out to them by Russian barbarism, the Talmud of the ghetto still holds a certain sway; but take those Jews and transplant them to England, France, the United States, or the Argentine Republic, and in a single generation a great transformation takes place. The rapidity with which the Russian Jews are assimilating themselves in this country to American ways and manner of thought, the still greater ease with which German Jews become Americans in soul and body, is the most striking proof for the correctness of Leroy-Beaulieu's assertion, that the traits peculiar to the Jews have been impressed upon them, not by racial instincts, nor by their religion, but *solely* by the ghetto. Our French author goes so far as to declare that the virtues of the Jews are of their own making. For their vices and unpleasant traits he holds the Christian world responsible,—that world which tarnished the bright name of Christ by the cruel spirit that it manifested towards the Jews, that defamed its Gospel of Love by inhuman treatment of millions of human beings, that trod upon the very principles of justice and mercy which it professed to teach mankind. Perhaps this is going too far, but at all events Leroy-Beaulieu is right in emphasizing the fact that the virtues of the Jews *are* of their own making. Their sobriety, their industry, the purity of their domestic life, the strong family attachment, are all traits as directly resulting from ghetto life as their clannishness (which still prevails) represents the other side of the picture and due to the same cause, and as their tendencies to commercial life, on the one hand, and to intellectual pursuits, on the other,—both tendencies holding the balance to one

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another,—are the natural outcome of the two factors at play in ghetto life—shrewdness engendered by timidity, and concentration of effort.

The Jew of Western Europe and of America has, to all practical purposes, entered the common arena of life, where he meets on equal terms with his fellow-struggler and fellow-worker. Traces of the ghetto still remain with the Jew, and will remain just as long as traces of the unjust discriminations against the Jew remain in our modern statutes. The Jews, by general admission, occupy honorable positions in science, in literature, and the arts. They are contributing their share to that industrial and commercial development which is as characteristic of this century as the achievement in scientific investigations, and which is as essential to the progress of civilization. Withal that, certain peculiarities of manner still distinguish many of them, peculiarities not in themselves reprehensible, but which naturally make them a target for those sweeping generalizations which persons judging from the surface of things are prone to indulge in. The perfect assimilation in outward form—speech and general deportment—to the standards peculiar to each country is, after all, a question of individual culture. More serious is the tendency of the Jews to confine their social intercourse to their own people. Such a course is certain to preserve peculiarities and to engender new ones. Of course, there are two sides to this question. "Clannishness" does not cover the whole subject. A fear of being obtrusive is an important factor in accounting for the unwillingness of many Jews to extend their circle beyond certain bounds. Doors are not always opened to receive them with a hearty welcome. Still, much can be done by the cultured ones among them to come into closer contact with persons and things around them. Perhaps at the bottom of this clannishness—for such in large measure it is—there lies a certain lack of public spirit, an inaptitude on the part of many of them to interest themselves in the great movements looking to the general advancement of education and the social betterment of the race. True, the Jews are generous and charitable, but a certain clannish spirit mars even their generosity. It is right that they should

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feel strongly the obligation to help their own unfortunate and weaker brethren, but it is not right that their efforts should stop here. The cry of their own flesh must not make them deaf to the far stronger cry of suffering humanity. In their own charitable undertakings, a broader spirit might be manifested. Let them open their benevolent institutions, their employment bureaus, their educational missions and not merely their hospitals, to all, regardless of creed. At least, let them not proclaim to the world that their charity is based on the distinction between Jew and non-Jew. It must be confessed that in the various movements of our days that aim at promoting the highest endeavors of mankind in the search for knowledge, as well as in those undertakings which seek to lift up the "submerged tenths" of the great cities out of the slough into which they have fallen, in the efforts being made all over the civilized world to improve the conditions of the working classes, the Jews are not contributing a share proportionate to their numbers and ability. In the noteworthy endowments to universities made during the past decade, Jews cut a poor figure. It would contribute much to their standing if they would help along the great educational institutions of this country. They do not found libraries or establish public museums. They take but little interest in college settlements. Questions of municipal reform appeal to only very few among them, and so other illustrations might be adduced in support of the proposition advanced. But surely it is not remarkable that some trace of the sad isolation of the ghetto days should still remain. "Public spirit" is perhaps the highest of the civic virtues, one that comes only to those who have the mind to see *far* more clearly and the heart to feel far more keenly than the average individual the general needs of the community in which he lives. The struggle for existence was a severe one for the Jews during this century. Their energies were consumed in adapting themselves to the new world into which they were permitted to enter. The past generations were handicapped in the race. The present starts out under more favorable auspices. On the Jews of to-day will rest the reproach, if they fail to take their place with the

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earnest body of men and women who, stirred by the great ideals of the seers of all ages and all faiths, are endeavoring to lead humanity on to the heights, to help weaker brethren in the passage from darkness to light, from misery and suffering to happiness and peace, from lives of evil to right-thinking and right-doing.

III.

There is, however, another side to the present phase of the Jewish Question besides the one we have been considering. There is not merely a Jewish Question so far as the relation of the Jews to the world around them is concerned; there is a problem confronting the Jews which affects their relation to Judaism. It is to this *internal* phase of the question (as we may call it) that a collection of essays* by Josephine Lazarus is devoted. An earnest seeker after truth, filled with the noble aspirations that distinguished her lamented sister, Miss Lazarus attempts to define the present status of Judaism and to point out the needs of the hour.

The problem is an exceedingly difficult one. The entrance of the Jews into the current of modern thought has affected their religious beliefs as forcibly, as the rest of that portion of mankind has been affected which stands in the centre of our present civilization. The question asked by the German theologian Strauss some forty years ago, "Are we still Christians?" finds its parallel in the question, "Are we still Jews?" which has recently been discussed by the ablest representative of Jewish thought in this country.† There are many Jews, as there are many Christians, who are unable to accept the Bible as a work produced by superhuman agencies.‡ In the place of "Divine Revelation," Biblical criticism, in unison with modern thought, substitutes the term "historical evolution." The Divine element, both of the Old and of the New Testament, is to be sought in the spirit pervading it, in the contents of the sacred collections, but not in the manner in which they were produced. The

* "The Spirit of Judaism." † E. G. Hirsch, of Chicago.

‡ *E.g.*, a Jewish savant and rabbi, Abraham Geiger, as early as 1836.

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Bible still remains the most wonderful of books, but by virtue of the unique development of a people's ideals that it reflects, by virtue of the influence that it has wielded, and because of its literary splendor. The study of it with an application of modern methods, in a historical spirit, and with a utilization of the researches made in this century in Oriental archæology, in Arabic customs and Semitic modes of thought, in comparative philology and comparative religion, is one of the most fascinating of tasks, and one of the most fruitful. But, as a consequence of the modern view taken of the Bible, its enactments are not regarded as authoritative by many Jews and Christians, and, in a measure, its doctrines, or what were supposed to be its doctrines, have been cast aside.

The religious history of Christianity and Judaism in this century may be described as an attempt to preserve the historical connection with the past, in the face of the contrast presented by the present to the past. Some have found the solution in differentiating between the Biblical spirit and Biblical authority, maintaining an adherence to the former, while rejecting the latter. Others have claimed that, for the sake of the spirit, the authority must be maintained. Within the limits marked by these two positions, various parties exist, both in the Christian and in the Jewish Church, while not a few parties have broken entirely with the past and with tradition, to take their stand on a broad platform, which, recognizing what is good and valuable in the past phases of the two religions, make the ethical ideals of humanity the highest authority for individual conduct—the final court of appeal. The same numerous shades of belief and unbelief found among Christians of to-day are met with among Jews. Judaism, as little as Christianity, represents a unit. For certain larger purposes, in educational and charitable movements more particularly, Jews unite as Christians do, but both feel that in matters of religion, uniformity no longer exists, and is no longer possible.

The belief in God is not involved in these differences, nor the belief in Immortality. Both these doctrines, though variously conceived, are regarded as independent of Judaism or Christianity, paramount to either and both. For the Christian,

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several momentous doctrines are at stake,—the divinity of Christ, the question of salvation, the view to be taken of the Trinity, and the like. For the Jew, the case is somewhat simpler. The relation of the Jews to Judaism hinges upon the view to be taken of "Israel's Election." According to the old view, the Jews are divinely appointed as the bearers of the message of monotheism. But with the Bible as a collection, which though sacred was yet evolved in a natural manner, the mission of the Jews becomes merely a postulate of history, to be compared to the purposes which we find other nations fitted to carry out. If the mission of the Jews is merely a recognition of the purpose that they have served, and every nation has a mission given to it, then there is no *special* reason for the Jews to maintain a distinctive position as Jews. The Biblical enactments have no binding force upon them. The religious rites of the Old Testament are human institutions, as the Talmudic elaborations upon these rites are human. As such, they can be thrown aside when they have served their purpose and can be replaced by others, or they can be modified to suit changing conditions. All that can be demanded of the Jews is that they maintain their conception of monotheism pure and free from any anthropomorphic contamination, and, emphasizing the ethical teachings of their prophets, legislators, and sages, give to the universal traits of their religion a universal form, or at least a form that could become universal. This is practically the attitude of many thousands of Jews born and reared in Western Europe or America. Not all have the courage of their convictions as Miss Lazarus has, not many see the issue as clearly as she does. What is the solution? Upon this point, Miss Lazarus is not as definite as some might desire. She does not pose as a diviner of the future. Her endeavor is to rouse the Jews to a sense of the situation, rather than to act as a leader in a new religious movement. Apparently, she herself has not made up her mind exactly what is the right step to take, but there is no question in her mind as to the *direction* whither further religious progress among the Jews must tend. She

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makes an earnest plea for more spirituality; and all will agree with her that questions of ritual and custom are of infinitely less importance than the attainment of a high standard of religious thought and conduct. But "spirituality" is a vague term. As a policy it does not admit of precise definition. But so much is certain that the cultivation of a high sense of honor in our dealings with our fellows and the strengthening of our sympathies with all that concerns mankind, are necessary conditions to the promotion of "spirituality" in our religious conceptions. It is an encouraging sign for the future to see the stress that all churches are now laying upon conduct as against the emphasis formerly placed upon creeds. Can there be any doubt of the outcome of this movement? The creed of the future will be shaped wholly by new ideals of conduct. Through such a creed, an effectual check will be given to the spirit of greed and materialism that constitutes the menace of every age unfolding an intellectual and industrial activity such as ours.

Miss Lazarus also enters a plea for a broader spirit in the synagogue. She would have Judaism take up, as one of its elements, the gospel of Love as preached by Christianity. In this plea she does not stand alone. Mr. Claude Montefiore, one of the ablest Biblical scholars of England and a close student of Judaism as well as of religious affairs in general, has a notable passage at the close of his "Hibbert Lectures" on "The religion of the ancient Hebrews" * of the same tenor as Miss Lazarus' proposition. Naturally, Mr. Montefiore's words have aroused considerable comment. The Jews, feeling themselves to be a minority, have that instinctive dread of taking a step that might affect their identity, which may be regarded as an inheritance of the timidity engendered through ghetto life. The Christian Gospel of Love is not opposed to the spirit of Judaism. The heart of the Hebrew prophets is broad enough to embrace other nations besides the Hebrews, and even in the legal enactments of the Penta-

* "Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated by the Religion of the Ancient Hebrews." London, 1892, pp. 550–52.

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teuch the spirit of love is not absent. So the teachers of Judaism tell us. That less stress was laid upon the element of love in religion by the Jews in the past is due to the hate which the world manifested towards them. The "loss of identity"—there's the rub! Shall Israel, it is asked, now that it has come out triumphant from the trials of the past, deliberately surrender to the majority? It is natural that this question should be asked, but is it just to apply the term "surrender" to a proposition which merely involves the reassertion of an old principle? And if, as the result of this step, a closer assimilation should be brought about between Judaism and *certain* types of Christianity, is this a misfortune that must be averted at all hazards, even at the expense of intellectual honesty? If so, then the ideals of the Hebrew prophets whose teachings favor assimilation should also be thrown aside. Here, then, is the crucial point. On this ground the issue must be fought out, with what result no one can foretell at present.

The situation is a novel one for Judaism. So much, however, may be said. The internal phase of the Jewish Question is closely bound up with its external phase. The course of Judaism is dependent upon the treatment accorded to the Jews, and it is, after all, the Jews that make Judaism, and not the reverse. If, as seems likely, the social feeling still prevalent against the Jews will gradually die out, there is no doubt that the universal element in the Jewish religion will become its dominant feature. As long, however, as discriminations are made against them, the distinctive features impressed upon the religion by its *tribal origin* will be maintained. The duty devolving upon the Jews is clear. To merit by their lives, by their example, by their devotion to the ideals of humanity, the good-will and respect of those with whom they dwell, and in their attitude towards their religion to be guided by their convictions. Convictions, maturely formed and firmly held, cannot lead us astray. The vexed problems of religion can be solved in no other way than by intellectual courage. The duty of Christians is no less clear. To purge their hearts of all bitterness and prejudice, to practise the

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gospel of humanity as taught by Jesus, to protest against wrong, injustice, and discriminations of any kind against any body of individuals. As for the future, let both Jews and Christians learn to regard it with that calmness which characterized the ancient prophets of Israel, who, true to their name, which means "proclaim," felt that their duty was ended when they spoke out the convictions of their hearts, irrespective of criticism or consequences, and then acted according to those convictions. It did not lay within their province, and it does not lie within ours, to shape the future. Not policy but conviction should be our guiding star. This is the great lesson of the past for all of us.

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HEGEL'S THEORY OF PUNISHMENT.

WE may define punishment as the infliction of pain on a person because he has done wrong. That it must be painful, and that it must be inflicted on a person who has done, or is thought to have done, wrong, will be generally admitted. But we must also remember that it is essential that it should be inflicted *because* of the wrong-doing. In the little books written by the authors who educated our parents, the boy who went out without his mother's leave was struck by lightning. This cannot, unless theology is introduced, be considered as a punishment. For the lightning would have struck with equal readiness any boy in the same spot, although provided with the most ample parental authority. And the little books written by the moralists who are anxious to educate our children, although less amusing than their predecessors, are often not more accurate. They delight in talking of the rewards and punishments which Nature herself distributes among us. But Nature, though she often destroys, never punishes. For the moral value of an action makes no difference to her. She takes no account of intention or purpose. She destroys, with

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a magnificent indifference, alike the man who has injured his body by self-indulgence, and the man who has injured his body in his work for others. Her typhoid fever is shed abroad equally on the man who let the drains go wrong, on the man who is trying to put them right, and on the child who was not consulted in the matter. Some people assert Nature to be above morality, but, whether above or below, she is certainly regardless of it. And so, to get a proper use of the idea of punishment, we must go beyond her, in the one direction, to God, or, in the other direction, to man.

Punishment, then, is pain, and to inflict pain on any person obviously needs a justification. There are four ways in which punishment is usually justified,—not by any means incompatible. One punishment might be defended under all of them. The first is what is called the vindictive theory. It asserts that, if a man has done wrong, it is right and just that he should suffer for it, even if the pain does no good, either to himself or others. He is said to deserve it, for the punishment is looked on as a satisfaction of abstract justice. The second way in which a punishment may be defended is that it is deterrent. It is desirable to suppress all wrong-doing. And so we try to attach to a fault a punishment so certain, and so severe, that the remembrance of it will prevent the offender committing it again, while the fear of a similar one will prevent others from following his example.

We must mark here an important distinction. In these two cases the object which justified our action could only be obtained by punishment. In the first, abstract justice was supposed to require that the man should be made unhappy. In the second case, it is clear that you can only deter—that is, frighten—men from crime by making its consequences painful. But now we come to two other uses of punishment in which it is useful, not because it is painful, but for other qualities which the particular punishment happens to have. The first of these is that it may deprive the criminal under punishment of the chance of committing fresh crimes. A man cannot steal while he is in prison, or commit murder—in this life—after he is hanged. But this effect does not come because

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the man has been punished. If he welcomed imprisonment or death gladly, they would cease to be a punishment, but they would be equally preventive of crime.

The second of these further advantages of punishment is the reformation of the criminal. This does not mean that the punishment frightens him from offending again. That is the deterrent effect of which we spoke before. But a punishment may sometimes really cure a man of vicious tendencies. The solitude which it gives him for reflection, or the religious influences which may be brought to bear on him in prison, or the instruction which he may receive there, may give him a horror of vice or a love of virtue which he had not before. But if his punishment does this, it is not *as* a punishment. If, while he is in prison, his character is changed for the better, that change is not made because he was unhappy. To be unhappy may convince a man that vice does not pay, but will not teach him to reject it on moral grounds. Thus, for reformation, as well as for prevention, punishment may be a useful means, but only incidentally; while we can only avenge a crime, or deter men from repeating it, by means of punishment.

Of late years we have almost given up the defence of vindictive punishment, both in law and education, though it is still retained in theology by those who accept the doctrine that punishment may be eternal. The ordinary view of the use of punishment in law is, I take it, that its main object is deterrent—to prevent crime by making the possible criminal frightened at the punishment which will follow. Its preventive use—of checking crime by restraining or removing persons who have already proved themselves criminals—is also considered important, but in a lesser degree. Finally, if the state *can* reform the criminal while punishing him, it considers itself bound to try; but the primary object of criminal justice, I think, is held to be the protection of the innocent rather than the improvement of the guilty, and therefore the discouragement of crime is taken as of more importance than the reform of the criminal.

Capital punishment, indeed, is still sometimes defended on the ground of vindictive justice, but more often as being

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deterrent of crime on the part of others, and a safeguard against its repetition by the particular criminal executed. And in other cases vindictive punishment has dropped out of law, and, perhaps, still more out of education.

There is no tendency to the contrary in Sir James Stephen's ingenious defence of the vindictive pleasure that men feel in punishing atrocious criminals. He defends that pleasure on the ground that it renders their punishment more certain. But he does not recommend that a man should be punished merely because he has done wrong. He only says that, in cases where punishment is desirable for the good of society, it is advisable to cultivate any feelings, which will lead people to exert themselves to bring that punishment about.

We have now seen what the ordinary view of punishment is. My object is to consider what relation to this ordinary view is held by Hegel's theory of punishment, as expressed in his "Philosophy of Law." It has often been said that he supports vindictive punishment. And, at first sight, it looks very much as if he did. He deals with this subject in the ninety-ninth and subsequent paragraphs of his book on the "Philosophy of Law," and there he expressly says that it is superficial to regard punishment as protective to society, or as deterring, or as improving the criminal. If it is not protective or threatening, we must surrender the theories which we have called the preventive and the deterrent. If it is not improving, we must give up the reformatory theory. Hegel does not deny that punishment may deter, prevent, or improve, and he does not deny that this will be an additional advantage. But he says that none of these are the chief object of punishment, and none of them express its real nature. It would seem, therefore, that he must intend to advocate vindictive punishment. And this is confirmed by the fact that he expressly says the object of punishment is not to do "this or that" good.

Nevertheless, I believe that Hegel had not the slightest intention of advocating what we have called vindictive punishment. For he says, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that in punishment the criminal is to be treated as a moral being,—

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that is, one who is potentially moral, however immoral he may be in fact, and one in whom this potential morality must be called into actual existence. He complains that in the deterrent theory we treat a man like a dog to whom his master shows a whip, and not as a free being. He says that the criminal has a right to be punished, which indicates that the punishment is in a sense for his sake. And, still more emphatically, "in punishment the offender is honored as a rational being, since the punishment is looked on as his right." *

Now this is incompatible with the view that Hegel is here approving of vindictive punishment. For he says that a man is only to be punished because he is a moral being, and that it would be an injury to him not to punish him. The vindictive theory knows nothing of all this. It inflicts pain on a man, not for his ultimate good, but because, as it says, he has deserved to suffer pain. And, on Hegel's theory, punishment depends on the recognition of the criminal's rational and moral nature, so that, in his phrase, it is an honor as well as a disgrace. Nothing of the sort exists for vindictive punishment. It does not care whether the sinner can or will do good in the future. It punishes him because he has done wrong in the past. If we look at the doctrine of hell,—which is a pure case of vindictive punishment,—we see that it is possible to conceive punishment of this sort when the element of a potential moral character has entirely disappeared, for I conceive that the supporters of this doctrine would deny the possibility of repentance, since they deny the possibility of pardon.

What, then, is Hegel's theory? It is, I think, briefly this. In sin, man rejects and defies the moral law. Punishment is pain inflicted on him because he has done this, and in order that he may, by the fact of his punishment, be forced into recognizing as valid the law which he rejected in sinning, and so repent of his sin—really repent, and not merely be frightened out of doing it again.

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* "Philosophy of Law." Sections 99 and 100.

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Thus the object of punishment is that the criminal should repent of his crime, and by so doing realize the moral character, which has been temporarily obscured by his wrong action, but which is, as Hegel asserts, really his truest and deepest nature. At first sight this looks very much like the reformatory theory of punishment, which Hegel has rejected. But there is a great deal of difference between them. The reformatory theory says that we ought to reform our criminals *while* we are punishing them. Hegel says that punishment itself tends to reform them. The reformatory theory wishes to pain criminals as little as possible, and improve them as much as possible. Hegel's theory says that it is the pain which will improve them, and therefore, although it looks on pain in itself as an evil, is by no means particularly anxious to spare it, since it holds that through the pain the criminals will be raised, and that we have therefore no right to deny it to them.

When Hegel says, therefore, as we saw above, that the object of punishment is not to effect "this or that good," we must not, I think, take him to mean that we do not look for a good result from punishment. We must rather interpret him to mean that it is not in consequence of some *accidental* good result that punishment is to be defended, but that, for the criminal, punishment is inherently good. This use of "this or that" to express an accidental or contingent good seems in accordance with Hegel's usual style. And we must also remember that Hegel, who hated many things, hated nothing more bitterly than sentimental humanitarianism, and that he was in consequence more inclined to emphasize his divergence from a reformatory theory of punishment, than his agreement with it.

We have thus reached a theory quite different from any of the four which we started this paper by considering. It is not impossible that we may find out that the world has been acting on the Hegelian view for many ages, but as an explicit theory it has found little support. We all recognize that a man can be frightened into or out of a course of action by punishment. We all recognize that a man can sometimes be reformed by

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influences applied while he is being punished. But can he ever be reformed simply by punishment? Reform and repentance involve that he should either see that something was wrong which before he thought was right, or else that the intensity of his moral feelings should be so strengthened that he is enabled to resist a temptation, to which before he yielded. And why should punishment help him to do either of these things?

There is a certain class of people in the present day who look on all punishment as essentially degrading. They do not, in their saner moods, deny that there may be people for whom it is necessary. But they think that, if any one requires punishment, he proves himself to be uninfluenced by moral motives, and only to be governed by fear, which they declare to be degrading. (It is curious, by the way, that this school is rather fond of the idea that people should be governed by rewards rather than punishments. It does not seem easy to understand why it is less degrading to be bribed into virtue than to be frightened away from vice.) They look on all punishment as implying deep degradation in some one,—if it is justified, the sufferer must be little better than a brute; if it is not justified, the brutality is in the person who inflicts it.

This argument appears to travel in a circle. Punishment, they say, is degrading, therefore it can work no moral improvement. But this begs the question. For if punishment could work a moral improvement, it would not degrade but elevate. The humanitarian argument alternately proves that punishment can only intimidate because it is brutalizing, and that it is brutalizing because it can only intimidate. The real reason, apparently, of the foregone conviction which tries to justify itself by this confusion, is an unreasoning horror of the infliction of pain which has seized on many very excellent and disinterested people. That pain is an evil cannot be denied. It may, perhaps, be reasonably asserted that it is the ultimate evil. But to assert that it is always wrong to inflict it is equivalent to a declaration that there is no moral difference between a dentist and a wife-beater. No one can deny that the infliction of pain may in the long run increase happi-

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ness—as in the extraction of an aching tooth. If pain, in spite of its being evil *per se*, can thus be desirable as a means, the general objection to pain as a moral agent would seem to disappear also.

Of course, there is nothing in simple pain, as such, which can lead to repentance. If I get into a particular train, and break my leg in a collision, that cannot make me repent my action in going by the train, though it will very possibly make me regret it. For the pain in this case was not a punishment. It came, indeed, because I got into the train, but not because I had done wrong in getting in to the train.

Hegel's theory is that punishment, that is, pain inflicted because the sufferer had previously done wrong, may lead to repentance for the crime which caused the punishment. We have now to consider whether this is true. Our thesis is not that it always produces repentance—which, of course, is not the case—but that there is something in its nature as punishment which tends to produce repentance. And this, as we have seen, is not a common theory of punishment. "Men do not," says George Eliot in "Felix Holt," (Chap. 41,)—"men do not become penitent and learn to abhor themselves by having their backs cut open with the lash; rather, they learn to abhor the lash." That the principle expressed here is one which often operates, cannot be denied. Can we so far limit its application that Hegel's theory shall also be valid?

We have so far defined punishment as pain inflicted because the sufferer has done wrong. But, looking at it more closely, we should have to alter this definition, which is too narrow, and does not include cases of unjust or mistaken punishment. To bring these in we must say that it is pain inflicted because the person who inflicts it thinks that the person who suffers it has done wrong. Repentance, again, is the realization by the criminal, with sufficient vividness to govern future action, that he has done wrong. Now is there anything in the nature of punishment to cause the conviction in the mind of the judge to be reproduced in the mind of the culprit? If so, punishment will tend to produce repentance.

I submit that this is the case under certain conditions.

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When the culprit recognizes the punishing authority as one which embodies the moral law, and which has a right to enforce it, then punishment may lead to repentance, but not otherwise.

Let us examine this a little more closely. A person who suffers punishment may conceive the authority which inflicts it as distinctly immoral in its tendencies. In this case, of course, he will not be moved to repent of his action. The punishment will appear to him unjust, the incurring of the punishment will present itself in the light of a duty, and he will consider himself not as a criminal, but as a martyr. On the other hand, if the punishment causes him to change his line of action, this, his convictions being as we have supposed, will not be repentance, but cowardice.

Or again, he may not regard it as distinctly immoral—as punishing him for what it is his duty to do, but he may regard it as non-moral—as punishing him for what he had a right, though not a duty, to do. In this case, too, punishment will not lead to repentance. He will not regard himself as a martyr, but he will be justified in regarding himself as a very badly-treated individual. If the punishment does cause him to abstain from such action in future, it will not be the result of repentance, but of prudence. He will not have come to think it wrong, but he may think it not worth the pain it will bring on him.

If, however, he regards the authority which punishes him as one which expresses, and which has a right to express, the moral law, his attitude will be very different. He will no longer regard his punishment either as a martyrdom or as an injury. On the contrary, he will feel that it is the proper consequence of his fault. And to feel this, and to be able to accept it as such, is surely repentance.

But it may be objected that this will lead to a dilemma. The punishment cannot have this moral effect on us unless it comes from an authority which we recognize as expressing the moral law, and therefore valid for us. But if we recognize this, how did we ever come to commit the sin, which consists in a defiance of the moral law? Does not the existence of the

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sin itself prove that we are not in that submissive position to the moral law, and to the power which is enforcing it, which alone can make the punishment a purification?

I do not think this is the case. It is, in the first place, quite possible for a recognition of the moral law to exist which is not sufficiently strong to prevent our violating it at the suggestion of our passions or our impulses, but which is yet strong enough, when the punishment follows, to make us recognize the justice of the sentence. After all, most cases of wrong-doing, which can be treated as criminal, are cases of this description, in which a man defies a moral law which he knows to be binding, because the temptations to violate it are at that moment too strong for his desire to do what he knows to be right. In these cases the moral law is, indeed, recognized, —for the offender knows he is doing wrong,—but not recognized with sufficient strength; for, if it was, he would abstain from doing wrong. And, therefore, the moral consciousness is strong enough to accept the punishment as justly incurred, though it was not strong enough to prevent the offender from incurring it. In this case, the significance of the punishment is that it tends to produce that vividness in the recognition of the moral law, which the occurrence of the offence shows to have been previously wanting. The pain and coercion involved in punishment present the law with much greater impressiveness than can, for the mass of people, be gained from a mere admission that the law is binding. On the other hand, the fact that the pain coincides with that intellectual recognition, on the part of the offender, that the law is binding, prevents the punishment having a merely intimidating effect, and makes it a possible stage in a moral advance.

Besides these cases of conscious violation of a moral law, there are others where men sincerely believe in a certain principle, and yet systematically fail to see that it applies in certain cases, not because they really think these cases are exceptions, but because indolence or prejudice has prevented them from ever applying their general principle to those particular instances. Thus there have been nations who conscientiously believed murder to be sinful, and yet fought duels with a good

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conscience. If pressed, they would have admitted duels to be attempts to murder. But no one ever did press them, and they never pressed themselves. As soon as a set of reformers arose, who did press the question, duels were found to be indefensible, and disappeared. So for many years the United States solemnly affirmed the right of all men to liberty, while slavery was legally recognized. Yet they would not have denied that slaves were men.

When such cases occur with a single individual, punishment might here, also, lead to repentance. For it was only possible to accept the general law, and reject the particular application, by ignoring the unanswerable question, Why do not you in this case practise what you preach? Now, you *can* ignore a question, but you cannot ignore a punishment, if it is severe enough. You cannot put it on one side; you must either assert that it is unjust, or admit that it is just. And in the class of cases we have now been considering, we have seen that when the question is once asked, it must condemn the previous line of action. Here, therefore, punishment may lead to repentance.

A third case is that in which the authority is recognized, but in which it is not known beforehand that it disapproved of the act for which the punishment is awarded. Here, therefore, there is no difficulty in seeing that recognition of the authority is compatible with transgression of the law, because the law is not known till after it has been transgressed. It may, perhaps, be doubted whether it is strictly correct to say in this case that punishment may lead to repentance, since there is no wilful fault to repent, as the law was, by the hypothesis, not known, at the time it was broken. The question is, however, merely verbal. There is no doubt that in such cases the punishment, coming from an authority accepted as moral, may lead a man to see that he has done wrong, though not intentionally, may lead him to regret it and to avoid it in future. Thus, at any rate, a moral advance comes from the punishment, and it is of no great importance whether we grant or deny it the name of repentance.

It may be objected, however, that punishment in the two

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last cases we have mentioned would be totally unjust. We ought to punish, it may be said, only those acts which were known by their perpetrators at the time when they did them to be wrong. And therefore we have no right to punish a man for any offence, which he did not know to be an offence, whether because he did not know of the existence of the law, or because he did not apply it to the particular case.

I do not think, however, that on examination we can limit the proper application of punishment to cases of conscious wrong-doing, plausible as such a restriction may appear at first sight. We must remember, in the first place, that not to know a moral law may be a sign of greater moral degradation than would be implied in its conscious violation. If a man really believed that he was morally justified in treating the lower animals without any consideration, he would not be consciously doing wrong by torturing them. But we should, I think, regard him as in a lower moral state than a man who was conscious of his duty to animals, though he occasionally disregarded it in moments of passion. Yet the latter in these moments would be consciously doing wrong. A man who could see nothing wrong in cowardice would be surely more degraded than a man who recognized the duty of courage, though he sometimes failed to carry it out. Thus, I submit, even if punishment were limited to cases of desert, there would be no reason to limit it to cases of conscious wrong-doing, since the absence of the consciousness of wrong-doing may itself be a mark of moral defect.

But we may, I think, go further. There seems no reason why we should inquire about any punishment, whether the criminal deserved it or not. For such a question really brings us, if we press it far enough, back to the old theory of vindictive punishment, which few of us, I suppose, would be prepared to advocate. On any other theory a man is to be punished, not to avenge the past evil, but to secure some future good. Of course, a punishment is only to be inflicted for a fault, for the effect of all punishment is to discourage the repetition of the action punished, and that would not be desirable unless

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the action was wrong. But to inquire into how far the criminal is to be blamed for his action seems irrelevant. If he has done wrong, and if the punishment will cure him, he has, as Hegel expresses it, a right to his punishment. If a dentist is asked to take out an aching tooth, he does not refuse to do so, on the ground that the patient did not deliberately cause the toothache, and that therefore it would be unjust to subject him to the pain of the extraction. And to refuse a man the chance of a moral advance—when the punishment appears to afford one—seems equally unreasonable.

Indeed, any attempt to measure punishment by desert gets us into hopeless difficulties. If we suppose that every man is equally responsible for every action which is not done under physical compulsion, we ignore the effect of inherited character, of difference of education, of difference of temptation, and, in fact, most of the important circumstances. Punishments measured out on such a system may, perhaps, be defended on the ground of utility, but certainly not on the ground of desert. On the other hand, if we endeavored to allow for different circumstances in fixing punishments, we should have no punishments at all. That a man commits an offence in given circumstances is due to his character, and, even if we allowed a certain amount of indeterminate free-will, we could never know that a change in the circumstances would not have saved him from the crime, so that we could never say that it was his own fault.

The only alternative seems to be to admit that we punish, not to avenge evil, but to restore or produce good, whether for society or the criminal. And on this principle we very often explicitly act. For example, we do not punish high treason because we condemn the traitors, who are often moved by sincere, though perhaps mistaken, patriotism. We punish it because we believe that they would, in fact, though with the best intentions, do harm to the state. Nor do parents, I suppose, punish young children for disobedience, on the ground that it is their own fault that they were not born with the habit of obedience developed. They do it, I should imagine, because punishment is the most effective way of teaching them

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obedience, and because it is desirable, for their own sakes, that they should learn it.

We must now return to the cases in which punishment can possibly produce repentance, from which we have been diverted by the question as to whether the punishment inflicted in the second and third cases could be considered just. There is a fourth and last case. In this the authority which inflicts the punishment was, before its infliction, recognized, indeed, theoretically and vaguely, as embodying the moral law, and therefore as being a valid authority. But the recognition was so languid and vague that it was not sufficient to prevent disobedience to the authority's commands. This, it will be seen, is rather analogous to the second case. There the law was held so vaguely that the logical applications of it were never made. Here the authority is recognized, but not actively enough to influence conduct. It is scarcely so much that the criminal recognizes it, as that he is not prepared to deny it.

Here the effect of punishment may again be repentance. For punishment renders it impossible any longer to ignore the authority, and it is, by the hypothesis, only by ignoring it that it can be disobeyed. The punishment clearly proves that the authority is in possession of the power. If it is pressed far enough, there are only two alternatives—to definitely rebel, and declare the punishment to be unjust, or to definitely submit and to acknowledge it to be righteous. The first is here impossible, for the criminal, by the hypothesis, is not prepared definitely to reject the authority. There remains therefore only the second.

Perhaps the best example of this state of things may be found in the attitude of the lower boys of a public school towards the authority of the masters. Their conviction that this is a lawful and valid authority does not influence them to so great an extent as to produce spontaneous and invariable obedience. But it is, I think, sufficient to prevent them from considering the enforcement of obedience by punishment unjust, except in the cases where their own code of morality comes explicitly in conflict with the official code—cases which are not very frequent. In fact, almost all English school sys-

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tems would break down completely, if they trusted to their punishments being severe enough to produce obedience by fear. That they do not break down would seem important evidence that punishment can produce other effects than intimidation, unless, indeed, any ingenious person should suggest that they could get on without punishment altogether.

We have now seen that when punishment is able to fulfil the office which Hegel declares to be its highest function,—that of producing repentance,—it does so by emphasizing some moral tie which the offender was all along prepared to admit, although it was too faint or incomplete to prevent the fault. Thus it essentially works on him as, at any rate potentially, a moral agent, and thus, as Hegel expresses it, does him honor. It is no contradiction of this, though it may appear so at first sight, to say that a punishment has such an effect only by the element of disgrace which all deserved punishment contains. Here it differs from deterrent punishment. A punishment deters from the repetition of the offence, not because it is a punishment, but because it is painful. An unpleasant consequence which followed the act, not as the result of moral condemnation, but as a merely natural effect, would have the same deterrent result. A man is equally frightened by pain, whether he recognizes it as just or not. And so a punishment may deter from crime quite as effectually when it is not recognised as just, and consequently produces no feeling of disgrace. But a punishment cannot lead to repentance unless it is recognized as the fitting consequence of a moral fault, and it is this recognition which makes a punishment appear disgraceful.

It seems to be a fashionable theory at present that it is both cruel and degrading to attempt to emphasize the element of disgrace in punishment, especially in the education of children. We are recommended to trust principally to rewards, and, if we should be unhappily forced to inflict pain, we must represent it rather as an inconvenience which it would be well to avoid for the future, than as a punishment for an offence which deserved it. And for this reason all punishments, which proclaim themselves to be such, are to be avoided.

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I must confess that it is the modern theory which seems to me the degrading one. To attempt to influence by the pleasures of rewards and by the pain element in punishment, implies that the person to be influenced is governed by pleasure and pain. On the other hand, to trust to the fact that his punishment will appear to him a disgrace implies that he is to some degree influenced by a desire to do right; for, if not, he would feel no disgrace in a punishment for doing wrong. And on the whole it would seem that the latter view of a child's nature is the more hopeful and the less degrading of the two.

There seems to be in this argument a confusion between degradation and disgrace. A man is degraded by anything which lowers his moral nature. A punishment which did this would of course stand condemned. But he is disgraced by being made conscious of a moral defect. And to become conscious of a defect is not to incur a new one. It is rather the most hopeful chance of escaping from the old one. It can scarcely be seriously maintained that, if a fault has been committed, the offender is further degraded by being ashamed of it.

This confusion seems to be at the root of the discussion as to whether the corporal punishment of children is degrading. There is no doubt that it expresses, more unmistakably and emphatically than any substitute that has been proposed for it, the fact that it is a punishment. It follows that, unless the offender is entirely regardless of the opinions of the authority above him, that it is more calculated than other punishments to cause a feeling of disgrace. But, supposing it to be inflicted on the right occasions, this is surely the end of punishment. That it produces any degradation is entirely a separate assertion, which demands a separate proof—a demand which it would be difficult to gratify.

But although a punishment must, to fulfil its highest end, be disgraceful, it does not follow that we can safely trust to the disgrace involved in the offence itself as a punishment,—a course which is sometimes recommended. The aim of punishment is rather to produce repentance, and, as a means to it,

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disgrace. If we contented ourselves with using as a punishment whatever feeling of disgrace arose independently in the culprit's mind, the result would be that we should only affect those who were already conscious of their fault, and so required punishment least, while those who were impenitent, and so required it most, would escape altogether. We require, therefore, a punishment which will produce disgrace where it is not, not merely utilize it where it is. Otherwise we should not only distribute our punishments precisely in the wrong fashion, but we should also offer a premium on callousness and impenitence. As a matter of prudence, it is as well to make sure that the offender, even if he refuses to allow his punishment to be profitable to him, shall, at any rate, find it painful.

And in this connection we must also remember that the feeling of disgrace which ensues on punishment need be nothing more introspective or morbid than a simple recognition that the punishment was deserved. On the other hand, an attempt to influence any one—especially children—by causing them to reflect on the disgrace involved in the fault itself, must lead to a habitual self-contemplation, the results of which are not unlikely to be both unwholesome to the penitent and offensive to his friends.

I have thus endeavored to show that there are certain conditions under which punishment can perform the work which Hegel assigns to it. The question then arises, When are these conditions realized? We find the question of punishment prominent in jurisprudence and in education. It is found also in theology, in so far as the course of the world is so ordered as to punish sin. Now it seems to me that Hegel's view of punishment cannot properly be applied in jurisprudence, and that his chief mistake regarding it lay in supposing that it could.

In the first place, the paramount object of punishment from the point of view of the state ought, I conceive, to be the prevention of crime and not the reformation of the criminal. The interests of the innocent are to be preferred to those of the guilty—for there are more of them, and they have on the whole a better claim to be considered. And the deterrent

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effect of punishment is far more certain than its purifying effect. (I use the word purifying to describe the effect of which Hegel treats. It is, I fear, rather stilted, but the word reformatory, which would be more suitable, has by common consent been appropriated to a different theory.) We cannot, indeed, eradicate crime, but experience has shown that by severe and judicious punishment we can diminish it to an enormous extent. On the other hand, punishment can only purify by appealing to the moral nature of the criminal. This may be always latent, but is sometimes far too latent for us to succeed in arousing it. Moreover, the deterrent effect of a punishment acts not only on the criminal who suffers it, but on all who realize that they will suffer it if they commit a similar offence. The purifying influence can act only on those who suffer the punishment. For these reasons it would appear that if the state allows its attention to be distracted from the humble task of frightening criminals from crime, by the higher ambition of converting them to virtue, it is likely to fail in both, and so in its fundamental object of diminishing crime.

And in addition there seems grave reason to doubt whether, in a modern state, the crimes dealt with and the attitude of the criminal to the state are such that punishment can be expected to lead to repentance. The crimes which a state has to deal with may be divided into two classes. The first and smaller class is that in which the state, for its own welfare, endeavors to suppress by punishment conduct which is actuated by conscientious convictions of duty. Examples may be found in high treason and breaches of the law relating to vaccination. Now in these cases the criminal has deliberately adopted a different view of his duty to that entertained by the state. He is not likely, therefore, to be induced to repent of his act by a punishment which can teach him nothing except that he and the state disagree in their views of his duty—which he knew before. His punishment may appear to him to be unjust persecution, or may be accepted as the inevitable result of difference of opinion, but can never be admitted by him as justly deserved by his

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action, and cannot therefore change the way in which he regards that action.

In the second, and much larger, class of criminal offences, the same result happens, though from very different reasons. The average criminal, convicted of theft or violence, is, no doubt, like all of us, in his essential nature, a distinctly moral being. And, even in action, the vast majority of such criminals are far from being totally depraved. But, by the time a man has become subject to the criminal law for any offence, he has generally become so far callous, with regard to that particular crime, that his punishment will not bring about his repentance. The average burglar may clearly learn from his sentence that the state objects to burglary. He might even, if pressed, admit that the state was from an objective point of view more likely to be right than he was. But, although he may have a sincere abhorrence of murder, he is probably in a condition when the disapproval of the state of his offences with regard to property will rouse no moral remorse in him. In such a case repentance is not possible. Punishment can, under the circumstances I have mentioned above, convince us that we have done wrong. But it cannot inspire us with the desire to do right. The existence of this is assumed when we punish with a view to the purification of an offender, and it is for this reason that the punishment, as Hegel says, honors him. Where the desire to do right is, at any rate as regards one field of action, hopelessly dormant, punishment must fall back on its lower office of intimidation. And this would happen with a large proportion of those offences which are dealt with by the criminal law.

Many offences, no doubt,—especially those committed in a moment of passion, or by persons till then innocent,—are not of this sort, but do coexist with a general desire to do right, which has been overpowered by a particular temptation. Yet I doubt if, at the present day, repentance in such cases would be often the result of punishment by the state. If the criminal's independent moral will was sufficiently strong, he would, when the particular temptation was removed, repent without the aid of punishment. If it was not sufficiently strong, I

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doubt if the punishment would much aid it. The function of punishment, as we have seen, in this respect, was to enforce on the offender the disapproval with which his action was considered by an authority, whom he regarded as expressing the moral law. But why should the modern citizen regard the state as expressing the moral law? He does not regard it as something above and superior to himself, as the ancient citizen regarded his city, as the child regards his parent, or the religious man his God. The development of individual conscience and responsibility has been too great for such an attitude. The state is now for him an aggregate of men like himself. He regards obedience to it, within certain limits, as a duty. But this is because matters which concern the whole community are matters on which the whole community is entitled to speak. It does not rest on any belief that the state can become for the individual the interpreter of the moral law, so that his moral duty lies in conforming his views to its precepts. Not only does he not feel bound, but he does not feel entitled, to surrender in this way his moral independence. He must determine for himself what he is himself to hold as right and wrong. The result of this is that if he sees for himself that his action was wrong, he will repent without waiting for the state to tell him so, and, if he does not see it for himself, the opinion of the state will not convince him. I do not assert that there are no cases in which a man finds himself in the same child-like relation to the state as was possible in classical times, but they are too few to be of material importance. And except in such cases we cannot expect the punishments of jurisprudence to have a purifying effect.

Hegel's mistake, in applying his conception of punishment to criminal law, resulted from his high opinion of the state as against the individual citizen. The most significant feature of all his writings on the metaphysics of society is the low place that he gives to the conscience and opinions of the individual. He was irritated—not without cause, though with far less cause than we have to-day—at the follies of the writers who see nothing in morality but conscientious convictions, or

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"the good will." It would almost seem, according to some exponents of these views, that it is entirely unimportant, from a moral point of view, what you do, if only you can manage to persuade yourself that you are doing right. But he did not lay enough emphasis on the fact that, though the approval of conscience does not carry you very far, by itself, towards a satisfactory system of morality, yet that *without* the approval of the individual conscience no modern system of morality can be satisfactory. As between adult human beings, it has become in modern times impossible for one man to yield up his conscience into the hands of any other man or body of men. A child, while it is young enough to be treated entirely as a child, can and ought to find its morality in the commands of others. And those who believe in a divine revelation, will naturally endeavor to place themselves in an attitude of entire submission to what appears to them to be the divine will, whether manifested through books or through some specially favored organization of men. But a man is not a child, and the state is not God, and the surrender of our consciences to the control of others has become impossible. A man may indeed accept the direction of a teacher whom he has chosen,—even accept it implicitly. But then this is by virtue of his own act of choice. We cannot now accept any purely outward authority as having, of its own right, the power of deciding for us on matters of right and wrong.

Hegel, indeed, in the "Phänomenologie des Geistes," points out that the highest realization of the state—that in which it is the universal which completely sums up the individuals which compose it—may be considered as being in the past or the future, but not in the present. But when he comes to deal with the state in detail he seems to forget this. Sometimes he appears to think of the classical state as not yet passed away. The ancient state did indeed endeavor to stand in the same relation to its citizens as the father to the child, or even as God to man, as is indicated by the very close connection which existed in the ancient world between religion and patriotism. But to attempt to bring this idea into the modern world is to ignore the enormous development of the idea of

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individuality, which accompanied, whether as cause or effect, the rise of Christianity, and was marked by the increasing prominence of the ideas of immortality and conscience. The individual began then to claim the right of relating himself directly to the highest realities of the universe—and, among others, to duty. He insisted on judging for himself. The state could be no longer the unquestioned judge of right and wrong; it could now itself be judged and condemned by the individual on moral grounds. It had still a claim to obedience, but not to unquestioning veneration. Nor is there anything inconsistent with this in the authority—perhaps as strong as that of the classical state—which the church exercised during the middle ages. For the church was regarded as a supernaturally commissioned authority. It could never have held its position, if it had been looked on as an assembly of mere men. And in the course of years it became evident that even the church's claim to unquestioning veneration could not stand before the demand of the individual, to have everything justified at the tribunal of his own spirit.

From another point of view, Hegel may be said to have supposed that the ideal state had already come, when it was still far in the future. Indeed, we may go farther and say that, by the time the state had become ideal, it would have long ceased to be a state. No doubt Hegel looked forward, and by his philosophical system was justified in looking forward, to an ultimate ideal unity which should realize all, and far more than all, that the classical state had ever aimed at. He contemplated a universal so thoroughly realized in every individual that the most complete unity of the whole should be compatible with the most complete self-development of the parts. But before this last and highest development of reality could be reached, we should have to leave behind us altogether the world of matter and time, which would be incompatible with such a complete perfection of spirit. Still more would it be impossible in a stage of development in which external government and criminal justice still existed. And to encourage the actual state, as we see it in the world to-day, to assume functions justified only in the far past or in the

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indefinitely remote future, is disastrous both in theory and practice. No part of Hegel's teaching has been productive of more confusion than his persistent attempt to identify the kingdom of Prussia with the kingdom of Heaven.

The result, then, to which we have come is as follows. Hegel's view of the operation of punishment is one which is correct under certain circumstances. And when punishment has this function, it is fulfilling its highest end, since only in this manner does it succeed in really eradicating the fault which caused it. But this function is one which it scarcely ever succeeds in performing at present, when administered in the course of criminal law, and which it is not more likely to succeed in performing in the future.

This does not, however, render it unimportant. For, although it is disappearing in jurisprudence, it is persistent and important in education. There is not the same need in education as in law that punishment shall be deterrent at all cost. The ordinary offences of children are not very dangerous to the structure of society, and we can therefore turn our attention, without much risk, rather to curing them than to suppressing them. And, as a general rule, the decisions of the elder world are tacitly accepted by the younger as righteous. In cases where the authority who inflicts the punishment, or the law upon which it is inflicted, are explicitly rejected as unjust by the offender, we cannot hope that punishment will be more than deterrent. But such cases are infrequent, and, in spite of the efforts of reformers, there is good reason to hope they will remain so. For it is a fact, which, though often forgotten, cannot well be denied, that children are born young, and remain so for some years,—a fact which has some significance.

So, too, in theology. In so far as any person conceives the universe as arranged by a virtue-loving God with a view, among other things, to the promotion of virtue, the effect of any event which he looks on as a divinely inflicted punishment may be, for him, purifying.

If one had the time—and the courage—some interesting, though not, I think, revolutionary, conclusions with regard to

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practice, and particularly to education, might be deduced from these premises. We might point out, for example, that rewards and punishments cannot properly be considered, as they often are, to be purely correlative methods of exerting influence, but that, under certain circumstances, punishment may have a moral effect to which there is nothing analogous in reward.

Again, it is not uncommonly held that "men may rise on stepping-stones of their dead selves to higher things," and that a repented sin may sometimes place the sinner on a higher level than that of his original innocence. And if we are to hold, also, that punishment may produce repentance, we might even be led to the conclusion that a fault and its punishment, taken together, may not only cancel one another, but, in some circumstances, be a positive good. And this might lead us to see some justification for institutions and practices which have been prospering lately without much theoretical defence. We might, for example, believe that it was not a reproach to a system of education that it rested largely on punishment. We might believe that it was not to be regretted that a child should require punishment—provided, of course, that there was a reasonable chance of his getting it. We might believe that it was not desirable, either to try to turn boys into jelly-fish, for fear they should break rules, or to abolish all discipline, that there might be no rules to break. We might even deny that we should gain much by reconstituting the public schools of England on the model either of a Jesuit seminary or a kindergarten.——But I perceive that at this point I have become hopelessly reactionary, and I wish that I could think that it was only at this point that I had become hopelessly tedious.

J. Ellis McTaggart.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

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DISCUSSIONS.

"THE MORAL ASPECTS OF SOCIALISM."

WE will try briefly to put the readers of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS in possession of our point of view as regards Mr. Ball's article on "The Moral Aspects of Socialism." He accuses us, in effect, of generalizing our idea of Socialism from the lower current conception of it, of ignoring what is highest and most significant in modern Socialism, and of lacking the discrimination that philosophy might be expected to exercise between different tendencies of the day.

Now on the matter of discrimination, I have said what I thought, and think, sufficient, in writings previous to "Aspects of the Social Problem," especially in a paper read before the Fabian Society and published long ago in "Essays and Addresses." I do not expect Mr. Ball to know this, but I cannot be expected to repeat myself forever. And in dealing with certain critical points, as for example the treatment of the family, and the condition of private property, we have in "Aspects" itself carefully distinguished what we hold to be the good and the bad movement in public control, and have pointed out that in certain stages they may even coincide for a time. But for the folly of hazarding a confusion of tongues, we could readily represent our own views, including the recognition of the family and private property, as the "only true Socialism," and stigmatize the lower conception, which Mr. Ball agrees with us in deprecating, as a barbarous Individualism, which we fully believe it to be. But the copyright of names cannot thus be put aside; the result would be that we should be credited with views which we do not hold, and the underlying connection between a one-sided universalism and a one-sided particularism, which we take to be at the root of the tendency that we condemn, would escape detection. We, therefore, when referring to Socialism or Collectivism, mean by that term the views of recognized Socialist bodies in England, as expressed in their authorized publications and manifestoes. Mr. Ball's ideas are interesting, but are uninfluential in comparison with the body of popular literature which is disseminated, and the practical influence which is exercised, day by day among the wage-earning classes. And, moreover, so far as can be

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judged from Mr. Ball's article, his ideas, though aiming high, have in them that fatal one-sidedness which inevitably, under the stress of active life, turns over into hitting low. We will illustrate this at starting, and need not return to it. He thinks because those who hold views like ours put character first as the condition of conditions, that we reduce material conditions to a negligeable quantity. He thinks that I show an idealistic bias in saying that the sanitary worker does good more by educating the householder than by unstopping a drain. This I take as a noble corroboration of my views. That a true idealism is to be found in the drains and the slums and the daily worry of following up causation in the lives of the poor, I have always urged. But to find a simple practical precept, obvious to every sanitary worker and borne in on my own mind merely by detailed experience, held up as showing idealistic bias, is more than I should have hoped for. Does Mr. Ball not grasp the point that the man who lives in a house is the only man who can keep it clean, and who, if defects arise beyond his control, can give notice to the authority whose duty it is to see them amended? Granted that there must be such an authority; this, on my view, is obvious; but both its existence and its effectiveness are simply an expression of the determination of individuals to have the work done, and without this the whole concern is futile. If those who try to reform do not try in this spirit, they fail; * the

* Mr. Ball insists on the case of the old lady who was saved from the incipient habit of drinking by a neighbor who boiled her kettle for her. This, he thinks, is a strong case against the view that character is primary,—the condition of conditions. But surely no one could understand me to deny that an appropriate act of kindness, done in the nick of time, and precisely adapted to an individual need, might save a soul,—the soul being precisely ready to be saved in that way. It is the bearing on the individual whole of life that we claim to be all important; obviously, in a certain sense, every detail is a circumstance, and all life is made up of details. These are truisms; the question is what lesson we learn broadly from such a case as that referred to. The managers of a great charitable building trust in one of our great cities have learnt that it is well to have a gas ring in poor tenants' rooms, so that the tired home-comer may get tea without lighting a fire. Here is Mr. Ball's circumstance, as a circumstance pure and simple, and quite right so far. But in some at least of the buildings of this trust, out of no selfish motives, for none can operate, but out of inexperience and reliance on carefully devised "circumstances," individual supervision and selection have been neglected. The effect of the surroundings has therefore not been what was hoped for as regards the character of the tenants, and grave complaints are brought against the buildings as a bad influence rather than a good one. There

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desired improvement of material conditions is not effected, and the failure is due to the self-frustration of a "high" aim in consequence of one-sidedness. But it is not truly "high;" it is low, because abstractly or indolently held. To accuse us of minimizing material conditions because we insist on the only practical way of amending them, and to call us idealists because we have learned our lesson from hard experience, seems to me an inversion of the truth characteristic of the side which Mr. Ball espouses.

I do not absolutely conclude from this that Mr. Ball is very slightly acquainted with the polemical literature of his own side, for I fear that his ideas, well meant though I believe them to be, are too abstract to make him duly sensitive to the narrowness—perhaps the complementary narrowness—of that literature. But I cannot think that he would have written as he has, if he had been really familiar with the pressure of Socialistic forces in actual life, with the Fabian tracts and pamphlets, and, say, for example, with the "joint manifesto" of May 1, 1893. Let us begin with the latter, by which, practically, all English Socialists are bound until they repudiate it. It is signed in the most formal manner by the Joint Committee of the Social Democratic Federation, the Fabian Society and the Hammersmith Socialist Society, among whose names are those of Mr. Sidney Webb, Mr. Bernard Shaw, and Mr. William Morris; and it is also signed separately by the secretaries of the three above-mentioned societies. Why Mr. Ball should speak of this as an "attempt at a joint Socialist manifesto," and hint that a Socialist would not attach much importance to the fact that the free maintenance of necessitous children appears in it, I am unable to conceive. Does he think that it does not matter what is said in penny pamphlets that go out under such auspices among the working classes? Is it also unimportant that the same manifesto says: "Thus we look to put an end forever to the wage-system, to sweep away all distinctions of class and eventually to establish national and international communism on a sound basis"? When I discuss on what conditions as to possible saving and in-

is no greed of property here, but a lavish expenditure of what is practically public money, under enlightened architectural advice, for the material advancement of the conditions under which the poor have to live. It is a serious case, and worth reflecting on. I do not think that any dwellings, however poor, managed on lines which have primary reference to character, have shown any tendency to produce such an effect. This is the sort of experience from which we have to learn.

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vestment a wage-system fulfils the idea of private property, Mr. Ball tells me airily that Collectivism would be wholly based on a wage-system, and that I confound Socialism with Communism. In fact, I was making precisely the discrimination which he desiderates. I was considering what condition *any* possible wage-system must fulfil in order to meet the just ends of private property, and I said that my analysis applied to Collectivist system as to others. Mrs. Webb's "no margin" argument* makes the discrimination necessary, and the manifesto shows that the view which Mr. Ball agrees with me in ruling out is the view of English Socialism, at least for propagandist purposes. I am aware of Mr. Webb's explanation of the phrase, "abolition of the wage-system;"† but the real question is here that of saving and investment, which both the entire anti-saving polemic and the accepted aim of Communism show to be excluded.

Let us now cast a glance at the Fabian tracts and current Socialism in the light of Mr. Ball's assertion: "The more scientific Socialist has never regarded the so-called Socialistic proposals as other than the herring across the track." The proposals in question are out-door relief, relief works, and old age pensions. Old age pensions are strongly advocated by Mr. Sidney Webb in Fabian Tract No. 17, the "Reform of the Poor Law;" and the diatribes to be found in this and other papers against the harshness of the New Poor Law, and Mr. Webb's hints as to the real views of the 1834 Report, must be held to refer in part to the policy of limiting out-relief. The relatively wise tendency of Mr. Webb's and Mr. Burns's views on relief works I am glad to recognize, though I think that the latter goes further in the direction of "making work" than he is himself aware; and the Independent Labor Party, of course, claim to be Socialist, and relief works are almost their main stalking-horse. But, all this being so, what becomes of selection and the standard of life? This would wholly depend on the principle adopted as to distribution of work and wages, and as to the responsibility of heads of families. And it is just on this point that no plan really exists; only it is plain that the best heads (see Mr. Webb in "True and False Socialism,"‡ Fabian Tract, No. 51) anticipate a continued defence of the standard wage

* "The Co-operative Movement," p. 23. I understand Mrs. Webb to accept this reasoning, which she finds implicit in Owen's views.

† "Socialism—True and False," p. 17. ‡ Page 14.

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through the Trades Union, and such organizations would give, in fact, the only chance of some selection being retained. Mr. Ball has with praiseworthy audacity held up as the essential principle of Socialism the one thing so absolutely and admittedly lacking to it that a scheme involving it is only hinted at with extreme timidity by the leaders. Unless the primary responsibility for maintenance falls on the head of the family, and in some way depends on his services, as it now does, selection is annihilated. Mr. Ball may say that in his view it ought so to fall, but we have seen that there exists not only no accepted plan of selection, but in the official manifesto a strong suggestion of Communism.

The difference between the higher views of Socialists and their working Socialism might be illustrated by the difference between the higher- and the lower-priced edition of the Fabian Essays. The former presents on the cover an allegorical design, which may be taken to mean the contest of Greed and Humanity. But the latter has a plainer device,—a gentleman in top-boots and old-fashioned hat, with "privilege" inscribed on his ample waistband, stands upon a ladder marked "Capital" that leads to fruit-bearing trees, aiming, with a revolver in either hand, at a pair of workingmen who are approaching to dislodge him. This disgusting presentation of class hatred has gone out by the thousand among workingmen. Does Mr. Ball suppose that we who come in actual contact with those affected by such a propaganda can be indifferent to its result, which some of us have traced in broken lives and miserable homes, and confine our attention to the academic suggestions of the chair? Only yesterday I talked with an able workingman, so earnest and conscientious that, though a convinced Socialist, he had given up a half-day's work to come and hear a hostile criticism upon Socialism. And he fully and ardently believed that the family was a relic of barbarism which was doomed and ought to vanish. So the people are deceived.

Mr. Ball wants the idea that is relevant; so do we; and that is why we analyze the movement as it exists, and set over against it a more profound experience and a more solid ideal. And although discrimination is desirable, and we have done our part in discriminating, yet it must be remembered that the reason why the Socialist movement has so distinctly a lower side lies in the thin and superficial nature of its higher side. We are convinced by experience that whatever fine ideas may be exploited by the aca-

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demic wing of the movement, its leaders and spokesmen as a whole have not yet acquired—I do not say they may not acquire it—any real or thorough vision of the possible good for industrial life, nor any real effective care—the care born of knowledge and sympathy—whether or not the classes whom the movement affects are elevated or brutalized by its impact. Mr. Ball, for whose ideals and purpose I have the highest respect, has himself, it is obvious, no conception whatever of the weighty issues at stake, for the population of our large towns, in the Socialist propaganda as it practically exists. But we, who know, must act upon our knowledge.*

There is one other point to which I am bound to refer. Mr. Ball drags into his criticism the name of the Charity Organization Society, as if this reference were an adequate characterization of our views. But our book is largely theoretical, and deals with many topics on which the Charity Organization Society, whose aims are practical, has never formulated an opinion. A book, I submit, ought to be dealt with on its own merits, and not by reference to an institution with which its authors are known to be connected, especially where it is one the mention of which is certain to excite all sorts of ignorant prejudices. I go wholly with the Charity Organization Society, but I know that few outsiders have any idea of what its real practice is, and I know also that its publications do not contain explicit theories of the kind which we have ventured to put forward. If these theories are worth reviewing, they are worth studying for their own sake, which Mr. Ball shows no trace of having done; and I cannot help thinking that they would contribute to ending the wretched war of catchwords and party shibboleths like Socialism and Individualism.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

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* As illustrating the assistance given by organized Socialism, whatever its "inner" convictions, to a mischievous local propaganda, I may mention a handbill, now before me, announcing a public meeting at a well-known Radical club in my district of London, "calling upon the Government to grant to all Educational Authorities Power to organize the Maintenance of Necessitous School Children." The chairman is a local Guardian, a notorious out-relief man. Among the speakers announced are two members of the Social Democratic Federation, one member of the Independent Labor party, and one member of the Fabian Society.—B. B., May 7, 1896.

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I do not know what right Mr. Ball has to state that I consider it "superficial and immoral" to criticise any system. I have certainly never said so, and most of my writing so far has consisted in pointing out defects in the working of our present industrial and social organization. That I look for a cure in the moralization of the individual rather than in the machinery of a "popular control of industry" is another matter. What I *do* regard as superficial and immoral are the particular methods of handling facts and figures, and of gaining popularity, adopted by the Socialist Propagandists. This is what I have explained in the article referred to by Mr. Ball. As for my poor old spinster, it has been most amusing to see how our opponents have seized upon her as the salient weak point in our arguments, until I am almost tempted to ask whether under the Socialist *régime* there will be a special department for boiling kettles for poor old women, and so obviating the necessity for neighborly kindness.

HELEN BOSANQUET
(née Dendy).

LONDON.

DIRECT LEGISLATION DEFENDED.

MR. A. LAWRENCE LOWELL had an article in THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS for October, 1895 (vol. vi., pp. 51–63), attacking Direct Legislation—the Initiative and the Referendum—argumentatively and in its actual use in Switzerland. In my opinion his logic is faulty, and after careful investigation, including statements from authorities on the ground, I am sure that many of his facts are only half-truths. *

As an illustration of Mr. Lowell's faulty logic, he refuses to class the control of the liquor traffic by local option, so common in this country, as a species of the Referendum. He says: "It becomes a law without regard to their wishes, and the question of its application in any district is decided solely by the voters of that district. Such a system is, therefore, only a method of local self-government." The last statement is correct, and that is just what Direct Legislation is, "a method of local self-government." But how Mr. Lowell can say, "it becomes a law without regard to their wishes," when it can be applied or not as the voters wish, I cannot see. The latter part contradicts the first. The Grand Council of the Canton of Berne passes a proposed law, but it cannot go into effect until a majority of the voters in Berne have voted in favor of it. This is the obligatory referendum, where all laws have to be

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referred to the people and voted on. The legislature of Massachusetts passes a proposed local option law, and the voters of Boston vote to license saloons, while the voters of Brookline vote to have no saloons. This is the Referendum. And a great variety of other subjects are now being decided by the Referendum, from the voting of bonds in Georgia to the adoption of the Torren's system of transferring land-titles in Illinois, from the voting in Newark, N. J., to increase the pay of policemen from $2.75 to $3.00 per day, to voting the payment of bounties for the killing of wolves in Nebraska.

Now as to some of Mr. Lowell's errors of fact. He says: "The history of popular voting in Switzerland reveals a marked tendency to reject radical measures. . . . . Strange as it may seem, the tendency to reject radical projects applies to labor laws and other measures designed to improve the condition of the working-classes. . . . . In 1870, the people (of Zurich) rejected a cantonal law which reduced the period of work in factories to twelve hours a day, etc." This last is true. The reasons for this rejection are given to me by Hon. Charles Burkly, of Zurich, who for years has been, and is still, a member of the legislative council. He says: "The reasons for this rejection are manifold. First, a great number of industrial workingmen only worked twelve hours, anyway, and a large part of them, if not a majority, worked only eleven, ten-and-a-half, and ten. These, of course, voted 'no,' fearing that such an ugly legal working-day might lengthen their working-time. Second, the poor, half-starved weavers and spinners feared a reduction of wages, which their masters authoritatively told them would be the case. And, thirdly, the bulk of the peasantry, being impartial and not at all concerned, would not force it on the city workers, when it was very evident they did not want it. So that only 18,216 voted 'yes,' and 26,883 voted 'no.'" When workingmen who work less than twelve hours a day vote against a twelve hour day, it puts an entirely different face on the cause of its rejection.

Switzerland, as a whole, is ahead in factory and labor legislation of the State of Massachusetts, which is ahead of the other States in the Union; and the Canton of Zurich, containing the manufacturing city of the same name, has stronger and better labor laws than the country or non-manufacturing cantons. It is true they sometimes reject laws which purport to be in the interests of labor. But the title of a law does not always correctly characterize it.

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Again, Mr. Lowell speaks of the rejection of a similar federal law in 1877. In 1877 the Swiss people accepted a law fixing eleven hours as the legal working-day by a vote of 181,204 "yes" against 170,857 "no," and in Zurich the vote was 26,443 "yes" and 26,492 "no," a slight majority for rejection. These facts were published in *The Direct Legislation Record* for September, 1894, and in German in the book entitled "Initiative and Referendum," by Herr Heinrich Stulsi, the Zurich Secretary of State.

To show the Swiss feeling about the working-day, it is only necessary to state that the first normal working-day legally fixed in Europe was enacted in 1864 in the Canton of Glarus by the Landsgemeinde, or by Direct Legislation. Also, in Zurich, on August 12, 1894, a law limiting female workers to ten hours a day was adopted by a vote of about 45,000 "yes" to 11,000 "no."

Mr. Lowell says that, in 1878, they rejected a law establishing a school of weaving, and, "moreover, they have repeatedly rejected measures for increasing the amount of education in the public schools (1872, 1885, 1888, and 1891), and they have refused to sanction bills to provide free text-books for the children (1887 and 1888)." These facts are true, because, as Mr. Burkly says: "Our peasantry and factory hands are too poor to send their children to school two years longer, as these laws of 1872, 1885, 1888, and 1891 intended. They, like the English gentlemen in Parliament, do not make laws against their own interests. Our peasants say: 'It's all very well, and we're grateful for the good meaning; but we are not rich enough to do it, and, therefore, we reject it.'"

Yet the Canton of Zurich and its communes (municipalities) spend yearly (1892) six and a half million francs (about $1,300,000) for education, and the population is about 350,000 (the census of 1888 shows 338,580). This is an average of $3.71 per head of population. According to the "Statesman's Year Book," an acknowledged authority, there was spent on education in Italy, in 1887-88, by the state, 41,000,000 lire, in 1886 by the provinces, 5,000,000 lire, and by the communes in the same year, 62,000,000 lire, or a total of 108,000,000 lire, which is, in round figures, $21,600,000; or, reckoning the population at 30,000,000 (it was 30,565,253 in 1888), this would be 72 cents per head.

Following the same method, and using facts from the same authority, one finds that Prussia pays 57 cents per unit of population; Wurtemberg, 55 cents; France, 74 cents; the United States,

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just under $2.00, and, according to David A. Wells, in "Recent Economic Changes," Great Britain and Ireland pay $1.45.

Switzerland is a poor country compared with either our own country or England, yet the Canton of Zurich under the Referendum, which Mr. Lowell says "has a purely negative effect," spends in proportion to population nearly double the amount spent on education in the United States, more than two and a half times the amount spent in England, and from five to seven times the amount spent in her surrounding countries.

Zurich has the obligatory referendum, and every one of the laws appropriating these large amounts for education has been approved by the people. It is no wonder that, of all the laws submitted to the people, some could be found which, while good in themselves, were too expensive for the people to adopt. Very likely these laws were passed by the legislative body just to get the opinion of the people on the question of expense and heavier taxation.

In speaking of the Initiative, Mr. Lowell says: "The required number of voters demanded an amendment (to the national constitution) forbidding the slaughter of animals by bleeding, a measure whose real object was not to prevent cruelty, but to harass the Jews. The Federal Assembly urged the rejection of the bill as opposed to the principles of religious liberty guaranteed by the constitution, but it was nevertheless enacted by a popular vote." This is incorrect. The measure was formulated and urged by the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. It simply forbids the bleeding of animals to death without their first being rendered insensible. It was not done to harass the Jews, who number only eight thousand in a population of between three and four millions. The fact that animals are still slaughtered according to the Talmudic customs, although they must first be rendered insensible, at once disproves this. This was not, as Mr. Lowell calls it, "a petty persecution of the Jews," but a humane act which it would be well for other countries to imitate.

Again he says: "Of the measures proposed and rejected at the polls, some were good and some bad, but they are of no consequence to us, for what we want to know is, the effect of the Initiative in producing legislation. The net, direct result in Zurich during twenty-four years has been the enactment of only three laws to which the legislature was opposed. . . .

"We are forced to conclude, therefore, either that the wants of the people are satisfied by the action of the legislature, and if so,

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the Initiative is needless, or that it has not enabled them to express their real wishes, in which case it is a failure."

This would be a good argument against the Initiative, if it did not overlook the very best part of the results of both the Initiative and the Referendum, the indirect results. Hon. Charles Burkly says: "The best is what is not seen at all; many laws formerly unscrupulously made by the deciding representative or parliament are not now made because of the fear of rejection." The same is true of the Initiative. Desirable laws are not smothered, but are brought up for discussion and adoption because of the fear of an Initiative petition. This recently happened in Geneva regarding the abolishment of brothel licensing. The Initiative and Referendum have produced far more than the direct results seen in the defeat or enactment of certain laws. They have produced law-making bodies which strive to get at and enact the will of the people, and which are free from corruption. During the last quarter of a century there has hardly been a single charge of corruption against a member of the Swiss National Council. What other country can show such a result? It has produced a set of law-makers who are elected year after year, even by voters some of whom are directly opposed to their opinions. But they know that these men are experienced in drafting laws, and that, if at any time they pass a law which the people do not want, the people can defeat it. During a recent election only two candidates for re-election were defeated. Legislators, or, as they are more properly called, councillors, have practically life-tenure. This system makes the people take an interest in policies and principles, instead of in the history of parties and the *personnel* of candidates. This is highly educational. The indirect results of the Initiative and Referendum, which Mr. Lowell has completely overlooked, are the more important.

Mr. Lowell says: "Surely a destruction of the limitations of our government which would allow absolute power to be wielded by any group of men who could get control of the state, would not be a benefit to the working-classes." This is true. But when all the people decide on a law, surely it would be impossible for a "group of men" to wield "absolute power." The reverse would happen. The trouble with our system now is that a corporation or a group of corporations wield, through corruption, almost absolute power. Direct Legislation would prevent this.

"In a community," says Mr. Lowell, "as complex as ours,

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legislation is a very intricate matter, and requires a great deal of careful study." Rittinghausen tells how, during a discussion on the adoption of the National Referendum in Switzerland years ago, this same argument was brought up in a public meeting, and great stress was laid on the relations of the church and state, and the fact that the common people could not possibly understand the "Concordat." A workingman raised his hand, and being given an opportunity to speak, said, "Let him who wants to pray, pay." The people would likely cut through these intricate problems in some such common-sense and just manner. Our legislation is made intricate so that people cannot understand how they are governed. It should be simple. The Canton of Berne, with the obligatory Referendum, has passed an average of four laws a year during the last score of years. In 1891 or 1892, there were thirteen thousand national and State laws passed in this country. New Jersey alone passed six hundred, some of which are longer than the whole Justinian Code.

Mr. Lowell further says: "It (the Referendum) would probably be used chiefly in the case of laws that had aroused a good deal of party feeling and had been carried as party measures." It strikes me that this would be a very good thing, as partisan measures are usually good for the party and bad for the people. Washington's prophecy in his farewell address, as to the evils of partisanship, has come true. Direct Legislation has preserved what is good in parties in Switzerland, but it has killed the bitter partisan feeling which is a curse here.

To quote again: "The Referendum . . . . is essentially a check on legislation, a method by which the people can reject measures, but not, in any sense, a means of passing laws. . . . . The Referendum, therefore, could not produce legislation for the benefit of the working-classes, and would be likely to hinder it. The instrument designed for the popular creation of laws is the Initiative. . . . . It has not been a success in its native country." Mr. Lowell goes on in the same strain, overlooking entirely the fact that, in forcing the law-drafting body to obey the people, the Initiative and Referendum have been a great success—yes, a success also in enacting laws for the benefit of the working-classes, but not for the benefit of one class when such a law would work for the detriment of other classes. The Initiative and Referendum are not a failure in Switzerland. While some of the politicians would gladly oppose and repeal those institutions, not a

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single public man dare openly oppose them, so strongly are they rooted in the hearts of the Swiss people.

In his closing paragraph, Mr. Lowell says: "If the Referendum and the Initiative were instruments by which the laboring class could legislate for its own special benefit, they would be mischievous. Class legislation, enacted by a class, is absolutely inconsistent with democracy, which is a government by the whole people for the benefit of the whole people." True; and that is just what Direct Legislation is; it is a means by which any class or group in a community, whether village, city, State, or nation, can bring up its grievances and its proposed remedy for such grievances before the whole people for discussion, and then the whole people decides on the proposed remedy. The laboring class can force a discussion on some measure for its own special benefit, but it cannot, unless the people agree with it, make this measure a law. Direct Legislation will prevent class legislation.

As Mr. Lowell truly says, "If history proves anything, it proves that a democracy in which any one class becomes too powerful is doomed."

ELTWEED POMEROY.

NEWARK, N. J.

SPINOZA'S DOCTRINE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MIND AND BODY.

EVERY student of Spinoza has doubtless felt the difficulty of reconciling those propositions in the *Ethic* which appear to make the mind dependent on the body, with other propositions, especially in the fifth part, in which Spinoza maintains, not only the power of the mind over the passions, but its immortality. I propose to offer a few observations, which, if they do not solve the problem, may remove some of its difficulties.

It is presupposed, of course, that the reader is familiar with the *Ethic*, and knows what Spinoza means by extension and thought, and what he understands to be the connection between them.

According to Proposition 13, Part 2, "the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else." For "idea" we may substitute "knowledge," and Spinoza himself uses the phrase "idea or knowledge." The "idea constituting the human mind" is therefore a certain aggregate of knowledge. What is meant by "object"? At first sight it might be supposed that the body is the

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mind's "object" in the sense that the mind is merely a kind of transcript of the affections of the body. If so, Spinoza is purely physiological and materialistic, and contradicts himself, not only in the fifth part, but perpetually in the earlier parts of the *Ethic*. For example, in Proposition 18, Part 2, we hear of "a concatenation of ideas which takes place according to the order of the intellect" expressly distinguished from "the order and concatenation of the affections of the human body," and in Scholium, Proposition 29, Part 2, perception "according to the common order of Nature" is declared to be "confused knowledge," and it is the prerogative of the mind to determine itself "internally," and so to arrive at "adequate" knowledge. It is clear that, for Spinoza, the mind has the power to arrange its thoughts in some other order than that of the affections of the body, and to draw conclusions which do not follow from the order in which the affections of the body occur. He maintains, also, that the mind can form conceptions which transcend; that the infinite cannot be conceived by the imagination, but by the intellect alone; and in Proposition 11, Part 3, we find that the death of the body involves the cessation of *memory* and *imagination*, a limitation which is careful and precise, and is exactly that of the fifth part. Once more, according to Proposition 2, Part 3, "the body cannot determine the mind to thought, neither can the mind determine the body to motion nor rest, nor to anything else, if there be anything else." The Scholium, which is rather lengthy, is a polemic against those who disbelieve the latter part of the proposition. The reason why Spinoza lays particular stress on this latter part no doubt was that at the time Descartes and the pineal gland were much in fashion, but he is just as careful to tell us that the body cannot determine the mind.

It is evident, therefore, from a consideration of these early propositions, to say nothing of those which deal with man's power over his passions and those of the fifth part, that to Spinoza the body is not the object of the mind, in the sense that the mind is its separate, but exact reflection or counterpart, and it is difficult to suppose that the immortality of the fifth part was, as some suggest, an after-thought. What Spinoza intends by "object" is in fact *ob-jected*. He denies the existence of two utterly diverse entities, mind and body. How, he thinks, if this be true, are we to pass from one to the other? He takes the conclusions of his first part and applies them to man. The body and mind *are the same*

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thing considered under two different attributes. The proposition last quoted means that there is no such thing as an abstract mind issuing its orders to the body, and no such thing as an abstract body controlling the mind. Abstract mind and abstract body are impossible unrealities. Man thinking *in time and existent* is this particular body as thought: man's body is the mind as extension. The highest flights of thought are the body as thought, and (Proposition 39, Part 5) "he who possesses a body fit for many things possesses a mind of which the greater part is eternal." Nevertheless, it is true that the body as thought can "concatenate" its own affections, govern its own passions, and "strive" (the word is Spinoza's own) to acquire such a distinct knowledge of its affections that it cannot be mastered by them.

We now come to the fifth part. The twenty-first proposition proves that "the mind can imagine nothing, nor can it recollect anything that is past, except while the body exists." This calls for no comment. The next proposition is that "in God, nevertheless, there necessarily exists an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity." "Essence" is defined, Definition 2, Part 2 (and Spinoza lays much stress on minute attention to this definition), as "that, which being given, the thing itself is necessarily posited, and being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken: or, in other words, that, without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which in its turn cannot be nor be conceived without the thing." The essence of the body (Corollary, Proposition 10, Part 2) is a modification of an attribute of God (extension); and the idea expressing the essence, according to Scholium, Proposition 23, Part 5, is "a certain mode of thought which pertains to the essence of the mind." The essence of this or that human body is a certain form of extension with its affections, and the idea is the knowledge of those affections, or the mind. Spinoza elsewhere distinctly denies the existence of a bare, empty *I*. Man is what he knows, and this knowledge is *through* the body, but nevertheless it is partly under the form of eternity. There is really here no contradiction, save the contradiction of actual fact. Without its object the mind cannot conceive the infinite. Nay more, without its object the mind is *not*, but nevertheless the object is not infinite, nor, as an abstraction, is it the mind. Proposition 23, Part 5, affirms that "the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal," the proof

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being that the ascription of duration or existence through the body is only possible to the mind so long as it is limited in time, but that there is "something" which pertains to the essence of the mind which must "be conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the essence itself of God" and must be eternal.

It is noticeable that the "idea" of the twenty-second proposition here becomes "something,"—a little more indefinite. Spinoza could not go any further than "something." He was firmly convinced, on the one hand, of the reality of mind, but that objectless mind is pure fiction, and that through the object infinity is reached; that, in short, infinity and finitude are each in the other, and one without the other is nothing.

The practical conclusion is that the more we "conceive through intelligence, the larger is the eternal part in us," and (Scholium, Proposition 38, Part 5) "it is possible for the human mind to be of such a nature that that part of it which we have shown perishes with its body, in comparison with the part of it which remains, is of no consequence."

It is not my object to defend Spinoza's creed, nor do I pretend that I have completely understood or explained it, but it is a fair reply to the charge of obscurity that all religion, in so far as it is speculative, is obscure, and Spinoza's is not more so than the Christian mysteries. Neither is it so obscure as the popular notion as to soul and body, nor as many other conclusions of common sense which are clear solely because we have so often repeated them. To break down these conclusions is one of the special functions of philosophy.*

W. Hale White.

* Many parallel passages might be quoted from other authors. "Further, this creative reason does not at one time think, at another time not think (it thinks eternally); and when separated from the body it remains nothing but what it essentially is; and thus it is alone immortal and eternal. Of this unceasing work of thought, however, we retain no memory, because this reason is unaffected by its objects; whereas the receptive, passive intellect (which is affected) is perishable, and can really think nothing without the support of the creative intellect." —Aristotle's "Psychology" (Wallace's translation, p. 161).

"I believe," said Pantagruel, "that all intellectual souls are exempt from the scissors of Atropos. They are all immortal."—Rabelais, "Pantagruel," Book iv., Chapter 27.

"To give heed to her (Wisdom's) laws confirmeth incorruption; and incorruption bringeth near unto God."—Wisdom of Solomon, Chapter vi., Verses 18, 19.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

ESSAYS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY AND ON THE PRIVATE AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF MANKIND. By Jonathan Dymond. Ninth edition. Dublin: Eason & Son, Limited, 1894. Pp. xiv., 294.

This book, though perhaps not much known in philosophical circles, seems to have a very wide circulation, and is of real interest to the serious student of practical ethics and of the history of ethical ideas, because it represents one of the few attempts, outside the Catholic Church, to work out a *system* of strictly *Christian* ethics. The author was a linen-draper of Exeter (England), who died in 1828, at the age of thirty-two. His family belonged to the Society of Friends. The "Essays on Morality" were published in 1829, after his death, and were made the occasion of an elaborate criticism by the poet Southey in the *Quarterly Review* for January, 1831. Southey accepts Dymond's disregard of metaphysics; he accepts his rejection of utilitarian ethics; like him he makes the ultimate standard of right and wrong to be the "Will of God" revealed in the Bible. In the application of this standard there are naturally considerable differences between the Anglican Tory, imbued to the full with the spirit of reaction, and an hereditary Quaker whose political sympathies had much in common with the more moderate "Radicals" of his day. The agreements and disagreements are curious and instructive. Southey fully approves Dymond's doctrine of non-resistance to governments,—*passive* obedience,—"the old and true doctrine of the Church of England;" but for Dymond's very modest and temperate criticism of the unreformed British constitution he has not much toleration, nor for his objections to the punishment of death, war, and established churches.

Dymond, as has been said, makes the revealed Will of God the supreme and ultimate rule of morals, but he attempts no proof that the Christian Scriptures contain the most perfect and completest expression of that Divine Will. His position is one which might be taken with equal reasonableness by a Mohammedan who accepts the Koran as the final revelation. It is not logically open to Dymond to argue from the superior moral excellence of Christian ethics, for such an argument assumes that we have a standard of right and wrong by which to judge Scripture, and therefore makes

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Scripture no longer the supreme rule in morals. The authority of the "Law of Nature" and of "Utility" he holds to be subordinate to that of the "Moral Law," by which he means the moral precepts of the New Testament. He does indeed speak of "an immediate communication of the will of God," not limited to the writers of the New Testament nor to the Christian, but this "immediate communication," he says, "is little adapted to the formation of external rules," so that he evidently regards Scripture as the only certain source of moral rules. Unlike the seventeenth century Puritans, and in frequently expressed disagreement with Milton, he refuses to accept the Old Testament as of equal authority with the New Testament, even when not expressly put aside by the latter. But within the New Testament he draws no distinction between the "counsels of perfection" of the Sermon on the Mount and that adaptation of Christian principles to the needs of an organized community living in the ordinary world which we find already in the Pauline Epistles. On many matters, *e.g.*, as to oaths, Dymond, like all Quakers, accepts the precepts of the Gospel as absolutely binding. But though he condemns all wars without exception on the supposed authority of the New Testament and irrespective of any considerations of expediency, he does not, like Count Tolstoi, propose to apply rigidly the principle of "not resisting evil" in cases where injuries have been done by individuals to one another within the state. On the contrary, he proposes to treat many acts as crimes, to be punished by imprisonment, which are at present only regarded as civil wrongs; he even allows distraint for rent against unprincipled tenants; and proposes severe measures against fraudulent debtors. "Who would admit a footpad to his table? And who would admit to his table a man who was just like a footpad?"—a healthy sentiment, doubtless; but is it more consistent with the principle of "loving our enemies" than is a rebellion against intolerable tyranny or a war undertaken to put down misgovernment and oppression? The precepts about taking no thought for the morrow and about letting the thief who takes your coat take your cloak also have, fortunately for the Quakers and for the world, never been construed very literally by the Quaker community.

Punishment is said by Dymond to have only three proper ends: (1) Reformation of the offender; (2) Example; (3) Restitution or compensation to the injured. The primary object of punishment—the safety of the community—does not seem to be considered at all, except in so far as it comes under the second of these

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heads. It is difficult to see how, if we allow punishments of individuals by the state (punishments which, however mild, necessarily involve some use of force by the state), it is *always* wrong in the state to use force to protect its members against attack from without. The unpractical Tolstoi is a consistent representative of Oriental religious anarchy, while the Quakers as good business men have understood the more obvious requirements of civil order. They have been a useful leaven in communities that have always possessed enough of the fighting spirit to be able to tolerate with safety and advantage a small body of protesters for peace. To the modern and moderate form of Quakerism, which is admirably represented in this book, belongs in a special manner the distinction of treating religion as primarily ethical. Ceremonies are of course conspicuously put aside, but theological orthodoxy is not allowed, as too often in other religious bodies, to usurp the place of right conduct in the ordinary affairs of life. In Dymond's book the *distinctive* creed of Christianity is only referred to in the concluding words. But it is clear enough that the attempt to derive a detailed working code of ethics from scattered "texts" of the New Testament leads at times to casuistry of a questionable sort in the hands of the Quaker as much as in the hands of the Roman Catholic theologian. And the Catholic has the enormous advantage of making the distinction between counsels of perfection for the few and commands binding on all.

A consideration of Dymond's book suggests two questions as well worth the study of ethical students: (1) What do we mean when we use the phrase "Christian ethics"? Are we thinking of the ideals of the Sermon on the Mount? or are we thinking of the whole of the New Testament? or of the whole Bible? and of the Bible as interpreted and glossed by the Catholic Church, or by any body of Protestants, or by the individual who is using the word "Christian"? or do we mean to use "Christian" in an objective, historical sense, for what is prevalent among peoples that profess Christianity, as others profess Buddhism or Mohammedanism? (2) What have been the special contributions made to practical ethics by different religious bodies? We should hope to find that, amid much of misdirected energy and zeal, something of value was due to all that had ever moulded for any length of time the lives of their members.

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BUCKLE AND HIS CRITICS: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY. By J. M. Robertson. London: Sonnenschein Co., 1895.

This book was well worth writing, and in spite of its length (550 pages) is well worth reading. It is, as the title professes, not only a reply to the critics of Buckle, but a study in sociology. Mr. Robertson follows his hero wisely, and therefore not wholly, and he has been able, without sacrificing the first main purpose of his undertaking, to give ample token of his own fitness for independent sociological work.

It must be admitted at once that he has shown the weakness of most of the current criticisms of Buckle. Men of high repute, like Maine and Professor Flint, are shown to have repeated common accounts rather than looked closely at the original of the author. Froude is not in this case the worst offender.

The mistake of popular criticism has been to represent Buckle as formulating without qualification certain principles (such as the influence of physical conditions and the unprogressiveness of morality) which were not in fact stated by him so absolutely. On the other hand, it would be no mistake to say that Buckle often writes as if he had himself forgotten the qualifications. Some have defended him by supposing that in sociology he abstracted from morals, for example, as the economists abstracted from it in economic reasoning (Robertson, p. 271, Mill, "Logic," VI., xi. 537 n.). But the economists were not giving the laws of all social progress, but only of economical progress, while Buckle is dealing with the larger problem. Mr. Robertson's defence is that to Buckle morality meant simply willingness to do duty (272), an identical factor in all ages. This conception is too narrow, but it makes Buckle's position logically defensible.

Mr. Robertson frankly admits his author's defects of expression, and even his defective psychology and ethics. His chapter (xi.) on "Buckle's Real Errors" is very instructive. It is remarkable that, at a time when the *prestige* of the older political economy was undoubtedly waning (1857), Buckle should laud abstract economics and *laisser faire* as he did. Mr. Robertson's criticisms on this subject are well considered. He substantially agrees, too, with Mr. Venn's remarks in the "Logic of Chance" (Robertson, 285 *et seq.*). Mr. Venn had fastened on such statements as: "In a given state of society a certain number of persons must put an end to their own life," and pointed out that this fatalistic interpreta-

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tion of statistics (which was common to Buckle with Quetelet, Herschel, and others) is based on a neglect of the influence produced on men by the very knowledge of the statistics themselves. It is to be remembered that Buckle wrote at a time when the "theory of probabilities" was being almost for the first time clearly illustrated and exemplified by statistical results, and there was a temptation to regard its derivative uniformities as causes rather than what they really were, effects.

When all has been said in censure of Buckle, it must not be forgotten that the "History of Civilization in England" was a fragment; and Mr. Robertson's book is an opportune reminder of the courage and power and learning with which Buckle supported, before an indifferent or sceptical public, the claims of a science of history in general.

In the case of a book like the one before us, where scores of contemporary authors* are marshalled and characterized freely and fearlessly, there is sure to be some little disagreement between the writer and every reader, still more between the writer and every reviewer. Instead of dwelling on such inevitable disagreements, we might point out one cause of offence that seems avoidable and regrettable, and that is in the language. The style is excellent in all particulars but one, and that is diction. If "worsens" (273), "countering" (203) and "magistral" (348) can serve their turn, there are few students whose flow of thought will not be rudely interrupted when they come upon "intelligised" (275) "biasable" (277), "polemist" (300), and "God-ism" (538).

J. Bonar.

London.

Punishment and Reformation: An Historical Sketch of the Rise of the Penitentiary System. By Frederick Howard Wines, LL.D. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. 339.

Mr. Wines's interesting volume is appropriately dedicated to the memory of his father, an American citizen of the very best type. Mr. Wines, the elder, was prominently connected with the prison movement in all its phases, and during the course of an active and energetic career succeeded in rendering conspicuous

* The article on Buckle by James Macdonell, in the *North British Review*, December, 1867, seems to have escaped notice, but it would be hard to find another instance.

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service to the cause of enlightened and humane methods of dealing with the criminal classes. The book before us consisted in its original form of a series of lectures delivered before the students of the University of Wisconsin, and afterwards in a somewhat altered shape before the Lowell Institute in Boston. It has been rewritten for publication in the hope that it may prove both instructive and interesting to a wider circle of readers. We have no doubt that this hope will be fulfilled, inasmuch as it is in many respects a book of sterling merit.

The conditions which produce the criminal population are for all practical purposes of two kinds, individual and social. In recent years the individual conditions have been inquired into with great minuteness by Professor Lombroso and his school, a school which is generally known as the school of criminal anthropology. According to the teachings of this school the criminal is to a large extent a product of atavistic and pathological anomalies. In physical appearance he resembles the savage or primitive man: it is the same with his mental habits and modes of thought and feeling. But his atavistic peculiarities are often seen in combination with pathological characteristics, and it is a question whether the supposed atavistic peculiarities of criminals are not in reality pathological. Among French and German investigators the prevalent opinion is that the criminal is a product of degeneracy and not of atavism. In Italy Professor Lombroso and his followers consider that the criminal is a product of both degeneracy and atavism. One of the difficulties connected with the question is the vagueness and obscurity which still hang around the terms degeneracy and atavism. Until we have a clear definition of what is meant by degeneracy and an equally clear conception of what is meant by atavism, it will be impossible to say to what extent these two factors enter into the production of the criminal, or whether he is the result of only one of them. It is fortunate that for most practical purposes we already know enough to enable us to set forth the principles on which the treatment of the criminal population should proceed. Mr. Wines's book deals with these principles in a very satisfactory manner. If penitentiary treatment is to be of any use as a protection to society, it must be of such a character as will not make a man who is suffering from physical or mental degeneracy still more degenerate. A large percentage of criminals are, in the opinion of competent observers, of a degenerate type. A system of prison discipline which takes

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one of these human beings, and subjects him to a course of severities in the form of insufficient food, insufficient exercise, insufficient or degrading occupation, is certain to accentuate the degeneracy from which he already suffers, and to turn him out of prison in a worse condition than he was before he entered it. A system based upon these principles offers very little protection to society, inasmuch as it renders the criminal less adapted than ever to earn an honest livelihood. When this is the case he inevitably relapses into a life of crime. A properly constituted prison system must be constructed so as to contend as far as possible with the adverse conditions which have turned a man or woman into a criminal. If these conditions consist of physical or mental infirmity, or, as is frequently the case, a combination of both, the only rational method of treatment is to use every effort to remove these adverse conditions, and to subject the offender to a regimen which has this end clearly and distinctly in view. This is the system, Mr. Wines informs us, which prevails in such institutions as the New York State Reformatory and the Massachusetts Reformatory at Concord. The great underlying thought in these institutions is "that every prisoner must be individualized and given the special treatment adapted to develop him in the point in which he is weak —physical, intellectual, or moral culture in combination, but in varying proportions according to the diagnosis of each case: that time must be given for the reformatory process to take effect before allowing him to be sent away uncured: that his cure is always facilitated by his co-operation and often impossible without it: that no other form of rewards and punishments is so effective in many instances as transfer from one class to another, with different privileges in each: but that the supreme agency for gaining the desired co-operation on the prisoner's part is power lodged in the administration of the prison to lengthen or shorten the duration of his term of incarceration. The other great thought is that the whole process of reformation is educational; not meaning by that term the injection of information without assimilation, but the drawing out to its full natural and normal limit of every faculty of the body, mind, and soul of every man who passes through the institution. The aim of the institution is to send out no man who is not prepared to do something well enough to be independent of the temptation to fraud or theft."

"If the question is asked," continues Mr. Wines, "Where does the punishment come in? the answer is: In the discipline which is

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unremitting and exacting; in the violence done to the criminal tastes and habits of the prisoners, which they have no opportunity to indulge; in the consciousness that one is held in a net of influence and restraint which one is powerless to break; in the uncertainty as to one's ability to earn a discharge in time or without too great a personal sacrifice; in the regularity and monotony of life under a rigid rule. Certain it is that the worse men prefer to be sent to a prison organized on the old plan, and that there have been moments when the strain of anxiety to win an early parole has been so ominous of possible mental derangement as to alarm the superintendent, and compel him to relax the pressure upon certain sensitive spirits thought to be in danger of eclipse. For the generation of the moral force necessary to carry the mass of prisoners upward and onward in a great reformatory current association under necessary restrictions is indispensable, which is the reply to the criticisms upon this system by the advocates of the Pennsylvania system. Nor is there any point in the observation that association and routine are inseparable, and that individual treatment is impossible without cellular separation by day and night. If that were true, it would be necessary to have a separate class-room for every child in school, and to build our churches with separate stalls as chapels are constructed in some foreign prisons."

Mr. Wines is no sentimentalist. He fully recognizes that no system of prison treatment will be successful in every case. There remains a residuum of the criminal population who persist in a career of crime no matter how many opportunities are given them, inside a prison or outside of it, of becoming useful members of the community. Some people will not permit us to say that these offenders are incorrigible. Anyhow, it is allowable to say that after every means has been tried they remain uncorrected. For cases of this description Mr. Wines is an advocate of indefinite seclusion. We do not hesitate to adopt this method with lunatics, and, inasmuch as many of these uncorrected criminals are more dangerous to social order and social welfare than lunatics, there is no reason why they should not be subjected to a similar method of treatment.

W. D. Morrison.

London.

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ISRAEL AMONG THE NATIONS. A STUDY OF THE JEWS AND OF ANTISEMITISM. By Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu. Translated by Frances Hellman. Authorized edition for the United States and Europe. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. London: William Heinemann, 1895. Large 16mo, pp. xxiii., 385.

M. Leroy-Beaulieu's volume ought to set the "Jewish Question" at rest. All the reasons, religious, national, and economic or social, alleged in our times for distrust of the Jews are examined by him with equal learning and fairness, and shown to be based on no valid ground. The studies of his life have fitted him to make such an investigation as this, and he has specially prepared himself for the work not only by consulting statistics but by personal intercourse with Jewish communities of different classes in various parts of Europe. His book has gone through nearly a dozen editions in France, and it is so attractive in form and in spirit that one may hope for it a similar success in this country and England. Will it change the popular estimate of Jews? This would no doubt be the case if men were governed by wide knowledge and careful judgment; but most men will probably continue to base their opinions on their own limited observation.

M. Leroy-Beaulieu says truly that religious differences are not now the cause of the hatred of the Jew, and he adds, with less probability, that perhaps they never were. In the old days there was genuine, hearty hatred in every positive religious circle towards all others; Christians regarded Jews and Moslems alike as enemies of the only true and saving religion. The general change in modern feeling is due to the spread of intelligence and the softening of manners; the religious dislike of Jews is further diminished by the fact that they are not regarded as rivals. On our author's excellent treatment of the supposed anti-foreign spirit of the Talmud I have only one dissenting remark to make: he does not seem to bring out clearly enough the fact that the national narrowness in both Old Testament and Talmud is an affair, not of race or religion, bu of the stadium of social training, and that it is a moral limitation from which modern society is far from having freed itself.

The greater part of the volume is devoted to the discussion of the relation of the Jewish world to the national and social sides of modern life. Is the Jew likely to denationalize the Christian nations of to-day? There are many persons who appear to look on such a

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result as not only possible but imminent. It is said that Jews are getting control of money, of the public press, and of the theatres—that they form a closed community, and are indifferent to the interests of the peoples among whom they dwell—that, as Semites, they are divided from us Aryans by so wide a gulf that a real union between them and us is impossible. These points are examined in detail by M. Leroy-Beaulieu. He shows, by a large citation of facts, that the Jew is de-Judaizing himself at the same time that the Christian is de-Christianizing himself—that, in proportion as the man of Israel is admitted to the civil and social privileges of a Christian community, he identifies himself with his new home, and contributes all his capacities and resources to its advancement. The Jews have been looked on as a separate people since the days of Juvenal and Tacitus. In antiquity (that is, after the year B.C. 440) they were isolated by their monotheism which made it impossible for them to take part in the religious observances of other nations; and since the establishment of Christianity they have been further isolated by their religious customs and by the fanatical spirit of the Christian peoples of Europe, who forced them to dwell apart, and, until a comparatively recent time, refused them the rights of citizenship. But, when this pressure is removed, they show themselves good and faithful citizens of their countries of adoption. As to the supposed antagonism between the Aryan and Semitic races M. Leroy-Beaulieu holds that it here amounts to little. In the first place, the Jews of to-day cannot be regarded as a pure Semitic race. In the twenty-five centuries which have elapsed since they were dispersed among the nations not only have intermarriages between them and non-Jews been numerous, but many outsiders have come into the Jewish communities as proselytes; as in Christian nations there is no little admixture of Jewish blood, so it is probable that among the Jews there is no little Christian blood. And granted (as we must grant) that the old Semitic peoples differed in genius from Greek, Latin, and Goth, it is improbable that such differences should be perpetuated down to these times when the intellectual environment of the Jews has completely changed, and when they are no longer a nation but only a body of communities living under the conditions of the communities in whose midst they dwell. It is, in fact, patent that the Jew has no difficulty in accepting the ideas and modes of life of Aryan peoples. To say this is not to deny his individuality and power, but only to deny the impossibility of real social union between him and others.

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The chapters on the modern Jewish psychology, genius, and spirit are full of suggestions. The author, while recognizing the very great ability of the Jews in certain directions, is not disposed to assign them a high inventive capacity or a peculiar genius. Their ruling faculty, he thinks, is the faculty of assimilation, their chief mental characteristics lucidity, precision, and pliancy, with them the mind is stronger than the body, but the character weaker than the intellect. All their qualities, physical, intellectual, and moral, he properly regards as largely the products of their social conditions during the last ten centuries. They have been traders and students, and they have been socially under the ban—therefore they have learned to be acute, and supple, and worldly-wise. The Jew of to-day is a modern man, the product of modern conditions, though with a certain flavor of antiquity—he has a great tradition of national life behind him. It may be doubted whether he is morally either better or worse than his Gentile fellow-citizens. It is too soon to judge of his special capacity in science and art, for he has not been long enough in the circle of modern culture. Nor is it easy to say whether our author's characterization of him is quite correct. I am disposed to think, however, that the best Jewish life of to-day exhibits one quality of which M. Leroy-Beaulieu makes no mention—I mean the passion for social regeneration, a passion to be traced back, perhaps, to the old prophets.

After giving some interesting statistics concerning the vitality of the Jews (their "expectation of life," as the American Census calls it), the author closes with an inquiry into the nature and causes of Jewish solidarity. He points out that, instead of massing themselves, they are moving to all quarters of the globe, and that this fact is favorable to their incorporation into the various nationalities of the earth. It is impossible, he says, that they should try to separate the nations. The majority of them have no desire to found a separate Jewish nation in Palestine—their interest is with the nations in the midst of whom they live—their religion is identical with Christianity in its moral and religious principles—they are not revolutionary (in the popular acceptation of that term), but conservative even when progressive.

The book is well fitted to be an antidote to such erratic productions as Drumont's "La France Juive," which would have us believe that all the political and moral decadence in France is the work of the Jews. Leroy-Beaulieu looks at his Jewish fellow-man as a human being, with the weaknesses and possibilities of other men; it might

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be added that, as he has been long oppressed, he deserves special sympathy.

It is pleasant to be able to say (remembering what sad work was made of Renan's "Histoire du Peuple d'Israel") that the English translation is very good—faithful and idiomatic.

C. H. Toy.

Harvard Divinity School.

The Spirit of Judaism. By Josephine Lazarus. New York: Dodd, Meade & Co.

This is a very striking and very pathetic book. If all Jews possessed the spirit of Josephine Lazarus, Jew-baiting would quickly come to an end. But then it would also happen that Judaism itself would soon come to an end. This book is the unconscious expression of the anguish of a soul which is bound in hereditary bonds from which its better sense desires freedom. She realizes in part the unfortunate position in which the better spirits of that strange, contradictory race find themselves. She struggles to get free, and she urges upon her people to free themselves from the bonds which they have forged for themselves and which they hug to their hearts.

"We cannot expect to become citizens of the world while we remain citizens of Judaism, bound by local ties, local prejudices and interests, so long as we insist upon perpetuating a race that separates us from the people around us."

This is the key to the whole situation. It seems strange that the people of this race, gifted as they are with such keenness of insight, should be so blind to the reason of the world's dislike, which they at the same time feel so keenly. The persecution of Jews has long ceased to be, if indeed it ever was, a religious matter. Whether they be knouted in Russia or robbed in Germany or avoided in the United States, the reason is always the same. It is not due to their religion. In point of fact, their religion is their redeeming quality. Christendom would certainly not soon forget what it owes to the Jews. It receives its religion of a righteous God corresponding to righteousness in man from Moses and the prophets, and is deeply grateful. But it refuses to take along with it the spirit of caste and exclusiveness which has characterized the Jew. If any family or tribe within Christendom were to adopt to-day the principle of exclusiveness which marks this race and to carry the principle into practice, fifty years would be sufficient to make that family the laughing-stock of the world. Suppose the head of some brilliant, wise, and rich family in New York were to gather his brothers

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and sisters and children about him, and to make a compact with them that from this time forward they would neither eat, drink, pray, nor marry with any man or woman except those of their own blood, and should carry this compact into actual practice, how long would it take for them to become first isolated from all mankind, and then detested by all mankind? This is what the Jew has done; he has done it in the name of his religion. The author of this book is clear-sighted enough to see and bold enough to say that her religion cannot rightly be invoked in benediction upon such a course of action.

"Let us not be deceived. We cannot save our Judaism, not in narrow, not in partial sense even, unless we loose it by emerging and doing to it that which will make it no longer Judaism; in other words, by entering in to the larger spiritual life which makes no conditions, no restrictions necessary, draws no boundary line, no arbitrary and external limitations of race and creed, sets up no barrier between man and man, between man and God."

This fairly states the spirit of Josephine Lazarus. We wish we could believe it was the spirit of Judaism.

S. D. McConnell.

Philadelphia.

An Introduction to Herbart's Science and Practice of Education. By Henry M. and Emmie Felkin. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

Some three years ago we had the pleasure of welcoming Mr. and Mrs. Felkin's translation of Herbart's "Allgemeine Pädagogik," and we then expressed the opinion that the study of Herbart's theory of education would be of the utmost help to English-speaking teachers. Since that time a knowledge of Herbartian principles has spread. In America there is a flourishing Herbart Club, to the members of which we are already indebted for the translation of such valuable works as Lange's "Apperception" and Ufer's "Introduction to Herbart," and even in England one occasionally meets a teacher who has heard of Herbart. The "Science of Education" has, however, apparently not met with the success its merits deserved. Nor is this to be wondered at. The book is not an easy one, its arrangement is not very methodical, and its modes of thought and expression are largely foreign to the English teacher. The translators of that work have, therefore, written a brief exposition of the foundation and development of the Herbartian system, as an introduction to the study of Her

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bart himself. The aim of the book is, consequently, limited. It rarely attempts criticism, and does not always distinguish between the essential and the unessential. At the same time its utility is not that of a mere preparation for the study of another work; it contains a lucid and fairly complete statement of the general character of Herbartian pedagogics.

After a brief introduction dealing with the Spread of Herbartian principles, follow short but clear outlines of Herbart's psychology and ethics. And it is here, chiefly, that the failure to distinguish the essential from the accidental strikes us. We have a statement —too brief to be of much aid to the non-philosophical reader—of Herbart's metaphysical conception of the nature of the soul. But this has absolutely no bearing on the pedagogical principles to which the psychology is an introduction. Whether Herbart was right in his idea that "the souls of all human beings are alike in substance," and have "originally no contents," need not be decided by the teacher, for, as our author tells us, "the teacher has to do solely with the union of body and soul, and he finds, at the stage when he comes in contact with it, certain endowments already present" (p. 16). As to Herbart's psychology in general it may be remarked that though his thorough-going mechanism cannot be considered as a satisfactory account of soul-life, yet such a psychological mechanism is a permissible mode of describing one aspect of that life, and that the aspect which has a direct bearing on pedagogics. For it is the task of the teacher to select and arrange the material from which the soul organizes its content. The account of feelings, desires, and will, and their connection with each other, incomplete as it seems to us from the psychological stand-point, is yet well adapted to pedagogical application. For the teacher this is sufficient—that the will springs from desire, and that we desire only that we know. Similar remarks apply to Herbart's ethics. We may not accept the "five moral principles" intuitively known as a satisfactory theoretical basis of the science; we may not grant the universality of such intuitive judgments; but this has little bearing on the pedagogical application. The Herbartians practically find the child's morality in the fulfilment of the duties of his station; they build upon the accepted morality of the day.

After this theoretical introduction we have an exposition of the Herbartian "Practical Pedagogy." Here the treatment of interest and of method (sections 1 and 2) is the most valuable portion. In

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sections 3 to 5 we have a discussion of Ziller's "concentration" theory. It is expounded in section 3, illustrated in section 5, and criticised by Voigt in section 4. It would add to clearness, we think, were section 5 made to precede section 4. Into the merits of this controversy we cannot enter. Ziller's scheme does not seem to us of the essence of Herbartianism, and it does seem mechanical in the extreme, and neglectful of the art of school experience of the child.

The fourth chapter deals with Government and Discipline. We do not think our authors have succeeded as well here as in the preceding chapter. Their exposition is very brief, and not very thorough. Perhaps this is owing to the fact that the treatment of this subject was the most intelligible portion of the work to which this is primarily an introduction. The book closes with a short account of the relation of Herbart's system to that of Pestalozzi. In conclusion we would cordially recommend its perusal to all teachers who desire something better than blind empiricism as a basis for their work.

J. WELTON.

YORKSHIRE COLLEGE, LEEDS.

THIER ETHIK. DARSTELLUNG DER SITTLICHEN U. RECHTLICHEN BEZIEHUNGEN ZWISCHEN MENSCH U. THIER. Preischrift von Ignatz Bregenzer. Bamberg: C. C. Buchner, 1894. Pp. x., 422.

Nearly all possible relations that can exist between the world of man on the one side and that of the animals on the other, are considered in a most thorough and interesting manner by Bregenzer, in his "Animal Ethics." The book is provided with abundant references to the literature of the subject, and shows that the author's knowledge is comprehensive and covers the whole field under consideration. It has the advantage over similar books of being extremely interesting and instructive, and at the same time absolutely free from sentimental declamation.

The matter falls into two parts: one, ethnologico-historical, the other systematic, of which the latter is by far the more important on account of its distinct statement of the author's own views. But in the first part he often finds occasion to bring out his fundamental stand-point. Yes, Bregenzer designates the ethnological part as what is (comparatively) new and of central moment in his investigation, since it enables him to prove inductively that the popular ideas concerning the relation of man to animals are, after all,

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at the root of philosophical theories. Accordingly, the author considers, first of all, the way in which animals have been regarded by religion (both in its lower and higher forms), and in ordinary life and custom, and in law; and, lastly, the history of scientific animal ethics. It is an uncommonly rich lot of material which is here accumulated and analyzed. Animal worship, totemism, animal sacrifice, all forms of sympathy and antipathy to animals, the position of animals in art and in law, are explained. In the beginning, men were under the influence of the fear of animals, whence arose animal worship. From the taming of domestic animals arose love for them, and consequently law for animals. Parallel with this love contempt also showed itself. Only out of an increasing development of humanity can a really just animal ethics shape itself.

The development of scientific animal ethics corresponds with the development of the people's relations to animals; first comes the primitive animistic speculation corresponding to animal worship; monism and the love for animals coincide; contempt for animals corresponds with the dualistic and anthropocentric views of the mediæval church. Modern animal ethics is contemporaneous with modern humanity.

Bregenzer is a strict monist, a Darwinian, and recognizes in animism the starting-point of religious development. From the rich inductive material offered by the first part of his book, he deduces two important laws for ethics. The one is, that the life of feeling and impulse always forms the starting-point and centre of *ethos*. The second, that the older, primitive, feeling is individualistic (fear), to which the social-ethical feeling (love) succeeds, and out of which it is developed.

The second, systematic part gives us the author's views concerning the fundamental questions of ethics, and here, too, one can thoroughly adopt his point of view, not only as to questions of ethics in general, but in particular as to duty towards the animal world. We have not here the views of a confused, sentimental vegetarian, for whom every injury of an animal, even for the best purposes, is "murder," but with a warm-hearted, serious, and thoughtful man, who is full of love for the animal world and yet leaves mankind its rights. Here we come to the concluding vital point of animal ethics—animal law or right (Recht.). Is there a common right (Recht) between men and animals? Is the relation of mankind to the animal world one of kindly feeling merely or one of right? Bregenzer here stands in opposition to most of

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the jurists of to-day. He says: binding force over men's actions, and hence practical significance, can be ascribed not to any divine or philosophic right, but only to a right that is human, positive, created and recognized by ourselves, and therefore enforceable. But a general, international establishment of right by means of law or contract is with the animal world an impossibility, and this the author himself recognizes. The whole matter really turns upon the question, What right has the state to limit the liberty of the individual by laws for the protection of animals? Bregenzer says, animals have a right to protection. The ground of this protection is not humanity's interests, but directly the interests of the animals themselves. The answer as to which position is correct,—Bregenzer or our jurisprudence which will not agree to this,—depends very much upon what is understood by "right." If one takes this conception in the sense given it by jurists, one cannot easily allow that a cat, for example, has the right to demand that it shall not be tormented. If one, however, takes the conception in a wider and more comprehensive sense as justice, and also takes the company of those subject to right in a wider sense, as including animals, then we can indeed say: in the kingdom of nature all living things have an equal right to existence, man no more than any other being. Such an assertion has a deep *moral* truth. But "right" signifies here something broader than is ordinarily understood by it. In tracing out the consequences of this view, Bregenzer does not go far in other respects; he only asks that our laws for the protection of animals be made stricter.

Bregenzer's book may be heartily recommended to all who interest themselves in the animal world, to all who have a warm heart for our fellow-occupants of the earth who are not human; every student of ethics will find much stimulus in it.

I. HIMMELBAUR.

VIENNA.

RECENT FRENCH PHILOSOPHICAL AND ETHICAL WRITINGS.

THE French philosophical writings which have been received during the year 1895, a complete list of which is given below, can be classified in several groups, only one of which is directly concerned with Ethics.

At the outset we can set aside books on Metaphysics and Philosophy, such as "La Théorie de l'Ondulation universelle," by Basile Conta, who takes up the doctrine of the "First Principles" of

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Herbert Spencer, modifying its form rather than its substance, and which, though written in French, is the work of a Roumanian statesman and philosopher; likewise "Le Monde extérieur," by Dewys Cochin, who, distinguishing the sensible or vulgar idea from the scientific idea of the external world, recognizes the relativity and subjectivity of the former, but tries to demonstrate that the latter has objective importance and absolute value. Finally, we have "L'Histoire de la Philosophie atomistique," by Mabilleau, in which the atomistic theory is studied from its first origins to the present day, from the double point of view of speculative philosophy and scientific research.

A second group includes books on Psychology and Physiological Psychology, such as "Les Elements de Psychologie humaine," by the Belgian Professor Van Biervliet, who attempts to harmonize the fundamental dogma of spiritualism with the actual facts of the physiology of the nervous system. The "Les Etats intellectuels dans la Mélancholie," by George Dumas, is the work of a young physician, who discusses an interesting problem in mental pathology according to the method of Ribot. "Tempérament et Caractère," by A. Fouillée, contains some ingenious views on the science of Etiology, which is but slightly advanced as yet. And, lastly, we mention "L'Abstraction et son rôle dans l'Education intellectuelle," by Queyrat, an excellent monograph treating of one of the most important operations of the human mind, according to the method of Ribot, but necessarily more psychologically than physiologically.

In a third group bordering on the two preceding ones, we place the treatises on occult Psychology and Metaphysics, such as "L'Extériorisation de la Sensibilité," by M. de Rochas, which brings to light new experiences that are very curious and extremely difficult to explain in the present state of our scientific knowledge. There is also the French translation of the book by Aksakof, "Animisme et Spiritisme," an answer to the book of Hartmann on "Spiritisme," which attempts to prove the truth of the spiritistic hypothesis as being the only one capable of explaining a certain class of phenomena. There still remain books on Ethics and Sociology to be noticed. Some are historical, as "L'Amitié antique," by Dugas, in which the Socratic and Platonic theories of love are very conscientiously studied in their relation to ancient manners and their influence on the entire ethical philosophy of antiquity; or such a book as "St. Ambroise et la Morale Chrétienne," by

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Thamin, who demonstrates how the doctrine of "De Officiis" of Cicero has been transformed while passing into the treatise of St. Ambrose, which bears the same title. This author also takes the opportunity in his book of comparing the three great systems of morality that seem to obtain as yet among men,—pagan morality, Christian morality, and the modern morality. Dogmatic treatises on Ethics are represented by "Obligation morale et Idéalisme," by Lefèvre, who, not without subtlety, works out the theory that moral obligation and idealism (in the metaphysical sense) are inseparable, so that Idealism alone can serve to justify moral obligation as well as suffice to prove it; "La Logique sociale," by Tarde, a work swarming with ideas, but as a whole hard to grasp, and, finally, "La Cité moderne," by Izoulet, which has had a great "succès de presse" in our country, owing, doubtless, to the brilliant and eloquent style of its author, who is a great admirer of Carlyle, but who does little more than develop the well-worn assimilation of human society with the animal organism.

To all these we must add the second year's issue of the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, in which, however, the contributions on metaphysics continue to outnumber those on Ethics, and among the latter we can find but one searching article, that by G. Belot, on "L'Utilitarisme et ses nouveaux critiques." The article by J. Weber, entitled "Une Étude réaliste de l'Acte et ses conséquences morales," appears to us indeed a purely metaphysical contribution. Among the essays on sociology we notice particularly "Le problème de la Sociologie," by G. Simmel, "l'Imitation et la Logique sociale," by R. Berthelot, and "La Définition du Socialisme," by F. Lapie.

PARIS. E. BOIRAC.

NEW BOOKS.

[N.B.—A number of important reviews and additional announcements of new books were crowded out and will appear in the next issue.—MAN. ED.]

THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY. An Analysis of the Phenomena of Association and of Social Organization. By Professor Franklin H. Giddings, M.A. (Columbia University Press.) New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1896.

SOCIAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES. Addresses to Ethical Societies. (*The Ethical Library.*) By Leslie Stephen. In two volumes. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896.

METHODS OF SOCIAL REFORM: Essays, Critical and Constructive. By Thomas Mackay. London; John Murray, 1896.

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EDUCATION. An Introduction to its Principles and their Psychological Foundations. By H. Holman, M.A. London: Isbister & Co., 1896.

ANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY. By G. F. Stout, M.A. In two volumes. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896.

STUDIES IN THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC. By J. Ellis McTaggart, M.A. Cambridge: University Press, 1896.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BELIEF; or, Law in Christian Theology. By the Duke of Argyll, K.G., K.T. London: John Murray, 1896.

DEMOCRACY AND LIBERTY. By W. E. H. Lecky. Two volumes. London: Longmans & Co., 1896.

THE POOR IN GREAT CITIES. Their Problems, and What is Doing to Solve Them. By Robert A. Woods (and other writers). London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1896.

THE PATH OF PROGRESS. Being a Reply to "Merrie England." (A Pamphlet.) By W. D. MacGregor. London: John Heywood, 1896.

CHILDREN'S SERVICES, with Hymns and Songs; to which is added ETHICS FOR THE YOUNG. By W. L. Sheldon. Edited by the Rev. A. W. Oxford, M.A. Third Edition. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1894.

GRUNDZUGE DER WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN UND TECHNISCHEN ETHIK. Von Dr. Fred Bon. Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann, 1896.

ORGANISME ET SOCIÉTÉ. Par R. Worms. Paris: V. Girard & E. Brière, 1896.

VOLTAIRE ET LE VOLTAIRIANISME. Par Nourrisson, Membre de l'Institut. Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1896.

FRANCESCO D'ASSISI E ALCUNI DEI SUCI PIU RECENTI BIOGRAFI. By Raffaele Mariano. Naples: Tipografia Della Regia Universita, 1896.

FRATERNITY. A Monthly Magazine. Edited by Mary A. M. Marks. The Official Organ of the International Society for the Recognition of the Brotherhood of Man. Numbers received for January, February, March, April, and May, 1896. London: H. R. Allenson. [The objects of this society are: "(*a*) To declare the Unity of the Human Race, and to further the Brotherhood of Mankind. (*b*) To influence public opinion in the promotion of Justice and Sympathy between all Races, Classes, Creeds, and Communities. (*c*) To discourage and denounce Race Separation, Race Animosity, and Race Arrogance wheresoever displayed. (*d*) To assert the Interdependence of Nations and their Responsibilities and Reciprocities; and especially to insist upon the duty of the Strong to protect the Weak." Members pledge themselves "to do what in them lies to secure to every member of the human family Freedom, Equal Opportunity, and Brotherly Consideration."]

EDINBURGH SUMMER MEETING, August, 1896. [Programme of Lectures and Classes, including, among others, the following:—*Contemporary Social Evolution*, by Professor Patrick Geddes; *The Relation between Science and Philosophy*, by Professor R. M. Wenley; *The Borderland of Ethics*, by Miss Julia Wedgwood; *La Grandeur du Moment présent*, by M. Paul Desjardins; *Comparative Economics in Europe*, by Victor V. Branford, M.A.; *The Individual and his Revelation*, by Mrs. Boole; *Herbart's Leben und Lehre*, by Dr. Wilhelm Rein; *The Physiology of the Nervous System and the Mechanism of Conduct*, by Louis G. Irvine, M.A., M.B., B.Sc.; *Present Educational Problems*, a Conference.] Outlook Tower, University Hall, Edinburgh.

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